Citation Nr: 1031297 Decision Date: 08/19/10 Archive Date: 08/24/10 DOCKET NO. 97-20 938 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Columbia, South Carolina THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for hypertension, to include as proximately caused by service-connected diabetes mellitus, type II. REPRESENTATION The Veteran represented by: The American Legion WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL The Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. J. Houbeck, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active service from May 1966 to June 1970, from July 1970 to June 1986, and from February 1991 to June 1991. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) following a February 2005 Order from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) vacating the Board's May 2003 decision. This matter was originally on appeal from a January 1997 Regional Office (RO) in Columbia, South Carolina rating decision. The Veteran's claim was previously before the Board and remanded on multiple occasions, most recently in September 2008. In addition, the Board notes that the Veteran testified at a hearing before an RO representative in April 1998, a transcript of which is of record. FINDING OF FACT Hypertension was not initially manifested during service or within one year of service and was not proximately caused by diabetes mellitus, type II, or other incident of service. CONCLUSION OF LAW Service connection for hypertension is not warranted. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1112, 1131, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (2006); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Duties to notify and assist When an application for benefits is received, VA has certain notice and assistance requirements under the law. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009). First, proper notice must be provided to a claimant before the initial VA decision on a claim for benefits and must: (1) inform the claimant about the information and evidence not of record necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) inform the claimant about the information and evidence that VA will seek to provide; (3) inform the claimant about the information and evidence the claimant is expected to provide. The February 2005 Court Order, discussed above, vacated and remanded the Board's May 2003 decision, in relevant part, so VA could provide the Veteran legally adequate notice. Subsequently, the Veteran was informed of the above-noted elements with regard to the claim for service connection for hypertension in letters of March 2005, July 2006, October 2008, and June 2009. The Veteran was afforded sufficient opportunity to respond and the claim, thereafter, was readjudicated in each case. The Veteran was notified specifically how the VA assigns disability ratings and effective dates in July 2006, October 2008, and June 2009. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). The Board finds that VA has also fulfilled its duty to assist the Veteran in making reasonable efforts to identify and obtain relevant records in support of the Veteran's claim and providing a VA examination when necessary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(i). In this regard, the Veteran's service treatment records, VA treatment records, and private treatment records are associated with the claims file. In addition, the Board notes that the February 2005 Court Order and July 2006 Board remand also directed the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) to request records from the Beaufort Naval Hospital from June 1986 to June 1998. A remand by the Board confers on the Veteran, as a matter of law, the right to compliance with the remand orders. Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998). The claims file reflects that such records were requested, obtained, and associated with the file, to the extent available. In September 2008, the Board again remanded the case to the AOJ for additional development. In relevant part, the September 2008 Board remand directed the AOJ to obtain treatment records for the Veteran's hypertension from 1986 from all pertinent providers. Such development was undertaken. In addition, the remand directed the AOJ to obtain an examination addressing whether any current hypertension was related to any symptoms or signs the Veteran may have had in service or within one year of service separation. The Board notes that the examination was afforded and the requested opinion obtained. The issue now returns to the Board for appellate review. The Board recognizes a duty to provide a VA examination when the record lacks evidence to decide the Veteran's claim and there is evidence of (1) a current disability, (2) an in- service event, injury, or disease, and (3) some indication that the claimed disability may be associated with the established event, injury, or disease. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(i) (2009); see also McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). A VA opinion with respect to the issue on appeal was obtained in an April 2010 compensation and pension examination (C&P). 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). To that end, when VA undertakes to provide a VA examination or obtain a VA opinion, it must ensure that the examination or opinion is adequate. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 312 (2007). As discussed in greater detail below, the Board finds that the VA opinion obtained in this case is adequate, as it was predicated on review of the private and VA medical records in the Veteran's claims file, and interview of the Veteran, and an appropriate examination. The examiner considered all of the pertinent evidence of record and provided a complete rationale for the opinion stated, relying on and citing to the records reviewed. Accordingly, the Board finds that VA's duty to assist with respect to obtaining a VA examination opinion with regard to the issue on appeal has been met. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). Under the circumstances of this case, "the record has been fully developed," and "it is difficult to discern what additional guidance VA could have provided to the Veteran regarding what further evidence he should submit to substantiate his claim." Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Furthermore, as discussed above, the Board finds that there has been substantial compliance with its July 2006 and September 2008 remand directives. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998) (a remand by the Board confers upon the Veteran, as a matter of law, the right to compliance with the remand instructions, and imposes upon the VA a concomitant duty to ensure compliance with the terms of the remand); see also D'Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 97, 105 (2008); Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141, 146-47 (1999). In that regard, the Board notes that the April 2010 VA examination report did not explicitly discuss whether any signs or symptoms noted within one year of service were the first manifestations of hypertension. However, in context, the examiner clearly considered and rejected the notion that any such signs or symptoms within one year of separation were the first manifestations of hypertension, as evidenced by his discussion of the July 1992 VA examination report and the failure therein to diagnose hypertension. Therefore, the Board is satisfied that VA has complied with the duty to assist requirements of the VCAA and the implementing regulations and the record is ready for appellate review. Standard of review Once the evidence has been assembled, it is the Board's responsibility to evaluate the record. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a). When there is an approximate balance of evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2009). In Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990), the Court stated that "a veteran need only demonstrate that there is an 'approximate balance of positive and negative evidence' in order to prevail." To deny a claim on its merits, the evidence must preponderate against the claim. Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996), citing Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 54. Service connection The Veteran contends that his hypertension began in service or, alternatively, was proximately caused by his service-connected diabetes mellitus and seeks service connection be granted on one of those bases. Generally, service connection may be granted for any disability resulting from injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation in service of a pre-existing injury or disease. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131. Service connection may be established by demonstrating that the disability was first manifested during service and has continued since service to the present time or by showing that a disability which pre-existed service was aggravated during service. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge from service, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. When a chronic disease such as hypertension becomes manifest to a degree of 10 percent within one year of the Veteran's discharge from service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the Veteran's period of service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. To establish a right to compensation for a present disability on a direct basis, a Veteran must show: "(1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service." Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Any disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury shall be service connected. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. Establishing service connection on a secondary basis requires evidence sufficient to show (1) that a current disability exists and (2) that the current disability was either (a) caused by or (b) aggravated by a service-connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) (2006); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). The Board observes that the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 were amended effective as of October 20, 2006, during the pendency of the instant appeal. See 71 Fed. Reg. 52744-47 (Sept. 7, 2006). The amendment sets a standard by which a claim based on aggravation of a non-service-connected disability by service- connected one is judged. Although the VA has indicated that the purpose of the regulation was merely to apply the Court's ruling in Allen, it was made clear in the comments to the regulation that the changes were intended to place a burden on the Veteran to establish a pre-aggravation baseline level of disability for the non-service connected disability before an award of service connection based on aggravation may be made. This had not been the VA's practice and thus suggests that the recent change amounts to a substantive change in the regulation. For this reason and as the Veteran's claim was pending before the regulatory change was made, the Board will consider his claim under the prior version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 as it is more favorable to the Veteran. The Veteran's service treatment records include dozens of blood pressure readings. Several readings during service were elevated. In April 1969, the Veteran had a blood pressure of 148/108 and the Veteran complained of headaches. In February 1977, the Veteran's blood pressure was 136/72 slightly over three (3) hours after an automobile accident. In February 1980, the Veteran's blood pressure was 120/84, when the Veteran complained of back pain, extremity soreness, and general malaise. In April 1982, the Veteran's blood pressure was 116/86 after a knee injury playing softball. After suffering a right hand injury in May 1983, the Veteran had a blood pressure of 130/70. He had an observed blood pressure of 110/86 in March 1984 after being hit in the mouth playing basketball and suffering a lacerated upper lip. The Veteran had tenderness and swelling of his left thumb and blood pressure readings of 126/94 and 110/80 in October 1984. In February 1985, the Veteran's blood pressure was 130/70 when he was assessed with pneumonia. In July 1985, the Veteran suffered a deep laceration of the shin and had blood pressures of 162/80 and 124/86. During a follow-up visit in August 1985 to remove the sutures in his shin, the Veteran's blood pressure was 118/80. The Veteran's blood pressure was 124/85 in August 1985 during a follow-up for a laceration of the right eye. In April 1986, the Veteran's blood pressure was 110/80. The Veteran suffered a left eye injury in May 1986 and had a blood pressure of 140/82. The Veteran had many additional blood pressure readings lower than those listed. In March 1991, for example, the Veteran denied a history of high blood pressure and on contemporaneous examination his blood pressure was 104/68. After the Veteran's service, in October 1991 his blood pressure was 132/92; in March 1992, 142/87; in April 1992, 118/86 and 158/88. During intervening treatment visits, the Veteran often had significantly lower blood pressure readings. In July 1992 the Veteran was afforded a general VA examination. At that time his blood pressure measured 128/80. The VA examiner did not diagnose hypertension at that time, or otherwise discuss the Veteran's blood pressure. The Veteran had continued treatment over the following years and was first diagnosed with hypertension in approximately August 1995, after which time his treatment providers attempted to control the disorder with medication. Treatment records also indicate that the Veteran was diagnosed with diabetes mellitus, type II, in approximately April 1995. In April 2010, in accordance with the directives of the Board's September 2008 remand, the Veteran was afforded a VA examination for his hypertension. The examiner noted review of the claims file and medical record. The examiner noted that the Veteran had 52 blood pressure readings during service and that four of these would be considered elevated. With respect to those four readings, the examiner noted that one was from 1977 following a motor vehicle accident, one from 1969 following an acute injury of the hand involving swelling, and injuries in 1984 and 1985 involving emergency room treatment for acute medical problems. The examiner noted the July 1992 VA examination wherein the Veteran's blood pressure was 128/80 and that the examiner had not diagnosed hypertension or otherwise discussed the Veteran's blood pressure with him. The Veteran reported initial notification of high blood pressure in 1995, from which time he had been prescribed medication. Based on the foregoing, the examiner concluded that it was clear that the Veteran's hypertension was not related to his military service. Moreover, the examiner opined that the Veteran's hypertension was not caused or aggravated by his service-connected diabetes mellitus, type II, or any other service-connected disability. In that regard, the examiner noted that the latest diagnostic evidence of record indicated a normal BUN and creatinine with no evidence of end- stage renal disease, as one would expect to find if the diabetes had caused or aggravated the hypertension. For compensation purposes, the VA has defined hypertension as a diastolic blood pressure that is predominantly 90 mm. or greater, or systolic blood pressure that is predominantly 160 mm. or greater with a diastolic blood pressure of less than 90 mm. To support a diagnosis of hypertension, the blood pressure readings must be taken two or more times on at least three different days. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.104, Diagnostic Code 7101 (Note 1). Initially, the Board observes that no diagnosis of hypertension was made in service, and that the observed blood pressure readings in service would not otherwise support a diagnosis of hypertension as defined under Diagnostic Code 7101 (Note 1). Nor is there evidence of blood pressure readings that would support a diagnosis of hypertension within one year of service. Significantly, the Veteran received regular treatment during service and immediately after service, yet he was not diagnosed with hypertension until many years after service, in 1995. In that regard, the Board notes that the Veteran initially claimed that he was diagnosed with hypertension either in service or within one year of service. See, e.g., April 1998 RO hearing transcript. However, the most recent evidence of record, specifically the Veteran's reported onset during the April 2010 VA examination, indicates that the Veteran recognizes that he was not diagnosed with hypertension until 1995. The Board notes that the April 2010 VA examiner specifically considered whether the Veteran's current hypertension was caused or aggravated by his military service and concluded that hypertension was not related to service in any way. The examiner reviewed the Veteran's claims file and medical records, interviewed the Veteran, and conducted appropriate examination. Based on the foregoing, the examiner concluded that the Veteran's current hypertension was unrelated to his military service. The examiner provided a sufficient rationale for his opinion, noting the Veteran's multiple non-elevated blood pressure readings in service, explained the reason for the Veteran's four elevated readings in service, and noted the July 1992 VA examination one year after service where the examiner had not diagnosed, or even discussed, hypertension. As such, the Board finds the examiner's opinions credible and probative. As will be discussed in greater detail below, to the extent that the Veteran claims that his hypertension is directly related to his military service, the Board finds the April 2010 examiner's opinion to be significantly more probative in light of the examiner's much greater level of medical training and experience. Given the foregoing, service connection on a direct basis is not warranted. Nor is presumptive service connection under the provisions of 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307 and 3.309 warranted, as the Veteran was not diagnosed with hypertension in service or within one year of service. Service connection for diabetes mellitus is in effect, from August 1996. As noted above, the Veteran contends that his hypertension was proximately caused by diabetes. The Board has considered, therefore, whether the Veteran's current hypertension is proximately due to or the result of his service-connected diabetes mellitus, type II. Based on the evidence of record, the Board concludes it is not. The Board finds the opinions expressed in the April 2010 VA examiner's report to be credible and probative. The report was based on an interview of the Veteran, his reported medical history, appropriate diagnostic testing, and physical examination. Further, a complete and through rationale is provided for the opinions rendered. As noted, the examining physician found that the Veteran's normal BUN and creatinine levels and the absence of any indication of end-stage renal disease made it unlikely that the Veteran's service-connected diabetes mellitus caused or aggravated his hypertension. The examiner's conclusion is fully explained and consistent with the evidence of record. In that regard, the Board specifically finds that the April 2010 examiner's opinion contemplated and rejected both that the Veteran's hypertension was caused by his military service, to include his service-connected disabilities and specifically diabetes, or had been permanently aggravated by the same. The examiner's notation that the Veteran's hypertension was not caused by or related to the above clearly contemplated both causation and aggravation. The Board acknowledges the Veteran's assertions that his hypertension is the result of his diabetes mellitus, type II. Certainly, the Veteran can attest to factual matters of which he had first-hand knowledge and symptoms experienced through the senses, and his testimony in that regard is entitled to some probative weight. See Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 368 (2005). In general, however, a layperson is not competent to diagnose a medical disorder or render an opinion as to the cause or etiology of any current disorder because he does not have the requisite medical knowledge or training. See Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997) (stating that competency must be distinguished from weight and credibility, which are factual determinations going to the probative value of the evidence). In this instance, therefore, the Veteran as a lay person has not been shown to be capable of making medical conclusions, especially as to complex medical diagnoses such as a link between his hypertension and service-connected diabetes mellitus, type II. Thus, his statements regarding any such link are much less probative than the conclusions of the VA health care specialist discussed above. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining in footnote 4 that a veteran is competent to provide a diagnosis of a simple condition such as a broken leg, but not competent to provide evidence as to more complex medical questions). To the extent that the Veteran believes that his hypertension is related to any other remote incident of service, the Board similarly affords substantially greater weight to the opinion of the April 2010 examiner. In conclusion, the physician rendering the April 2010 VA medical opinion clearly reviewed the Veteran's medical history, interviewed the Veteran, and offered a detailed rationale for his opinions. No other medical professional has opined a link between the Veteran's hypertension and his service-connected diabetes mellitus, type II. Thus, the Board finds the April 2010 opinion to be competent and the most persuasive of record. As such, service connection cannot be granted for the claimed disability on a secondary basis. In light of the foregoing, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, and the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application. See generally Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361 (Fed Cir. 2001). The appeal must therefore be denied. ORDER Service connection for hypertension is denied. ____________________________________________ HEATHER J. HARTER Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs