Citation Nr: 1032235 Decision Date: 08/26/10 Archive Date: 09/01/10 DOCKET NO. 01-09 423 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in New Orleans, Louisiana THE ISSUE Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder other than posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), namely a depressive disorder, including as secondary to service-connected bilateral knee disability. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Marine Corps League WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL The Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. P. Swick, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty in the Navy from October 1967 to March 1969. This appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) is from a March 2005 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in New Orleans, Louisiana. In December 2008, the Veteran testified at a videoconference hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge of the Board. In February 2009, the Board granted the Veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD but additionally remanded the petition to reopen his claim for service connection for any other acquired psychiatric disorder - including a depressive disorder, to RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC) in Washington, DC, for further development and consideration. The AMC has since completed this additional development, continued to deny the claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder other than PTSD, including, namely, a depressive disorder, and returned the file to the Board for further appellate consideration of this remaining claim. There is one final preliminary point also worth mentioning. As service connection already has been granted for PTSD in the Board's prior February 2009 decision, the new regulations pertaining to PTSD claims found at 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3), which more recently took effect on July 13, 2009, need not be discussed - also because these revisions have no bearing on his remaining claim for other mental illness such as a depressive disorder. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. An October 1998 Board decision denied the Veteran's claim for service connection for a depressive disorder, and he did not appeal. 2. The additional evidence received since that October 1998 Board decision denying this claim is cumulative or redundant of evidence already considered in that decision or does not relate to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate this claim or raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating this claim. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The October 1998 Board decision that denied service connection for depressive disorder is final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1100 (2009). 2. New and material evidence has not been submitted since that Board decision to reopen this previously denied and unappealed claim for service connection. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a)(2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. The Duties to Notify and Assist As provided by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA), VA has duties to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and medical or lay evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will obtain and assist the claimant in obtaining; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002); Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370, 373-74 (2002). In Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006), the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court/CAVC) held that VA must both notify a claimant of the evidence and information necessary to reopen the claim and of the evidence and information necessary to establish entitlement to the underlying benefit being sought. To satisfy this requirement, VA adjudicators are required to look at the bases of the denial in the prior decision and provide the claimant a notice letter describing what evidence would be necessary to substantiate those elements required to establish service connection that were found insufficient in the previous denial. VA's Office of General Counsel issued informal guidance interpreting Kent as requiring the notice to specifically identify the kind of evidence that would overcome the prior deficiency rather than simply stating the evidence must relate to the stated basis of the prior denial. VA Gen. Couns. Mem., para. 2, 3 (June 14, 2006). These VCAA notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service-connection claim: (1) Veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the Veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), aff'd sub nom. Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (2007). Further, this notice must include information that a downstream disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is granted. Id., at 486. Ideally, VCAA notice should be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the RO. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004) (Pelegrini II). If, however, for whatever reason it was not, or the notice provided was inadequate, this timing error can be effectively "cured" by providing any necessary VCAA notice and then going back and readjudicating the claim - such as in a statement of the case (SOC) or supplemental SOC (SSOC), such that the intended purpose of the notice is not frustrated and the Veteran is given an opportunity to participate effectively in the adjudication of the claim. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Mayfield IV); Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006). In Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009), the United States Supreme Court held that a reviewing court, in considering the rule of prejudicial error, is precluded from applying a mandatory presumption of prejudice rather than assessing whether, based on the facts of each case, the error was outcome determinative. In Sanders, the Supreme Court rejected the lower Federal Circuit's framework (see Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F. 3d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) that all VA notice errors are presumptively prejudicial, in part, because it was "complex, rigid, and mandatory." Id., at 1704. The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's analysis because it imposed an unreasonable evidentiary burden on VA to rebut the presumption and because it required VA to demonstrate why the error was harmless, rather than requiring the appellant - as the pleading party, to show the error was harmful. Id., at 1705-06. The Supreme Court stated that it had "warned against courts' determining whether an error is harmless through the use of mandatory presumptions and rigid rules rather than case-specific application of judgment, based upon examination of the record." Id., at 1704- 05. Thus, it is clear from the Supreme Court's analysis that, while the Veterans Court may conclude generally that a specific type of error is more likely to prejudice an appellant, the error must nonetheless be examined in the context of the facts of the particular case. Id. The Veterans Court held in Vazquez-Flores v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 37, 48 (2008), since overturned on other grounds in Vazquez- Flores v. Shinseki, 2009 WL 2835434 (Fed.Cir.), that prejudicial deficiencies in the timing or content of a VCAA notice can be cured by showing the essential fairness of the adjudication will not be affected because: (1) the defect was cured by actual knowledge on the part of the claimant ("Actual knowledge is established by statements or actions by the claimant or the claimant's representative that demonstrates an awareness of what was necessary to substantiate his or her claim.") (citing Dalton v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23, 30-31 (2007)); (2) that a reasonable person could be expected to understand from the notice what was needed; or (3) that a benefit could not have been awarded as a matter of law. Sanders, 487 F. 3d at 889. Additionally, consideration also should be given to "whether the post-adjudicatory notice and opportunity to develop the case that is provided during the extensive administrative appellate proceedings leading to the final Board decision and final Agency adjudication of the claim ... served to render any pre- adjudicatory section 5103(a) notice error non-prejudicial." Vazquez-Flores, 22 Vet. App. at 46. See also Overton v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 427, 435 (2006) (finding the Board had erred by relying on various post-decisional documents for concluding adequate 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) notice had been provided to the appellant, the Veterans Court nonetheless determined the evidence established the Veteran was afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the adjudication of his claims, and therefore found the error harmless). In this case, letters satisfying the notice requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1) were sent to the Veteran in February 2004, September 2004, and March 2009. These letters informed him of the evidence required to reopen his previously denied claim, the evidence required to establish his underlying entitlement to service connection, and his and VA's respective responsibilities in obtaining supporting evidence. The most recent March 2009 letter also complied with Dingess, as it apprised him as well of the downstream disability rating and effective date elements of his claim. And since providing that additional notice, the AMC has readjudicated the petition to reopen his claim in the April 2010 SSOC, including considering any additional evidence received in response to that additional notice. See again Mayfield IV and Prickett, supra. VA also fulfilled its duty to assist the Veteran by obtaining all relevant evidence in support of his claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. The RO and AMC obtained his service treatment records (STRs) and VA treatment records. The RO and AMC also obtained his private medical records from S.J.S., L.C.S.W. There is no indication of any outstanding records pertaining to the claim. Additionally, the AMC has substantially complied with the Board's February 2009 remand directives by sending the Veteran notice in compliance with Dingess and obtaining his treatment records from S.J.S., L.C.S.W. See Chest v. Peake, 283 Fed. App. 814 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998); Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141, 146-47 (1999). As here, if the claim at issue has been previously considered - and denied, and the Veteran did not timely appeal the decision, he is required to present new and material evidence to reopen the claim under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 before the Board's duty to assist is triggered and the Board may proceed to evaluate the merits of the claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(f); see also Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Secretary of VA, 345 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003). And despite his and his representative's contentions to the contrary, since, as will be explained, the Board is denying the petition to reopen the claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder other than PTSD, absent the required new and material evidence, there is no obligation to schedule the Veteran for a VA compensation examination concerning this claim unless and until he first satisfies this threshold preliminary evidentiary burden. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(iii). Nevertheless, the Veteran was provided a VA psychiatric evaluation in November 2006. The Board finds this examination was sufficiently comprehensive to try and determine the etiology of his depressive disorder. The mere fact that the examiner found no evidence to link the Veteran's psychiatric symptoms to his knee disabilities and stated that she could not answer this question of secondary causation without resorting to mere speculation does not render this examination inadequate. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 311 (2007) (holding that once VA undertakes the effort to provide an examination for a service-connection claim, even if not statutorily obligated to do so, it must provide an adequate one or, at a minimum, notify the claimant why one will not or cannot be provided). A more recent precedent case also admonished the Board for relying on medical opinions that also were unable to establish this required linkage, without resorting to mere speculation, as cause for denying the Veteran's claims. See Jones v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 382 (2010). In Jones, the Court noted it was unclear whether the examiners were unable to provide this requested definitive medical comment on etiology because they actually were unable to since the limits of medical knowledge had been exhausted or, instead, for example, needed further information to assist in making this determination (e.g., additional records and/or diagnostic studies) or other procurable and assembled data. The Court in Jones acknowledged there are instances where a definitive opinion cannot be provided because required information is missing or can no longer be obtained or current medical knowledge yields multiple possible etiologies with none more likely than not the cause of the claimed disability. See Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 6 (2009) (noting the Board need not obtain further medical evidence where the medical evidence "indicates that determining the cause is speculative"). The Court in Jones held, however, that in order to rely upon a statement that an opinion cannot be provided without resort to mere speculation, it must be clear that the procurable and assembled data was fully considered and the basis for the opinion must be provided by the examiner or apparent upon a review of the record. Here, the use of the "resort to mere speculation" phrase indicates the examiner is not invalidating the theory that chronic pain may in certain instances cause psychiatric symptoms in some people, but instead is simply stating that she has found no evidence of this causation for the Veteran's symptoms, in particular. Indeed, as the medical rationale for her opinion, this examiner stated the Veteran was unable to specify any particular psychiatric symptoms, especially any that could be attributable to his knee disabilities, other than that he worries about his physical condition. So the examiner's opinion has adequate, appropriate findings, and the rationale discusses why she was unable to more definitively answer the question of secondary etiology. Hence, another medical opinion is not required to satisfy the requirements of the VCAA. II. Whether there is New and Material Evidence to Reopen the Claim The Veteran is attempting to reopen this previously denied, unappealed claim. However, for the reasons and bases discussed below, the Board finds that new and material evidence has not been submitted, so his petition to reopen this claim must be denied. A December 1997 rating decision denied the claim for service connection for a depressive disorder based on there being no link between the disorder and the Veteran's military service. An October 1998 Board decision affirmed the RO's decision, thereby subsuming it, and he did not appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1104. Unless the Chairman of the Board orders reconsideration of a decision, the Veteran appeals the decision, or another exception to finality applies (such as the decision is collaterally attacked and determined to have been clearly and unmistakably erroneous), all Board decisions are final and binding on the date stamped on the face of the decision and are not subject to revision on the same factual basis. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100. The Veteran filed his current petition to reopen this claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder in January 2004. As support for his claim, he has since submitted treatment records from S.J.S., L.C.S.W., a written statement, and, as mentioned, had a November 2006 VA psychiatric evaluation. Before addressing the claim for service connection on its underlying merits, the Board must first determine whether new and material evidence has been submitted since the October 1998 Board decision that previously considered and denied this claim. Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 1996). This initial determination affects the Board's jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim on its underlying merits. If there is no new and material evidence, that is where the analysis ends, and what the RO may have determined in this regard is irrelevant. Jackson v. Principi, 265 F. 3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Butler v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 167, 171 (1996); McGinnis v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 239 (1993); and VAOPGCPREC 05-92 (March 4, 1992). Under VA law and regulation, if new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to a final decision, the Secretary shall reopen and review the former disposition of the claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. When a petition to reopen is presented, a two-step analysis is performed. The first step is to determine whether the evidence presented or secured since the last final disallowance of the claim is "new and material." See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1998). According to VA regulation, "new" means existing evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers. "Material" evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence cannot be cumulative or redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). Second, if VA determines the evidence is new and material, VA may then proceed to evaluate the merits of the claim on the basis of the all evidence of record, but only after ensuring the duty to assist has been fulfilled. See Winters v. West, 12 Vet. App. 203, 206 (1999) (en banc) (discussing the analysis set forth in Elkins v. West, 12 Vet. App. 209 (1999)), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Winters v. Gober, 219 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This second step becomes applicable only when the preceding step is satisfied. See Vargas-Gonzalez v. West, 12 Vet. App. 321, 325 (1999). VA is required to review for newness and materiality only the evidence submitted by a claimant since the last final disallowance of a claim on any basis to determine whether a claim should be reopened and readjudicated on the merits. Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 273, 283 (1996). The newly presented evidence need not be probative of all the elements required to award the claim, but it must be probative as to each element that was a specified basis for the last disallowance. Id., at 284. In Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the Federal Circuit Court reiterated this, noting that new evidence could be sufficient to reopen a claim if it could contribute to a more complete picture of the circumstances surrounding the origin of a claimant's injury or disability, even where it would not be enough to convince the Board to grant a claim. The credibility of this evidence must be presumed, albeit just for the limited purpose of deciding whether it is new and material. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). But see Duran v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 216 (1994) ("Justus does not require the Secretary [of VA] to consider the patently incredible to be credible"). Here, the evidence that must be considered in determining whether there is a basis for reopening the Veteran's claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is the evidence that has been added to the record since the final and binding October 1998 Board decision. And considering the basis of that denial, new and material evidence must suggest his acquired psychiatric disorder, diagnosed alternately as depressive disorder and anxiety disorder, was incurred during or aggravated by his military service or is secondary to a service-connected disability such as his bilateral (i.e., right and left) knee disability. Concerning this, as mentioned, since the October 1998 Board decision the Veteran has submitted treatment records from S.J.S., L.C.S.W., a personal statement, and has had a VA mental status evaluation in November 2006. On the one hand, this evidence is "new" in that it did not exist at the time of the October 1998 Board decision and, therefore, was not considered and could not possibly have been. This additional evidence is not, however, material to the determinative issue of whether his psychiatric disorder was incurred in or aggravated by his military service or is secondary to a service connected disability, in particular, the disabilities affecting his knees. Instead, this evidence only indicates he has anxiety and depression, and concerns his ongoing evaluation and treatment of these conditions, without also in turn etiologically linking these disorders either directly or presumptively to his military service or, in the alternative, secondarily to his service-connected knee disabilities. See Morton v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 508 (1992) (per curiam) (medical records merely describing the Veteran's current condition are not material to issue of service connection and are not sufficient to reopen a claim for service connection based on new and material evidence.). In order to reopen this claim, the Veteran must provide the unestablished facts missing from his original claim. The essential basis of the Board's final and binding October 1998 decision was the lack of a medical nexus between his psychiatric condition and his military service - either directly, presumptively, or secondarily to a service-connected disability. Therefore, because this newly submitted evidence does not contain a medical nexus supportive of his claim, this additional evidence does not provide the unestablished facts necessary to substantiate this claim. The report of the November 2006 VA psychiatric evaluation also is not material to the claim because, even though asked to determine whether the Veteran's psychiatric disorder could be related to his bilateral knee disability, the examiner ultimately found no basis for this correlation and stated, instead, that she could not answer this question posed without resorting to mere speculation. A statement that, for all intents and purposes, is inconclusive as to the origin of a disorder cannot be employed as suggestive of a linkage between the disorder and the Veteran's military service - including, as here, by way of a service- connected disability. See, e.g., Warren v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 4, 6 (1993); Sklar v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 104, 145-6 (1993). Opinions like this, which instead can only make this necessary connection between the current disorder and the Veteran's military service by resorting to mere speculation, ultimately amount to "nonevidence," neither for nor against the claim, because service connection may not be based on speculation or remote possibility. See generally Bloom v. West, 12 Vet. App. 185 (1999) (a medical opinion based on speculation, without supporting clinical data or other rationale, does not provide the required degree of medical certainty). See also 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (when considering application of the benefit- of-the-doubt doctrine, reasonable doubt is one within the range of probability, as distinguished from pure speculation or remote possibility). Therefore, the November 2006 report is not supportive of the claim - indeed, at least arguably goes against the claim, and therefore is insufficient reason to reopen the claim. Additionally, the Veteran's personal statements of a medical nexus are not material within the meaning of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. In Moray v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 211 (1993), the Court noted that a layman is not competent to offer a diagnosis and medical opinion regarding causation, and that such evidence does not provide a basis on which to reopen a claim of service connection. Indeed, in Routen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 183, 186, (1997), the Court specifically noted that "[l]ay assertions of medical causation cannot suffice to reopen a claim under 38 U.S.C. 5108." Also, to the extent the Veteran is merely reiterating arguments he made prior to the Board previously denying this claim, this is not new evidence. Cf. Bostain v. West, 11 Vet. App. 124 (1998) (lay hearing testimony that is cumulative of previous contentions considered by decision maker at time of prior final disallowance of the claim is not new evidence). See also Reid v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 312, 315 (1992). Hence, none of the additional evidence received since the Board's October 1998 decision is both new and material to the claim as defined by VA regulation. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. Therefore, the decision remains final and binding. Furthermore, inasmuch as the Veteran has not fulfilled his threshold burden of submitting new and material evidence to reopen this finally disallowed claim, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is inapplicable. See Annoni v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 463, 467 (1993). ORDER The petition to reopen a claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder other than PTSD, including depressive disorder, is denied. ____________________________________________ KEITH W. ALLEN Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs