Citation Nr: 1031340 Decision Date: 08/19/10 Archive Date: 08/24/10 DOCKET NO. 07-21 556 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Seattle, Washington THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea, to include as secondary to a service-connected disability. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD B. Thomas Knope INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from October 1993 to September 1999. This matter is on appeal from an October 2006 decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Seattle, Washington. This case was then remanded by the Board in May 2009 for further development and is now ready for disposition. The Veteran testified before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge in February 2009. A transcript of the hearing is of record. Please note this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2009). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a)(2) (West 2002). FINDING OF FACT Sleep apnea was not shown in service, and is unrelated to service or to a disease or injury of service origin, including PTSD. CONCLUSION OF LAW Sleep apnea was not incurred in or aggravated by service, nor is it proximately due to or the result of service-connected disability. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103(a), 5103A (West 2002 & Supp. 2010); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159, 3.303, 3.310 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 As provided for by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2010); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2009). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and medical or lay evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). This notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the RO. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). In addition, the notice requirements of the VCAA apply to all five elements of a service-connection claim, including: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Further, this notice must include information that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded. Id. at 486. Here, the VCAA duty to notify was satisfied by way of a letter sent to the Veteran in May 2006 that fully addressed all notice elements and was sent prior to the initial RO decision in this matter. The letter informed her of what evidence was required to substantiate the claim and of her and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence. Under these circumstances, the Board finds that the notification requirements of the VCAA have been satisfied as to both timing and content. With respect to the Dingess requirements, in the May 2006 letter, the RO also provided the Veteran with notice of what type of information and evidence was needed to establish a disability rating, as well as notice of the type of evidence necessary to establish an effective date. With that letter, the RO effectively satisfied the remaining notice requirements with respect to the issue on appeal. Therefore, adequate notice was provided to the Veteran prior to the transfer and certification of her case to the Board and complied with the requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). Next, VA has a duty to assist a veteran in the development of the claim. This duty includes assisting him or her in the procurement of service treatment records and other pertinent records, and providing an examination when necessary. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2009). After a careful review of the file, the Board finds that all necessary development has been accomplished, and therefore appellate review may proceed without prejudice to the Veteran. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). First, the RO has obtained the Veteran's service treatment records and VA outpatient treatment records. Further, the Veteran submitted private treatment records and a medical journal case report from 1998. She was also provided an opportunity to set forth her contentions during the hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge in February 2009. In Bryant v. Shinseki, --- Vet. App. ----, No. 08-4080 (Jul. 1, 2010), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) recently held that 38 C.F.R. 3.103(c)(2) (2009) requires that the RO Decision Review Officer/Veterans Law Judge who chairs a hearing fulfill two duties to comply with the above the regulation. These duties consist of (1) the duty to fully explain the issues and (2) the duty to suggest the submission of evidence that may have been overlooked. Here, during the February 2009 hearing, the Veteran was asked when she was first diagnosed as having sleep apnea. Further, noting the Veteran's primary theory of entitlement was that of secondary service connection, the undersigned asked the Veteran whether any medical professional had provided her the opinion that her sleep apnea was caused or aggravated by her PTSD. Her representative then indicated that she would attempt to secure a medical opinion that addressed that question. Neither the Veteran nor his representative has asserted that VA failed to comply with 38 C.F.R. 3.103(c)(2) nor has identified any prejudice in the conduct of the RO/Board hearing. By contrast, as noted above, the hearing focused on the element(s) necessary to substantiate the claim and the Veteran, through her testimony, demonstrated that she had actual knowledge of the element(s) necessary to substantiate his claim for benefits. As such, the Board finds that, consistent with Bryant, DRO/VLJ complied with the duties set forth in 38 C.F.R. 3.103(c)(2) and that the Board can adjudicate the claim(s) based on the current record. A VA opinion with respect to the issue on appeal was obtained in November 2009. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (4). To that end, when VA undertakes to provide a VA examination or obtain a VA opinion, it must ensure that the examination or opinion is adequate. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 312 (2007). As noted below, the Board finds that the VA opinion obtained in this case is more than adequate, as it is predicated on a full reading of the private and VA medical records in the Veteran's claims file. It considers all of the pertinent evidence of record, to include the findings of a September 2004 formal sleep study, subsequent VA treatment records relating to the Veteran's use of a CPAP machine, and the statements of the appellant (an interview lasting over 2 hours), and provides a complete rationale for the opinion stated, relying on and citing to the records reviewed. Accordingly, the Board finds that VA's duty to assist with respect to obtaining a VA examination or opinion with respect to the issue on appeal has been met. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (4). Therefore, the available records and medical evidence have been obtained in order to make adequate determination as to this claim, and no further notice or assistance is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist in the development of the claim. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd, 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Entitlement to Service Connection for Sleep Apnea Under the relevant laws and regulations, service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002). If a chronic disease is shown in service, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, may be service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2009). However, continuity of symptoms is required where a condition in service is noted but is not, in fact, chronic or where a diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2009). Further, service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2009). The Board must determine whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the appellant prevailing in either case, or whether the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case, service connection must be denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Under section 3.310(a) of VA regulations, service connection may be established on a secondary basis for a disability which is proximately due to or the result of service-connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). Establishing service connection on a secondary basis requires evidence sufficient to show (1) that a current disability exists and (2) that the current disability was either (a) proximately caused by or (b) proximately aggravated by a service-connected disability. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995) (en banc). Where a service-connected disability aggravates a nonservice-connected condition, a veteran may be compensated for the degree of disability (but only that degree) over and above the degree of disability existing prior to the aggravation. Allen, 7 Vet. App. at 448. Temporary or intermittent flare-ups of symptoms of a condition, alone, do not constitute sufficient evidence aggravation unless the underlying condition worsened. Cf. Davis v. Principi, 276 F. 3d 1341, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Hunt v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 292, 297 (1991). The provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 were amended, effective from October 10, 2006; however, the new provisions require that service connection not be awarded on an aggravation basis without establishing a pre-aggravation baseline level of disability and comparing it to current level of disability. 71 Fed. Reg. 52744- 47 (Sept. 7, 2006). Although the stated intent of the change was merely to implement the requirements of Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995), the new provisions amount to substantive changes to the manner in which 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 has been applied by VA in Allen-type cases since 1995. Consequently, the Board will apply the older version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310, which is more favorable to the claimant because it does not require the establishment of a baseline before an award of service connection may be made. Service Connection as Secondary to PTSD The Veteran's primary argument on appeal is that her service- connected PTSD has led to her sleep apnea. However, based on the weight of the medical evidence, the Board concludes that her sleep apnea is not related to her service-connected PTSD or any other service-connected disability. Specifically, the Board places great weight on the opinion of the VA examiner in November 2009. There, after a review of the claims file and an interview with the Veteran that lasted over two hours, the examiner observed that she had been diagnosed with sleep apnea in the past. However, the examiner pointed out that sleep apnea is a physiologic disorder, as opposed to a psychiatric disorder, and that its treatment is by physical means. The examiner emphasized that sleep apnea: "is a physiological disorder found in hundreds of Americans and in the considered opinion of the examiner, bears no relationship to her posttraumatic stress disorder either in terms of causation or aggravation. It is responding to physical treatment measures. It does occur in veterans with PTSD, as well as with veterans without it and indeed widely in the general population, but a direct relationship is not postulated." Based on this fact, the physician specifically concluded that he did not find evidence that her sleep apnea was caused or aggravated by her PTSD. The Veteran, through her representative, argues that the November 2009 examination report did not properly consider the question of whether the Veteran's PTSD aggravated her sleep apnea. However, on close review of the examination report, the Board notes that the examiner explicitly stated that the Veteran's PTSD did not aggravate her sleep apnea. Consideration has also been given to examiner's comment that: "[t]his is not to say that at times when her [the Veteran] sleep disorder, sleep apnea, is difficult to control, she does not have some daytime sleepiness either from sleep medication or simply from sleep deprivation." The representative argues that this statement suggests that the Veteran's sleep apnea is aggravated by her PTSD. The Board does not agree. Notwithstanding the fact the examiner repeated on multiple occasions that the Veteran's PTSD did not aggravate her PTSD, the Board observes that the examiner went on to state that the Veteran's "sleep is also disturbed by the anxiety of PTSD, especially in the form of initial insomnia, but the major sleep problem is her apnea." Put not another way, the examiner is stating that the Veteran's PTSD may at times contribute to sleep difficulty due to causing initial insomnia. This is not the same as saying that the PTSD is aggravating the sleep apnea. The evidence of record also fails to demonstrate relationship (causal or aggravation) between the Veteran PTSD and her sleep apnea. It is true that the Veteran has on occasions such as September 2005, January 2007 and October 2008 complained of difficulty sleeping, which she attributed to her psychiatric disorder. However, on none of those occasions did she or the evaluating physicians go on to suggest that her sleep apnea was related to her PTSD. Indeed, the Veteran testified that she was unaware of any medical professional relating her sleep apnea to her PTSD, and that it was only her opinion that such a relationship existed. Transcript at 16. In fact, the Veteran's assertion that her sleep apnea is a product of her service-connected PTSD appears primarily based on a 1998 medical journal case report, which discusses a potential relationship between the PTSD and sleep apnea. While, in general, medical treatises may be utilized in the consideration of a claim, see Wallin v. West, 11 Vet App. 509 (1998), citing Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991), the case report here does not actually support her assertion. Instead, the case report discusses the negative effects sleep apnea may have on some PTSD symptomatology. In other words, similar to the comments made in the November 2009 VA examination report, the article suggest that there is a co-morbid relationship between sleep and apnea, and that the symptoms of PTSD could improve if an individual secured better sleep, i.e, treating the sleep apnea. The Veteran, on the other hand, is arguing that her PTSD is causing her sleep apnea, which was not the basis of the article. Consideration has also been given to the Veteran's personal opinion that her sleep apnea was caused or aggravated by her PTSD. However, as a lay person without the appropriate medical training and expertise, she simply is not competent to provide a probative opinion on a medical matter, to include the diagnosis of a specific disability. See Bostain v. West, 11 Vet. App. 124, 127 (1998), citing Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992); see also Routen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 183, 186 (1997) ("a layperson is generally not capable of opining on matters requiring medical knowledge"). Moreover, her lay opinion is significantly outweighed by the medical opinion obtained in November 2009. As a result, the weight of the competent evidence does not indicate that the Veteran's PTSD has caused her sleep apnea. Moreover, the Veteran has not asserted a relationship between her sleep apnea and any of her other service-connected disabilities. Therefore, entitlement to service connection on a secondary basis is not warranted. Entitlement to Service Connection on a Direct Basis Next, although the Veteran has primarily asserted that her sleep apnea is attributable to her service-connected PTSD, the Board has also considered the claim on a direct basis. See Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994). However, this aspect of the appeal must also be denied. First, the Veteran's service treatment records reflect no complaints of, treatment for, or a diagnosis related to sleep apnea or any symptoms reasonably attributed thereto. While there were occasions where she stated that she had trouble sleeping, it was typically identified as a symptom of depression, such as in evaluations from September 1996 or December 1999, or from instance of shoulder pain in December 1996. Moreover, while she complained of fatigue at the time of her discharge physical examination in March 1999, sleep apnea was not observed. Therefore, sleep apnea was not noted in service. The Veteran does not argue to the contrary. Next, post-service evidence does not reflect symptoms related to sleep apnea for many years after service discharge. Specifically, in September 2004, the Veteran underwent a sleep study which led to a diagnosis of sleep apnea. However, this is the first recorded symptomatology related to sleep apnea, coming some five years after discharge. Therefore, the competent evidence does not reflect continuity of symptomatology. Again, the Veteran does not argue to the contrary. She testified that her sleep apnea was not diagnosed until 2004. Transcript at 16. Post-service treatments records reflect similar findings. In addition to the absence of documented post-service symptomatology for many years, the Board has considered the Veteran's statements regarding continuity of symptoms. The Board acknowledges that lay evidence concerning continuity of symptoms after service, if credible, is ultimately competent, regardless of the lack of contemporaneous medical evidence. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In determining whether statements submitted by a veteran are credible, the Board may consider internal consistency, facial plausibility, and consistency with other evidence submitted on behalf of the claimant. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995). The Board is not required to accept an appellant's uncorroborated account of his active service experiences. Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190 (1991). In this case, continuity of symptomatology since active service has not been shown, nor has the Veteran so asserted. Moreover, the Board emphasizes the multi-year gap between discharge from active duty service (1999) and initial identification of sleep apnea in 2004. Further, the Veteran has stated at her hearing before the Board in February 2009 that this disorder had been undiagnosed for only "several months," thereby implying that any related symptoms were not especially long-standing. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (lengthy period of absence of medical complaints for condition can be considered as a factor in resolving claim); see also Mense v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 354, 356 (1991) (affirming Board's denial of service connection where veteran failed to account for lengthy time period between service and initial symptoms of disability). Therefore, continuity has not here been established either through the competent evidence or through the Veteran's statements. Next, service connection may be granted when the evidence establishes a medical nexus between active duty service and current complaints. In this case, the Board finds that the weight of the competent evidence does not attribute the Veteran's sleep apnea to active duty. To that end, the Board again places significant probative value on the November 2009 VA examination undertaken specifically to address the issue on appeal. At that time, the Veteran reported symptoms of sleep apnea. However, the examiner opined that her sleep apnea was it was not related to active duty service, as there was "no credible evidence" to indicate that it arose during active duty service or was caused by any event during active duty. Finally, with regard to service connection on both a direct and secondary basis, the Board has also considered the Veteran's statements and sworn testimony asserting a nexus between her sleep apnea and both active duty service and her service- connected PTSD. While the Board reiterates that the Veteran is competent to report symptoms as they come to her through her senses, disorders such as sleep apnea are not the types of disorders that a lay person can provide competent evidence on questions of etiology or diagnosis. On the other hand, such competent evidence has been provided by the medical personnel who have examined the Veteran during the current appeal and by service records obtained and associated with the claims file. Here, the Board attaches greater probative weight to the clinical findings than to her statements. See Cartright, 2 Vet. App. at 25. Therefore, in light of the above discussion, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection on either a direct or secondary basis, and there is no doubt to be otherwise resolved. As such, the appeal is denied. ORDER Service connection for sleep apnea, to include as secondary to a service-connected disability is denied. ______________________________________ MICHAEL A. HERMAN Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs