Citation Nr: 1013902 Decision Date: 04/13/10 Archive Date: 04/29/10 DOCKET NO. 07-28 010A ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in San Juan, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Raymond Rivera, Attorney ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD E. Woodward Deutsch, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from September 1967 to April 1969. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from January 2004 and March 2006 rating decisions of a Department of Veteran's Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) that denied the benefits sought on appeal. The Board acknowledges that the March 2006 RO decision effectively characterized the Veteran's claim as one of new and material evidence, which it proceeded to reopen and deny. However, the record reflects that the Veteran filed a timely notice of disagreement with the January 2004 rating decision that initially denied his claim. Thus, the Board has treated this as a claim for service connection, as reflected on the title page of this decision. FINDING OF FACT The evidence of record is at least in equipoise as to whether the Veteran's depressive disorder is related to his service- connected non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability have been met. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Service Connection Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2009). Service connection generally requires evidence of a current disability with a relationship or connection to an injury or disease or some other manifestation of the disability during service. Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Service connection for certain chronic diseases, including psychoses, will be rebuttably presumed if they are manifest to a compensable degree within one year following active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2009). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. Presumptive periods are not intended to limit service connection to diseases so diagnosed when the evidence warrants direct service connection. The presumptive provisions of the statute and VA regulations implementing them are intended as liberalizations applicable when the evidence would not warrant service connection without their aid. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2009). For the showing of chronic disease in service, there must be a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. If chronicity in service is not established, evidence of continuity of symptoms after discharge is required to support the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2009). A disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury shall be service- connected. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (2009). Secondary service connection is permitted based on aggravation; compensation is payable for the degree of aggravation of a non-service- connected disability caused by a service-connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (2009); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). A determination of service connection requires a finding of the existence of a current disability and a determination of a relationship between the disability and an injury or disease incurred in service. Watson v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 309 (1993). Establishing service connection on a secondary basis essentially requires evidence sufficient to show that a current disability exists, and that the current disability was either caused or aggravated by a service-connected disability. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.310 (2009). In determining whether service connection is warranted for any disability, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the Veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 2002); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). The issue on appeal arose as a claim for service connection for PTSD, which the RO denied on the grounds that the Veteran had no documented combat service and that his reported stressors could not be verified. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2009). However, a claim for service connection for PTSD encompasses claims for service connection for all mental disorders. Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009). This decision grants service connection for a different acquired psychiatric disability, namely depressive disorder, which the Board finds is a grant of the claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder. The Veteran asserts that his currently diagnosed psychiatric problems had their onset during his period of active duty in Vietnam. Additionally, the evidence of record shows that the Veteran's depression has been clinically related to his service-connected non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (NHL). The Board is required to consider all theories of service connection entitlement raised either by the claimant or by the evidence of record as part of the non-adversarial administrative adjudication process. Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Thus, in view of the Veteran's contentions and the evidence of record, the Board will consider whether service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability is warranted both on a direct basis and as secondary to NHL. The Veteran's private and VA medical records show that he has been treated for various psychiatric and neurological problems since the 1980s. On a September 2003 VA examination, it was noted that he had been assessed with a psychogenic pain disorder in November 1983. It was further noted that he had been diagnosed with hysterical neurosis by his long-term private treating psychiatrist in March 1986 and with dysthymia by a mental health examiner in May 1989. The Veteran told the September 2003 VA examiner that he attended group therapy and took medication to treat his psychiatric and neurological symptoms. On mental health examination, he displayed a constricted, tearful affect, but no other obvious psychiatric symptoms. Based on the results of the examination, the September 2003 VA examiner concluded that, while the Veteran met the DSM-IV criteria for depressive disorder, not otherwise specified, he was not entitled to a diagnosis of PTSD on account of his lack of in-service stressors. That examiner's opinion served as the basis for the RO's January 2004 denial of the Veteran's PTSD claim. In the course of appealing the RO's decision, the Veteran submitted a August 2004 examination report from his long-term private treating psychiatrist, who determined that the Veteran had a long history of muscular pain, weakness, and neuropathy affecting his upper extremities, which had persisted since service and which caused him severe depression manifested by "obsessive negative thoughts." Based on those clinical findings, the private psychiatrist opined that the Veteran's current "mental health condition [was] due to his physical conditions" and that both sets of problems were related to his active service. In a subsequent evaluation report prepared in December 2004, a private neurologist determined that the Veteran displayed symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy due to Agent Orange exposure in Vietnam. The private neurologist also stated that the Veteran's symptoms included pain, discomfort, and numbness throughout his extremities with nuchal (neck) pain. Additionally, the neurologist observed that the Veteran's psychiatric symptoms were consistent with diagnoses of PTSD and dysthymia. The record thereafter shows that in November 2007, the Veteran was diagnosed with NHL. In April 2008, he was afforded a VA examination in which he was found to display NHL symptoms that included generalized pain, weakness, and fatigue in his neck and extremities, and other neurological problems manifested by dizziness and difficulties with balance. The April 2008 VA examiner concluded that the Veteran's NHL was most likely due to his exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam. He was subsequently granted service connection for NHL. An evaluation of the probative value of medical opinion evidence is based on the medical expert's personal examination of the patient, the examiner's knowledge and skill in analyzing the data, and the medical conclusion reached. The credibility and weight to be attached to such opinions are within the province of the Board as adjudicators. Greater weight may be placed on one physician's opinion over another depending on factors such as reasoning employed by the physicians and whether or not and the extent to which they reviewed prior clinical records and other evidence. Guerrieri v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 467 (1993). Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36 (1994). The probative value of a medical opinion is generally based on the scope of the examination or review, and the relative merits of the expert's qualifications and analytical findings, and the probative weight of a medical opinion may be reduced if the examiner fails to explain the basis for an opinion. Sklar v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 140 (1993). Here, the Board finds that the August and December 2004 opinions expressed by the Veteran's private psychiatrist and private neurologist, relating the Veteran's depression to his physical symptoms of neck and muscle pain, weakness, and peripheral neuropathy, are highly probative and persuasive, as is the April 2008 VA examiner's subsequent finding that those physical symptoms supported a diagnosis of NHL. Those opinions are based on the private psychiatrist's and private neurologist's long-term treatment of the Veteran and on the VA examiner's clinical examination and review of the claims folder. Moreover, those opinions are supported by a rationale and reflect a knowledge of both the Veteran's medical history and his exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam. Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444 (2000) (factors for assessing the probative value of a medical opinion include the physician's access to the claims folder and the Veteran's history, and the thoroughness and detail of the opinion). Furthermore, those opinions are consistent with the other lay and clinical evidence and there are no contrary medical findings of record. The Board recognizes that, at the time that the private psychiatrist and neurologist rendered their opinions, the Veteran was not service connected for NHL and had not yet been formally diagnosed with that disease. Nevertheless, because his two long-term private treating providers both associated his depression with multiple physical symptoms, which later were found on clinical examination to support a diagnosis of NHL, the Board concludes that the evidence is at least in equipoise regarding whether the Veteran's depression is related to that service-connected disability. In light of the probative medical opinion evidence showing a nexus between the Veteran's depression and his service- connected NHL, and in the absence of any competent evidence to the contrary, the Board concludes that the balance of positive and negative evidence is at the very least in relative equipoise. Reasonable doubt is therefore resolved in favor of the Veteran to find that his depressive disorder is related to his service-connected NHL. 38 U.S.C.A. 5107 (b) (West 2002); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Accordingly, the Board finds that service connection for depressive disorder is warranted. ORDER Service connection for an depressive disorder is granted. ____________________________________________ Harvey P. Roberts Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs