Citation Nr: 1016450 Decision Date: 05/04/10 Archive Date: 05/13/10 DOCKET NO. 07-06 773 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Seattle, Washington THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder (namely, depression), including as secondary to service-connected left and right knee disabilities and hypothyroidism. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion WITNESSES AT HEARING ON APPEAL The Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Biswajit Chatterjee, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty in the military from July 1987 to April 1990. This appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) is from a February 2007 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Seattle, Washington. There initially were three claims at issue on appeal - for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder (namely, depression) and a right knee disorder, as well as for an increased rating for an already service-connected left knee disorder. But in a July 2009 decision during the pendency of this appeal, the RO granted the claim for service connection for the right knee disorder - in turn meaning the Veteran now had established bilateral (left and right) knee disability attributable to her military service. In a subsequent September 2009 decision, the RO determined there was clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in the effective date assigned for service connection and a 10 percent rating for the left knee disability (specifically, the loss of extension component), and concerning the effective date assigned for service connection and a 10 percent rating for the right knee disability (both the limitation of flexion and extension components). So the RO proposed to make necessary revisions in these awards. The Veteran perfected an appeal to the Board concerning two claims: (1) whether she was entitled to a rating higher than 20 percent for the limitation of flexion component of her left knee disability, and (2) whether she was entitled to service connection for depression secondary to service- connected disability, either her hypothyroidism or now service-connected bilateral (left and right) knee disability. She had a hearing at the RO in October 2009 before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge of the Board. That type of hearing is also commonly referred to as a Travel Board hearing. During the hearing, she withdrew her claim for a higher rating for her left knee disability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.204 (2009). So the only claim currently at issue concerns her depression. There are a few other preliminary points also worth mentioning. In August 2009, the Veteran submitted an application (VA Form 21-8940) for a total disability rating based on individual unemployabilty (TDIU). In Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378, 1384 (2001), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that once a claimant: (1)submits evidence of a medical disability, (2) makes a claim for the highest possible rating, and (3) submits evidence of unemployability, an informal claim for a TDIU is raised under 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a). And as the Federal Circuit Court more recently explained in Rice v. Shinseki, 251 F.3d 1378, 1384 (2001), if the Board determines the TDIU claim requires further development before being adjudicated, the appropriate disposition is to remand the TDIU claim to the RO. Remands to the RO generally are via the Appeals Management Center (AMC). VA's Office of General Counsel also has indicated that remanding the derivative TDIU claim does not preclude the Board from going ahead and deciding the claim for a higher rating for the disability that formed the basis of the TDIU claim. See VAOPGCPREC 6-96 (Aug. 16, 1996) and VAOGCPREC 12-2001 (July 6, 2001). Here, though, as mentioned, the Veteran's only remaining claim on appeal is for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder - namely, depression. And the RO's February 2007 decision already considered and denied this additional claim for a TDIU. And since she did not appeal that decision denying this additional TDIU claim, that decision is final and binding on her concerning this additional claim based on the evidence then of record. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.160(d), 20.200, 20.302, 20.1103 (2009). It appears she has filed another TDIU claim with the submission of her August 2009 application. So this additional claim is referred to the RO for appropriate development and consideration. The Board does not have jurisdiction to consider it, even in a remand, because the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ, i.e., the RO) has not considered it in the first instance (since the prior February 2007 decision), much less denied the claim followed by the initiation and perfection of a timely appeal to the Board by the Veteran. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.200 (2009). See, too, Godfrey v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 398 (1995) (the Board does not have jurisdiction over an issue not yet adjudicated by the RO). FINDING OF FACT Based on the probative medical and other evidence of record, it is just as likely as not the Veteran developed an acquired psychiatric disorder - namely, depression, as a result of the chronic pain from her service-connected bilateral knee disability. CONCLUSION OF LAW Resolving all reasonable doubt in her favor, the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disorder - namely, her depression, is proximately due to, the result of, or chronically aggravated by her service-connected bilateral knee disability. 38 U.S.C.A §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1131, 1137, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310, 3.384 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION I. Duties to Notify and Assist As provided by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA), VA has duties to notify and assist a claimant in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). Here, though, the Board need not discuss whether there has been VCAA compliance because the claim is being granted, regardless. See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 20.1102 (2009) (harmless error). II. Analysis-Entitlement to Service Connection for an Acquired Psychiatric Disorder (namely, depression), including as Secondary to the Service-Connected Bilateral Knee Disability and Hypothyroidism The Veteran contends that she suffers from depression as a consequence of her service-connected hypothyroidism and bilateral (left and right) knee disability. Service connection is granted if it is shown the Veteran has disability resulting from an injury sustained or a disease contracted in the line of duty, or for aggravation during service of a pre-existing condition beyond its natural progression. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131, 1153; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.306. Stated somewhat differently, to establish entitlement to service connection, there must be: (1) a medical diagnosis of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain cases, lay evidence of in-service occurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus, i.e., etiological link between an in-service injury or disease and the current disability. Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 252 (1999), citing Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Psychoses will be presumed to have been incurred in service if manifested to a compensable degree of at least 10-percent disabling within one year after service. This presumption, however, is rebuttable by probative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. For purposes of this presumption, a "psychosis" consists of the following specific disorders: brief psychotic disorder, delusional disorder, psychotic disorder due to general medical condition, psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified, schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia, schizophreniform disorder, shared psychotic disorder, and substance-induced psychotic disorder. 38 C.F.R. § 3.384. See 71 Fed. Reg. 42,758-60 (July 28, 2006). Under 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) (2008), for VA purposes, all mental disorder diagnoses must conform to the fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). Service connection also is permissible on a secondary basis for disability that is proximately due to, the result of, or chronically aggravated by a service-connected condition. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) and (b) (2009). In this regard, establishing entitlement to service connection on this secondary basis requires evidence sufficient to show (1) that a current disability exists and (2) that the current disability was either (a) caused by or (b) aggravated by a service-connected disability. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995) (en banc). See, too, Wallin v. West, 11 Vet. App. 509, 512 (1998) and Velez v. West, 11 Vet. App. 148, 158 (1998). When determining whether service connection is warranted, all potential theories of entitlement - direct, presumptive, and secondary - must be considered. Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In adjudicating this claim, the Board also has considered the doctrine of reasonable doubt. In determining whether service connection is warranted for a disability, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise - meaning about evenly balanced for and against the claim, with the Veteran prevailing in either event, or whether instead a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). According to VA regulation, every Veteran shall be taken to have been in sound mental and physical health when examined, accepted, and enrolled for service, except as to defects, infirmities, or disorders noted at the time of the examination, acceptance, and enrollment, or where clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that the injury or disease existed before acceptance and enrollment and was not aggravated by such service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1111; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b). VA's General Counsel issued a precedent opinion holding that, in order to rebut this presumption of soundness under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1111, VA must demonstrate by clear and unmistakable evidence both that the disease or injury in question existed prior to service and that it was not aggravated by service. VAOPGCPREC 3-2003 (July 16, 2003). See also Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The claimant is not required to show that the disease or injury increased in severity during service before VA's duty under the second prong of this rebuttal standard attaches. Clear and unmistakable evidence is a more formidable evidentiary burden than the preponderance of the evidence standard. See Vanerson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 254, 258 (1999) (noting that the "clear and convincing" burden of proof, while a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence, is a lower burden to satisfy than that of "clear and unmistakable evidence.") It is an "onerous" evidentiary standard, requiring that the preexistence of a condition and the no-aggravation result be "undebatable." Cotant v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 116, 131 (2003) citing Laposky v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 331, 334 (1993). The Court has held on multiple occasions that lay statements by a Veteran concerning a pre-existing condition, alone, are insufficient to rebut this presumption of soundness. See, e.g., Gahman v. West, 13 Vet. App. 148, 150 (1999) (recorded history provided by a lay witness does not constitute competent medical evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of soundness, even when such is recorded by medical examiners); Paulson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 466, 470 (1995) (a layperson's account of what a physician may or may not have diagnosed is insufficient to support a conclusion that a disability preexisted service); Crowe v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 238 (1994) (supporting medical evidence is needed to establish the presence of a pre-existing condition). In this particular case at hand, the VA treatment records and September 2006 VA compensation examination report show the Veteran has a psychiatric disability, most notably major depression. The most recent VA compensation examination, provided in March 2009, show Axis I diagnoses of bipolar disorder, depressed with recurrent psychotic features, and adjustment disorder with depressed and recurrent anxious mood. So there is no disputing the Veteran has the claimed mental illness. See Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992) (indicating service connection presupposes a current diagnosis of the condition claimed, to at least confirm the Veteran has it, and that, without this minimum level of proof, there can be no valid claim). Consequently, the determinative issue is the etiology of this condition - and, in particular, whether her mental illness is attributable to her military service, including by way of already service- connected disability. See Watson v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 309, 314 (1993) ("A determination of service connection requires a finding of the existence of a current disability and a determination of a relationship between that disability and an injury or disease incurred in service."). See, too, Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000); D'Amico v. West, 209 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hibbard v. West, 13 Vet. App. 546, 548 (2000); and Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998). There is conflicting evidence in the file regarding whether the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disorder pre-existed her military service - and, therefore, would have to be considered on the theory that it was chronically aggravated during or by her military service, versus the alternative notion that it initially manifested during her service (or within the one-year presumptive period after) or is otherwise attributable to her service, including secondary to a service-connected disability. The Veteran's December 1986 military entrance examination report failed to note any psychiatric-related issues during that initial evaluation, either in the way of a relevant subjective complaint, pertinent history, or objective clinical finding such as a noteworthy diagnosis. The Board therefore must presume that she entered service in sound mental health. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1111; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b). The Board also finds that this presumption has not been rebutted since clear and unmistakable evidence does not show that any acquired psychiatric disorder pre-existed her military service. Evidence suggesting the Veteran's major depression nonetheless may have pre-existed her military service includes the report of a December 2006 Social Security Administration (SSA) mental health evaluation by Dr. J.R. and a March 2009 VA compensation examination report. Based on the Veteran's reported childhood history, Dr. J.R. stated the Veteran "is suffering from ongoing symptoms of depression and active symptoms related to a history of abuse as a child." On the other hand, Dr. J.R. did not proceed to find that the depressive disorder necessarily pre-existed service. Rather, the Veteran's reported history in that evaluation also contends that depression did not onset until 1995, and the Veteran in turn attributed this to her chronic knee and back pain. The March 2009 VA compensation examiner indicated the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disorder "may also have been aggravated by the childhood trauma from the physical and emotional abuse by her stepfather." Thus, by listing "childhood trauma" as a contributing factor in the development of the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disorder, this VA examiner apparently agreed that it may have pre- existed the Veteran's military service, at least in part. But again, this indication of a pre-existing acquired psychiatric disorder was based entirely on the Veteran's self-reported history to that examiner, which in turn is contradicted by the Veteran. Indeed, she also reported that she did not have onset of depression until 1989, well after her military service had begun in 1987, due to harassment by a male commanding officer (NCO) and secondary to chronic knee and low back pain. So these mere references of childhood experience as one possible etiological factor, among several, do not constitute the required clear and unmistakable evidence that her acquired psychiatric disorder necessarily pre-dated her military service. This is especially true since her service treatment records (STRs) are unremarkable for mention of any pre-existing mental illness. As noted, the clear and unmistakable burden of proof is an onerous evidentiary standard, requiring that the evidence concerning preexistence be undebatable. Cotant, 17 Vet. App. at 131, citing Laposky, 4 Vet. App. at 334. Moreover, a medical opinion from a February 2007 VA treating psychiatrist appears to refute this notion that the Veteran's depression and anxiety clearly and unmistakably preexisted her military service, instead attributing her then current psychiatric symptoms to chronic pain from an in-service injury. Hence, the presumption of soundness when entering service has not been rebutted in this case, and the Board must determine whether the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disorder was instead incurred in service, even presumptively, or, alternatively, is secondary to service-connected disability. After reviewing the relevant medical and other evidence of record, the Board finds that the evidence supports this claim on a secondary service connection theory. As alluded to, the March 2009 VA compensation examiner observed that the Veteran's adjustment disorder, with depressed and anxious mood, was multi-factorial and at least partly stemmed from her chronic physical pain from her knees and back. So the pain associated with her service-connected bilateral (left and right) knee disability has been identified as one of the sources of her current mental illness. Yet another identified etiological source was an alleged history of verbal abuse during service from her NCO - so akin to a claim for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) based on personal assault. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(4). However, none of the service records or other medical records confirms the credibility of this account. That notwithstanding, since the March 2009 VA examiner's opinion was based on a comprehensive review of the pertinent medical and other history and was supported by sound medical rationale, it provides compelling evidence that the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disorder - namely, her depression, is at least partly the result of having to deal or cope with the chronic pain associated with her service-connected bilateral (left and right) knee disability. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet App 295 (2008); Kowalski v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 171 (2005), and Coburn v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 427 (2006). In further support of her claim for secondary service connection, VA emergency and inpatient psychiatric treatment records, dated from February to March 2006, specifically attribute her diagnosed depressive disorder to a history of chronic pain. The STRs and post-service treatment records document some of this chronic pain as due to other unrelated factors, especially a nonservice-connected low back disorder (not for consideration here under the provisions of § 3.310), but also show a substantial history of treatment for pain symptoms from her service-connected bilateral (left and right) knee disability. Consequently, the medical evidence concerning the determinative issue of whether the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disorder was caused or has been aggravated by her already service-connected left and right knee disorders is in relative equipoise, i.e., about evenly balanced for and against her claim. In these situations she is given the benefit of the doubt and her claim granted. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); Ashley v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 52, 59 (1993), citing 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (under the "benefit-of-the-doubt" rule, where there exists "an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter," the Veteran shall prevail upon the issue). It is also worth mentioning in closing that the only competent evidence of record regarding any possible correlation between her mental illness and service-connected hypothyroidism, provided by the March 2009 VA examination report, specifically discounts this notion that any psychiatric-related symptoms developed secondarily to her hypothyroidism. Therefore, her hypothyroidism has not been identified as a basis for granting secondary service connection, only her bilateral knee disability. Finally, as the claim for service connection is being granted on this secondary basis, there is no further need to consider possible entitlement to direct or presumptive service connection. ORDER The claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder (namely, depression) is granted on the premise this disorder is secondary to the service-connected bilateral knee disability. ____________________________________________ KEITH W. ALLEN Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs