Citation Nr: 1015014 Decision Date: 04/20/10 Archive Date: 04/30/10 DOCKET NO. 05-39 147 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Muskogee, Oklahoma THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability other than posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), claimed as anxiety and depression, to include as secondary to service-connected disability. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESSES AT HEARING ON APPEAL The appellant and J.O. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD A. Shawkey, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from October 1970 to July 1974. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a February 2005 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Muskogee, Oklahoma. In this decision, the RO denied a number of issues including entitlement to service connection for anxiety and depression, claimed as secondary to diabetes mellitus. In a subsequent rating decision, in May 2005, the RO continued to deny claims of entitlement to service connection, to include service connection for anxiety and depression, claimed as secondary to diabetes mellitus. In April 2007, the Veteran testified before the undersigned at a video conference hearing. A transcript of the hearing has been incorporated into the claims file. This matter was previously before the Board in May 2009 at which time the Board remanded the issue of entitlement to service connection for anxiety and depression, claimed as secondary to diabetes mellitus, for additional development. The Board also remanded at that time the issue of entitlement to service connection for PTSD. In regard to this latter issue, the Board found that the Veteran had filed a timely Notice of Disagreement with the RO's denial of this issue and directed the RO to issue the Veteran a statement of the case (SOC). The RO issued the Veteran a SOC in October 2009 at which time the Veteran was informed that to perfect an appeal of the issue of entitlement to service connection for PTSD, he must file a substantive appeal within 60 days of the date of the SOC. As there is no substantive appeal on file, this issue has not been perfected for appellate review and will not be further addressed except to the extent of properly deciding the perfected appeal of entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability (other than PTSD), claimed as anxiety and depression, to include as secondary to service-connected disability See 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.200, 20.202, 20.302. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran's diagnosed depressive disorder was diagnosed many years after service and is not causally or etiologically related to any disease, injury, or incident in service either on a direct basis or due to aggravation; further, such disability was neither caused nor aggravated by a service- connected disability. CONCLUSION OF LAW A psychiatric disability, other than PTSD, diagnosed as depressive disorder, was not incurred in or aggravated by the Veteran's active duty military service and is not proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disability. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.310(a) (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 Initially, the Board notes that, in November 2000, the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000), was signed into law. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, and 5107 (West 2002). To implement the provisions of the law, VA promulgated regulations published at 66 Fed. Reg. 45,620 (Aug. 29, 2001) (codified at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2009)). The VCAA and its implementing regulations include, upon the submission of a substantially complete application for benefits, an enhanced duty on the part of VA to notify a claimant of the information and evidence needed to substantiate a claim, as well as the duty to notify the claimant what evidence will be obtained by whom. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). In addition, they define the obligation of VA with respect to its duty to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c). The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims' (Court's) decision in Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004) held, in part, that a VCAA notice, as required by 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a), must be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable decision on a claim for VA benefits. In the present appeal, the appellant was provided with initial notice of the VCAA in October 2004, which was prior to the February 2005 adverse decision on appeal. Therefore, the express requirements set out by the Court in Pelegrini have been satisfied. VA has fulfilled its duty to notify the appellant in this case. In the October 2004 letter, the RO informed the claimant of the applicable laws and regulations, the evidence needed to substantiate the claim decided herein, and which party was responsible for obtaining the evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159; See also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002); McKnight v. Gober, 131 F.3d 1483, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Board notes that 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 was revised, effective as of May 30, 2008, and several portions of the revisions are pertinent to the claim at issue. See 73 Fed. Reg. 23, 353-23, 356 (April 30, 2008). Notably, the final rule removes the third sentence of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1), which had stated that VA will request the claimant to provide any evidence in the claimant's possession that pertains to the claim. See Pelegrini II, at 120-21. Thus, the Board finds that the notice required by the VCAA and implementing regulations was furnished to the claimant and that no useful purpose would be served by delaying appellate review to send out additional VCAA notice letters. During the pendency of this appeal, the Court issued a decision in the consolidated appeal of Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), which held that the VCAA notice requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of a service connection claim. Those five elements include: 1) veteran status; 2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the veteran's service and the disability; 4) degree of disability; and 5) effective date of the disability. The Court held that upon receipt of an application for a service- connection claim, 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) require VA to review the information and the evidence presented with the claim and to provide the claimant with notice of what information and evidence not previously provided, if any, will assist in substantiating or is necessary to substantiate the elements of the claim as reasonably contemplated by the application. Dingess/Hartman, supra. With respect to the claim on appeal, the Board finds that the appellant is not prejudiced by a decision at this time since this claim is being denied. Therefore, any notice defect, to include disability rating and effective date, is harmless error since no disability rating or effective date will be assigned. The Board also finds that all necessary assistance has been provided to the appellant. The RO has made reasonable and appropriate efforts to assist the appellant in obtaining the evidence necessary to substantiate his claim, including requesting information from the appellant regarding pertinent medical treatment he may have received, and affording him a VA examination during the appeal period. The opinion supplied by the VA examiners in August 2009 was based on the Veteran's medical history and complaints, a thorough examination of the Veteran, and a review of his claims file. The examiners provided sufficient detail for the Board to make a decision in this appeal and the report is deemed adequate. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 311 (2007) (holding that once VA undertakes the effort to provide an examination for a service connection claim, even if not statutorily obligated to do so, it must provide an adequate one or, at a minimum, notify the claimant why one will not or cannot be provided). VA treatment records were obtained, pursuant to the directions in the May 2009 remand. There has been compliance with the remand directives. The appellant was also provided with the opportunity to attend a Board hearing and did attend a Board video conference hearing in April 2007. Under these circumstances, the Board finds that VA has fulfilled its duty to notify and assist the appellant in the claim on appeal and that adjudication of the claim at this juncture, without directing or accomplishing any additional notification and/or development action, poses no risk of prejudice to the appellant. See, e.g., Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 394 (1993). The appeal is now ready to be considered on the merits. II. Facts The Veteran's service treatment records are devoid of any psychiatric complaints or findings, and show that he had had normal clinical psychiatric evaluation at his June 1970 enlistment examination and July 1974 separation examination. In September 2004, the Veteran filed a claim of entitlement to service connection for anxiety and depression which he said was due to his diabetes mellitus, type II. On file is a November 2004 VA outpatient record from the mental health clinic noting that the Veteran had been depressed off and on for the past 10-15 years. He reported that his depressive episodes lasted approximately four to five days and were associated with hopelessness, anhedonia, suicidal ideation and decreased concentration. He further reported a 30 year history of nightmares and flashbacks related to service. He denied being involved in extensive combat action, but said he had "pulled dead bodies" when he was in Singapore. He also denied any previous psychiatric inpatient or outpatient treatment and said he had not been on psychotropic medication in the past. He was diagnosed as having depressive disorder not otherwise specified (NOS) and was prescribed Celexa. In a February 2005 rating decision, the RO denied the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus type II, claimed as due to exposure to herbicides. The RO also denied at that time claims of entitlement to service connection for PTSD, and for a psychiatric disability, claimed as anxiety and depression, to include as secondary to diabetes mellitus type II. A VA psychiatric treatment note in April 2005 states that the Veteran denied any recent depression and was happy with his prescribed Celexa. He was assessed as having depressive disorder NOS and depression stable. On file is a "To whom it may concern" letter from the President/Executive Board of the USS Saratoga Association dated in June 2005 confirming that the Veteran served aboard the aircraft carrier Saratoga during the period from April 11, 1972, to February 3, 1973, and had been assigned to "GM" duties. He said the Veteran had also been assigned to the fire and rescue teams which responded to any type of shipboard emergency. Enclosed with this letter was a list of accidents aboard the USS Saratoga that had been downloaded from the internet. This list included an incident in October 1972, during a port visit to Singapore, when a fire broke out in the boiler room killing three crewmen and injuring 12. The carrier was noted to have sustained light damage. There was also a letter from a former serviceman of the Veteran's stating that he met the Veteran around September 1971 and served with him on the Saratoga. He said that the Veteran had worked as an "AO" on the flight deck loading and unloading ordinance from aircraft. Also enclosed were pictures from a cruise book of the USS Saratoga showing that the Veteran had been a crew member. At a VA Mental Health Treatment Plan Review in August 2005, the Veteran reported being depressed the prior month after his fellow comrade had been killed in a car wreck. He said he attended the funeral and was doing OK at that time. He denied any recent depression and reported that his depression started approximately 10-12 years earlier and that he had been depressed off and on since. He was diagnosed as having depressive disorder NOS. In his substantive appeal dated in November 2005, the Veteran said that his mental state had been affected by "finding people dead while aboard". VA outpatient mental health notes include a December 2005 record noting that the Veteran had been having bad dreams three to four times a week that involved pulling dead bodies from the USS Saratoga back in 1970. On file is an April 2006 outpatient record from the mental health clinic noting that the Veteran had had depression 1-1/2 months earlier when his buddy died from a heart attack. He said he was presently doing OK with depression. No psychosis was noted. A July 2006 VA telephone record shows that the Veteran stated that he was doing much better since taking Celexa. The Veteran was found by a VA examiner in January 2007 as having a negative PTSD screen. In August 2007, a VA psychiatrist wrote a "To Whom It May Concern" note stating that the Veteran should be excused from work from August 7 to 10, 2007, due to "recent severe personal stress" related to his son's involvement in a severe accident. The Veteran reported during a September 2007 VA visit that he had been depressed about six weeks when his son had been seriously injured at work, but that his son was doing fine and that he was doing OK with his depression. A February 2008 VA mental health note states that the Veteran retired from American Airlines due to stressors from his son's accident. He was given a diagnosis of depressive disorder NOS. During an October 2008 mental health visit, the Veteran reported that he started having nightmares about burning ship when he was in Vietnam. No psychosis was noted. He was diagnosed as having depressive disorder NOS. The Veteran testified at a Board video conference hearing in April 2007 that his VA doctor told him that his anxiety and depression were due to active duty while aboard ship. In this regard, the Veteran asserted that while serving aboard ship there had been a fire in the boiler-room and that three men had been killed and 12 injured. He said that he had been in the fire brigade and had helped rescue the servicemen. He added that ever since then he has had bad dreams and sleep problems. He remarked that he first started going to the Tulsa Mental Health clinic approximately two years earlier. At a January 2009 VA outpatient visit, the Veteran reported that some days were better than others, but that overall he was doing much better since his last visit. He reported continuing nightmares and was diagnosed as having depressive disorder NOS. No psychosis was noted. At an April 2009 VA mental health visit, the Veteran was advised to continue taking Citalopram with an increase in dosage, and to discontinue Trazodone which made him "dopey". After examining the Veteran and reviewing his claims file, a VA psychiatric examiner in August 2009 diagnosed the Veteran as having major depression. He acknowledged the verified stressor as noted in the claims file (see PTSD Stressor Corroboration Research dated July 1, 2009) of a fire breaking out while the USS Saratoga had been docked at the Singapore Harbor in October 1972 resulting in three deaths, and went on to find that the Veteran did not meet the full criteria for DSM-IV diagnosis of PTSD. He then opined that the Veteran's depression was "primary" related to the injury of his son in 2007 and the loss of his brother in 1979, but that it was exacerbated by stressors while in the Navy, especially the fire on the USS Saratoga in October 1972. He further remarked that the Veteran's depression was less likely as not related to any service-connected disability which he noted as including tinnitus, diabetes, neuropathy, hearing loss and a skin condition. He said he reached his conclusions based on a review of the Veteran's medical records and claims file, as well as the Veteran's statements and his observations of the Veteran during the examination. He remarked that the Veteran's anxiety and visual hallucinations were a component of his major depressive disorder. III. Analysis Pertinent Law Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002). For the showing of chronic disease in service there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). If chronicity in service is not established, a showing of continuity of symptoms after discharge is required to support the claim. Id. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all of the evidence establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Additionally, for veterans who have served 90 days or more of active service during a war period or after December 31, 1946, certain chronic disabilities, including psychoses, are presumed to have been incurred in service if manifest to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Service connection may also be granted for disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). Additional disability resulting from the aggravation of a nonservice- connected condition by a service-connected condition is also compensable under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995) (en banc). The Board notes that VA amended its regulation pertaining to secondary service connection, effective from October 10, 2006. See 71 Fed. Reg. 52,744 (2006) (codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.310). The new regulation appears to place additional evidentiary burdens on claimants seeking service connection based on aggravation; specifically, in terms of establishing a baseline level of disability for the non-service-connected condition prior to the aggravation. Because the new law appears more restrictive than the old, and because the appellant's appeal was already pending when the new provisions were promulgated, the Board will consider this appeal under the law in effect prior to October 10, 2006. See, e.g., Kuzma v. Principi, 341 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (new regulations cannot be applied to pending claims if they have impermissibly retroactive effects). In determining whether service connection is warranted for a disability, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 2002). Discussion There are two theories of entitlement in the instant claim as shown by the record. One is the assertion the Veteran made when he initially filed his service connection claim in September 2004, that his anxiety and depression are due to his diabetes mellitus type II. Under this theory, as noted above, VA regulations provide that disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury shall be service connected. When service connection is thus established for a secondary condition, the secondary condition shall be considered a part of the original condition. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). However, the Veteran in this case is not service connected for diabetes mellitus type II. The Board denied this claim in May 2009. Consequently, under the law, the Veteran lacks legal grounds to establish entitlement to service connection for his claimed anxiety and depression as secondary to diabetes mellitus type II. See Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426 (1994). Regarding establishing service connection for depressive disorder as secondary to any other service-connected disability, the medical evidence militates against the Veteran's claim. In this regard, a VA examiner in August 2009 opined that it was less likely than not that the Veteran's major depression was related to any service- connected disability, which he identified as including tinnitus, diabetes, neuropathy, hearing loss, and a skin condition. Service connection is in effect only for bilateral tinnitus. The second theory of entitlement involved in this appeal is on a direct basis, that is, that the Veteran's major depressive disorder was either incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Regarding this claim on a direct basis, as noted above, the Veteran's service treatment records do not show complaints or findings of a psychiatric nature and show that he had a normal clinical psychiatric evaluation at his separation examination in July 1974. Thus, there is no evidence of a chronic psychiatric disability in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Moreover, the first postservice medical evidence diagnosing the Veteran as having depressive disorder is not until November 2004. Indeed, the Veteran denied receiving any psychiatric treatment prior to this time. As far as continuity of symptomatology, although the Veteran reported having nightmares related to service ever since service, he reported to VA medical personnel in November 2004 and during a VA Mental Health Treatment Plan Review in August 2005, that he had feelings of being depressed over the past 10 to 15 years. This places the onset of the Veteran's depressive feelings many years after service. Accordingly, service connection under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) based on continuity of symptomatology is not warranted by the evidence of record. As far as establishing a medical nexus between the Veteran's postservice diagnosis of depressive disorder, noted as early as 2004, and service, the evidence militates against the Veteran's claim. More specifically, the August 2009 VA examiner opined that the Veteran's depression was "primary" related to the injury of his son in 2007 and the loss of his brother in 1979. The examiner said that he based his conclusion on his review of the Veteran's medical records and claims file, the Veteran's statements, and his observations of the Veteran during the examination. In regard to aggravation, this theory of entitlement requires that the Veteran have a pre-existing depressive disorder disability. That is, that the Veteran's depressive disorder pre-existed his active duty service. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.304, 3.306. This is simply not shown by the evidence of record. Again, as noted in the facts above, the Veteran's service treatment records are devoid of any psychiatric complaints or findings, and show that he had a normal clinical psychiatric evaluation at his June 1970 enlistment examination and July 1974 separation examination. Moreover, there is no pre or postservice medical evidence suggesting that the Veteran had a preexisting depressive disorder or any psychiatric disability for that matter. As previously noted, the Veteran denied in November 2004 ever receiving psychiatric treatment and he reported at that time having depressive feelings for 10-15 years. Thus, the Veteran is presumed to have been sound when he entered active duty with respect to a psychiatric disability. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1111; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304. Therefore, the fact that the VA examiner in August 2009 stated that the Veteran's depression was exacerbated by stressors that occurred while in the Navy, especially the fire on the USS Saratoga in October 1972, in view of the fact that the Veteran did not have a preexisting psychiatric disability, does not establish service connection based on aggravation of a preexisting disability. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.304, 3.306. Furthermore, service connection based on additional disability resulting from the aggravation of a nonservice-connected condition by a service- connected condition is not warranted since the Veteran's depressive disorder is not shown to be aggravated by a service-connected disability. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995) (en banc). Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability other than PTSD, diagnosed as major depressive disorder, to include as secondary to service-connected disability and is not in relative equipoise. Consequently, the benefit-of-the-doubt rule does not apply and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002). ORDER Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability other than posttraumatic stress disorder, diagnosed as major depressive disorder, to include as secondary to service-connected disability, is denied. ____________________________________________ BARBARA B. COPELAND Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs