Citation Nr: 1016795 Decision Date: 05/05/10 Archive Date: 05/19/10 DOCKET NO. 06-35 696 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Buffalo, New York THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Jennifer R. White, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from April 1977 to March 1978. This case comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a February 2006 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Buffalo, New York. The Veteran was scheduled for a hearing in March 2007 at the RO before a Decision Review Officer. The Veteran failed to appear for her scheduled hearing, and the record reflects that she was adequately notified. She has not requested that the hearing be rescheduled. Therefore, her request for a hearing is considered withdrawn. The Board remanded this claim in March 2008 for further development and adjudicative action. Such development as ordered has been completed, and the case has been returned to the Board for further appellate action. This appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2009). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. No psychiatric disability was present in service or until more than one year thereafter. 2. The Veteran did not participate in combat with the enemy, and no stressor supporting a diagnosis of PTSD has been corroborated. 3. No other psychiatric disorder present during the pendency of this claime is related to the Veteran's active service. CONCLUSION OF LAW A psychiatric disability, to include PTSD, was not incurred in or aggravated by active service, and the incurrence or aggravation of a psychosis during such service may not be presumed. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1131, 1137 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), codified in pertinent part at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A (West 2002 & Supp. 2009), and the pertinent implementing regulation, codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2009), provide that VA will assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate a claim but is not required to provide assistance to a claimant if there is no reasonable possibility that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim. They also require VA to notify the claimant and the claimant's representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, not previously provided to the Secretary that is necessary to substantiate the claim. As part of the notice, VA is to specifically inform the claimant and the claimant's representative, if any, of which portion, if any, of the evidence is to be provided by the claimant and which part, if any, VA will attempt to obtain on behalf of the claimant. Although the regulation previously required VA to request that the claimant provide any evidence in the claimant's possession that pertains to the claim, the regulation has been amended to eliminate that requirement for claims pending before VA on or after May 30, 2008. The Board also notes that the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held that the plain language of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) requires that notice to a claimant pursuant to the VCAA be provided "at the time" that, or "immediately after," VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for VA-administered benefits. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 119 (2004). The Court further held that VA failed to demonstrate that, "lack of such a pre-AOJ-decision notice was not prejudicial to the appellant, see 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) (as amended by the Veterans Benefits Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-330, § 401, 116 Stat. 2820, 2832) (providing that '[i]n making the determinations under [section 7261(a)], the Court shall...take due account of the rule of prejudicial error')." The timing requirement enunciated in Pelegrini applies equally to the initial-disability-rating and effective-date elements of a service-connection claim. Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). The record reflects that the Veteran was provided with notice required under the VCAA by letter mailed in September 2005, prior to the initial adjudication of the claim. Although she was not provided with notice concerning the disability-rating and effective-date elements of the claim until April 2008, after the initial adjudication, the Board has determined that there is no prejudice to the Veteran in proceeding with the appeal. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 394 (1993). As explained below, the Board has determined that service connection for the claimed disability is not warranted. Consequently, no effective date or disability rating will be assigned, and the failure to provide earlier notice with respect to those elements of claim is no more than harmless error. The Board additionally notes that notice consistent with 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2009) was provided in a letter dated April 2008. Although adequate notice concerning the Veteran's claim for PTSD resulting from abuse was not provided until after the initial adjudication of the claims, the Board finds that there is no prejudice to the Veteran in proceeding with the issuance of a final decision. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 394 (1993). In this regard, the Board notes that following the provision of the required notice and the receipt of all pertinent evidence, the originating agency readjudicated the claim in March 2010. There is no indication or reason to believe that the ultimate decision of the originating agency on the merits of the claim would have been different had complete VCAA notice been provided at an earlier time. The record reflects that service medical records, service personnel records, and VA treatment records have been obtained as well as a VA medical opinion. The Board additionally notes that the Veteran is in receipt of Social Security Income, not Social Security disability payments, thus these records are irrelevant to the Veteran's claim for service connection. Neither the Veteran nor her representative has identified any outstanding evidence that could be obtained to substantiate the claim. The Board is also unaware of any such evidence. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran was not provided a VA examination in connection with her claim for direct service connection for a psychiatric disability. VA is obliged to provide a VA examination or obtain a medical opinion when: (1) there is competent evidence that the veteran has a current disability (or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability), (2) there is evidence establishing that the veteran suffered an event, injury or disease in service or has a disease or symptoms of a disease within a specified presumptive period, (3) the evidence indicates that the current disability or symptoms may be associated with service or with another service-connected disability, and (4) there is not sufficient medical evidence to make a decision. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4); see also Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370 (2002); and also McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). As explained below, there is no competent evidence of the presence of a psychiatric disability in service or within one year following the Veteran's discharge from service. Concerning her PTSD claim, there is no corroborating evidence of the claimed stressor and VA did obtain a VA opinion concerning the Veteran's claimed stressor with review of the relevant records. Thus, VA has no obligation to provide a VA examination or obtain an additional VA medical opinion in this case. In sum, the Board is satisfied that any procedural errors in the originating agency's development and consideration of the claim were insignificant and non-prejudicial to the Veteran. Accordingly, the Board will address the merits of the claim. Legal Criteria Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Service connection also may be granted for any disease initially diagnosed after service, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Where a veteran served continuously for ninety (90) days or more during a period of war, or during peacetime service after December 31, 1946, and manifests a psychosis to a degree of 10 percent within one year from date of termination of such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred or aggravated in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Entitlement to service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); (2) a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and (3) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). If the evidence establishes a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder during service and the claimed stressor is related to that service, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(1). If the evidence establishes that a veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(2). Service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the condition, credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred, and a link, established by medical evidence, between the current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Where the claimed stressor is not related to combat, a veteran's lay testimony alone will not be enough to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395 (1996); Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1996). In such cases, the record must contain service records or other corroborative evidence which substantiates or verifies the veteran's testimony or statements as to the occurrence of the claimed stressor. See West (Carlton) v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70, 76 (1994); Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91, 98 (1993). Moreover, a medical opinion diagnosing PTSD does not suffice to verify the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressors. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395-396 (1996); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 142 (1997). If a posttraumatic stress disorder claim is based on in- service personal assault, evidence from sources other than the veteran's service records may corroborate the veteran's account of the stressor incident. Examples of such evidence include, but are not limited to: records from law enforcement authorities, rape crisis centers, mental health counseling centers, hospitals, or physicians; pregnancy tests or tests for sexually transmitted diseases; and statements from family members, roommates, fellow service members, or clergy. Evidence of behavior changes following the claimed assault is one type of relevant evidence that may be found in these sources. Examples of behavior changes that may constitute credible evidence of the stressor include, but are not limited to: a request for a transfer to another military duty assignment; deterioration in work performance; substance abuse; episodes of depression, panic attacks, or anxiety without an identifiable cause; or unexplained economic or social behavior changes. VA will not deny a post-traumatic stress disorder claim that is based on in-service personal assault without first advising the claimant that evidence from sources other than the veteran's service records or evidence of behavior changes may constitute credible supporting evidence of the stressor and allowing him or her the opportunity to furnish this type of evidence or advise VA of potential sources of such evidence. VA may submit any evidence that it receives to an appropriate medical or mental health professional for an opinion as to whether it indicates that a personal assault occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). Except as otherwise provided by law, a claimant has the responsibility to present and support a claim for benefits under laws administered by the Secretary. The Secretary shall consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case before the Secretary with respect to benefits under laws administered by the Secretary. When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 2002); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). To deny a claim on its merits, the evidence must preponderate against the claim. Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996), citing Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 54. Analysis The Veteran contends, in essence, that she has PTSD due to traumatic experiences in service, specifically personal assaults by her spouse. The Veteran's service treatment records indicate that she was treated for lower back pain with an impression of bruised muscles in her back during April 1977. The examiner indicated no pathological findings except for mild tension and tenderness. A June 1977 treatment record indicates the Veteran complained of lower back pain; the examiner believed it was of a muscular etiology. A January 1978 treatment note indicates that the Veteran had fallen that morning and had a bruise and a strain. The report of Veteran's separation examination in March 1978 indicates that her psychiatric status was found to be normal on clinical evaluation. In the report of medical history completed in connection with her separation examination, the Veteran denied ever having depression, excessive worry or nervous trouble of any sort. Concerning the Veteran's service personnel records, the Veteran was given an Article 15 during December 1977 because she did not report for formation. A February 1978 letter from the Veteran's husband indicates that the Veteran joined the military as a means to support the family; the husband had a drinking problem; the husband had re-enrolled in medical school; and the Veteran wanted a hardship discharge as she had an offer of employment post-service. Additionally, the claims files contain a letter from the Veteran, dated in February 1978, indicating her need for a hardship discharge as one of her children lived with her mother and one with her at Fort Campbell; however, she had not been able to find a dependable babysitter. The Veteran additionally indicated that her husband had acquired a serious drinking problem. The files contain three additional letters dated in February 1978. The letter from the Veteran's attorney indicates that the Veteran had encountered numerous problems relative to her domestic situation and that the Veteran's mother could no longer take care of her youngest child. The attorney also indicated that the Veteran's husband had encountered numerous problems which rendered him unable to care for either of the children. A letter from the Assistant Majority Leader of The Assembly of the State of New York indicates that the Veteran needed a hardship discharge to pull her family together. There is also a letter from a Pastor which indicates that the Reverend found the Veteran to be honest and sincere in her actions. The Veteran was given a hardship discharge due to Parenthood Separation. The record of a private psychiatric assessment in July 2002 indicates that the Veteran had been married one time for twenty-six years and that she had been separated for the previous four years. She had three children - a twenty-one year old daughter, a nineteen year old daughter and a fourteen year old son. The Veteran claimed that she had depression which began three years prior and had been hearing voices. The Veteran indicated that her mother had a psychosis. The Veteran was diagnosed with major depression, recurrent, severe, with psychotic features. The additional treatment records dating to November 2003 do not indicate a diagnosis concerning PTSD or any information concerning the Veteran's claimed stressor. Concerning the Veteran's VA treatment records, a June 2005 psychiatric consult relates that the Veteran indicated she had flashbacks and nightmares related to an incident in a private hospital during May 2004 where a member of the nursing staff cut open her right foot because they were Caucasian and racist. The Veteran also related that she had flashbacks and nightmares, although she could not elaborate on the details, concerning her children at home getting hurt when she was on active duty during the 1970s. The Veteran also indicated that she had back surgery during service when she fell off a truck. The Veteran provided that she was now divorced from her marriage of over 28 years; her husband had been physically abusive towards her; she went in the service to get away from this husband; however, she denied ever needing medical attention from these injuries or any negative consequences from the physical abuse. The diagnosis was rule out PTSD. A July 2005 VA treatment note indicates that the Veteran told the examiner she had not been truthful previously concerning the extent of her husband's abuse, which had began during military service. The Veteran reported having flashbacks, nightmares, and hearing her husband's voice saying that he was going to come after her. She additionally indicated that she had fallen off a truck during service, injuring her back. The Veteran was diagnosed with PTSD. In an August 2005 social work note, the counselor noted that the Veteran realized that joining the military to get away from her husband was stupid because he continued to abuse and stalk her. A September 2005 psychiatry attending note indicates that the provider found the Veteran to be very demanding, drug seeking, and manipulative. The Veteran submitted an October 2005 stressor statement indicating that her husband was physically and verbally abusive to her during her time in the military. She cited constant worry about her children as a stressor, as they lived with her abusive husband. The Veteran also indicated that after her children went to live with her parents, her husband stalked her and beat her in the streets, causing numerous injuries. An October 2005 treatment note indicates that the Veteran had an Axis I diagnosis of PTSD. A January 2006 addendum to a treatment note indicates that the Veteran left a note saying that she was treated bad and the nurses tried to poison her orange juice. The January 2006 original treatment note relates that the Veteran accused her psychiatrist of not giving her the correct medications and she seemed paranoid, confused and argumentative. A letter dated in February 2006, from the Reverend listed as the signer of the February 1978 letter supporting the Veteran in her quest for a hardship discharge, indicates that the Reverend did not write that letter and there is no record of that correspondence in his files. The Reverend indicated that he hopes this information assists VA in evaluating the Veteran's application. A March 2006 discharge summary from Erie County Medical Center indicates that the Veteran was admitted due to psychotic decompensation, expressing belief that the government had planted a chip in her arm and that her family is involved in the conspiracy. The examiner surmised that the Veteran was a poor historian. The Veteran's discharge diagnosis was schizophrenia, paranoid type. An April 2006 behavioral health outpatient note indicates that the Veteran had been hospitalized for paranoid schizophrenia and that she had episodically been paranoid and psychotic since 1977. The Veteran was diagnosed with schizophrenia, paranoid type; rule out schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type; PTSD, chronic. A VA opinion concerning the Veteran's PTSD claim was obtained in January 2010 in response to the Board's directive. The examiner was asked to ascertain if there were behavioral changes which would evidence some form of personal assault while the Veteran was on active duty. The examiner discussed the evidence as indicated above, discussing the fact that an examination of her performance while in the service as well as subsequent to that was not significant for any type of physical health complaints that are usually associated with someone who was involved in some sort of assault to include decrement in occupational functioning or complaints that are usually associated with unreported trauma. The examiner believed that the Veteran's credibility was undercut by the private hospital's discharge summary indicating that she was a poor historian with psychotic beliefs about government action. The examiner opined that although it was possible that the Veteran's paranoid schizophrenia could be related to trauma; it was unclear whether such trauma occurred prior to, during or after her active duty period. The examiner additionally indicated that the Veteran's mental illness could be purely genetic. The examiner made similar comments concerning the Veteran's prior diagnosis of major depressive disorder. The examiner additionally observed that the Veteran's claim that her husband was physically abusive is not sufficient to determine if that would be qualified as a traumatic experience consistent with the DSM-IV criteria. See DSM-IV. Additionally, the examiner commented that the Veteran's claim concerning her children's safety was on the borderline as to whether this might qualify as a traumatic experience. In light of the above evidence, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the Veteran did not have a psychiatric disorder until more than one year following her discharge from service. In this regard, the Board notes that there is no contemporaneous medical evidence of any psychiatric disorder until many years following the Veteran's discharge from service. In addition, the Veteran's psychiatric status was found to be normal at the time of her discharge from service, and there is no medical opinion supporting the proposition that a psychiatric disorder was present in service or until more than one year after. The Board acknowledges that an April 2006 VA treatment note relates the Veteran's psychiatric disability back to 1977 when she was in service; however, this was based solely on the Veteran's history. Information which is simply recorded by a medical examiner, unenhanced by any medical comment by the examiner, does not constitute competent medical evidence. See LeShore v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 406, 409 (1995). The Board also acknowledges that lay assertions may serve to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F. 3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (addressing lay evidence as potentially competent to support presence of disability even where not corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence). While the Board has carefully considered the Veteran's statements, the Board has not found any contentions to the effect that her psychiatric disability began in service or was manifested within one year after her discharge from service to be credible. In this regard, the Board notes the absence of any finding or diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder in service and the normal psychiatric findings on the discharge examination, the Veteran did not file a claim for service connection for psychiatric disability until more than 25 years following her discharge from service, she did not seek treatment for any psychiatric disorder until many years after service, and her statements in support of her claim are self serving. Moreover, she has not submitted any corroborating evidence of the onset of psychiatric symptoms in service or of a continuity of psychiatric symptoms thereafter. Concerning the Veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD, the Veteran was not diagnosed with PTSD during service, she did not engage in combat with the enemy, and there is no corroborating evidence of an alleged stressor. Moreover, the VA examiner found that there was no record in the Veteran's claims file which would be consistent with in- service abuse. The Board additionally observes that the Veteran remained married to her in-service spouse for approximately an additional twenty years post-service. There is no corroborating evidence that the Veteran's spouse abused her at any time during their twenty-six years of marriage. Thus, taking into account all of the evidence of record, the Board finds that the Veteran's claim must be denied. ORDER Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability, to include PTSD, is denied. ____________________________________________ Shane A. Durkin Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs