Citation Nr: 1031259 Decision Date: 08/19/10 Archive Date: 08/24/10 DOCKET NO. 04-00 522 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in North Little Rock, Arkansas THE ISSUES 1. Whether new and material evidence has been received to reopen a service connection claim for a cervical spine disability; and if so, entitlement to service connection. 2. Entitlement to service connection for a neurological disability of the left hand, claimed as secondary to Agent Orange exposure. WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD S. B. Mays, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from September 1966 to November 1967. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an April 2003 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Little Rock, Arkansas, that declined to reopen the Veteran's service connection claim for residuals of a cervical spine injury and denied service connection for a neurological disability of the left hand. In March 2004, the Veteran appeared at the RO and testified before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A copy of the hearing transcript is associated with the claims folder and has been reviewed. This case was previously before the Board in February 2005 and was remanded for further development. Then, in November 2005, the Board determined that new and material evidence had not been received to reopen a service connection claim for residuals of a cervical spine injury and denied service connection for a neurological disability of the left hand. The Veteran thereafter appealed the matter to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). In January 2008, the Court issued a judgment that vacated the November 2005 Board decision with respect to both claims and remanded the case for action in compliance with its Memorandum Decision. The Board remanded the case for development in accord with the Memorandum Decision in January 2008. The case was again remanded in May 2009, and has since returned to the Board for further appellate consideration. In a statement received in February 2009, the Veteran indicated that he wished to remove the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), as his appointed representative. In March 2010, VFW submitted a motion to the Board seeking withdrawal of representation, and in response, the undersigned Veterans Law Judge determined that VFW presented good cause to withdraw as the Veteran's representative pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.608 (2009). In the Veteran's February 2009 correspondence and subsequent correspondence received in April 2010, the Veteran did not indicate that he wished to appoint another representative; therefore the Board finds that he wishes to represent himself in this matter. The issue of whether new and material evidence has been received to reopen a service connection claim for schizophrenia has been raised by the record (see Veteran's statement received in February 2009). Review of the record shows that the RO granted pension benefits in August 1970 on account of the Veteran's psychiatric disability, but service connection for such disability was denied in August 1970 and then again in May 1971. The current new and material evidence claim for schizophrenia has not yet been adjudicated by the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ). The Board does not have jurisdiction over it, and it is referred to the AOJ for appropriate action. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. A January 1985 rating decision denied service connection for residuals of a cervical spine injury on the basis that such disability was not shown to be related to service; the Veteran did not file a timely appeal following appropriate notice, and that decision became final. 2. The Veteran petitioned to reopen his service connection claim for a cervical spine disability prior to August 29, 2001. 3. Evidence received since the January 1985 decision does not bear directly and substantially upon the specific matter under consideration, and is not so significant that it must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits of the Veteran's service connection for a cervical spine disability. 4. The Veteran served in the Republic of Vietnam. 5. Service discharge examination report is negative for a neurological disability of the left hand and an upper extremity abnormality; a neurological disability of the left hand was first noted years following separation from service, and a clear preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that the current neurological disability of the left hand is related to the Veteran's active military service, including herbicide exposure in Vietnam. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. A January 1985 rating decision denying service connection for residuals of a cervical spine injury is final. 38 U.S.C. § 4005 (1982); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 19.129, 19.192 (1984); 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 20.302, 20.1103 (2009). 2. Evidence received since the January 1985 rating decision that denied service connection for residuals of a cervical spine injury is not new and material, and the Veteran's service connection claim for a cervical spine disability is not reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2002). 3. A neurological disability of the left hand was not incurred in or aggravated by active service, nor may it be presumed to have been incurred therein. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1116 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. Duties to Notify and Assist As provided for by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2009). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. This notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ). Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). In addition, the notice requirements of the VCAA apply to all five elements of a service-connection claim, including: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the Veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Further, this notice must include information that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded. Id. at 486. Where the veteran files a claim to reopen a previously denied service connection issue, the appellant must be supplied with notice of the evidence and information necessary to reopen the claim for service connection, the evidence and information necessary to establish entitlement to the underlying claim, and a description of the exact reasons for the previous denial of the claim for service connection. See Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006). VCAA notice errors are presumed prejudicial unless VA shows that the error did not affect the essential fairness of the adjudication. To overcome the burden of prejudicial error, VA must show (1) that any defect was cured by actual knowledge on the part of the claimant; (2) that a reasonable person could be expected to understand from the notice what was needed; or, (3) that a benefit could not have been awarded as a matter of law. See Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881 (Fed. Cir. 2007). However, in the recent case, Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S.Ct. 1696 (2009), the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) held that the Federal Circuit's blanket presumption of prejudicial error in all cases imposed an unreasonable evidentiary burden upon VA. Rather, in Shinseki v. Sanders, the Supreme Court suggested that determinations concerning prejudicial error and harmless error should be made on a case-by-case basis. Id. As such, in conformance with the precedents set forth above, on appellate review the Board must consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether any potential VCAA notice errors are prejudicial to the claimant. VCAA notice was provided to the Veteran in March 2002, December 2002, August 2008, July 2009, October 2009, and December 2009. These letters informed the Veteran of what evidence was required to substantiate his claims, and of the Veteran's and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence. The notice requirements for new and material evidence claims set forth in Kent, supra, were collectively met by the August 2008, July 2009, and October 2009 notice letters. Thereafter, the claims were readjudicated by way of a February 2010 supplemental statement of the case. VA also has a duty to assist the veteran in the development of the claim. This duty includes assisting the Veteran in the procurement of service treatment records and pertinent treatment records and providing an examination when necessary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. Service entrance and discharge examination reports are of record, however the Veteran's service treatment records are unavailable. The RO requested such records and according to a September 1970 letter from the Service Department, it was unable to locate any of the Veteran's treatment records. The RO also requested 1969- 1970 treatment records from the Old Little Rock VA medical center, as well as any treatment records from the Muskogee VA Medical Center. Nevertheless, after thorough searches, these records were not located. Accordingly, the Board finds that any further efforts to obtain such records would be futile. The Board finds that all necessary development has been accomplished, and therefore appellate review may proceed without prejudice to the appellant. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). In addition to the service entrance and discharge reports, the claims folder contains treatment records from the VA Medical Center in Little Rock, Social Security Administration (SSA) records, as well as private medical evidence. The Veteran was afforded examinations for VA purposes in July 1970, June 1972, and July 1980; he also underwent an Agent Orange examination in September 2000, and neurological examinations in September 2008 and July 2009. Moreover, the Veteran was afforded a personal hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. Significantly, the Veteran has not identified, and the record does not otherwise indicate, any additional existing evidence that is necessary for a fair adjudication of the claim that has not been obtained. Hence, no further notice or assistance to the Veteran is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist the Veteran in the development of the claim. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). II. New and Material Evidence Claim Rating decisions are final and binding based on evidence on file at the time the claimant is notified of the decision and may not be revised on the same factual basis except by a duly constituted appellate authority. 38 C.F.R. § 3.104(a). The claimant has one year from notification of a RO decision to initiate an appeal by filing a notice of disagreement with the decision, and the decision becomes final if an appeal is not perfected within the allowed time period. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.160, 20.201, 20.302. In a January 1985 decision, the RO denied service connection for residuals of a cervical spine injury, and the Veteran was notified of that decision in the same month. The Board acknowledges the Veteran's argument advanced in April 2010 that he never received the January 1985 rating decision. There is nothing on file, however, indicating that January 1985 rating decision and notice letter were not mailed to his correct address of record. The notice letter indicates that VA Form 1-4107 (which explained the appellant's procedural and appeal rights) was enclosed. There is a presumption of regularity under which it is presumed that government officials "have properly discharged their official duties." United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926); Mindenhall v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 271, 274 (1994) (VA need only mail notice to the last address of record for the presumption to attach). This presumption of regularity in the administrative process may be rebutted only by "clear evidence to the contrary." Schoolman v. West, 12 Vet. App. 307, 310 (1999). Thus, the Board finds that the Veteran was properly notified of the January 1985 decision, as the record lacks clear evidence to rebut the presumption of administrative regularity. His mere assertion that he did not receive that rating decision is insufficient to rebut this presumption of regularity in the administrative process, and there has been no allegation or evidence of any clear and unmistakable error in that decision. 38 C.F.R. §3.105(a); Flash, 8 Vet. App. at 340. Therefore, as the Veteran did not file a timely appeal of the January 1985 rating decision, it became final. 38 U.S.C. § 4005 (1982); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 19.129, 19.192 (1984); 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 20.302, 20.1103 (2009). Since the January 1985 rating decision is final, the Veteran's service connection claim for residuals of a cervical spine injury may be considered on the merits only if new and material evidence has been received since the time of the prior adjudication. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7104 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2009); Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Board notes that the regulation regarding new and material evidence was amended. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2002). This amendment applies only to claims to reopen a finally decided claim received on or after August 29, 2001. As the record contains correspondence from the Veteran dated in January 2001 that expresses a desire for entitlement to service connection for a back disability, the amended regulation does not apply. In this case, new and material evidence means evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers which bears directly and substantially upon the specific matter under consideration, which is neither cumulative nor redundant, and which by itself or in connection with evidence previously assembled is so significant that it must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits of the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2002). In determining whether evidence is new and material, the credibility of the new evidence is to be presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). With respect to the issue of materiality, the newly presented evidence need not be probative of all the elements required to award the service connection claim. In Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the Federal Circuit noted that new evidence could be sufficient to reopen a claim if it could contribute to a more complete picture of the circumstances surrounding the origin of a Veteran's injury or disability, even where it would not be enough to convince the Board to grant a claim. As the last final disallowance of the Veteran's service connection claim for residuals of a cervical spine injury was a January 1985 rating decision, the Board must now determine whether new and material evidence sufficient to reopen the claim has been received subsequent to the January 1985 decision. The RO, in its January 1985 rating decision, denied service connection for residuals of a cervical spine injury on the basis that there was no evidence of a cervical spine disability in service and thus, no evidence of a nexus between such disability and service. Service entrance and discharge examination reports were negative for any treatment or diagnoses pertinent to the cervical spine. The first evidence of a cervical spine disability is an April 1980 VA hospital summary report showing that the Veteran underwent cervical decompression and fusion due to a herniated nucleus pulposus of the cervical spine; that cervical spine injury was attributed to a truck accident that had occurred one month prior, and there was no showing that the Veteran's cervical spine disability was related to service. Thus, in this case, to be new and material, the evidence needs to show a nexus between the Veteran's residuals of a cervical spine injury and active service. On review, the Board finds that new and material evidence has not been received since the January 1985 rating decision to reopen the Veteran's service connection claim for residuals of a cervical spine injury. In this regard, the evidence received since the January 1985 rating decision includes VA medical evidence, private medical evidence, the Veteran's contentions, other lay statements, a hearing transcript, and SSA records. SSA records which deemed the Veteran disabled beginning in 1980 are new, however, they are not material in that they fail to show a nexus between cervical spine disability and service. The VA medical evidence and private medical evidence included with the SSA records reflects 1980's treatment for a cervical spine disability; such evidence is either duplicative or cumulative of the evidence already considered. The remaining VA medical evidence not included in the SSA records is not pertinent to a cervical spine disability and does not establish a nexus between current disaibilty and service. Finally, the Veteran's statements and other lay statements to the effect that the Veteran's residuals of a cervical spine injury are related to service are cumulative of contentions already considered by the RO. In sum, the evidence submitted since the January 1985 rating decision is not material in that it does not establish a relationship between residuals of a cervical spine injury and service. Rather, the new evidence reflects that the Veteran's cervical spine disability had its onset in 1980 following a truck accident. The newly received evidence does not bear directly and substantially upon the specific matter under consideration. It is not so significant that it must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits of the claim. Therefore, the evidence cannot be considered new and material for the purpose of reopening the service connection claim for residuals of a cervical spine injury. Accordingly, the claim must be denied. III. Service Connection Claim Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110. Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury shall be service connected. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. A service connection claim must be accompanied by evidence which establishes that the claimant currently has the claimed disability. See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992); Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141, 144 (1992). Where the Veteran served continuously for ninety (90) or more days during a period of war, and if an organic disease of the nervous system became manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from the date of the Veteran's termination of such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2009). If a Veteran served on active duty in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era (beginning on January 9, 1962 and ending on May 7, 1975), the Veteran is presumed to have been exposed to herbicides, unless there is affirmative evidence to establish that the Veteran was not exposed to any such agent during that service. The last date on which a Veteran shall be presumed to have been exposed to an herbicide agent shall be the last date on which he served in the Republic of Vietnam during the period beginning on January 9, 1962 and ending May 7, 1975. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (2009). In this case, the fact that the Veteran had service in Vietnam is undisputed; his DD-214 indicates that he served approximately six months in Vietnam, and therefore he is afforded the presumption of Agent Orange exposure while serving in Vietnam. If a Veteran was exposed to a herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service, the following diseases shall be service-connected, if the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a) are met, even if there is no record of such disease during service: chloracne or other acneform diseases consistent with chloracne, Hodgkin's disease, multiple myeloma, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, acute and subacute peripheral neuropathy, porphyria cutanea tarda, prostate cancer, respiratory cancers, diabetes mellitus, and soft- tissue sarcomas. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e). The diseases listed at § 3.309(e) shall have become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more at any time after service, except that chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne, porphyria cutanea tarda, and acute and subacute peripheral neuropathy shall have become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within a year after the last date on which the Veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(ii) (2009). The Secretary of Veterans Affairs, under the authority granted by the Agent Orange Act of 1991, has determined that a presumption of service connection based on exposure to herbicides used in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era is not warranted for the following conditions: 1) hepatobiliary cancers; 2) nasal and nasopharyngeal cancer; 3) bone cancers; 4) breast cancer; 5) cancers of the female reproductive system; 6) urinary bladder cancer; 7) renal cancer; 8) testicular cancer; 9) leukemia; 10) reproductive effects (abnormal sperm parameters and infertility); 11) Parkinson's disease; 12) chronic persistent peripheral neuropathy; 13) lipid and lipoprotein disorders; 14) gastrointestinal and digestive disease (other than diabetes mellitus); 15) immune system disorders; 16) circulatory disorders; 17) respiratory disorders (other than certain respiratory cancers); 18) skin cancer; 19) cognitive and neuropsychiatric effects; 20) gastrointestinal tract tumors; 21) brain tumors; 22) amyloidosis; and 23) any other condition for which the Secretary has not specifically determined a presumption of service connection is warranted. See 67 Fed. Reg. 42600 (June 24, 2002). Here, the Board observes that, in March 1983, it denied service connection for neuropathy of the arms. In March 1994, the RO denied service connection for a neurological disability of the arms, claimed as a result of Agent Orange exposure. Currently, the Veteran asserts that his neurological disability of the left hand is related to service, to include Agent Orange exposure therein. Medical evidence confirms a neurological disability of the left hand, thereby satisfying the first element of the Veteran's service connection claim. Recently, according to a September 2008 VA examination report, the Veteran was diagnosed with post- surgical neurological deficit of the left hand from surgery to the forearm in the early 1970's. Similarly, a July 2009 VA examiner found neurological deficits consistent with a "left radial nerve palsy, which is related to his surgery in the early 1970's, as well as sensory and reflex changes in the upper extremities but especially in the right C-6 distribution, related to his old cervical spine problems." Despite the current disability, a neurological disability of the left hand is not included the list of presumptive disabilities associated with herbicide exposure. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) (2009). Thus, the Board finds that the Veteran's claim for presumptive service connection for a neurological disability of the left hand based on Agent Orange exposure is not warranted. Nevertheless, even if a Veteran is found not entitled to a regulatory presumption of service connection, the claim must still be reviewed to determine if service connection can be established on a direct basis. See Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards (Radiation Compensation) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, § 5, 98 Stat. 2724, 2727-29 (1984), does not preclude a Veteran from establishing service connection with proof of actual direct causation). Considering the instant claim on a direct basis, the Board notes that there is no evidence of a neurological disability of the left hand in service. The first objective evidence of left hand problems is dated in 1972, approximately five years following the Veteran's discharge from service. At that time, in 1972, he underwent exploratory surgery of the left radial nerve (see July 1980 VA examination report). The Board concedes that the Veteran's complete service treatment records are unavailable; however, his discharge examination report is completely negative for a neurological disability of the left hand. Furthermore, there is no medical evidence relating the Veteran's current neurological disability of the left hand to his period of active service. In this regard, the September 2008 VA examiner opined that the Veteran's neurological deficit in his left hand is not due to, or directly related to, herbicide exposure. Moreover, the July 2009 VA examiner opined that he can find no way to relate the Veteran's neurological disability of the left hand to herbicide exposure during his service time. Significantly, the record does not contain an etiology opinion favorable to the claim. The Board has considered the Veteran's contention that his current neurological disability of the left hand is the result of his military service. The Court has held that a veteran is competent to describe symptoms of which he or she has first-hand knowledge. See Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370, 374-75 (2002). The Board finds that the Veteran is competent to describe his neurological symptomatology. See Barr v Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); see also Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 398, 405 (1995). However, competency must be distinguished from weight and credibility, which are factual determinations, going to the probative value of the evidence, for the adjudicator. See Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997). The Board has also considered the decision in Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F. 3d 1331, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2006), wherein the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the Board erred by finding that a claimant's report of in- service symptoms lacked credibility solely because there was no objective medical evidence corroborating those symptoms at the time. However, the Board believes the instant case is clearly distinguishable, as the Board is not relying solely upon a general absence of complaints during service. Instead, the Board is relying on the negative neurological and upper extremity evaluations taken at discharge, that the Veteran did not seek treatment for left hand complaints until five years later, and the opinions of the competent VA examiners who concluded that the Veteran's neurological disability of the left hand is not the result of his active service, to include Agent Orange exposure. The Board finds that the September 2008 and July 2009 VA opinions are the most probative evidence of record as to the relationship between the Veteran's current neurological disability of the left hand and service, and ultimately outweighs the lay reports of etiology. For the foregoing reasons, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim of service connection for neurological disability of the left hand, and the benefit-of-the doubt standard of proof does not apply. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). Thus, the claim must be denied. ORDER New and material evidence has not been received to reopen the service connection claim for a cervical spine disability; the claim to reopen is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a neurological disability of the left hand, claimed as secondary to Agent Orange exposure, is denied. ____________________________________________ THOMAS J. DANNAHER Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs