Citation Nr: 1030879 Decision Date: 08/17/10 Archive Date: 08/24/10 DOCKET NO. 05-07 127 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Atlanta, Georgia THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for dysthymic disorder, claimed as depression. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD William J. Jefferson III, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active military service from January 1995 to January 1999 and from April 1999 to April 2003. This appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) is from April and October 2004 decisions by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Atlanta, Georgia. Respectively, those decisions denied the Veteran's claims for service connection for depression and a left knee disorder. In a February 2008 decision, the Board also denied these claims, and the Veteran appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). In March 2009, during the pendency of the appeal to the Court, the Veteran's attorney and VA's Office of General Counsel - representing the Secretary of VA, filed a joint motion asking the Court to vacate the Board's decision regarding both claims and remand them for further development and readjudication in compliance with directives specified. That same month, the Court issued an order granting the joint motion for remand and returned the case to the Board. In June 2009, to comply with the terms of the Court-granted joint motion, the Board remanded the claims to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC). And a February 2010 decision, on remand, granted service connection for a left knee disorder - namely, patellofemoral syndrome, and assigned a 10 percent rating retroactively effective from June 4, 2004. Since the Veteran did not that initial rating and effective date for that disability, that claim is no longer in dispute. See Grantham v. Brown, 114 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (indicating he has to separately appeal these "downstream" issues). So the sole remaining claim concerns whether he also is entitled to service connection for dysthymic disorder, claimed as depression. In May 2010, the Board requested a medical expert opinion regarding this remaining claim from the Veterans Health Administration (VHA). The respondent submitted this opinion in July 2010. FINDING OF FACT It is just as likely as not the Veteran's dysthymia dates back to his military service, though not necessarily to the specific events and circumstances that he believes precipitated it. CONCLUSION OF LAW Resolving all reasonable doubt in his favor, the Veteran's dysthymia was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Duties to Notify and Assist Since the Board is granting the Veteran's claim, in full, there is no need to discuss whether there has been compliance with the duty-to-notify-and-assist provisions of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA) because even if, for the sake of argument, there has not been, this is ultimately inconsequential and, therefore, at most harmless, i.e., non-prejudicial error. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1102 (2009). See also Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009); Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Mayfield IV); Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006); and Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004) (Pelegrini II). Service Connection for Dysthymic Disorder Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Stated somewhat differently, service connection requires: (1) medical evidence of current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus (i.e., link) between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Service connection may be established either by showing direct service incurrence or aggravation or by using applicable presumptions, if available. Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Direct service connection generally requires evidence of a current disability with a relationship or connection to an injury or disease or some other manifestation of the disability during service. Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A disorder may be service connected if the evidence of record reveals the Veteran currently has a disorder that was chronic in service or, if not chronic, that was seen in service with continuity of symptomatology demonstrated subsequent to service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b); Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 494-97 (1997). Evidence relating the current disorder to service must be medical unless it concerns a disorder that may be competently demonstrated by lay observation. Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 495-97. For the showing of chronic disease in service, there is a required combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "chronic." 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Disorders diagnosed after discharge may still be service connected if all the evidence, including relevant service records, establishes the disorder was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Where the determinative issue involves medical causation or a medical diagnosis, there generally must be competent medical evidence to the effect that the claim is plausible; lay assertions regarding this usually are insufficient. Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). A layperson is generally incapable of opining on matters requiring medical knowledge. Routen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 183, 186 (1997). See also Bostain v. West, 11 Vet. App. 124, 127 (1998) citing Espiritu, 2 Vet. App. 494 (a layperson without the appropriate medical training and expertise is not competent to provide a probative opinion on a medical matter, to include a diagnosis of a specific disability and a determination of the origins of a specific disorder). Lay testimony is competent, however, to establish the presence of observable symptomatology and "may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection." Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994). When, for example, a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. In such cases, the Board is within its province to weigh that testimony and to make a credibility determination as to whether that evidence supports a finding of service incurrence and continuity of symptomatology sufficient to establish service connection. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007). Lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination, the benefit of the doubt is resolved in favor of the Veteran. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. As explained, the first and indeed perhaps most fundamental requirement for any service-connection claim is there must be competent evidence of the existence of the currently claimed disability. See Boyer, 210 F.3d at 1353; Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992) (service connection presupposes a current diagnosis of the condition claimed, to at least confirm the Veteran has it; without this minimum level of proof, there can be no valid claim). In December 2009, a VA clinician determined there was no evidence the Veteran had dysthymic disorder or depression; it was indicated, instead, that there was no clinical diagnosis. However, at the conclusion of a January 2005 VA mental disorders' examination, and according to the VHA medical expert opinion since obtained in July 2010, the Veteran's diagnosis is dysthymia. So resolving all reasonable doubt in his favor, see 38 C.F.R. § 3.102, there is the required confirmation he has this alleged condition. See Degmetich v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 208 (1995); 104 F.3d 1328, 1332 (1997) (holding that VA compensation only may be awarded to an applicant who has disability existing on the date of application, not for past disability). But see, too, McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007) (further clarifying that this requirement of current disability is satisfied when the claimant has disability at the time the claim for VA disability compensation is filed or during the pendency of the claim, and that a claimant may be granted service connection even though the disability resolves prior to VA's adjudication of the claim). Since there is the required diagnosis of dysthymia, the determinative issue is whether this condition is attributable to the Veteran's military service. See Watson v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 309, 314 (1993) ("A determination of service connection requires a finding of the existence of a current disability and a determination of a relationship between that disability and an injury or disease incurred in service."). See, too, Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000); D'Amico v. West, 209 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hibbard v. West, 13 Vet. App. 546, 548 (2000); and Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Veteran's service treatment records (STRs) show he was hospitalized for 5 days in May 1997 for suicidal ideation, with a several-month history of increased occupational, financial and relationship stressors. These stressors included dealing with carrying out his work duties, his pregnant wife with twins with a history of three miscarriages, and problems paying bills. Objective mental status evaluations found no evidence of psychosis, organicity, major mood or anxiety disorders. The diagnosis was partner-relational (relationship) problems and dependent traits. His STRs make no reference to any other pertinent complaints or treatment during the remainder of his service, including during re-enlistment examinations in December 1998 and April 1999. During a January 2005 VA compensation examination, the Veteran complained of depression and poor sleep - which he said made him see things off and on such as dead relatives and whispering. Objective findings indicated he had no impairment of thought process or communication. He also had no suicidal or homicidal ideas, plans, or intent. The diagnosis was dysthymic disorder and marital and financial problems. This VA examiner added that, although the Veteran had a dysthymic disorder, it appeared he was trying to exaggerate the severity of his symptoms. This VA examiner also stated the dysthymic disorder did not appear to be related to the one-time incident during service when, following a marital conflict, the Veteran made a suicidal statement or gesture and was admitted for observation and discharged with the conclusion that he did not suffer from any psychiatric disorder in May 1997. VA outpatient treatment records dated in February and September 2009 show diagnoses of depression. Following the appeal of the Veteran's claim for service connection for dysthymic disorder to the Court, in a Joint Motion by the contesting parties, it was recognized that the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) states "the essential feature of dysthymic disorder is a chronically depressed mood that occurs for most of the day more days than not for at least 2 years." DSM-IV 300.4, 345-49. So there was inherent conflict with the January 2005 VA compensation examiner's diagnosis of dysthymic disorder as unrelated to the Veteran's military service since his separation from service in April 2003 was within 2 years of that VA examiner's diagnosis in January 2005. Because of this contradiction, the Board remanded this case in June 2009 for that VA compensation examiner to reconcile his diagnosis of dysthymic disorder in light of this apparent discrepancy, considering the parameters set forth for this disorder recognized in the DSM-IV. However, apparently due to a transportation issue, the Veteran was unable to be seen again by this previous examiner, so an examination was performed instead by another VA compensation examiner at a different VA facility in December 2009. That examiner indicated he did not find clinical evidence of dysthymic disorder or depression. He said the Veteran offered various symptoms that were not consistent with dysthymic disorder or major depression, noting also that he did not find evidence of any other psychiatric disorder, either, so there was no diagnosis. But in May 2010, to try and obtain further comment regarding the merits of this case, the Board additionally obtained an expert medical opinion from the VHA. The respondent indicated in his July 2010 report that the Veteran meets the DSM-IV criteria for a diagnosis of dysthymic disorder (dysthymia) based on the fact that he reported subjective feelings of depression dating back to his time in the Army. Although the exact onset is not certain, given that there is no documentation on discharge from service about his mood, he may have had mood symptoms prior to his discharge, and the debated period is about a month period to have the duration of 2 years complete. The respondent then goes on to note that the Veteran's symptoms may have started anytime between 1999 and 2003 when he was discharged. He does not meet the criteria for a major depressive disorder, and does not appear to have met the criteria for this or posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) any time from the records reviewed. It appears from the records reviewed that his mood problems do not appear to be related to his suicide gesture in 1997 given the fact that there were no documented symptoms between 1997 and 2004, and he was supposedly with no symptoms on re-enlistment in 1999. And in response to the Board's question regarding the likelihood (very likely, as likely as not, or unlikely) this current diagnosis of dysthymia dates back to the Veteran's military service, which ended in April 2003, or is otherwise attributable to his service, including especially the earlier events in May 1997, this respondent concluded it is likely the Veteran's mood problems date back to his time in service in the military. However, added this respondent, it is not likely that his mood problems date back to 1997 (as also had been stated earlier in this report). In deciding whether the Veteran has current psychiatric disability - and specifically, dysthymia, due to his military service, it is the responsibility of the Board to weigh the evidence for and against the claim and decide where to give credit and where to withhold the same and, in so doing, accept certain medical opinions over others. Schoolman v. West, 12 Vet. App. 307, 310-11 (1999). The Federal Circuit Court has recognized the Board's "authority to discount the weight and probity of evidence in light of its own inherent characteristics and its relationship to other items of evidence." Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, there is no inherent reason for favoring one opinion over another concerning whether the Veteran has dythymia dating back to his military service or as a consequence of unfortunate events that occurred during his service, including especially in 1997. The opinions concerning this, for and against the claim, are about equally probative in certain respects versus others. Since, however, the opinion most recently obtained in July 2010 indicates the dysthymia dates back to his military service - albeit just, and does not stem from the unfortunate events and circumstances in 1997 that he believes precipitated it, there is sufficient evidence to grant the claim when resolving all reasonable doubt in his favor concerning the etiology of this condition and its potential relationship with his military service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. An absolutely accurate determination of etiology is not a condition precedent to granting service connection, nor is definite etiology or obvious etiology. See Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996). ORDER Service connection for dysthymic disorder, claimed as depression, is granted. ____________________________________________ KEITH W. ALLEN Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs