Citation Nr: 1032477 Decision Date: 08/30/10 Archive Date: 09/08/10 DOCKET NO. 06-25 467 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Paul, Minnesota THE ISSUES 1. Whether new and material evidence has been presented to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability. 2. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include depression and major depressive disorder. 3. Entitlement to service connection for organic affective syndrome. 4. Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD James A. DeFrank, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from September 1966 to December 1967. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a June 2005 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Paul, Minnesota. In the June 2005 rating decision, the RO considered the claim of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include depression, on the merits without considering whether new and material evidence had been submitted. The Board must initially determine whether new and material evidence has been submitted regardless of the RO's actions. Jackson v. Principi, 265 Fed. Cir. 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The issue of entitlement to service connection for PTSD is addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and is REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In a final August 1975 rating decision, the RO denied entitlement to service connection for sociopathic personality disorder. 2. The evidence received since August 1975 includes evidence that is neither cumulative nor redundant, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include depression and major depressive disorder, and raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 3. The preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that depression or major depressive disorder were incurred in service, and there is evidence that depressive symptoms are attributable to a personality disorder. 4. The Veteran's organic affective syndrome was not present in service or for many years thereafter, and is not etiologically related to service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. New and material evidence has been received to reopen the claim of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include depression. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2009). 2. An acquired psychiatric disability, to include depression and major depressive disorder, was not incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131, 1137, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2010); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159, 3.303 (2009). 3. Organic affective syndrome was not incurred or aggravated during the Veteran's military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2010); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) VA's duties to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits are found at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 and 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a). See also 73 Fed. Reg. 23,353-23,356 (April 30, 2008) (concerning revisions to 38 C.F.R. § 3.159). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative, if any, of any information, and any medical evidence or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). In accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1), proper notice must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. Notice should be sent prior to the appealed rating decision or, if sent after the rating decision, before a readjudication of the appeal. A Supplemental Statement of the Case, when issued following a notice letter, satisfies the due process and notification requirements for an adjudicative decision for these purposes. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Regarding the Veteran's claim to whether new and material evidence has been presented to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for acquired psychiatric disability, to include depression, in view of the Board's favorable decision to reopen the claim for service connection for acquired psychiatric disability, to include depression, further assistance is unnecessary to aid the Veteran in substantiating his claim, as the claim has been successfully reopened. Regarding the remaining service connection claims, the RO provided notice to the Veteran in a March 2005 letter that explained what information and evidence was needed to substantiate a claim for service connection as well as what information and evidence must be submitted by the Veteran, and what information and evidence would be obtained by VA. The June 2005 RO rating decision reflects the initial adjudication of the claim followed the issuance of the March 2005 letter. Following the rating decision on appeal, a July 2007 letter provided the Veteran with information pertaining to VA's assignment of disability ratings and effective dates, as well as the type of evidence that impacts those determinations, consistent with Dingess/Hartman. Although that notice was not followed by readjudication of the claim-which could, potentially, cure a timing problem (see Mayfield v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 537, 543 (2006), and Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006))-on these facts, the timing of the notice is not shown to prejudice the Veteran. Because the Board herein denies the claims for service connection, no disability rating or effective date is being, or is to be, assigned. Accordingly, there is no possibility of prejudice by the timing of this post- rating notice to the Veteran under the notice requirements of Dingess/Hartman. No further development is required with respect to the duty to notify. VA has also fulfilled its duty to assist in obtaining the identified and available evidence needed to substantiate the Veteran's claims. The RO has either obtained, or made sufficient efforts to obtain, records corresponding to all treatment described by the Veteran. Pertinent medical evidence associated with the claims file consists of service and VA treatment records, and the Veteran's January 2005 VA examination. Also of record and considered in connection with the appeal are the various written statements provided by the Veteran and by his representative. The Board finds that no additional RO action to further develop the record on the claim is required here. Overall, there is no evidence of any VA error in notifying or assisting the Veteran that reasonably affects the fairness of this adjudication. Acquired Psychiatric Disability - New and Material The RO denied the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder in August 1975 on the basis that there was no evidence of a current acquired psychiatric disability, as the Veteran was diagnosed with a constitutional or developmental abnormality of sociopathic personality disorder. The Veteran did not appeal the August 1975 rating decision within one year, and it became final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105. VA may reopen and review a claim that has been previously denied if new and material evidence is submitted by or on behalf of a veteran. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). See also Hodge v. West, 155 F. 3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Veteran sought to reopen his claim in October 2004. In this regard, the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) define "new" evidence as evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers and "material" evidence as evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2009). In determining whether new and material evidence has been received, VA must initially decide whether evidence received since the prior final denial is, in fact, new. As indicated by the regulation cited above, and by judicial case law, "new" evidence is that which was not of record at the time of the last final disallowance (on any basis) of the claim, and is not duplicative or "merely cumulative" of other evidence then of record. This analysis is undertaken by comparing the newly received evidence with the evidence previously of record. After evidence is determined to be new, the next question is whether it is material. The provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 require a review of all evidence submitted by or on behalf of a claimant since the last final denial on any basis to determine whether a claim must be reopened. See Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 273, 282-3 (1996). Here, the last final denial of the claim is the RO's August 1975 denial of service connection on the basis that new and material evidence had not been submitted to reopen the claim. Furthermore, for purposes of the "new and material" analysis, the credibility of the evidence is presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 512-513 (1992). In this case, evidence received since the last final August 1975 rating decision includes a January 2007 VA treatment note which demonstrated a diagnosis of moderate depression. A private psychological evaluation shows a diagnosis of major depressive disorder. The Board finds that the above-described evidence provides a basis for reopening the claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include depression and major depressive disorder. Indeed, this evidence is "new" in that it was not before agency adjudicators at the time of the August 1975 denial of service connection, and is not duplicative or cumulative of evidence previously of record. Moreover, this evidence is "material" in that it pertains to the previously unestablished element of a current disability, and raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. The prior denial of service connection for a nervous condition was based on a lack of evidence of a current acquired psychiatric disability in service or following service. The January 2007 VA record and private medical record suggest a current acquired psychiatric disability following service. Hence, this evidence raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the Veteran's claim for service connection. As noted above, for purposes of determining whether the claim should be reopened, the evidence is presumed to be credible. Under these circumstances, the Board concludes that the criteria for reopening the claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include depression and major depressive disorder, have been met. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. Service Connection- Laws and Regulations Service connection will be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Establishing service connection generally requires (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), an alternative method of establishing the second and third Shedden element is through a demonstration of continuity of symptomatology. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); see Savage v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-97 (1997); see also Clyburn v. West, 12 Vet. App. 296, 302 (1999). Continuity of symptomatology may be established if a claimant can demonstrate (1) that a condition was "noted" during service; (2) evidence of post-service continuity of the same symptomatology; and (3) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the post-service symptomatology. Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 495-96; see Hickson, 12 Vet. App. at 253 (lay evidence of in-service incurrence sufficient in some circumstances for purposes of establishing service connection); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Lay persons are generally not competent to opine as to medical etiology or render medical opinions. Barr v. Nicholson; see Grover v. West, 12 Vet. App. 109, 112 (1999); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). Lay testimony is competent, however, to establish the presence of observable symptomatology and "may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection." Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 398, 405 (1995) (lay person competent to testify to pain and visible flatness of his feet); Espiritu, 2 Vet. App. at 494-95 (lay person may provide eyewitness account of medical symptoms). "Symptoms, not treatment, are the essence of any evidence of continuity of symptomatology." Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 496 (citing Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 16, 19 (1991). Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible. See Layno, supra (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted"). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 2002); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). Acquired psychiatric disability Factual Background and Analysis Service treatment records show that the Veteran's September 1966 enlistment examination revealed a normal clinical evaluation. A June 1967 treatment note diagnosed the Veteran with a schizophrenic reaction. It was noted that he had swallowed an unknown quantity of medication in a suicide attempt. In the narrative summary, the examiner noted the Veteran had a long history of difficulty with police and juvenile authorities. The Veteran reported he had entered service out of the county jail, where he had been held for a robbery charge. He was given the choice of joining the Army or going to jail. In August 1967, he was diagnosed with an emotionally unstable personality. The Veteran reported he had always been a "problem child." He reiterated the facts reported above about entering service right out of the county jail. The Veteran asked if he could be given another chance. The examiner diagnosed emotionally unstable personality manifested by difficulty controlling impulses, suicidal gestures, difficulty with authority. The examiner determined it was not incurred in the line of duty and existed prior to service. A November 1967 report of psychiatric evaluation shows a diagnosis of emotionally unstable personality. The treating psychiatrist noted that no further attempt at rehabilitation should be made as it was believed that he was of little or no use to the service. He stated the Veteran had a severe character disorder. It was recommended that the Veteran be considered for administrative separation because of unsuitability due to a personality defect. In June 1970, the Veteran was admitted to a VA hospital because of frequent altercations with the law. The Veteran reported having difficulty with impulse control for most of his life. He described himself as living on the side of danger even when he was a young boy. The Veteran stated during his junior high school days, he frequently came to the attention of the administration because of rebellion from authority. He was asked to leave school in the tenth grade because of his difficulties with the school authorities. The diagnosis was sociopathic personality. A November 2004 VA treatment note indicated that the Veteran's diagnosis of severe and persistent mental illness included, but was not limited to schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major affective disorder or severe PTSD. The Veteran underwent a VA examination in January 2005. The examiner noted that the Veteran had a long history of difficulties with police and juvenile authorities. The Veteran also entered the service directly out of jail. The diagnosis was organic affective syndrome, poly-substance dependence under Axis I and a personality disorder not otherwise specified (NOS) with antisocial and borderline traits under Axis II. The examiner indicated that the Veteran's organic affective syndrome was not caused by the military as it was related to a motorcycle accident in 1998. The examiner also noted that the Veteran met the diagnosis of a personality disorder NOS which developed in his child and teen years prior to his military service. She stated the Veteran's reported depressive symptoms were secondary to his personality disorder and were present in his teen years prior to his military service. The Veteran's mental health problems were not caused or aggravated by the military. The Veteran underwent an assessment by a private psychologist in January 2007. The Veteran described experiences that were quite dramatic regarding his service during in Japan at a hospital during the Vietnam War. Following his discharge from the service, he described a long history of drug dependency. The psychologist noted that the Veteran was struggling with symptoms of depression and PTSD. This combination appeared to be a feature of his life for many years. The psychologist noted that the Veteran had a history of problems sometimes seen in individuals with antisocial personality disorder but this diagnosis was not made because the juvenile precursors were not identified. Therefore, these issues were probably best seen as an outgrowth of the Veteran's marginalized lifestyle he lived when he was using drugs regularly. The diagnosis was major depressive disorder and PTSD. A January 2007 VA treatment note reflected a diagnosis of moderate symptoms of depression. After having carefully reviewed the evidence of record, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that an acquired psychiatric disorder, such as depression and major depressive disorder, had its onset in service. The service treatment records are replete with evidence that the Veteran had a personality disorder at that time, which is not a disease or injury for VA purposes. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(c), 4.9, 4.127 (2009); Winn v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 510, 516 (1996) (holding that 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c), as it pertains to personality disorder, is a valid regulation). Additionally supporting the service treatment records is the June 1970 VA hospitalization summary report, which shows a diagnosis of sociopathic personality disorder. Thus, three years after the Veteran's discharge from service, he continued to be diagnosed with a personality disorder. In the January 2005 VA examination report, the examiner also diagnosed the Veteran with a personality disorder and stated that the Veteran had developed depressive symptoms, but that such were attributable to the personality disorder. Thus, when multiple medical professionals examine the Veteran and diagnose him with a personality disorder, it is clear that the Veteran has a personality disorder. To the extent that the VA examiner stated that the depressive symptoms were attributable to the personality disorder, the Board does not find that such establishes a basis for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. Manifestations of the personality disorder are still part of the personality disorder, which is not a disease or injury for VA purposes. See id. Additionally, the VA examiner stated that these depressive symptoms had existed prior to service and were not aggravated during service. Thus, her finding specifically refutes any finding that the depressive symptoms were aggravated during service. The January 2007 psychologist stated she was unable to diagnose a personality disorder because the usual juvenile precursors were not identified. The Board does not find that such is evidence against the Board's finding that the Veteran had a personality disorder for two reasons. One, it is clear that the private psychologist did not have an opportunity to review the service treatment records which provide a description of the Veteran's childhood prior to entering service. Two, her lack of diagnosis of a personality disorder is outweighed by the service treatment records, the June 1970 VA hospitalization summary report, the January 2005 VA examination report, and other VA treatment records. For example, a November 2004 treatment record shows that the examiner stated that the Veteran's antisocial personality disorder was supported by both testing and conflicts with the law. The Board notes that the January 2007 private psychologist stated that the Veteran's psychiatric disabilities were probably best seen as an outgrowth of the Veteran's marginalized lifestyle he lived when he was using drugs regularly which occurred after his service. The Veteran has received other diagnoses such as bipolar disorder and schizophrenia; however, such diagnoses were entered by a registered nurse. When the Veteran has been examined by psychologists and psychiatrists, none of them have determined that the Veteran has bipolar disorder or schizophrenia. They have all diagnosed either a personality disorder and/or organic brain syndrome. Thus, the Board finds that the evidence does not support diagnoses of bipolar disorder and/or schizophrenia, as these diagnoses have been outweighed by professionals with more training in mental illness. Even accepting these diagnoses, no competent professional has attributed them to service, and there is no competent evidence that either was manifested to a compensable degree within one year following service discharge. The first documented evidence of depression is in approximately 2004, which is more than 25 years following service discharge. Such facts are evidence against the Veteran's claim. See Maxson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 453 (1999) (service incurrence may be rebutted by the absence of medical treatment of the claimed condition for many years after service). Thus, the Board concludes there is no competent evidence of a relationship between the post service diagnoses of depression and major depressive disorder and the Veteran's service. While service connection may be granted, in limited circumstances, for disability due to aggravation of a constitutional or developmental abnormality by superimposed disease or injury (see VAOPGCPREC 82-90, 55 Fed. Reg. 45,711 (1990); Carpenter v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 240, 245 (1995); Monroe v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 513, 514-15 (1993)), there is no competent evidence whatsoever to even suggest that such has occurred in this case. In fact, in the January 2005 VA examination report, the examiner specifically stated that his mental health problems were not aggravated by service. Therefore, service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include depression and major depressive disorder, must be denied. Organic affective syndrome Factual Background and Analysis The Veteran's service treatment records are negative for treatment or complaints related to organic affective syndrome. In June 1998 the Veteran was admitted to a hospital with a closed head injury secondary to an assault. The July 1998 discharge summary noted traumatic injuries including a probable basilar skull fracture. The Veteran underwent a VA examination in January 2005. The examiner noted that the Veteran had a long history of difficulties with police and juvenile authorities. The diagnosis was organic affective syndrome, poly-substance dependence and a personality disorder not otherwise specified (NOS) with antisocial and borderline traits. The examiner indicated that the Veteran's organic affective syndrome was not caused by the military as it was related to a motorcycle accident in 1998. A November 2005 VA treatment note reflected a diagnosis of organic affective syndrome. The Veteran underwent an assessment by a psychologist in January 2007. The Veteran described experiences that were quite dramatic regarding his service during in Japan at a hospital during the Vietnam War. The Veteran also reported a motor vehicle accident that left him in a coma and required him to regain basic functions. The Board finds at this point that the Veteran has shown a diagnosis of organic affective syndrome; accordingly, the first element of service connection is satisfied. However, a veteran seeking disability benefits must establish not only the existence of a disability, but also an etiological connection between his military service and the disability. Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000); D'Amico v. West, 209 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hibbard v. West, 13 Vet. App. 546, 548 (2000). The Board notes in that regard that the Veteran's service treatment records were negative for any complaints, treatment, or diagnoses of organic affective syndrome. He was not diagnosed with organic affective syndrome until many years after service. This is strong evidence against a finding of any continuity of symptomatology and against his claim for service connection. See Maxson, 12 Vet. App. 453. Moreover, the only opinion addressing the etiology of the Veteran's organic affective syndrome weighs against the claim. After reviewing the medical evidence in the claims file and examining the Veteran, the January 2005 VA examiner concluded that the Veteran's organic affective syndrome was not caused by his military service. This opinion constitutes the only competent opinion to address the relationship between the Veteran's current organic affective syndrome and service, and neither the Veteran nor his representative has identified, presented, or alluded to the existence of a contrary medical opinion-i.e., one that, in fact, establishes a relationship between organic affective syndrome and service. VA must consider all favorable lay evidence of record. 38 USCA § 5107(b); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995). The Board has accordingly considered the lay evidence offered by the Veteran in the form of his correspondence. A layperson is competent to testify in regard to the onset and continuity of symptomatology. Heuer v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 379, 384 (1995); Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 398, 403 (1995); Caldwell v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 466 (1991). However, lay persons are not competent to opine as to medical etiology or render medical opinions. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); see Grover v. West, 12 Vet. App. 109, 112 (1999). It is the province of trained health care professionals to enter conclusions that require medical expertise, such as opinions as to diagnosis and causation. Jones v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 134, 137 (1994). In this case, there is no medical opinion of record showing a relationship between organic affective syndrome and the Veteran's military service. The medical records that address any current organic affective syndrome make no mention whatsoever of the Veteran's military service. Based on the evidence above the Board finds the criteria for service connection for organic affective syndrome are not met. Accordingly, the claim must be denied. ORDER New and material evidence having been received, the claim of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include depression is reopened. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include depression and major depressive disorder, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for organic affective syndrome is denied. REMAND The Veteran alleges that he has PTSD as a result of stressful incidents during his service at a hospital in Japan during the Vietnam War. In a June 2005 decision, the RO denied service connection for PTSD on the basis of no verified stressor. Since, that decision, on July 13, 2010, VA published a final rule that amended its adjudication regulations governing service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by liberalizing, in certain circumstances, the evidentiary standard for establishing the required in-service stressor. 75 Fed. Reg. 39843 (July 13, 2010). Specifically, the final rule amends 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) by redesignating current paragraphs (f)(3) and (f)(4) as paragraphs (f)(4) and (f)(5), respectively, and by adding a new paragraph (f)(3) that reads as follows: If a stressor claimed by a veteran is related to the veteran's fear of hostile military or terrorist activity and a VA psychiatrist or psychologist, or a psychiatrist or psychologist with whom VA has contracted, confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder and that the veteran's symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. For purposes of this paragraph, "fear of hostile military or terrorist activity" means that a veteran experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or circumstance that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of the veteran or others, such as from an actual or potential improvised explosive device; vehicle- imbedded explosive device; incoming artillery, rocket, or mortar fire; grenade; small arms fire, including suspected sniper fire; or attack upon friendly military aircraft, and the veteran's response to the event or circumstance involved a psychological or psycho-physiological state of fear, helplessness, or horror. In this case, the Veteran has submitted a stressor which allegedly supports his PTSD diagnosis that involves his service in Japan during the Vietnam War. Specifically, the Veteran reported that despite having clerical duties, he helped burn victims and injured soldiers at the 106th General Hospital in Yokohma, Japan. The Veteran's DD-214 reflects that his last duty and assignment was at the 12th Field Hospital. The Veteran was afforded a VA examination in January 2005. The Axis I diagnosis was organic affective syndrome and poly- substance dependence. PTSD was not found. Despite the finding of the January 2005 VA examiner, the Board notes that record of a February 2007 private physician include a diagnosis of and treatment for PTSD. Although the private physician statement dated in February 2007 indicates a diagnosis of PTSD, the revised regulation requires a diagnosis by a VA psychiatrist or psychologist. Therefore, a remand is necessary for a VA psychological evaluation by a VA or contract psychiatrist or psychologist to determine the nature and etiology of any claimed psychiatric disorder. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. Contact the Veteran and his representative and obtain the names, addresses and approximate dates of treatment for all medical care providers, VA and non-VA, who treated the Veteran for his PTSD and whose records are not found within the claims file. After the Veteran has signed the appropriate releases, those records not already associated with the claims file should be obtained and associated with the claims file. All attempts to procure records should be documented in the file. If records identified by the Veteran cannot be obtained, a notation to that effect should be inserted in the file. The Veteran is to be notified of unsuccessful efforts in this regard, in order to allow him the opportunity to obtain and submit those records for VA review. 2. Schedule the Veteran for an examination by a VA psychiatrist or psychologist. All indicated tests and studies are to be performed. Based on a review of the record, and examination of the Veteran, and considering the identified stressors and DD-214, the examiner should offer an opinion as to whether it is at least as likely as not (50 percent probability or greater) that he has PTSD due to a claimed stressor that is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the his service; in other words, in addition to the other information provided in the examination report, please specifically state whether or not the claimed stressor is related to the Veteran's fear of hostile military or terrorist activity. Prior to the examination, the claims folder and a copy of this remand must be made available to the examiner for review of the case. A notation to the effect that this record review took place should be included in the report. The opinion should be provided based on the results of examination, a review of the medical evidence of record, and sound medical principles. All examination findings, along with the complete rationale for all opinions expressed, should be set forth in the examination report. 3. After completing any additional necessary development, re-adjudicate the issue of service connection for PTSD. If the disposition of the claim remains unfavorable, furnish the Veteran and his representative a supplemental statement of the case and afford the applicable opportunity to respond. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2010). ____________________________________________ Alexandra P. Simpson Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs