Citation Nr: 1019720 Decision Date: 05/27/10 Archive Date: 06/09/10 DOCKET NO. 09-09 178 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Tampa, Florida THE ISSUE Entitlement to payment or reimbursement of unauthorized medical expenses incurred at a private hospital on November 14, 2004. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Clifford R. Olson, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from September 1966 to September 1968. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an August 2005 decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center (MC) in Tampa, Florida. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Unauthorized medical expenses incurred at a private hospital on November 14, 2004 were not rendered in a medical emergency of such nature that delay would have been hazardous to life or health. 2. VA facilities were feasibly available to provide the unauthorized medical expenses incurred at a private hospital on November 14, 2004 and an attempt to use them before hand would not have been considered unreasonable by a prudent layperson. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for payment or reimbursement for unauthorized medical expenses incurred at a private hospital on November 14, 2004 have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1725, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 U.S.C.A. § 1725 (as in effect prior to October 10, 2008); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 17.120, 17.121, 17.1000, 17.1001, 17.1002 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Duty to Notify and Assist As provided for by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). There is some question as to whether VCAA applies to claims for payment or reimbursement of unauthorized medical expenses. In Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 394, 403-04 (2005), although not explicitly stated, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) appeared to assume that the VCAA was applicable to a Chapter 17 claim, but then held that the failure to comply with the VCAA notice requirements in that case constituted non-prejudicial error. Duty to Notify In this case, a notice that fully complied with the requirements of the VCAA was sent to the claimant in February 2007. Thereafter, he was afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his claim and given ample time to respond. This cured any notice defects before the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) readjudicated the case in June 2008. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006). Duty to Assist The Board also finds that all relevant facts have been properly developed, and that all evidence necessary for equitable resolution of the issue has been obtained. The VA records pertaining to the Veteran's entitlement and the private hospital records pertaining to the November 14, 2004 emergency room treatment have been obtained. Significantly, the appellant has not identified, and the record does not otherwise indicate, any additional existing evidence that is necessary for a fair adjudication of the claim that has not been obtained. Hence, no further notice or assistance to the appellant is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist the appellant in the development of the claim. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Criteria There are two programs providing for payment or reimbursement of unauthorized medical expenses. One program provides for payment or reimbursement for treatment of an adjudicated service-connected disability; or a non-service-connected disability associated with and held to be aggravating a service-connected disability; or any disability of a veteran who has a total disability, which is permanent in nature due to service-connected disability; or for any illness, injury, or dental condition in the case of a veteran who is a participant in a vocational rehabilitation program. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1728 (West 2002). The record shows the Veteran does not have any service-connected disabilities. Therefore, he does not qualify for payment or reimbursement under this program and its implementing regulations, 38 C.F.R. §§ 17.120, 17.121. As a person receiving regular health care at VA medical centers, the Veteran does meet the threshold requirement for payment or reimbursement under the other program, provided by the Veterans Millennium Health Care and Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C.A. § 1725 with implementing regulations at 38 C.F.R. § 17.1000 et seq. To be eligible for reimbursement under this authority the Veteran has to satisfy all of the following conditions: (a) The emergency services were provided in a hospital emergency department or a similar facility held out as providing emergency care to the public; (b) The claim for payment or reimbursement for the initial evaluation and treatment is for a condition of such a nature that a prudent layperson would have reasonably expected that delay in seeking immediate medical attention would have been hazardous to life or health (this standard would be met if there were an emergency medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) that a prudent layperson who possesses an average knowledge of health and medicine could reasonably expect the absence of immediate medical attention to result in placing the health of the individual in serious jeopardy, serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part); (c) A VA or other Federal facility/provider was not feasibly available and an attempt to use them before hand would not have been considered reasonable by a prudent layperson (as an example, these conditions would be met by evidence establishing that a Veteran was brought to a hospital in an ambulance and the ambulance personnel determined that the nearest available appropriate level of care was at a non-VA medical center); (d) The claim for payment or reimbursement for any medical care beyond the initial emergency evaluation and treatment is for a continued medical emergency of such a nature that the Veteran could not have been safely transferred to a VA or other Federal facility; (e) At the time the emergency treatment was furnished, the Veteran was enrolled in the VA health care system and had received medical services under authority of 38 U.S.C. Chapter 17 within the 24-month period preceding the furnishing of such emergency treatment; (f) The Veteran is financially liable to the provider of emergency treatment for that treatment; (g) The Veteran has no coverage under a health-plan contract for payment or reimbursement, in whole or in part, for the emergency treatment (this condition cannot be met if the Veteran has coverage under a health-plan contract but payment is barred because of a failure by the Veteran or provider to comply with the provisions of that health-plan contract, e.g., failure to submit a bill or medical records within specified time limits, or failure to exhaust appeals of the denial of payment). The provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 1725 were changed by legislation that became effective October 10, 2008. See Veterans' Mental Health and Other Care Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-387, 122 Stat. 4110 (2008). Specifically, the word "shall" in the first sentence replaced the word "may." This made the payment or reimbursement by VA mandatory and non-discretionary, if the requirements for such payment were satisfied. Under both versions, all of the conditions set out in the remainder of the statute must be met in order for VA to make payment or reimbursement. The provisions became effective when the law was signed on October 10, 2008. There was no specific effective date or applicability date indicated for the provision, but there is a general presumption against the retroactive effect of new statutes. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). Under both the former and revised versions of § 1725, the definition of the term "emergency treatment" was and is defined as medical services furnished, in the judgment of the Secretary, (1) when Department or other Federal facilities are not feasibly available and an attempt to use them beforehand would not be reasonable; (2) when such services are rendered in a medical emergency of such nature that a prudent layperson reasonably expects that delay in seeking immediate medical attention would be hazardous to life or health; and (3) until such time as the Veteran can be transferred safely to a Department facility. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1725(f)(1)(B). Also changed by the revision was how long emergency treatment continued, once the definition of "emergency treatment" was met. Under the former version, treatment is considered emergent until the Veteran is transferred safely to a Department facility or other Federal facility and such facility is capable of accepting such transfer. Under the revised version, "emergency treatment" is continued until (i) such time as the Veteran can be transferred safely to a Department facility or other Federal facility and such facility is capable of accepting such transfer; or (ii) such time as a Department facility or other Federal facility accepts such transfer if--(I) at the time the Veteran could have been transferred safely to a Department facility or other Federal facility, no such facility agreed to accept such transfer; and (II) the non-VA facility in which such medical care or services was furnished made and documented reasonable attempts to transfer the Veteran to a VA facility or other Federal facility. The length of treatment is not a matter in dispute here. The Board need not here determine whether § 1725 as revised effective October 10, 2008 is to be given retroactive effect. Whether the version effective prior to October 10, 2008 or the version effective since October 10, 2008 is applied, the result is the same in this case. Discussion The facts of this case are not in dispute. On November 13, 2004, the Veteran was injured in a motorcycle accident and received emergency treatment at the private hospital. That treatment is not in dispute. In the notice of disagreement, the hospital explained that the Veteran received a sprain of the neck along with contusions and abrasions. He was then released from the hospital. The following day, November 14, 2004, he was experiencing continued neck pain. He returned to the hospital emergency room. He was treated, tests were done, and he was released for follow-up with his primary health care provider-VA. The claim is for emergency room services and computerized tomography scans done at the private hospital on November 14, 2004. Reimbursement requires that the services being reimbursed be incurred in an emergency. There is nothing here that indicates the services incurred on November 14, 2004 were incurred in an emergency. The private hospital emergency room records show that the Veteran came from home and was ambulatory. His chief complaint was neck pain characterized as dull and mild. Computerized tomography studies were done and showed no fracture. The emergency physician wrote that the Veteran was there for recheck/repeat neck X-rays. The priority was non-acute. He was discharged home with a diagnosis of cervical strain. There is nothing in these facts that could tack the emergency room visit on November 14, 2004 to the emergency of the previous day. The evidence does not describe a condition of such a nature that a prudent layperson would have reasonably expected that delay in seeking immediate medical attention would have been hazardous to life or health. There were no pains or other acute symptoms of sufficient severity that a prudent layperson who possesses an average knowledge of health and medicine could reasonably expect the absence of immediate medical attention to result in placing his health in serious jeopardy, serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. Simply, the evidence does not describe an emergency. The medical records in this case form a preponderance of evidence showing that the expenses at issue were not incurred in a medical emergency. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not applicable and the appeal must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F. 3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). ORDER Payment or reimbursement for unauthorized medical expenses incurred at a private hospital on November 4, 2004 is denied. ____________________________________________ J. A. MARKEY Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs