Citation Nr: 1017045 Decision Date: 05/07/10 Archive Date: 05/19/10 DOCKET NO. 08-30 302 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Chicago, Illinois THE ISSUES 1. Whether new and material evidence has been presented to reopen a claim for service connection for residuals of a head injury, to include headaches and tinnitus. 2. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of a head injury, to include headaches and tinnitus. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include as secondary to headaches and tinnitus. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD W. Harryman, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active duty from April 1967 to March 1968. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a May 2007 decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Chicago, Illinois. This appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a)(2) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2009). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In June 2002, the RO issued a decision which determined that new and material evidence had not been presented to reopen the Veteran's claim for service connection for residuals of a head injury. Although provided notice of that decision that same month, the Veteran did not file an appeal. 2. Evidence associated with the claims file since the unappealed June 2002 rating decision raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the Veteran's claim for service connection for residuals of a head injury. 3. The evidence shows that the Veteran's headaches are due to a personality disorder, not to residuals of a head injury. 4. The evidence shows that the Veteran's tinnitus is not due to residuals of a head injury. 5. The evidence shows that the Veteran's various psychiatric manifestations are manifestations of a personality disorder, which is not a disability for VA purposes. 6. A current diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is not of record. 7. Service connection is not in effect for any disorder. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Evidence submitted to reopen the claim for service connection for residuals of a head injury, to include headaches and tinnitus, is new and material, and therefore, the claim is reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2009). 2. Residuals of a head injury, to include headaches and tinnitus, were not incurred in or aggravated by military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2009). 3. A psychiatric disorder was not incurred in or aggravated by military service, nor is it the result of or proximately due to a service-connected disorder. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.310 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Pursuant to the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2009). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and medical or lay evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). This notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the RO. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). In claims to reopen, VA must both notify a claimant of the evidence and information that is necessary to reopen the claim and notify the claimant of the evidence and information that is necessary to establish entitlement to the underlying claim for the benefit that is being sought. Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006). To satisfy this requirement, VA is required to look at the bases for the denial in the prior decision and to provide the claimant with a notice letter that describes what evidence would be necessary to substantiate those elements required to establish service connection that were found insufficient in the previous denial. In this case, the notice letter provided to the Veteran in June 2006 included the criteria for reopening his previously denied claim, the criteria for establishing service connection, and information concerning why the claim was previously denied. Moreover, the June 2006 letter to the Veteran notified him of the elements for setting effective dates and the assignment of disability evaluations. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006); see also Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that where notice was not provided prior to the RO's initial adjudication, this timing problem can be cured by the Board remanding for the issuance of a VCAA notice followed by readjudication of the claim by the RO); see also Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006) (finding that the issuance of a fully compliant VCAA notification followed by readjudication of the claim, such as a statement of the case or supplemental statement of the case, is sufficient to cure a timing defect). Further, the purpose behind the notice requirement has been satisfied because the Veteran has been afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his claim, to include the opportunity to present pertinent evidence, including at a hearing. Simmons v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 892, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that although VCAA notice errors are presumed prejudicial, reversal is not required if VA can demonstrate that the error did not affect the essential fairness of the adjudication). As for the Veteran's claim to reopen, the VCAA explicitly provides that "[n]othing in [38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A] shall be construed to require [VA] to reopen a claim that has been disallowed except when new and material evidence is presented or secured, as described in [38 U.S.C.A. § 5108]." 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(f). Nevertheless, VA has a duty, in order to assist claimants, to obtain evidence needed to substantiate a claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. The Veteran's service treatment records and identified VA and private medical treatment records have been obtained. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. The Veteran has been afforded examinations by three examiners in conjunction with the current appeal, and the reports of those examinations fully assess his current conditions and provide medical opinions that address all questions raised in this case. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 307 (2007). The Board concludes, therefore, that further examinations are unnecessary in this matter. Finally, there is no indication in the record that additional evidence relevant to the issues decided herein is available and not part of the claims file. See Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). As there is no indication that any failure on the part of VA to provide additional notice or assistance reasonably affects the outcome of this case, the Board finds that any such failure is harmless. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 537, 542-43 (2006); see also Dingess/Hartman, 19 Vet. App. 473. Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Service connection may also be granted for any disease initially diagnosed after service, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d); Cosman v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 503, 505 (1992). In order to prevail on the issue of service connection there must be medical evidence of a current disability; medical evidence, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in- service occurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and medical evidence of a nexus between an in-service injury or disease and the current disability. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); see also Pond v. West, 12 Vet App. 341, 346 (1999). Service connection may also be established on a secondary basis for a disability which is proximately due to or the result of service-connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). Establishing service connection on a secondary basis requires evidence sufficient to show (1) that a current disability exists and (2) that the current disability was either (a) proximately caused by or (b) proximately aggravated by a service-connected disability. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995) (en banc). Where a service-connected disability aggravates a nonservice- connected condition, a veteran may be compensated for the degree of disability (but only that degree) over and above the degree of disability existing prior to the aggravation. Temporary or intermittent flare-ups of symptoms of a condition, alone, do not constitute sufficient evidence aggravation unless the underlying condition worsened. Cf. Davis v. Principi, 276 F. 3d 1341, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Hunt v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 292, 297 (1991). New and Material Evidence A rating decision becomes final and is not subject to revision on the same factual basis unless a notice of disagreement and substantive appeal are filed within the applicable time limits. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.302, 20.1103 (2009). If a claim has been previously denied and that decision is final, the claim can be reopened and reconsidered only if new and material evidence is presented with respect to that claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108. If the claim is so reopened, it will be reviewed on a de novo basis. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105; Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 273 (1996); Manio v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 140 (1991). New evidence means existing evidence not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). A rating decision in August 1974 denied service connection for residuals of a head injury on the basis that no such residuals were found at the time of the Veteran's separation examination. The Veteran was notified of that decision and did not appeal. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105. In April 1984, the RO notified the Veteran that the time for appealing the previous denial had expired and that, in order to reopen the claim, he needed to submit new and material evidence. The letter indicated that no further action would be taken on his claim until he submitted the additional evidence. The Veteran disagreed with that determination, and he was furnished a statement of the case; but the Veteran did not submit a substantive appeal within one year. Id. In May 1998, the RO again wrote the Veteran to notify him that his claim could be reconsidered only if he submitted material evidence that was not previously considered. The Veteran did not respond to that letter by submitting additional evidence or by appealing that determination. Id. A rating decision in June 2002 found that new and material evidence had not been submitted to reopen the claim of entitlement to service connection for residuals of a head injury. The Veteran was notified of that decision, and did not appeal. Accordingly, that decision is final. Id. In May 2006, the Veteran submitted a claim to reopen the issue of entitlement to service connection for residuals of a head injury. Although the RO found that new and material evidence had been submitted to reopen this claim, that decision is not binding on the Board. The Board must first decide whether evidence has been received that is both new and material to reopen the claim. Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1996); McGinnis v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 239 (1993) (Board reopening is unlawful when new and material evidence has not been submitted). The evidence that was of record and considered at the time of the final rating decision in June 2002 included the Veteran's service treatment records, VA treatment records dated from 1984 through 1991, private treatment records dated from 1985 through 1987, and the reports of VA compensation examinations in October 1987, May 1991, and October 2001. The evidence added to the record since the June 2002 rating decision was not considered by the RO at that time, despite the fact that the March 2000 VA hospital summary was constructively of record at that time. See Bell v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 611 (1992). However, the additional evidence relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim - evidence of a current disability that is alleged to relate to service. The Board finds that the additional evidence is neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the June 2002 rating decision and that it raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. Therefore, the claim of entitlement to service connection for residuals of a head injury, to include headaches and tinnitus, is reopened. Residuals of a Head Injury The Veteran's service treatment records show that the Veteran was hospitalized for four days for observation in January 1968 following his being struck in the right forehead area with a cue ball. He initially developed a large swelling in the right forehead area and complained of severe headaches. There was no loss of consciousness and the neurological examination remained normal. Post-concussion syndrome was diagnosed. The Veteran was temporarily placed on limited duty. The service treatment records also show that the Veteran was evaluated in October 1967 because of a desire to leave the service. A psychiatrist diagnosed chronic passive aggressive reaction, which existed prior to service. The examiner indicated that if the Veteran failed to function as an effective soldier after a period of rehabilitation, he should be administratively separated. In January 1968, after the above hospitalization, another psychiatrist evaluated the Veteran and drew a similar conclusion, diagnosing passive aggressive personality, and recommended administrative separation. In March 1968, the Veteran was discharged from military service under honorable conditions. VA clinic records dated in February 1984 note the Veteran's report that he had taken Tylenol #3 for headaches since the head trauma during service. He was hospitalized at a VA facility in April 1984 for evaluation of the headaches. The summary of the hospitalization notes the history of the in- service head injury. The examiner also noted that the Veteran was then under tremendous financial stress. The neurological evaluation, which included a brain scan, was completely negative. A diagnosis of muscle contraction headaches was assigned. Private treatment records dated in August 1985 show that an examiner noted nervous tension and prescribed Valium. In June and July 1987, the Veteran reported having constant headaches and indicated that he was given Valium by VA. A private psychiatrist evaluated the Veteran in August 1987 and diagnosed antisocial personality disorder, probable drug abuse, and a significant degree of anxiety and nervousness. A private clinical psychologist evaluated the Veteran in March 1988. That examiner noted the Veteran's reported history of having sustained as many as 10-12 concussions in his lifetime from beatings, car accidents, and fights. The examiner indicated that the concussion had left the Veteran with markedly slow information processing skills and emotional lability. The examiner diagnosed organic brain syndrome, which was the result of the numerous noted concussions, as well as severe antisocial personality disorder. Another VA compensation examination was conducted in October 1987. The Veteran reported that since his separation from service, he had been anxious, got into fights, and easily became frustrated and angered. He also indicated that he had severe headaches. The examiner diagnosed organic anxiety disorder. VA clinic examiners from September 1987 to January 1991 related the Veteran's headaches to either muscle tension or anxiety. A VA psychiatric compensation examination was conducted in May 1991. The examiner discussed the Veteran's history in detail and diagnosed antisocial type personality disorder, by history, and intermittent explosive personality, by history. The examiner stated that the Veteran's history of anxiety symptoms and tension headaches was secondary to the described "personality and adjustment and social problems" and that there was no evidence of organic brain syndrome. A March 2000 hospitalization summary indicates that the Veteran was treated primarily for unrelated conditions. The list of diagnoses, however, included recurrent major depression, without further comment. In October 2001, a VA physician indicated that the Veteran was being treated for a recurrent psychotic depressive disorder. In October 2006, a VA psychologist reviewed the claims file and evaluated the Veteran. The examiner diagnosed depressive disorder, not otherwise specified, and antisocial personality disorder. The examiner commented that although the Veteran reported having experienced headaches several times a week since the in-service head injury, he did not report a change in the severity or frequency of his depressed mood secondary to the physical discomfort or restricted physical functioning. The examiner therefore indicated that it was less likely than not that the Veteran's depression was due to the head trauma in service. The examiner further opined that the Veteran's functional impairment was primarily the result of his antisocial personality disorder. A VA neurological compensation examination was conducted in November 2006. That examiner also discussed in detail the Veteran's history as set forth in the claims file. The examiner noted a minimal degree of lower extremity spasticity and impaired upper limb motor control. The diagnoses also included nonspecific behavior-related headache and personality disorder. The examiner provided rationale for concluding that the noted neurological findings could not be the result of any service related events, including the cue ball incident. The examiner added that the Veteran's headaches were a component of his personality disorder. Finally, the Veteran was examined by a VA audiologist in November 2006 regarding his claim for service connection for tinnitus as a residual of the in-service head injury. The examiner reviewed the claims file, noting in particular that the injury was to the Veteran's forehead and that there was no mention of reported tinnitus in the service treatment records. The examiner concluded that in light of the presence of normal hearing at separation, the absence of evidence of tinnitus during service, and normal skull x-rays during service, there was no indication that any current tinnitus was related to service. Although the Veteran contends that he has had headaches ever since his head injury in service, the vast majority of the examiners who have addressed the issue have attributed the headaches to aspects of the Veteran's antisocial personality disorder, which the service treatment records document was manifested in service. Examiners have stated that the headaches are due to muscle tension or anxiety, while other examiners indicated that those latter manifestations are themselves due to the Veteran's personality disorder. A personality disorder, however, is not a disability within the meaning of applicable legislation for VA benefits. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c). Additionally, there is no medical evidence linking the Veteran's headaches to the incident of head trauma noted in service. In fact, examiners have specifically indicated that the headaches were not due to the head trauma. The Veteran has stated and testified before the Board that he complained of headaches while he was hospitalized in service following the in-service head injury, indicating that his current headaches are due to that injury. However, only persons with medical training are competent to make medical diagnoses or to provide a competent opinion as to the etiology of a disorder. Accordingly, the Veteran's statements in this regard are entitled to no probative weight. See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). The Veteran testified at his hearing before the Board that he complained of tinnitus at the time of the hospitalization in Germany during service following the inservice head injury. However, the service treatment records do not document any such complaints. Further, none of the post-service treatment or examination records indicate that the Veteran complained of tinnitus until his most recent claim. Moreover, the VA audiologist who examined him in November 2006, noting the clinical findings recorded at the time of the in-service injury, as well as the absence of any complaint of tinnitus in the medical reports of record, opined that the Veteran's current tinnitus was not related to service. Again, in light of the unfavorable medical evidence regarding this issue, the Board accords the Veteran's lay statements as to the etiology of his current tinnitus, little, if any, probative value. For all the foregoing reasons, the claim for service connection for residuals of a head injury, to include headaches and tinnitus, must be denied. There is no evidence of record of a chronic residual of the in-service head injury, to include headaches and tinnitus. In reaching this conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for residuals of a head injury, to include headaches and tinnitus, that doctrine is not applicable in the current appeal. 38 U.S.C.A. 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1991); Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996). Psychiatric Disorder As discussed above, the post-service treatment and examination reports have listed several psychiatric diagnoses, including depression. Although the Veteran contends that his depression is due to the incident in service, the medical evidence indicates that it is not. Psychiatric examiners have repeatedly stated that the Veteran's various psychiatric manifestations - anxiety, depression, and headaches - are manifestations of his personality disorder. A personality disorder, however, is not a disability within the meaning of applicable legislation for VA benefits. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c). The Veteran has also contended that his depression is due to his headaches and tinnitus. Again, the medical evidence shows that all of those manifestations are due to his personality disorder. Moreover, because service connection for headaches and tinnitus has been denied, and therefore, service connection is not in effect for any disorder, service connection on a secondary basis is not warranted. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. Finally, at his hearing before the Board, the Veteran raised the issue of entitlement to service connection for PTSD, contending that, at the time of the in-service head injury, he feared for his life. The Veteran's claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder must necessarily include any other psychiatric disorder shown by the record. See Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009); see also Ephraim v. Brown, 82 F.3d 399 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The record shows that the Veteran has been treated and evaluated for psychiatric problems since at least 1984. Numerous physicians and other examiners have considered the issue and were cognizant of the Veteran's head injury in service. But no examiner has diagnosed PTSD, indicated that any of his psychiatric symptoms might be related to PTSD, or even discussed PTSD. In light of that evidence, the Board finds that a remand to obtain another examination to determine whether the Veteran has PTSD is not needed. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4) (2009); see also McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). As set forth above, service connection requires a current disability. See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223 (1992). Therefore, because there is no medical evidence that the Veteran currently has or has ever had PTSD, service connection for PTSD must also be denied. In reaching this decision the Board considered the doctrine of reasonable doubt, however, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include a secondary to a service connected disorder, the doctrine is not for application. Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 56. ORDER New and material evidence having been presented, the claim for service connection for residuals of a head injury, to include headaches and tinnitus, is reopened. Service connection for residuals of a head injury, to include headaches and tinnitus, is denied. Service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include as secondary to a service-connected disorder, is denied. ____________________________________________ JOY A. MCDONALD Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs