Citation Nr: 1014569 Decision Date: 04/16/10 Archive Date: 04/29/10 DOCKET NO. 08-32 553 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Milwaukee, Wisconsin THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to an increased evaluation for major depressive disorder, previously diagnosed as dysthymic disorder, evaluated as 30 percent disabling, prior to April 7, 2008. 2. Entitlement to an increased evaluation for major depressive disorder, previously diagnosed as dysthymic disorder, evaluated as 70 percent disabling, from April 7, 2008. 3. Entitlement to a total disability rating for compensation purposes based on individual unemployability (TDIU) due to service-connected disability. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Wisconsin Department of Veterans Affairs ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD K. Marenna, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The appellant had active service from November 1978 to December 1980. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a January 2008 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, which granted an increased evaluation of 30 percent, effective May 29, 2007. A September 2008 rating decision of the RO in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, granted an increased rating of 70 percent, effective April 7, 2008. The appeal for entitlement to TDIU is REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. VA will notify the appellant if further action is required. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Prior to April 7, 2008, the appellant's major depressive disorder, previously diagnosed as dysthymic disorder, was productive of complaints of depression, anxiety, and low energy, the appellant had normal speech and a logical thought process, was fully oriented, had no problems with social judgment, denied suicidal ideation, and was assigned a GAF score of 64 upon VA psychological examination. 2. From April 7, 2008, the evidence of record demonstrates severe major depressive disorder symptoms, including anxiety, depression, irritability, problems concentrating and sleeping, and suicidal ideation, but his symptoms do not reveal total occupational and social impairment with impairment in thought or communication, persistent delusions or hallucinations, grossly inappropriate behavior, persistent danger of hurting others, intermittent inability to perform the activities of daily living, disorientation to time or place, or memory loss for names of close relatives. The appellant was assigned a GAF score of 48 upon VA psychological examination. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Prior to April 7, 2008, the criteria for entitlement to an evaluation in excess of 30 percent for major depressive disorder, previously diagnosed as dysthymic disorder, have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 5103A, 5107(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 4.130, Diagnostic Codes 9433, 9434 (2009). 2. From April 7, 2008, the criteria for entitlement to an evaluation in excess of 70 percent for major depressive disorder, previously diagnosed as dysthymic disorder, have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 5103A, 5107(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 4.130, Diagnostic Codes 9433, 9434 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Board has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence in the appellant's claims folder. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, the evidence submitted by the appellant or on his behalf. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). The analysis below focuses on the most salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claim. The appellant must not assume that the Board has overlooked pieces of evidence that are not explicitly discussed herein. See Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122 (2000) (the law requires only that the Board address its reasons for rejecting evidence favorable to the appellant). The Board must assess the credibility and weight of all evidence, including the medical evidence, to determine its probative value, accounting for evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and providing reasons for rejecting any evidence favorable to the claimant. Equal weight is not accorded to each piece of evidence contained in the record; every item of evidence does not have the same probative value. When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the appellant prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against a claim, in which case, the claim is denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA) VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions as to the appellant's claim for an increased evaluation for major depressive disorder. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326 (2009). Under the VCAA, when VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, it is required to notify the claimant and his representative, if any, of any information and medical or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2009). The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Prior to initial adjudication of the appellant's increased rating claim, a letter dated in August 2007 fully satisfied the duty to notify provisions for the elements two and three. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); Quartuccio, at 187. The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that to satisfy the first Quartuccio element for an increased-compensation claim, section 5103(a) compliant notice must meet a four part test laid out in Vazquez-Flores v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 37 (2008). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) overruled the Vazquez-Flores in part, striking claimant-tailored and "daily life" notice elements. Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Thus modified, VA must notify the claimant that, 1) to substantiate a claim, the claimant must provide, or ask VA to obtain, medical or lay evidence demonstrating a worsening or increase in severity of the disability, 2) a disability rating will be determined by applying relevant Diagnostic Codes, which typically provide for a range in severity of a particular disability from noncompensable to as much as 100 percent (depending on the disability involved), based on the nature of the symptoms of the condition for which disability compensation is being sought, their severity and duration, and their impact upon employment, and 3) provide examples of the types of medical and lay evidence that the claimant may submit (or ask VA to obtain) that are relevant to establishing entitlement to increased compensation. Vazquez-Flores, 22 Vet.App. at 43, overruled in part sub. nom. Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The RO provided Vazquez-Flores-compliant VCAA notice in June 2008. Although this letter was not sent prior to initial adjudication of the appellant's claim, this was not prejudicial to him, since he was provided time to respond with additional argument and evidence, and the claim was readjudicated and a statement of the case (SOC) was provided to the appellant in September 2008. See Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370 (2006). In light of the foregoing, the Board finds that the requirements of Vazquez-Flores are met. The Board, therefore, finds that the requirements of Quartuccio are met and that the VA has discharged its duty to notify. See Quartuccio, supra. The Board also concludes VA's duty to assist has been satisfied. The appellant's service treatment records and VA medical records are in the file. The appellant has at no time referenced outstanding records that he wanted VA to obtain or that he felt were relevant to the claims. The duty to assist includes, when appropriate, the duty to conduct a thorough and contemporaneous examination of the appellant. Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 121 (1991). In addition, where the evidence of record does not reflect the current state of the appellant's disability, a VA examination must be conducted. Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589 (1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.327(a) (2009). The RO provided the appellant with appropriate VA examinations in September 2008 and October 2007. The appellant has not reported receiving any recent treatment specifically for this condition (other than at VA and the private treatment mentioned above, records of which are in the file), and there are no records suggesting an increase in disability has occurred as compared to the prior VA examination findings. There is no objective evidence indicating that there has been a material change in the severity of the appellant's service-connected disorder since he was last examined. 38 C.F.R. § 3.327(a). The duty to assist does not require that a claim be remanded solely because of the passage of time since an otherwise adequate VA examination was conducted. VAOPGCPREC 11-95. The September 2008 and October 2007 VA examination reports are thorough and supported by VA treatment records. The examinations in this case are adequate upon which to base a decision. As there is no indication that any failure on the part of VA to provide additional notice or assistance reasonably affects the outcome of this case, the Board finds that any such failure is harmless. See Newhouse v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2007). II. Increased Evaluation A September 1990 Board decision granted service connection for an adjustment disorder with depression. A January 1991 rating decision granted an initial noncompensable (zero percent) evaluation, effective June 13, 1989, and an April 1992 rating decision recharacterized the service-connected disability as dysthymic disorder, and granted a 30 percent rating, effective June 13, 1989. A June 1993 rating decision reduced the evaluation from 30 percent to 10 percent, effective September 1, 1993. To file an appeal, an appellant must file a notice of disagreement within one year of the date that notice of the rating decision was provided to the claimant. 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(b) (2009). The appellant did not appeal the June 2003 rating decision within one year of receiving notice of the decision. Thus, the decision became final. The appellant filed a claim for an increased evaluation in August 2007. As noted above, the January 2008 rating decision on appeal granted an increased evaluation of 30 percent for dysthymic disorder, effective May 29, 2007. A September 2008 rating decision granted an evaluation of 70 percent for major depressive disorder, previously characterized as dysthymic disorder, effective April 7, 2008. The Court has held that a "decision awarding a higher rating, but less than the maximum available benefit . . . does not . . . abrogate the pending appeal . . . ." AB v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 35, 38 (1993). Therefore, the appellant's appeal of the assigned disability evaluation for major depressive disorder continues. For the reasons that follow, the Board concludes that an increased evaluation is not warranted for either rating period on appeal. Disability evaluations are determined by comparing a veteran's present symptomatology with the criteria set forth in the Schedule for Rating Disabilities, which is based on average impairment in earning capacity. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1155 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. 4.1 (2009). When a question arises as to which of two ratings applies under a particular diagnostic code, the higher evaluation is assigned if the disability more closely approximates the criteria for the higher rating. Otherwise, the lower rating will be assigned. 38 C.F.R. § 4.7. Any reasonable doubt regarding the degree of disability will be resolved in favor of the appellant. 38 C.F.R. § 4.3. A disability rating may require re-evaluation in accordance with changes in a veteran's condition. Thus, it is essential in determining the level of current impairment that the disability is considered in the context of the entire recorded history. 38 C.F.R. § 4.1. Nevertheless, where, as here, the appellant is appealing the rating for an already established service-connected condition, the present level of disability is of primary concern. Francisco v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 55, 58 (1994). The Court recently held that "staged" ratings are appropriate for an increased rating claim when the factual findings show distinct time periods where the service-connected disability exhibits symptoms that would warrant different ratings. Hart v. Mansfield, 21 Vet App 505 (2007). Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) is a scale reflecting the psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health illness. See Carpenter v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 240, 242 (1995); see also Richard v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 266, 267 (1996) (citing DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 32 (4th ed. 1994)) (DSM-IV). According to DSM-IV, a GAF score of 61 to 70 indicates the examinee has some mild symptoms or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning, but generally functions pretty well with some meaningful interpersonal relationships. A GAF score of 51 to 60 indicates the examinee has moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. A GAF score of 41 to 50 indicates the examinee has serious symptoms or a serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning. A GAF score of 31 to 40 indicates the examinee has some impairment in reality testing or communication or major impairment in several areas, such as work or school. A GAF score of 21 to 30 indicates that the examinee's behavior is considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations, has serious impairment in communication or judgment, or is unable to function in almost all areas of life. See also QUICK REFERENCE TO THE DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FROM DSM-IV, 46-47 (1994). A. Entitlement to an evaluation in excess of 30 percent, prior to April 7, 2008. Prior to April 7, 2008, the appellant is assigned a 30 percent evaluation for his service-connected major depressive disorder, previously diagnosed as dysthymic disorder, pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, Diagnostic Codes 9433, 9434 (2009). Under that diagnostic code section, a 30 percent evaluation is warranted where the evidence demonstrates occupational and social impairment with occasional decrease in work efficiency and intermittent periods of inability to perform occupational tasks (although generally functioning satisfactorily, with routine behavior, self-care, and conversation normal), due to such symptoms as: depressed mood, anxiety, suspiciousness, panic attacks (weekly or less often), chronic sleep impairment, and mild memory loss (such as forgetting names, directions, recent events). In order to achieve the next-higher 50 percent rating under Diagnostic Codes 9433 and 9434, the evidence must show occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity due to such symptoms as: flattened affect; circumstantial, circumlocutory, or stereotyped speech; panic attacks more than once a week; difficulty in understanding complex commands; impairment of short- and long-term memory (e.g., retention of only highly learned material, forgetting to complete tasks); impaired judgment; impaired abstract thinking; disturbances of motivation and mood; and difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships. The Board has reviewed the evidence of record and finds that it does not support an evaluation in excess of 30 percent prior to April 7, 2008. The October 2007 VA examination report did not reflect that the appellant had circumstantial, circumlocutory, or stereotyped speech. A May 2007 VA treatment record reflects that the appellant's speech was clear, relevant and goal directed. The October 2007 VA examination report reflects that the appellant had a generally sad, dejected demeanor. There is no indication the appellant experienced panic attacks in any of the evidence dated prior to April 7, 2008. The October 2007 VA examination report reflects that a cognitive status evaluation indicated average levels of memory and concentration. The appellant performed serials sevens adequately, and could recall three simple items after five minutes, how he spent last Christmas, and digit spans four places forward and two backward. There were no problems with primary social judgment. The October 2007 VA examination report indicated there was no evidence of suicidal or homicidal intent. A March 2008 VA treatment record reflects that the appellant denied having suicidal thoughts. Regarding social and occupational functioning, the October 2007 VA examiner found there was a mild degree of impact on social and occupational functioning. His marital situation was strained, and he reported having no close friends or interactions with any of his seven siblings. However, the appellant was gainfully employed at the time of the October 2007 VA examination. In his January 2008 notice of disagreement, the appellant stated that he was fired from his employment for his inability to focus on the job or follow instructions to call in, and for missing too much work. In a September 2007 statement, the appellant reported that he preferred to be alone, and would get angry and push people away. He reported that he asked another driver to cover twenty-five percent of his shifts at work over the last year. The October 2007 VA examiner found the appellant was chronically sad more often than not, was helpless, had low energy and fatigue, and very low self-esteem, but his condition did not appear to rise to the level of a major depressive disorder. The October 2007 VA examination reflects that the appellant had a GAF score of 64, indicating the appellant had some mild symptoms or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning, but generally functioned pretty well with some meaningful interpersonal relationships. The October 2007 VA examiner also found that the appellant's service- connected disability had only a mild degree of impact on social and occupational functioning. The Board finds that the clinical evidence of record regarding the increased rating claim does not show distinct time periods exhibiting symptoms warranting further staged evaluations than as already shown by the record. Hart, 21 Vet. App. at 509-10. The Board finds that the evidence prior to April 7, 2008, shows a disability picture most nearly approximated by the 30 percent rating. The majority of the evidence does not establish symptomatology consistent with the criteria for a 50 percent rating under Diagnostic Codes 9433 and 9434. Indeed, there is no showing of circumstantial, circumlocutory, or stereotyped speech. The appellant was not shown to have panic attacks, difficulty in understanding complex commands, impairment of short-term and long-term memory, impaired judgment, or impaired abstract thinking. Although the appellant had symptoms of dysthymic disorder, including difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships, and flattened affect, the October 2007 VA examiner found the disorder had only a mild degree of impact on social and occupational functioning. Therefore, the Board finds that the evidence prior to April 7, 2008, demonstrates symptoms consistent with no more than the current 30 percent rating. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt rule is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 54-56 (1990). B. Entitlement to an evaluation in excess of 70 percent, from April 7, 2008. Based upon a VA outpatient treatment record, dated on April 7, 2008, the RO found that the appellant's service-connected dysthymic disorder had worsened as major depressive disorder, and increased his rating to 70 percent, effective the date of the VA treatment record. Major depressive disorder is rated by applying the criteria in 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9434 (2009). The VA Schedule rating formula for mental disorders reads in pertinent part that a 70 percent rating is warranted for occupational and social impairment, with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood, due to such symptoms as: suicidal ideation; obsessional rituals which interfere with routine activities; speech intermittently illogical, obscure, or irrelevant; near continuous panic or depression affecting the ability to function independently, appropriately and effectively; impaired impulse control (such as unprovoked irritability with periods of violence); spatial disorientation; neglect of personal appearance and hygiene; difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances (including work or a work like setting); inability to establish and maintain effective relationships. The next-higher rating of 100 percent, the maximum schedular rating, is warranted when the evidence shows total occupational and social impairment, due to such symptoms as: gross impairment in thought processes or communication; persistent delusions or hallucinations; grossly inappropriate behavior; persistent danger of hurting self or others; intermittent inability to perform activities of daily living (including maintenance of minimal personal hygiene); disorientation to time or place; memory loss for names of close relatives, own occupation or own name. The Board has reviewed the evidence of record and finds that it does not support an evaluation in excess of 70 percent at any time from April 7, 2008. The September 2008 VA examination report indicates the appellant did not have total occupational and social impairment. The evidence does not reflect gross impairment in thought processes or communication. The September 2008 VA examination report indicates the appellant's eye contact was good, and his answers to the questions were pertinent, without tangentiality or circumstantiality. The appellant's speech was normal in rate and flow without loose associations. There is no indication the appellant had delusions or hallucinations. The September 2008 VA outpatient treatment record indicates the appellant denied having hallucinations, delusions, and paranoia. The September 2008 VA examination report reflects that the appellant denied having panic attacks. He reported having experiences where he became nervous and anxious for a half hour to an hour at a time. The September 2008 VA examination report does not reflect any grossly inappropriate behavior. There is no evidence that the appellant is a persistent danger to himself or others. The April 2008 VA outpatient treatment record indicates the appellant denied having thoughts about harming others or feeling homicidal. The September 2008 VA examination report reflects that the appellant's wife found him moody, irritable, and very controlling in the home. In a July 2008 statement, the appellant's wife reported that he experienced anger, but did not indicate that he was dangerous. The appellant reported that he had never been physically assaultive with anyone, although he had gotten into a verbal altercation with his wife, which resulted in a disorderly conduct charge. The April 2008 VA outpatient treatment record reflects that the appellant had no thoughts of self-harm and he denied feeling suicidal. The September 2008 VA examination report indicates the appellant had suicidal thoughts. The September 2008 VA examiner noted that the appellant gave a number of responses which suggested significant thinking about suicide. The evidence of record indicates the appellant was able to perform activities of daily living, including maintenance of minimal personal hygiene. The September 2008 VA examiner noted that the appellant was neatly dressed and groomed, other than needing a shave. There is no evidence the appellant experienced disorientation of time or place. The April 2008 VA outpatient treatment record reflects that the appellant was oriented to name, place and date. The September 2008 VA examiner reported that the appellant was alert, oriented , and cooperative throughout the interview. Further, there is no indication the appellant had memory loss for names of close relatives his own occupation, or his own name. The September 2008 VA examination report reflects that the appellant had not noticed any problems with his short-term or long-term memory, but stated that his concentration was poor, and he could not stay focused on a task. The September 2008 VA examination report indicates the appellant had a GAF score of 48, reflecting serious symptoms or a serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning. The April 2008 VA outpatient treatment record reflects that the appellant had a GAF score of 52, indicating moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. The April 2008 VA outpatient treatment record indicates the appellant was fired in January 2008 from his job as a truck driver because of conflicts with the dispatcher. The April 2008 VA outpatient treatment record reflects that the appellant liked to spend free time outdoors, and enjoyed yard work and gardening. The September 2008 VA examination report indicates the appellant spends his time cutting wood in the woods because he can be alone. He reported that there were no activities that he engaged in or enjoyed other than cutting wood. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that the appellant's disability picture, from April 7, 2008, does not most nearly approximate the next-higher 100 percent rating under Diagnostic Codes 9433 and 9434. The evidence does indicate serious major depressive disorder symptoms, including, among others noted above, suicidal ideation, depression affecting the ability to function independently, appropriately and effectively, difficulty concentrating, and an inability to establish and maintain effective relationships. However, the September 2008 VA examination report indicates the appellant was alert, oriented and neatly dressed, and had no problems with his short-term or long-term memory. The appellant did not report having delusions, hallucinations, or panic attacks. The Board finds that the foregoing major depressive disorder symptoms have already been contemplated by the appellant's current 70 percent rating. Moreover, there was no demonstration of gross impairment in thought processes or communication. His reported GAF score of 48 is consistent with no more than serious impairment of social and occupational functioning. The Board finds that the clinical evidence of record regarding the increased rating claim does not show distinct time periods exhibiting symptoms warranting further staged evaluations than as already shown by the record. Hart, 21 Vet. App. at 509-10. Finally, the Board has also considered whether a referral for an extraschedular rating is warranted. See Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 111, 115 (2008). Initially, there must be a comparison between the level of severity and symptomatology of the claimant's service-connected disability with the established criteria found in the rating schedule for that disability. Under the approach prescribed by VA, if the criteria reasonably describe the claimant's disability level and symptomatology, then the claimant's disability picture is contemplated by the rating schedule; therefore, the assigned schedular evaluation is adequate, and no referral is required. See VAOPGCPREC 6-96; see also Fisher v. Principi, 4 Vet. App. 57, 60 (1993) (a threshold finding that the evidence before VA presents such an exceptional disability picture that the available schedular evaluations for that service-connected disability are inadequate is required for extraschedular consideration referral). The schedular evaluation for the appellant's disability is not inadequate. The appellant has not reported significant treatment, hospitalization or symptoms unaccounted for by the ratings schedule. There is no evidence his major depressive disorder has interfered with his employment more than contemplated by the ratings schedule, which provides for occupational and social impairment. As a result, it does not appear that the appellant has an "exceptional or unusual" disability status. He does not have any symptoms from his service-connected disorder that are unusual or are different from those contemplated by the schedular criteria. Therefore, the available schedular evaluations for that service-connected disability are adequate. Referral for extraschedular consideration is not warranted. See VAOPGCPREC 6-96. Further inquiry into extraschedular consideration is moot. See Thun, supra. In conclusion, from April 7, 2008, the currently assigned 70 percent rating for major depressive disorder appropriately reflects the appellant's disability picture and a higher evaluation is not warranted. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt rule is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 54-56 (1990). ORDER Entitlement to an increased evaluation for major depressive disorder, previously diagnosed as dysthymic disorder, evaluated as 30 percent disabling, prior to April 7, 2008, is denied. Entitlement to an increased evaluation for major depressive disorder, previously diagnosed as dysthymic disorder, evaluated as 70 percent disabling, from April 7, 2008, is denied. REMAND Regarding the issue of entitlement to TDIU, the Board finds this issue needs to be remanded for issuance of a statement of the case (SOC). In his January 2008 notice of disagreement, the appellant indicated he had difficulty finding work due to his service-connected disability. The RO construed the January 2008 statement as a claim for entitlement to TDIU. An August 2008 rating decision denied the appellant's claim for entitlement to TDIU. In his October 2008 substantive appeal for his increased evaluation claims, the appellant indicated he was not able to obtain employment due to his service-connected disability. He stated that employers were not willing to accommodate his needs and his condition made him incapable of re-training. As the statement expresses disagreement with the RO's determination that he was not eligible for entitlement to TDIU, the October 2008 statement can be construed as a notice of disagreement with regard to the August 2008 rating decision. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (2009). The Board also notes that the Court recently held that a request for TDIU is not a separate claim for benefits, but rather involves an attempt to obtain an appropriate rating for a disability. Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447, 453 (2009). If the claimant or the record reasonably raises the question of whether the appellant is unemployable due to the disability for which an increased rating is sought, then whether TDIU is warranted as a result of that disability is part and parcel to that claim. Id. at 455. The record does not reflect that a SOC has been issued in response to the appellant's notice of disagreement pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 19.26 regarding the claim for entitlement to TDIU. In this situation, the Court has indicated that the proper action is to remand the issue to the RO for appropriate action. See Manlincon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 238, 240-41 (1999) ("Thus, the next step was for the RO to issue an SOC on the denial of the . . . claim, and the Board should have remanded that issue to the RO, not referred it there, for issuance of that SOC."). As such, the Board finds that this issue should be remanded for the issuance of a SOC by the RO. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: Provide the appellant with a statement of the case as to the issue of entitlement to TDIU. The appellant should be informed that he must file a timely and adequate substantive appeal in order to perfect an appeal of that issue to the Board. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.200, 20.202, and 20.302(b). If a timely substantive appeal is not filed, the claim should not be certified to the Board. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2009). ____________________________________________ U.R. POWELL Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs