Citation Nr: 1016997 Decision Date: 05/06/10 Archive Date: 05/19/10 DOCKET NO. 04-02 146 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in San Diego, California THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for depression, to include as secondary to service-connected tinnitus. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Tabitha G. Macko, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active service from May 1978 to May 1981. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a September 2003 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Oakland, California, which in relevant part denied service connection for depression. The claim file was later transferred to the San Diego, California, RO upon the Veteran's relocation. The Veteran had requested a hearing; however he failed to appear for the July 2007 travel board hearing. The request for a hearing is deemed waived. This claim has come before the Board in both January 2008 and February 2009, when the Board ordered additional development. The orders have been sufficiently complied with and the claim is ready for Board review. A remand by the Board confers upon the appellant, as a matter of law, the right to compliance with the remand instructions, and imposes upon the VA a concomitant duty to ensure compliance with the terms of the remand. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998). FINDING OF FACT There is insufficient evidence of record demonstrating that depression, claimed as secondary to the Veteran's service- connected tinnitus, is causally related to active service or aggravated by his service-connected tinnitus. CONCLUSION OF LAW The Veteran's depression disability was not incurred in or aggravated by active service, nor is it due to, proximately related to, or aggravated by service-connected disability. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.310 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Service connection will be granted for disability resulting from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. For the showing of chronic disease in service, there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "Chronic." When the disease entity is established, there is no requirement of evidentiary showing of continuity. Continuity of symptomatology is required only where the condition noted during service is not, in fact, shown to be chronic or where the diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. When the fact of chronicity in service is not adequately supported, then a showing of continuity after discharge is required to support the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Service connection may also be granted for a disease first diagnosed after discharge when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Establishing service connection generally requires medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) an in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a nexus between the claimed in- service disease or injury and the present disability. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). See also Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999). Secondary service connection is warranted where a disability is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). The threshold legal requirements for a successful secondary service connection claim are: (1) evidence of a current disability for which secondary service connection is sought; (2) a disability for which service connection has been established; and (3) competent evidence of a nexus between the two. Service connection is possible when a service-connected condition has aggravated a claimed condition, but compensation is only payable for the degree of additional disability attributable to the aggravation. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). VA has amended 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 to incorporate the Court's decision in Allen; except that VA will not concede aggravation unless there is medical evidence showing the baseline level of the disability before its aggravation by the service connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(b) (2009). The amendments to 38 C.F.R. § 3.310, providing for service connection on an aggravation basis were amended effective October 10, 2006. The amendments prohibit VA from conceding aggravation unless there is medical evidence showing the baseline level of the disability before its aggravation by the service connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(b) (2009). In this case, the Veteran applied for service connection prior to the effective date of the amendment and the rating decision on appeal before the Board as well as the statement of the case were all prepared prior to the effective date of the amendment. Kuzma v. Principi, 341 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Inasmuch as the new version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 places additional restrictions on the grant of service connection on the basis of aggravation, the new regulation is less favorable to the Veteran. Hence the old version of the regulation will be applied in this decision. When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to the veteran. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). The benefit of the doubt rule is inapplicable when the evidence preponderates against the claim. Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Veteran seeks service-connection for his depression, which in many statements of record he attributes to his already service-connected tinnitus and ultimately to an incident in service in which he had an adverse reaction to a dose of penicillin. A review of his service treatment records finds no complaint for depression or treatment of any acquired psychiatric disability. However, a July 1979 orthopedic evaluation, for the Veteran's complaint of recurrent left shoulder pain, noted the Veteran's history of his left shoulder was confusing and his speech was slow, which the treating physician considered possibly secondary to a low I.Q. or drugs. The physician recommended follow-up in about a month to rule out psychiatric problems. There were no further entries for 1979. In January 1980 the Veteran was given a dose of penicillin and had an adverse reaction. Through to his May 1981 discharge from service, the Veteran complained of and was evaluated for headaches and tinnitus. However, there were no psychological or psychiatric evaluations of record in service and his 1981 separation examination found his psychiatric system clinically normal. The Veteran sought VA medical care from May 1988 to September 1988. These treatment reports note his history of drug and alcohol abuse; the diagnoses were poly IV drug abuse and probable bacterial endocarditis. In September 1988 the Veteran left the hospital "AMA" (against medical advice). In August 1988 the Veteran filed his claim for other disabilities, including hearing loss and tinnitus; however he did not claim depression. He was afforded a VA audiological examination. He failed to appear for a general medical examination. In October 1996 the Veteran submitted another claim, in the form of a statement written on a VA Form 21- 4142, on which he stated he had had hallucinations and saw spots since service, specifically the adverse reaction to penicillin. Again he failed to report for a November 1996 general medical examination and his claim was denied. In November 2001 the Veteran sought medical care at a VA medical facility for a complaint of pain; however he left the examining room before the treating physician could complete the instructions about the prescriptions. The RO accepted a November 2002 statement as the claim seeking service connection for depression. The Veteran submitted a March 2002 signed statement of informed consent from state prison for his receipt of Prozac. He also later submitted state prison "Physician's Orders" forms spanning from 1998 to March 2003 indicating while in state prison he had been prescribed Prozac and other medications. However, these forms did not indicate why the medications were prescribed, what the diagnoses were, or how these diagnoses were reached. Correspondence in the claims file indicates the RO was informed that the Veteran was incarcerated and released and returned to prison on various occasions from 2002 through 2006. The Veteran sought VA medical treatment again in 2004 and an August 2004 evaluation included a diagnosis of a history of depression, though there was no reference to his military service or to his tinnitus. A January 2005 evaluation noted the Veteran showed "signs of anxiety," that he was homeless and had a history of intravenous drug use as his prescription to Prozac was "restarted." Following the first Board remand order, the Veteran failed to report for a September 2008 VA mental disorders examination. His representative contacted him and was informed that the Veteran attempted to cancel that day because he was feeling very sick. See January 2009 Appellant's Post-Remand Brief. The Board issued a second remand order providing for another examination. The Veteran appeared for the June 2009 examination and completed a history survey for the examiner. However, the examiner reported that shortly after the examination began, the Veteran refused to continue, telling the examiner he believed he was wasting his time. The Board finds that a preponderance of the evidence fails to support the Veteran's claim for depression either on a direct basis or as secondary to his service connected tinnitus. Service treatment records do not contain a diagnosis of depression or any treatment for depression. Though there are multiple treatment reports of his tinnitus and neurological evaluations of his headaches, there were no complaints of depression or findings of depression attributed to his tinnitus. The Board has considered the Veteran's many statements attributing his depression to his tinnitus which the Veteran ultimately attributed to his adverse reaction in January 1980 to a dose of penicillin. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran is competent to discuss his experienced symptoms. See, e.g., Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994). Lay evidence concerning continuity of symptoms after service, if credible, is ultimately competent, regardless of the lack of contemporaneous medical evidence. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The first depression diagnosis of record is found in the record in August 2004. The Board finds the absence of documented complaints or treatment for over 20 years since the Veteran's discharge from service until the Veteran was diagnosed in 2004 to be very probative factor against the Veteran's claim. In this regard, evidence of a prolonged period without medical complaint, and the amount of time that elapsed since military service, can be considered as evidence against the claim. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000). As the Veteran never responded to the January 2008 letter requesting he complete and return release forms for his state prison medical records, there is no objectively confirmed diagnosis for whatever disorder the state prison medical personnel found Prozac beneficial, starting in 1998. See Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69, 77 (1995) ("[w]hat a physician said, and the layman's account of what he purportedly said, filtered through a layman's sensibilities, is simply too attenuated and inherently unreliable to constitute medical evidence"). The Board finds that this lack of diagnosis or treatment of depression for over 20 years is more probative than the Veteran's current recollection of symptoms experienced in the distant past. Therefore, continuity has not been established, either through the competent evidence or through his statements. The Board is also cognizant of the Veteran's lack of cooperation in this regard as well. The Veteran has not been shown to possess the requisite training or credentials needed to render a medical diagnosis, and without such supporting documentation, his statements are of little probative value. See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494-95 (1992); see also Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir 2007) (holding that a layperson may provide competent evidence to establish a diagnosis where the lay person is "competent to identify the medical condition"). The Board finds the psychiatric disorder of depression too complicated to lend itself to lay diagnosis or lay attribution to another disability, in this case tinnitus. The competent and credible evidence of record does not show that the Veteran's depression began in service or is in any way related to service or to any service-connected disability. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt rule is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 54-56 (1990). The claim is denied. Duty to Notify and Duty to Assist The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) imposes obligations on VA in terms of its duty to notify and assist claimants. When VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, it is required to notify the claimant and the representative, if any, or any information and medical or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2009); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). In Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004), the Court held that VA must (1) inform the claimant about the information and evidence not of record that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) inform the claimant about the information and evidence that VA will seek to provide; and (3) inform the claimant about the information and evidence the claimant is expected to provide. The Board finds that the VCAA notice requirements have been satisfied by the March 2003, April 2004, March 2006, January 2008 and February 2009 letters. In these letters, the Veteran, and his representative, was informed of the evidence necessary to substantiate the claim for service connection. The letters informed the Veteran that in order to substantiate a claim for service connection, the evidence needed to show he had a current disability, a disease or injury in service, and evidence of a nexus between the post service disability and the disease or injury in service, which is usually shown by medical records or medical opinions. As to informing the Veteran of which information and evidence he was to provide to VA and which information and evidence VA would attempt to obtain on his behalf, VA informed him it had a duty to obtain any records held by any federal agency. It also informed him that on his behalf, VA would make reasonable efforts to obtain records that were not held by a federal agency, such as records from private doctors and hospitals. Finally, the RO told the Veteran that he could obtain private records himself and submit them to VA. During the pendency of this appeal, in March 2006, the Court issued a decision in the consolidated appeal of Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), which held that the VCAA notice requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of a service connection claim. Those five elements include: (1) Veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the Veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. The Court held that the VCAA notice must include notice that a disability rating and an effective date of the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection was awarded. In the present appeal, a March 2006 letter to the Veteran included the type of evidence necessary to establish a disability rating and effective date for the disability on appeal. Although this notice was not issued before the rating decision on appeal, the Veteran has not been prejudiced, as the Veteran's pending claim is denied. A supplemental statement of the case (SSOC) was also issued to him in October 2008. See Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370 (2006). VA must also make reasonable efforts to assist the claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claim for the benefit sought, unless no reasonable possibility exists that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. In connection with the current appeal, VA has obtained the Veteran's service treatment records and VA outpatient treatment records. The state prison physician's orders spanning 1998 to 2003 were submitted by the Veteran. The Veteran was also afforded VA examinations in connection with his claim; however he failed to appear for the September 2008 examination and though he appeared for the June 2009 examination, he refused to cooperate with the examiner and refused to complete the examination. As well, the Veteran was sent notice in January 2008 with multiple VA Forms 21- 4142 for him to complete to obtain his state prison medical treatment records and any other medical treatment records. Neither the Veteran, nor his representative, responded to this letter. The Board notes that "[T]he duty to assist is not always a one-way street. If a veteran wishes help, he cannot passively wait for it in those circumstances where he may or should have information that is essential in obtaining the putative evidence." Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). For the foregoing reasons, the Board concludes that all reasonable efforts were made by VA to obtain evidence necessary to substantiate the claim. The evidence of record provides sufficient information to adequately evaluate the claim, and the Board is not aware of the existence of any additional relevant evidence which has not been accounted for. Therefore, no further assistance to the Veteran with the development of evidence is required. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(a)(2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(d); see Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). ORDER Service connection for depression, claimed as secondary to service-connected tinnitus, is denied. ____________________________________________ C. CRAWFORD Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs