Citation Nr: 1019340 Decision Date: 05/25/10 Archive Date: 06/09/10 DOCKET NO. 07-12 582 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Paul, Minnesota THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to an initial evaluation in excess of 30 percent for depressive disorder with anxious mood, prior to January 24, 2007. 2. Entitlement to an initial evaluation in excess of 50 percent for depressive disorder with anxious mood, from January 24, 2007, to December 8, 2009. 3. Entitlement to an initial evaluation in excess of 70 percent for depressive disorder, with anxious mood, from December 8, 2009. 4. Entitlement to a total disability rating for compensation purposes based on individual unemployability (TDIU). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD K. Marenna, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The appellant had active service from July 1986 to November 1986 and from November 1990 to June 1991. These matters come before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a June 2006 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Paul, Minnesota, which granted service connection for depressive disorder, not otherwise specified with anxious mood, effective October 29, 2004. An April 2007 rating decision granted an evaluation of 50 percent, effective January 24, 2007. A January 2010 rating decision granted an evaluation of 70 percent, effective December 8, 2009. The appellant's claim for a higher initial evaluation for a depressive disorder with anxious mood was construed by the RO as a claim for an increased rating. The appellant was granted service connection for a depressive disorder with anxious mood in the June 2006 rating decision. The rating decision was mailed to the appellant in August 2006 with a VA Form 4107, Your Rights to Appeal Our Decision, which explained the appellant's rights to appeal the rating decision. To file an appeal, an appellant must file a notice of disagreement within one year of the date that notice of the rating decision was provided to the claimant. 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(b) (2009). In a January 2007 statement, the appellant's representative stated that the appellant requested an increase in the service-connected mood disorder as the condition had become worse. As the statement was filed within one year of issuance of notice of the June 2006 rating decision and the appellant requested an increased rating, the Board construes the statement as a notice of disagreement. A substantive appeal was received within 60 days of issuance of a statement of the case in January 2008. Therefore, the issue before the Board is whether the appellant is entitled to a higher initial evaluation for depressive disorder with anxious mood. The appellant's claim for a higher initial evaluation for his service-connected depressive disorder with anxious mood was previously before the Board in May 2009 and was remanded for further development to comply with VA's duty to assist. As will be discussed below, the Board finds that the there has been substantial compliance with the remand and will proceed to adjudicate the appeal. See Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141 (1999) (noting that a remand is not required under Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998) where the Board's remand instructions were substantially complied with), aff'd, Dyment v. Principi, 287 F.3d 1377 (2002). The issue of entitlement to TDIU is addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and is REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Prior to January 24, 2007, the appellant's depressive disorder with anxious mood was manifested by complaints of a depressed mood, anxiety, and sleep impairment. The evidence of record indicates that the veteran has normal speech, no deficits in comprehension, intelligence, or judgment, with a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score indicating moderate impairment upon VA examination. 2. From January 24, 2007, to December 8, 2009, the appellant's depressive disorder with anxious mood was manifested by anxiety, panic attacks, depressed mood and sleep impairment. The evidence of record indicates the appellant had normal speech and memory, and comprehension, with a GAF score indicating moderate impairment upon VA examination. 3. From December 8, 2009, the appellant's depressive disorder with anxious mood was manifested by anxiety, depressed mood, difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances, and panic attacks. The appellant's speech, thought process and thought content were unremarkable, with no deficits in intelligence, memory or judgment. The appellant had a GAF score indicating moderate impairment upon VA examination. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for entitlement to an initial evaluation in excess of 30 percent for depressive disorder, not otherwise specified, with anxious mood, prior to January 24, 2007, have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 5103A, 5107(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 4.126, 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9435 (2009). 2. The criteria for entitlement to an initial evaluation in excess of 50 percent for depressive disorder, not otherwise specified, with anxious mood, from January 24, 2007, to December 8, 2009, have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 5103A, 5107(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 4.126, 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9435 (2009). 3. The criteria for entitlement to an initial evaluation in excess of 70 percent for depressive disorder, not otherwise specified, with anxious mood, from December 8, 2009, have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 5103A, 5107(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 4.126, 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9435 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Board has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence in the appellant's claims folder. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, the evidence submitted by the appellant or on his behalf. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). The analysis below focuses on the most salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claim. The appellant must not assume that the Board has overlooked pieces of evidence that are not explicitly discussed herein. See Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122 (2000) (the law requires only that the Board address its reasons for rejecting evidence favorable to the appellant). The Board must assess the credibility and weight of all evidence, including the medical evidence, to determine its probative value, accounting for evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and providing reasons for rejecting any evidence favorable to the claimant. Equal weight is not accorded to each piece of evidence contained in the record; every item of evidence does not have the same probative value. When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the appellant prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against a claim, in which case, the claim is denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA) VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions as to the appellant's claim for entitlement to an increased disability rating for depressive disorder, with anxious mood. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326 (2009). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2009); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Proper VCAA notice must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). VCAA notice should be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on a claim. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004); see also Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Because the June 2006 rating decision granted the appellant's claim for service connection for depressive disorder with anxious mood, such claim is now substantiated. His filing of a notice of disagreement as to the June 2006 rating decision does not trigger additional notice obligations under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a). 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(3) (2009). Rather, the appellant's appeal as to the initial rating assignment here triggers VA's statutory duties under 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5104 and 7105, as well as regulatory duties under 38 C.F.R. § 3.103. As a consequence, VA is only required to advise the appellant of what is necessary to obtain the maximum benefit allowed by the evidence and the law. This has been accomplished here, as will be discussed below. The January 2008 statement of the case (SOC), under the heading "Pertinent Laws; Regulations; Rating Schedule Provisions," set forth the relevant diagnostic code (DC) for rating the disability at issue (38 C.F.R. § 4.87, DC 6204), and included a description of the rating formulas for all possible schedular ratings under this diagnostic code. The appellant was thus informed of what was needed not only to achieve the next-higher schedular rating, but also to obtain all schedular ratings above that assigned. Therefore, the Board finds that the appellant has been informed of what was necessary to achieve a higher rating for the service- connected disability at issue. All the VCAA requires is that the duty to notify is satisfied, and that claimants are given the opportunity to submit information and evidence in support of their claims. Once this has been accomplished, all due process concerns have been satisfied. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993); Sutton v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 553 (1996). The Board finds the VCAA notice requirements have been met in this case. The Board also concludes VA's duty to assist has been satisfied. The appellant's service treatment records and VA medical records are in the file. The appellant has at no time referenced outstanding records that he wanted VA to obtain or that he felt were relevant to the claims. In the March 2009 Board hearing, the appellant indicated that he had applied for and been denied benefits from the Social Security Administration (SSA). He stated that he applied for benefits for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and bi- polar disorder. Both conditions are not service-connected and unrelated to the disability currently on appeal before the Board. There is no indication that the records in possession of the SSA are relevant to the instant claim. The Board concludes that the duty to assist does not require the appellant's SSA records to be associated with the file. See Loving v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 96, 102 (2005) (noting that the Secretary has a duty to assist in obtaining relevant and adequately identified records). The duty to assist includes, when appropriate, the duty to conduct a thorough and contemporaneous examination of the appellant. Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 121 (1991). In addition, where the evidence of record does not reflect the current state of the appellant's disability, a VA examination must be conducted. Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589 (1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.327(a) (2009). The RO provided the appellant with an appropriate VA examination in December 2009, as requested in the May 2009 Board remand. The appellant was also seen for VA examinations in June 2006 and March 2007. The appellant has not reported receiving any recent treatment specifically for this condition (other than at VA treatment mentioned above, records of which are in the file), and there are no records suggesting an increase in disability has occurred as compared to the prior VA examination findings. There is no objective evidence indicating that there has been a material change in the severity of the appellant's service-connected disorder since he was last examined. 38 C.F.R. § 3.327(a). The duty to assist does not require that a claim be remanded solely because of the passage of time since an otherwise adequate VA examination was conducted. VAOPGCPREC 11-95. The June 2006, March 2007, and December 2009 VA examination reports are thorough and supported by VA outpatient treatment records. The examinations in this case are adequate upon which to base a decision. As there is no indication that any failure on the part of VA to provide additional notice or assistance reasonably affects the outcome of this case, the Board finds that any such failure is harmless. See Newhouse v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2007). II. Initial Rating for Depressive Disorder with Anxious Mood Disability evaluations are determined by comparing a veteran's present symptomatology with criteria set forth in VA's Schedule for Rating Disabilities, which is based on average impairment in earning capacity. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1155 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. Part 4 (2009). When a question arises as to which of two ratings applies under a particular diagnostic code, the higher evaluation is assigned if the disability more closely approximates the criteria for the higher rating. 38 C.F.R. § 4.7. Otherwise, the lower rating will be assigned. Id. After careful consideration of the evidence, any reasonable doubt remaining is resolved in favor of the appellant. Id. § 4.3. An appeal from the initial assignment of a disability rating, such as the appeals in this case, requires consideration of the entire time period involved, and contemplates staged ratings where warranted. See Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119 (1999). The appellant was awarded service connection and granted a 30 percent evaluation for depressive disorder, not otherwise specified with anxious mood, effective October 29, 2004, by the June 2006 rating decision. The appellant's disability evaluation for depressive disorder, not otherwise specified, with anxious mood was then increased to 50 percent disabling, effective January 24, 2007, by an April 2007 rating decision. The January 2010 rating decision granted an evaluation of 70 percent for depressive disorder, not otherwise specified, with anxious mood, effective December 8, 2009. The Court has held that a "decision awarding a higher rating, but less than the maximum available benefit . . . does not . . . abrogate the pending appeal . . . ." AB v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 35, 38 (1993). Thus, the appellant's appeal of the assigned disability evaluation for depressive disorder, not otherwise specified with anxious mood continues. When evaluating a mental disorder, the rating agency shall consider the frequency, severity, and duration of psychiatric symptoms, length of remissions, and a veteran's capacity for adjustment during periods of remission. 38 C.F.R. § 4.126(a). The rating agency shall assign an evaluation based on all the evidence of record that bears on occupational and social impairment rather than solely on the examiner's assessment of the level of disability at the moment of the examination. Id. However, when evaluating the level of disability from a mental disorder, the rating agency will consider the extent of social impairment, but shall not assign an evaluation solely on the basis of social impairment. 38 C.F.R. § 4.126(b). A mood disorder, not otherwise specified, is rated under 38 C.F.R. § 9413 (2009) and is subject to the criteria listed under the General Rating Formula for Mental Disorders. VA's Schedule for rating mental disorders reads, in pertinent part, as follows: A 30 percent rating is warranted for occupational and social impairment with occasional decrease in work efficiency and intermittent periods of inability to perform occupational tasks (although generally functioning satisfactorily, with routine behavior, self-care, and conversation normal), due to such symptoms as: depressed mood, anxiety, suspiciousness, panic attacks (weekly or less often), chronic sleep impairment, mild memory loss (such as forgetting names, directions, recent events). A 50 percent evaluation is warranted for occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity due to such symptoms as: flattened affect; circumstantial, circumlocutory, or stereotyped speech; panic attacks more than once a week; difficulty in understanding complex commands; impairment of short- and long-term memory (e.g., retention of only highly learned material, forgetting to complete tasks); impaired judgment; impaired abstract thinking; disturbances of motivation and mood; and difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships. A 70 percent rating under Diagnostic Code 9413 is warranted when the evidence shows occupation and social impairment, with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood, due to such symptoms as suicidal ideation; obsessional rituals which interfere with routine activities; speech intermittently illogical, obscure, or irrelevant; near-continuous panic or depression affecting the ability to function independently, appropriately and effectively; impaired impulse control; spatial disorientation; neglect of personal appearance and hygiene; difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances; and occupation and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, or mood. To warrant the next-higher 100 percent rating (the maximum schedular rating), the evidence must show total occupational and social impairment, due to such symptoms as: gross impairment in thought processes or communication; persistent delusions or hallucinations; grossly inappropriate behavior; persistent danger of hurting self or others; intermittent inability to perform activities of daily living (including maintenance of minimal personal hygiene); disorientation to time or place; memory loss for names of close relatives, own occupation or own name. Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) is a scale reflecting the psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health illness. See Carpenter v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 240, 242 (1995); see also Richard v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 266, 267 (1996) (citing DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 32 (4th ed. 1994)) (DSM-IV). According to DSM-IV, a GAF score of 61 to 70 indicates the examinee has some mild symptoms or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning, but generally functions pretty well with some meaningful interpersonal relationships. A GAF score of 51 to 60 indicates the examinee has moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. A GAF score of 41 to 50 indicates the examinee has serious symptoms or a serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning. A GAF score of 31 to 40 indicates the examinee has some impairment in reality testing or communication or major impairment in several areas, such as work or school. A GAF score of 21 to 30 indicates that the examinee's behavior is considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations, has serious impairment in communication or judgment, or is unable to function in almost all areas of life. See also QUICK REFERENCE TO THE DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FROM DSM-IV, 46-47 (1994). A. Entitlement to an initial evaluation in excess of 30 percent, prior to January 24, 2007. The appellant contends that his service-connected depressive disorder with anxious mood was worse than the initial evaluation of 30 percent, prior to January 24, 2007. The Board has reviewed the evidence of record and finds that it does not support an evaluation in excess of 30 percent prior to January 2007. The evidence prior to January 2007 did not indicate the appellant had a flattened effect, or circumstantial, circumlocutory, or stereotyped speech. The June 2006 VA examination report reflects that the appellant had a normal affect and unremarkable speech. A September 2006 VA treatment record indicated the appellant had speech with a normal tone rate and volume. The appellant denied having panic attacks. There is no evidence the appellant had difficulty in understanding complex commands or that his short-term and long-term memory was impaired. He was able to do serial 7's and spell a word forward and backward. The appellant was intact as to person, time and place, and had an unremarkable thought process and thought content. The appellant did not have impaired judgment. The June 2006 VA examiner noted that the appellant understood the outcome of his behavior. However, the VA examination report indicates the appellant's judgment appears to be poor when he is upset. He did not have impaired abstract thinking. The appellant denied having suicidal or homicidal thoughts. A November 2006 VA treatment record reflects that the appellant had no significant depression, impulsivity or hypomania. The June 2006 VA examination report indicated the appellant did have difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships. The report notes that the appellant was frequently withdrawn and did not have close relationships with others. However, the overall weight of the evidence fails to reveal a disability picture more nearly approximated by the next-higher 50 percent evaluation for depressive disorder with anxious mood under Diagnostic Code 9435, prior to January 24, 2007. The June 2006 VA examination report reflects that the appellant had a GAF score of 60, indicating he had moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. The Board finds that the above reported GAF score supports no more than the assigned 30 percent evaluation prior to January 24, 2007. The June 2006 VA examination found that the appellant had a depressed mood, anxiety, and a sleep impairment. The appellant was able to maintain minimum personal hygiene, and did not have a problem with toileting, grooming, self-feeding, dressing, and traveling. He did have a moderate problem with household chores, shopping, and recreational activities. The appellant's symptoms were consistent with a 30 percent rating. As discussed above, the overall weight of the evidence fails to reveal a disability picture more nearly approximated by the next-higher 50 percent rating, prior to January 24, 2007. B. Entitlement to an initial evaluation in excess of 50 percent for depressive disorder with anxious mood, from January 24, 2007, to December 8, 2009. The appellant contends that his service-connected depressive disorder with anxious mood was worse than the initial evaluation of 50 percent, from January 24, 2007 to December 8, 2009. The Board has reviewed the evidence of record and finds that it does not support an evaluation in excess of the 50 percent. The March 2007 VA examination report indicates that the appellant denied having suicidal ideation or obsessive behavior. There is no evidence that appellant had speech that was intermittently illogical, obscure, or irrelevant. The March 2007 VA examination report reflects that the appellant's speech was unremarkable. The appellant did not have impaired impulse control. The March 2007 VA examiner noted that the appellant's impulse control was good, and that although he had previous episodes of violence, he now managed his impulses better. There is no evidence that the appellant had spatial disorientation. The March 2007 VA examination report reflects that the appellant was intact to person, time and place. He was able to interpret proverbs appropriately. An April 2008 VA treatment record indicated the appellant's memory and concentration were good, and his thoughts were goal directed with no delusion. The appellant was also clean and casually dressed at the March 2007 VA examination, and he had no problems with toileting, grooming, bathing, and dressing. An April 2008 VA treatment record indicates his grooming and personal hygiene were adequate. There is no evidence that the appellant's depression affected his ability to function independently, appropriately and effectively. The March 2007 VA examination report indicated that the appellant had panic attacks when he became extremely anxious and agitated in a situation. He would feel the need to escape. However, an April VA examination report indicates the appellant denied having panic attacks. A November 2008 VA treatment record indicates the appellant had a job where he interacted with people. The March 2007 VA examiner noted that the appellant reported he had stopped leaving the house if he could avoid it due to his problems dealing with crowds. A February 2008 VA treatment record indicates the appellant denied feeling hopeless or helpless. There is also evidence the appellant had difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances. The March 2007 VA examiner reported that in the past he had poor impulse control, but he would now avoid the stress. The evidence does not indicate that the appellant was unable to establish and maintain effective relationships. The March 2007 VA examiner reflects that the appellant met with a mentor and pastor once a week. A December 2007 VA treatment record indicates the appellant reported that he met with army buddies for dinner every few weeks. The April 2008 VA examination report indicated the appellant had a good relationship with his father. The April 2008 VA examination report reflects that the appellant had passive suicidal thoughts with no intent or plan. The March 2007 VA examination report reflects that the appellant had a GAF score of 55. The April 2008 VA examination report indicated his GAF score was 55. The April 2008 VA treatment record indicated his GAF score was 55-60. An October 2007 VA treatment record noted that the appellant's GAF score was 60. The GAF scores indicate the appellant had moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social or occupational functioning. The Board finds that the above reported GAF scores support no more than the assigned 50 percent evaluation from January 24, 2007, to December 8, 2009. The April 2008 VA examination report indicated the appellant had unremarkable speech and thoughts processes and a normal memory. Although the appellant had some problems with activities of daily living, the April 2008 VA examination report indicated his psychological condition had a slight effect on household chores, a moderate effect on shopping and recreational activities, and a severe effect on engaging in sports and exercise, but no effect on grooming, bathing, and driving. A February 2008 VA treatment record indicated the appellant's grooming and personal hygiene were adequate, his thoughts were goal oriented and his memory and concentration were good. A November 2008 VA treatment record indicated he had a job where he interacted with people. As discussed above, the overall weight of the evidence fails to reveal a disability picture more nearly approximated by the next-higher 70 percent rating, from January 24, 2007, to December 8, 2009. C. Entitlement to an initial evaluation in excess of 70 percent for depressive disorder, with anxious mood, from December 8, 2009. The January 2010 rating decision granted an evaluation of 70 percent for depressive disorder, not otherwise specified, with anxious mood, effective December 8, 2009, the date of the first medical evidence of worsening symptoms. The Board has reviewed the evidence of record and finds that it does not support an evaluation in excess of the 70 percent, from December 8, 2009. The appellant was seen for a VA examination in December 2009. The December 2009 VA examination report does not support an evaluation of 100 percent, the next-higher rating under 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9435. There is no evidence that appellant had gross impairment of thought processes or communication. The December 2009 VA examination report indicates the appellant's thoughts process, thought content, and speech were unremarkable. The December 2009 VA examination report reflects that the appellant did not have any delusions or hallucinations. There was no evidence the appellant was unable to perform activities of daily living, including maintenance of minimal personal hygiene. The December 2009 VA examination report noted that the appellant was clean and casually dressed. He had no problem with toileting, grooming, self-feeding, bathing, and dressing. The December 2009 VA examination report indicates the appellant's orientation was intact as to person, time and place. The appellant's remote, recent and immediate memory was normal. The appellant did not describe having grossly inappropriate behavior or indicate he was a persistent danger of hurting himself or others. The December 2009 VA examination report notes that the appellant had road rage fits where he wanted to kill on the road, but he controlled the urge. He would also lash out at others, including a good friend's wife. However, the December 2009 VA examination report does not indicate the appellant's behavior was grossly inappropriate or dangerous to himself or others. The December 2009 VA examination report reflects that the appellant had a GAF score of 55, indicating moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social or occupational functioning. The Board finds that the above reported GAF scores support no more than the assigned 70 percent evaluation from December 8, 2009. As discussed above, the evidence of record does not support a finding that the appellant is entitled to the next higher evaluation of 100 percent, from December 8, 2009. The December 2009 VA examination report indicated the appellant had symptoms such as panic attacks, and difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances, but did not indicate the appellant had total occupational and social impairment due to symptoms such as gross impairment in thought processes, persistent delusions, or grossly inappropriate behavior. Therefore, the Board finds the appellant is not entitled to an evaluation higher than 70 percent from December 8, 2009. Finally, the Board has also considered whether a referral for an extraschedular rating is warranted. See Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 111, 115 (2008). Initially, there must be a comparison between the level of severity and symptomatology of the claimant's service-connected disability with the established criteria found in the rating schedule for that disability. Under the approach prescribed by VA, if the criteria reasonably describe the claimant's disability level and symptomatology, then the claimant's disability picture is contemplated by the rating schedule; therefore, the assigned schedular evaluation is adequate, and no referral is required. See VAOPGCPREC 6-96; see also Fisher v. Principi, 4 Vet. App. 57, 60 (1993) (a threshold finding that the evidence before VA presents such an exceptional disability picture that the available schedular evaluations for that service-connected disability are inadequate is required for extraschedular consideration referral). The schedular evaluation for the appellant's depressive disorder with anxious mood is not inadequate. The appellant has not reported significant treatment, hospitalization or symptoms unaccounted for by the ratings schedule. There is no evidence the appellant's depressive disorder has interfered with his employment more than contemplated by the schedular ratings of 30, 50 and 70 percent, which provide for occupational and social impairment. As a result, it does not appear that the appellant has an "exceptional or unusual" disability status. He does not have any symptoms from his service-connected disorder that are unusual or are different from those contemplated by the schedular criteria. Therefore, the available schedular evaluations for that service-connected disability are adequate. Referral for extraschedular consideration is not warranted. See VAOPGCPREC 6-96. Further inquiry into extraschedular consideration is moot. See Thun, supra. As such, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the appellant's claims. Consequently, the benefit-of-the-doubt rule does not apply, and the claims must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55 (1990). ORDER Entitlement to an initial evaluation in excess of 30 percent for depressive disorder with anxious mood, prior to January 24, 2007, is denied. Entitlement to an initial evaluation in excess of 50 percent for depressive disorder with anxious mood, from January 24, 2007, to December 8, 2009, is denied. Entitlement to an initial evaluation in excess of 70 percent for depressive disorder, with anxious mood, from December 8, 2009, is denied. (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) REMAND An August 2008 rating decision denied the appellant's claim for entitlement to TDIU. The appellant received notice of the August 2008 rating decision later in August 2008. No appeal was taken within one year of the determination. Nevertheless, in an informal hearing presentation dated in March 2010, the Veteran's representative asserts that a claim of TDIU is inextricably intertwined with the increased initial staged rating issues on appeal. In this regard, the Board notes that in Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447 (2009), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (hereinafter, "the Court") held that a TDIU claim is part of an increased rating claim when such claim is raised by the record. The Court further held that when evidence of unemployability is submitted at the same time that the Veteran is appealing the initial rating assigned for a disability, the claim for TDIU will be considered part and parcel of the claim for benefits for the underlying disability. Id. In this case, the Board finds that a claim for a TDIU is raised by the record. Further, the Board also notes that a completed VA Form 21-8940, Veteran's Application for Increased Compensation Based on Unemployability, was received into the record in March 2010, without prior RO consideration. There has been no waiver of RO consideration of this additional evidence by the Veteran or his representative. As such, the Board finds that the issue of entitlement to a TDIU should be remanded for adjudication by the RO, prior to appellate consideration, with consideration of all evidence of record. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. Issue appropriate VCAA notice as to the issue of entitlement to TDIU. 2. Adjudicate the issue of entitlement to TDIU. Notice of the determination and the Veteran's appellate rights should be provided to the Veteran and his representative. The appellant should be informed that, if the benefit sought is not granted, he must timely file and complete an appeal in order to perfect an appeal of the TDIU issue to the Board. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.200, 20.202, and 20.302(b). If a timely substantive appeal is not filed, the claim should not be certified to the Board. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2009). _________________________________________________ U.R. POWELL Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs