Citation Nr: 1014606 Decision Date: 04/16/10 Archive Date: 04/29/10 DOCKET NO. 04-28 201 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Reno, Nevada THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder. 2. Entitlement to a rating in excess of 20 percent for lumbar strain. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD M. C. Graham, Counsel INTRODUCTION The appellant is a Veteran who served on active duty from July 1973 to November 1976. These matters are before the Board of Veterans' Appeal (Board) on appeal from an August 2003 rating decision by the Cleveland RO which denied a claim to reopen the claim of service connection for a psychiatric disorder and denied an increased rating for lumbar strain. In July 2006, a videoconference hearing was held before the undersigned; a transcript of this hearing is associated with the claims file. At the time of the hearing, the veteran's claims file was in the jurisdiction of the Reno RO, as he resided in that state. The claims file then contained an unrevoked power of attorney designating Texas Veterans Commission (TVC) as his representative. TVC does not have a presence in Nevada, where the videoconference hearing was held. The Veteran was advised of this and of alternate representation options in conjunction with his videoconference hearing in July 2006; he waived representation. In December 2006 the Board found that new and material evidence had been presented and reopened the claim of service connection for a psychiatric disorder. That matter (on de novo review) and the matter of the rating for lumbar strain were remanded for additional development. The Veteran now resides in Texas, and is represented by the Disabled American Veterans. The matter of the rating for lumbar strain is being REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. VA will notify the Veteran if any action on his part is required. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran's major depressive disorder was aggravated by his service-connected lumbar strain. 2. A psychotic disorder was not manifest during, or prior to, service; affirmative evidence establishes that the Veteran's psychotic disorder is related to an intercurrent postservice head injury; his personality disorder and mental retardation are not compensable disabilities. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Service connection for major depressive disorder is warranted. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.310 (2009). 2. Service connection for a psychiatric disorder other than major depressive disorder is not warranted. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA) The VCAA, in part, describes VA's duties to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). VCAA notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service connection claim: 1) veteran status; 2) existence of a disability; 3) a connection between the Veteran's service and the disability; 4) degree of disability; and 5) effective date of the disability. Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 484-86 (2006), aff'd, 483 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2007). VCAA notice should be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction decision on a claim. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When VCAA notice is delinquent or erroneous, the "rule of prejudicial error" applies. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7261(b)(2). In the event that a VA notice error occurs regarding the information or evidence necessary to substantiate a claim, VA bears the burden to show that the error was harmless. However, the appellant bears the burden of showing harm when not notified whether the necessary information or evidence is expected to be obtained by VA or provided by the appellant. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009). With respect to the claim for service connection for major depressive disorder, inasmuch as the benefit sought is being granted, there is no reason to belabor the impact of the VCAA on the matter; any notice defect or duty to assist failure is harmless. Regarding the claim of service connection for other psychiatric disorders, the Veteran was advised of VA's duties to notify and assist in the development of his claim. Mayfield, 444 F.3d at 1333. A September 2003 letter explained the evidence necessary to substantiate the claim, the evidence VA was responsible for providing, and the evidence he was responsible for providing. Even though this claim was previously adjudicated as a claim to reopen, the September 2003 letter provided him with proper notice of what evidence is necessary to substantiate a service connection claim on de novo review. The Veteran is not prejudiced by any technical notice deficiency (including in timing) that may have occurred earlier in the process as he has had ample opportunity to respond/supplement the record, including during his hearing before the undersigned. In compliance with Dingess/Hartman, 19 Vet. App. at 473, a September 2008 letter informed the Veteran of disability rating and effective date criteria. The case was thereafter readjudicated in a May 2009 supplemental statement of the case (SSOC). Regarding VA's duty to assist, all appropriate development to obtain the Veteran's service medical records (STRs) has been completed and the record contains Social Security Administration (SSA) records as well as VA and private treatment records. The Veteran has provided testimony as well as numerous written statements in addition to a statement from his wife. In connection with this claim, a VA examination was performed in 2007 and a Veterans Health Administration (VHA) medical advisory opinion was secured in 2009. Taken together, these examinations are adequate for adjudication purposes as the 2007 examiner had the claims files for review, obtained a reported history from the Veteran, and conducted a thorough examination. Any deficiencies in the 2007 examination were remedied by the 2009 medical opinion which was prepared by a Board-certified psychiatrist who had the claims files for review and referred to the evidence of record in his/her opinion. The psychiatrist also provided rationales for his/her conclusions. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007) (finding that VA must provide an examination that is adequate for rating purposes). The Veteran was advised of the opinion, and had opportunity to respond. The Board is satisfied that evidentiary development is complete; VA's duties to notify and assist are met. The Veteran is not prejudiced by the process in this matter. Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). II. Service connection for a psychiatric disorder Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disability was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection may be established on a secondary basis for a disability that is proximately due to, or the result of, or aggravated by a service-connected disease or injury. Establishing service connection on a secondary basis requires: (1) Competent evidence (a medical diagnosis) of a current disability (for which secondary service connection is sought); (2) evidence of a service connected disability; and (3) competent evidence that the current disability was either (a) caused or (aggravated) by the service connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a); see also Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995)(en banc). Effective October 10, 2006, 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 was revised to implement the Allen decision. The revised 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 institutes additional evidentiary requirements that must be satisfied before aggravation may be conceded and service connection granted. In essence, it provides that in an aggravation secondary service connection scenario, there must be medical evidence establishing a baseline level of severity of disability prior to when aggravation occurred, as well as medical evidence showing the level of increased disability after aggravation occurred. As the Veteran's claim was pending prior to the effective date of the revised 38 C.F.R. § 3.310, the Board will consider the version in effect prior to October 10, 2006, as it is more favorable to the claimant. See Kuzma v. Principi, 341 F. 3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003); VAOPGCPREC 7-2003. When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. The Board notes that it has reviewed all of the evidence in the Veteran's claims files, with an emphasis on the evidence relevant to this appeal. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting its decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, every piece of evidence of record. Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that VA must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). Hence, the Board will summarize the relevant evidence as appropriate and the Board's analysis below will focus specifically on what the evidence shows, or fails to show, as to the claim. A. Major Depressive Disorder The evidence shows that the Veteran currently has a major depressive disorder (VA outpatient treatment records and VA examination and medical opinion reflect that major depressive disorder is diagnosed). However, his STRs are silent for any complaints, findings, treatment, or diagnosis of major depressive disorder (STRs reflect 1973 and 1974 reports of medical history denying complaints of depression). Consequently, service connection for major depressive disorder on the basis that such became manifest in service and persisted is not warranted. Furthermore, there is no competent evidence in the record showing or suggesting that the Veteran's major depressive disorder is somehow directly related to his service. The Veteran's theory of entitlement in this matter appears to be that service connection for a mental disability is warranted as he had a nervous breakdown within one year of service (July 2004 substantive appeal). Entitlement to service connection for a psychotic disorder on a presumptive basis is discussed below. The Board must address every theory of entitlement raised by the record. As was noted above, there are three requirements that must be met to substantiate a claim of secondary service connection. Of these, it is shown that he has major depressive disorder, the disability for which service connection is sought, and that he has established service connection for lumbar strain. The remaining question is whether the service-connected lumbar strain disability caused or aggravated his major depressive disorder. The 2007 VA mental disorders examiner noted that the Veteran has a "symptom complex which related to feeling depressed, secondary to chronic pain." The examiner noted that these symptoms began approximately 15 years ago, in 1992. In the medical opinion section of the examination report, the examiner noted that the diagnosed major depressive disorder "was, in part, related to chronic pain that he has been experiencing from back and neck." The 2009 VHA opinion likewise concluded that "based on [the Veteran's] records it is evident that the depressive disorder was not caused by but was aggravated by chronic back pain. Chronic pain is known to cause worsening of depressive symptoms. In my opinion, it is as likely as it is not that the chronic back pain aggravated the depressive disorder." Based upon the foregoing, the Board finds, resolving reasonable doubt in the Veteran's favor, that the evidence establishes that the Veteran's major depressive disorder is secondary to his service-connected lumbar strain and that secondary service connection for major depressive disorder is warranted. B. Other Psychiatric Disorders As is noted above, the Veteran's theory of entitlement in this matter appears to be that service connection for a mental disability is warranted as he had a nervous breakdown within one year after service (July 2004 substantive appeal). The 2009 VHA opinion diagnoses included a chronic psychotic disorder, a personality disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning versus mild mental retardation. Notably, a personality disorder (of itself, without superimposed pathology) and mental retardation are not compensable disabilities under VA regulation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c). Service connection a psychosis may be presumed if evidence shows that it became manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within the first year after service. The presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Evidence which may be considered in rebuttal of service incurrence of a disease listed in § 3.309 will be any evidence of a nature usually accepted as competent to indicate the time of existence or inception of disease, and medical judgment will be exercised in making determinations relative to the effect of intercurrent injury or disease. The expression "affirmative evidence to the contrary" will not be taken to require a conclusive showing, but such showing as would, in sound medical reasoning and in the consideration of all evidence of record, support a conclusion that the disease was not incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(d)(1). The evidence of record establishes that the Veteran served on active duty from July 1973 to November 1976. His STRs for his active service do not show any complaints of, treatment for or diagnosis of a psychotic disorder. A September 1977 record of VA follow-up treatment for psychotic episodes notes that the Veteran fell and hit his head in July 1977 and thereafter had bizarre experiences. It was noted that there was no previous psychiatric history. A March 1978 VA examination report notes that in July 1977 the Veteran "slipped and fell and bumped his head" and that he was "probably knocked unconscious". Immediately afterwards, "[h]is behavior was erratic and bizarre . . . in that he was throwing things, tearing up things, just 'went off' . . . ." He was then "brought under sedation by police" to a private hospital where he remained for 8 days. The Veteran described that since that time he must monitor his social interaction and attention to avoid "flipping out." A December 1991 private physician's report notes that the Veteran had a laceration on his head from an automobile accident in 1981. During a 1994 VA examination, the Veteran reported that he was in a "very serious car accident and sustained severe head trauma." In a December 2001 VA outpatient treatment record, the Veteran related his problems (hearing voices) to a car accident. During the 2007 VA examination, the Veteran reported that his auditory hallucinations preceded military service. He also described a head injury in 1980 "in which his head went through the window of the car" and he lost consciousness. The Veteran reported that he was discharged with no extended inpatient stay and that the only residuals of the incident were balance problems. He reported that his hallucinations did not increase in frequency or intensity after his head injury in 1980. The examiner noted that different providers were unconvinced with the Veteran's veracity and that "in psychiatry we are dependent upon the patient or the evaluee to describe symptoms as there is no objective test to determine the presence of hallucinations." The 2007 examiner opined that "schizophrenia would have likely have been present during his service career and may have been somewhat aggravated during the service, but likely predated the service as well based upon his description of timeframe of illness." The Board-certified psychiatrist who prepared the 2009 VHA opinion concluded that the Veteran's psychiatric symptoms started after his post-service head injury. Based on relatively contemporaneous records which referenced a hospital stay of 8 days, the examiner concluded that "given the duration of the hospitalization the head injury appears to be of significant severity to cause altered behavior and chronic psychosis." He concluded that "the head injury led to the psychotic disorder and altered behavior." The psychiatrist explained the reasoning behind his conclusion: (1) "[c]hronic psychotic disorder due to head injury is a known medical disorder"; (2) there was a temporal relationship between the event (head injury) and the onset of symptoms; (3) the head injury was of sufficient severity; (4) the Veteran had no previous psychotic problems; and (5) there were additional symptoms like headaches and cognitive problems which are typical in a chronic psychotic disorder like the Veteran's. The Board finds that the 2009 VHA opinion constitutes affirmative evidence contrary to the presumption that the Veteran's psychotic disorder is related to service. Rather the affirmative evidence establishes that the Veteran's psychotic disorder is related to the intercurrent head injury he sustained after service. Thus, the presumption is rebutted and service connection under the presumption is not warranted. The claim must still be reviewed to determine whether service connection can be established on a direct basis. Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043-1044 (Fed. Cir. 1994). As such, the Board has considered whether the Veteran is entitled to service connection for a psychotic disorder on a direct basis or based on aggravation. STRs are silent for any complaints of, treatment for or diagnosis of a psychotic disorder. The Veteran has contended that his psychotic disorder preexisted service and the 2007 VA examiner concluded, based upon the Veteran's description of the timeframe of his illness, that schizophrenia was "likely" present in service and "may have been somewhat aggravated" in service. The Board finds the opinion of the 2007 examiner in this regard to have no probative value as it is speculative and is based entirely upon the Veteran's statements which are unsupported by factual evidence, and are deemed not credible. The 2007 examiner indicated that a preexisting psychosis "may have" been aggravated in service. The United States Court of Veterans Appeals (Court) has held that the use of equivocal language such as "may have" makes a statement by an examiner speculative in nature. See Bostain v. West, 11 Vet. App. 124, 127-28, quoting Obert v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 30, 33 (1993) (medical opinion expressed in terms of "may" also implies "may or may not" and is too speculative to establish medical nexus); see also Warren v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 4, 6 (1993) (doctor's statement framed in terms such as "could have been" is not probative); Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 609, 611 (1992) ("may or may not" language by a physician is too speculative). As the 2007 examiner's opinion is speculative, it cannot provide a competent basis to grant the claim based on aggravation. Further, the conclusions of the 2007 examiner are lacking in probative value because, by the examiner's own admission, they are based solely upon the Veteran's reports. The Board is not obligated to accept medical opinions premised on a veteran's recitation of medical history. See Godfrey v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 113 (1995). This is particularly true where, as here, the Veteran's statements are not credible. Significantly, his STRs contain no mention of psychotic complaints, treatment, or diagnosis. Likewise, psychiatric treatment records dated in 1977 note no psychiatric history prior to his post-service head injury. Further, he stated in the 1970s and as late as 2001 that he had the onset of psychotic symptoms, like hearing voices, after post-service head trauma. The Veteran's statements in 2007, that he heard voices prior to service, during service, and that have persisted since service, are self- serving/compensation-driven, and in the absence of a more contemporaneous (i.e. to service) notation of hearing voices or any corroboration, are considered not credible. See Kowalski v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 171 (2005) (citing Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614, 618 (1992) for the proposition that Board may not disregard a medical opinion solely on the rationale that the medical opinion was based on a history given by the veteran); Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229, 233 (1993) (Board is not bound to accept uncorroborated account of veteran's medical history but must assess the credibility and weight of the evidence provided by the veteran rejecting it); see also Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 123 (2007) ("A mere conclusion by a medical doctor is insufficient to allow the Board to make an informed decision as to what weight to assign to the doctor's opinion"). As discussed above, the highly probative and persuasive opinion of the VA psychiatrist in 2009 determined that the Veteran's psychotic disorder was related to a post-service head injury. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence is against finding that a psychotic disorder is directly related to service, or was aggravated by a service-connected disability. For these reasons, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for a psychotic disorder on a direct, secondary, or presumptive basis. Consequently, the benefit of the doubt doctrine does not apply; this claim must be denied. ORDER Service connection for major depressive disorder is granted. Service connection for a psychiatric disorder other than major depressive disorder is denied. REMAND The increased rating claim for lumbar strain was remanded in December 2006 to obtain a VA orthopedic examination to ascertain the current severity of the disability. The Veteran reported for the examination in April 2009, but the examiner noted that the Veteran declined doing many parts of the exam, stating that his back was very painful because he had been without his medication for six days. As a result, the examiner was unable to assess the current severity of the Veteran's service-connected spine disorder. The Veteran has indicated that he is prepared to co-operate if another examination is scheduled. Accordingly, another attempt should be made to schedule the Veteran for a complete VA examination. The Veteran is to be prepared to co-operate when he is examined, as such is critical to his claim. The veteran is advised that under 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(b) when a claimant fails (without good cause) to report for an examination scheduled in conjunction with a claim for increase, the claim shall be denied. The Board notes that a failure to co-operate on examination would be considered equivalent of failure to report. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. Arrange for a VA orthopedic examination to ascertain the current severity of the veteran's lumbar strain. The veteran's claims file must be reviewed by the examiner in conjunction with the examination. The examiner should be provided copies of the current criteria for rating spine disorders and those in effect prior to September 26, 2003, and clinical findings reported must be adequate for rating the disability under both the current and the prior criteria for rating lumbar strain. The examiner should explain the rationale for all opinions given. 2. Then, readjudicate the claim for an increased rating for lumbar strain. If it remains denied, the RO should issue an appropriate SSOC, and afford the Veteran the opportunity to respond. The case should then be returned to the Board. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2009). ______________________________________________ GEORGE R. SENYK Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs