Citation Nr: 1036167 Decision Date: 09/24/10 Archive Date: 09/30/10 DOCKET NO. 04-11 977 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical and Regional Office Center in Wichita, Kansas THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include pain disorder. 2. Entitlement to service connection for a cervical spine disorder. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a left shoulder disorder. REPRESENTATION Veteran represented by: Daniel Krasnegor, Esq. WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL The Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD S. Dale, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active duty service from January 1976 to January 1979. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from December 2003 and March 2004 rating decisions of the RO, which denied entitlement to the benefits enumerated above. In April 2005, the Veteran testified at a hearing before the undersigned, which took place at the RO. A subsequent December 2005 Board decision denied the claims on appeal. The Veteran appealed the Board's December 2005 decision regarding the claims enumerated above to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). In an Order dated in February 2007, the Court ordered that the motion for remand be granted and remanded the Board's decision regarding the aforementioned claims for compliance with the instructions in the Joint Motion for Remand (Joint Motion) filed in this case. The issues on appeal were then remanded by the Board in September 2007 to attempt to obtain information concerning a Jeep accident which the Veteran variously claims occurred between January 1976 and January 1979 at either Fort Ord, Fort Irwin or Camp Roberts. Despite the Veteran's lack of specificity regarding the date and place of the accident, the RO requested any evidence relating to such from the United States Combat Readiness Center in February 2008. In March 2008 the United States Combat Readiness Center provided the RO with a negative response, detailing that a search yielded no records involving anyone with the Veteran's last name within the state of California during the time period. Therefore, the Board finds that its remand instructions have been substantially complied with, and thus, the Board may proceed in adjudicating the Veteran's claims. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998) (where the remand orders of the Board are not complied with, the Board errs as a matter of law when it fails to ensure compliance); see also D'Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 97, 105 (2008) and Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141, 146-47 (1999). In a July 2008 decision, the Board again denied the Veteran's claims herein on appeal. Again, the Veteran appealed the decision. In a Court-adopted Joint Motion dated in April 2009, the parties agreed that the Board's July 2008 denial failed to consider correspondence submitted by the Veteran's representative in February 2008, April 2008 and May 2008. The Veteran's claim was returned to the Board for further appellate proceedings in accordance with the April 2009 Joint Motion. Upon review of the Veteran's claims file, the Board notes that the February 2008, April 2008 and May 2008 statements from the Veteran's representative were Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. A Report of Contact dated in September 2010 reflects that the BVA Privacy Office responded to such requests in September 2009 and January 2010, and that the only document added to the Veteran's VA claims file after the BVA Privacy Office's last response was additional correspondence from the Veteran's private attorney. As such, no further action is necessary, and the Board will proceed to a decision. Concerning the Veteran's claim for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include pain disorder, the Board notes the Court's recent decision in Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009), holding that when a claimant makes a claim, he is seeking service connection for symptoms regardless of how those symptoms are diagnosed or labeled. In its decision, the Court indicated that VA unduly limited its consideration of claims for service connection for specific mental disorders under circumstances in which other diagnosed psychiatric disabilities may be present. In light of the Court holding in Clemons and in an attempt to give the Veteran every possible benefit of the appellate process, the Veteran's claim for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include pain disorder, (originally claimed as "psychological disabilities" by the Veteran) has been expanded and is as stated on the title page of this decision. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The preponderance of the competent medical and other evidence of record is against a finding that the Veteran was involved in an in-service motor vehicle accident. 2. An acquired psychiatric disorder, to include pain disorder, is not related to the Veteran's active duty service. 3. A cervical spine disorder had its onset in 1993, well after the Veteran's separation from service, and is not otherwise related to in-service disease or injury. 4. A left shoulder disorder is not related to any incident in service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Veteran's claimed acquired psychiatric disorder, which has been diagnosed as pain disorder, is not due to disease or injury that was incurred in or aggravated by his active duty service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2009). 2. The Veteran's claimed cervical spine disorder is not due to disease or injury that was incurred in or aggravated by active duty service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2009). 3. The Veteran's claimed left shoulder disorder is not due to disease or injury that was incurred in or aggravated by active duty service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2009). (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Board has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence in the Veteran's claims file. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, the evidence submitted by the Veteran or on his behalf. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). The analysis below focuses on the most salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claims. The Veteran must not assume that the Board has overlooked pieces of evidence that are not explicitly discussed herein. See Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122 (2000). The Board must assess the credibility and weight of all evidence, including the medical evidence, to determine its probative value, accounting for evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and providing reasons for rejecting any evidence favorable to the claimant. Equal weight is not accorded to each piece of evidence contained in the record; every item of evidence does not have the same probative value. When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the appellant prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against a claim, in which case, the claim is denied. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Service Connection In general, service connection may be granted for disability or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2009). For certain chronic disorders, to include arthritis, service connection may be granted if the disease becomes manifest to a compensable degree within one year following separation from service. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2009). In order to establish service connection for the claimed disorder, there must be (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999). The determination as to whether these requirements are met is based on an analysis of all the evidence of record and the evaluation of its credibility and probative value. See Baldwin v. West, 13 Vet. App. 1, 8 (1999). Discussion Because these issues involve the application of identical law to virtually identical facts, the Board will address them together for the sake of economy. Concerning Hickson element (1), medical evidence of a current disability, the Board notes that the Veteran has been diagnosed with an acquired psychiatric disorder (specifically, pain disorder) and minimal degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder and cervical spine. See e.g., a private psychological evaluation report from K.L.S., Ph.D. date in October 2003 and x- rays reports performed in conjunction with September 2003 VA examinations. As such, Hickson element (1) has been demonstrated as to each of the Veteran's claimed disorders. Concerning Hickson element (2), medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury, the Veteran asserts that all three of his claimed disorders are a result of an in-service motor vehicle accident. At the outset, the Board notes that the Veteran's service treatment records are devoid of any report reflecting active arthritis or psychiatric illness during service. Indeed, the Veteran has not asserted that he suffered from such during his service. Moreover, there is no medical evidence reflecting that the Veteran was diagnosed with arthritis or a psychiatric disorder within his initial post-service year. Accordingly, in- service disease has not been demonstrated, and the provisions of 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307 and 3.309 are not for application. Concerning an in-service injury, the Veteran has consistently stated that his disorders arise from an in-service motor vehicle accident. In making its determination, the Board must determine the credibility and probative value of the evidence. See Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and cases cited therein [in evaluating the evidence and rendering a decision on the merits, the Board is required to assess the credibility, and therefore the probative value, of proffered evidence in the context of the record as a whole]. The Board reminds the Veteran that VA decision makers have discretion to accept or reject pieces of evidence provided that sufficient reasons and bases are set forth explaining such actions. Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60, 69- 70 (1993), citing Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 192-193 (1992). In particular, the Board must assess the competence and credibility of the Veteran. See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 368-69 (2005). In Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007), the Court, citing Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 467-69 (1994), emphasized that lay testimony is competent if it is limited to matters that the witness has actually observed and is within the realm of the witness' personal knowledge. See also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2) [Competent lay evidence means any evidence not requiring that the proponent have specialized education, training or experience. Lay evidence is competent if it is provided by a person who has knowledge of the facts or circumstances and conveys matters that can be observed and described by a lay person]. The Veteran, as a lay person, is competent to testify about injury or symptomatology where the determinative issue is not medical in nature. See Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 398, 405- 406 (1995) (lay statements about a person's own observable condition or pain are competent evidence); Harvey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 390, 393 (1994) (lay person competent to testify of the observable series of events leading to an injury); Layno, supra (lay testimony is competent when it regards features or symptoms of injury or illness). Indeed, the Veteran is competent to assert that he was involved in an in-service motor vehicle accident and that he later experienced neck and left shoulder pain. However, once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible. See Layno, supra (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered"") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted")); see also Barr, supra. As will be discussed below, the Board does not find the Veteran's statement concerning the in-service motor vehicle accident to be credible. The Veteran first submitted a statement related to the alleged in-service motor vehicle accident in May 1993; more than 14 years after his separation from service. The Board notes that it may, and will, consider in its assessment of a service connection claim the passage of a lengthy period of time wherein the Veteran has not complained of the maladies at issue. See Maxson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 453, 459 (1999). The Veteran's May 1993 statement conveyed that he suffered multiple injuries as a result of a Jeep accident which occurred sometime in 1978 at "Ft. Ord military reservation. The Veteran also asserted that "Pvt. H." was driving the Jeep at the time of the accident and he "believed" that an investigation was completed by military police. In June 1993, the Veteran stated that the Jeep accident occurred in 1978 at Ft. Irwin, and that he was evacuated from the accident site and taken to the U.S. Army Dispensary in Ft. Irwin, California by helicopter. The Veteran also asserted that "Either Pvt. or PFC H." was the driver of the vehicle, and that, because he was taken from the accident scene in a helicopter, he did not know if an accident report was taken by the military police at either Ft. Irwin or Ft. Ord. The Veteran stated that he was a member of the "HHC 2nd/31st" at the time and incurred injuries to his head, face, ankle and back. In a separate statement dated during June 1993, the Veteran specifically asserted his May 1993 statement was incorrect, and that the motor vehicle accident took place at Ft. Irwin rather than Ft. Ord. The report of a June 1993 VA general medical examination reflects that the Veteran told the VA examiner that the Jeep accident occurred in 1978 at Ft. Ord, California, and that, after the accident, he was taken to Ft. Irwin by helicopter. The Veteran also told the VA examiner that he returned to his normal duties after one day. The Veteran also reported that he was involved in a post-service motor vehicle accident, which occurred on May 19, 1993, when the car he was driving was rear-ended. See the June 1993 VA examination report. In December 1993, the Veteran asserted that the Jeep accident occurred in 1977 rather than 1978, and that the accident took place at either "Ft. or Camp Irwin, just outside of Ft. Ord." The Veteran also stated that there were four people in the Jeep at the time of the accident (the Veteran and three others), and he would attempt to obtain statements from the three other soldiers involved in the Jeep accident. The Veteran additionally stated that two of the three were medically discharged from the service due to injuries sustained in the accident. See a December 1993 statement from the Veteran. The Board notes that the Veteran has failed to submit a statement from any of the three other soldiers in the Jeep in the nearly 17 years since he made this statement. In January 1994, VA received a statement from G.D.R., the Veteran's service "buddy", who asserted that he and the Veteran were from the same hometown and were assigned to Ft. Ord in the "2nd, 31st Infantry, HHC" from 1976 to 1979. G.D.R. stated that, even though he did not see the accident occur, he heard that a Jeep rolled over at Camp Irwin and that one of the four people injured was from his home town. [Emphasis added]. G.D.R. asserts that he visited the Veteran at the "HHC Company." See the January 1994 statement from G.D.R. In an August 1994 statement, the Veteran asserted that the following people were in the vehicle at the time of the accident: PFC H., the driver, from North Carolina; Sgt. C., from Pennsylvania; and SPT 4 J., from Kansas City, Missouri. The Veteran also stated that Sgt. C. received a medical discharge. See the Veteran's August 1994 statement. In a February 1997 brief, the Veteran's former representative asserted that the Veteran injured his back and ankle in a 1977 Jeep accident in Ft. Irwin, California. The report of September 2003 VA spine and joints examinations reflects that the Veteran asserted that he injured his neck, shoulders back in an in-service Jeep accident, which occurred in 1976, and resulted in the Veteran being hospitalized for two days. After review of the Veteran's complete VA claims file, the VA examiner noted that the Veteran's service treatment records were devoid of any medical evidence regarding such an accident, but the Veteran was involved in a post-service motor vehicle accident on May 19, 1993. See the reports of the September 2003 VA spine and joints examinations. An October 2003 private psychiatric evaluation report from K.L.S., Ph.D. reflects that the Veteran reported that he was involved in a Jeep accident in 1977. It is unclear how many individuals were involved in the accident, as the Veteran reported to K.L.S., PhD. that he was seated in the back seat with "three other individuals" and the driver had "gotten out for the moment". When the driver returned to the Jeep, he accidentally put the Jeep into neutral, sending it "down the mountain carrying all four of them." [Emphasis added]. The Veteran additionally stated that he was "knocked unconscious" for about six or seven hours, and was taken by helicopter to the hospital. At the VA hearing before the undersigned in April 2005, the Veteran asserted that the Jeep accident happened in 1977 at Camp Roberts, and "four or five guys" were involved. The Veteran asserted that he was knocked unconscious and was taken by helicopter to a hospital at Camp Roberts for treatment regarding his back, neck, knees, shoulders, and facial lacerations. The Veteran specifically testified that he has endured no post- service motor vehicle accidents. See the April 2005 VA hearing transcript. In a September 2007 brief, the Veteran's former representative stated that the Jeep accident happened at Camp Roberts. Most recently, the Veteran asserted in a November 2007 statement that C. (E-4) and PFC H. were in the Jeep when the accident happened. The Veteran also gave the names of other people assigned to his outfit and stated that he was assigned to the "31 PO 2nd Bergate [sic], HHC Company", which was also referred to as "the Polla Bears." Initially, the Board notes that the Veteran's service treatment records reflect no treatment or diagnoses of any injury to the Veteran's neck or left shoulder, and the separation examination was normal in all respects. The Board finds it incredible that the Veteran's separation examination failed to note an accident of such severity; causing loss of consciousness and being taken by a helicopter to a hospital where he was treated for up to two days. The Veteran's representative has asserted that there are no federal records which show that the motor vehicle accident did not occur. The Board disagrees. The Board observes that there is no record of such an accident. Attempts by VA to obtain corroborating evidence have failed. In June 1994, the RO requested any information from the Army relating to a motor vehicle accident involving the Veteran between January 1976 and January 1979. In June 1994, the Provost Marshall's Office in Ft. Irwin, California replied that records were not retained that far back, and that records were destroyed after five years. The Veteran was notified of this request and reply in a July 1994 Statement of the Case (SOC), which specifically stated that all records were destroyed after five years. VA again attempted to verify the Veteran's statements concerning the in-service Jeep accident in the September 2007 Board Remand, which was written under the specific instructions of the Court- adopted February 2007 Joint Motion. Under the instruction of the September 2007 Board Remand, the RO requested any evidence relating to such from the United States Combat Readiness Center. In March 2008 the United States Combat Readiness Center provided the RO with a negative response, detailing that a search yielded no records involving anyone with the Veteran's last name within the state of California during the time period. The Veteran representative asserts that the Veteran's lay statements are fully corroborated by the August 1994 statement from G.D.R. Again, the Board disagrees. While G.D.R. states that he saw the Veteran in the "HHC Company" and that he was injured on one side of his body, G.D.R. stated that he did not witness the Jeep accident. Moreover, G.D.R. states he was "shocked" at the extent of the Veteran's injuries. This level of injury, however, is not reflected in any of the service medical records. The Board places greater probative weight on the service medical records which were prepared around the time of the alleged accident which neither document any extensive injuries nor do they reference any motor vehicle accident. See Curry v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 59, 68 (1994) [contemporaneous evidence has greater probative value than history as reported by the Veteran]. In determining whether documents submitted by a Veteran are credible, the Board may consider internal consistency, facial plausibility, and consistency with other evidence submitted on behalf of the claimant. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 511 (1995). In the current case, the buddy statement prepared many years after the fact is not supported by any contemporaneous evidence and is contradicted by the medical evidence of record. The lack of annotations in the service medical records directly contradicts the author's allegations of the presence of visible injury on the Veteran during active duty. See Forshey v. West, 12 Vet. App. 71, 74 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002) [the definition of evidence encompasses "negative evidence" which tends to disprove the existence of an alleged fact]. For the reasons set forth herein, the buddy statement is simply unpersuasive. See Hayes, 5 Vet. App. at 69- 70; Wood, 1 Vet. App. at 192-193. Concerning the Veteran's statements regarding the alleged in- service motor vehicle accident, the Board notes that such have varied dramatically, as detailed above. The Veteran has been wildly inconsistent with regard to the time and place of the accident, as well as how many others were involved, his duration of and loss of consciousness after the accident. The Veteran's current and former representatives have argued that such inconsistencies are not pertinent and immaterial. See statements from the Veteran's former and current representatives dated in September 2007 and February 2010, respectively. Again, the Board disagrees. Such inconsistencies weigh against the Veteran's credibility and create an inability to properly assist the Veteran in attempts to verify the occurrence of such events. Moreover, it appears that the Veteran has an extensive history of misstating his medical history. The Veteran testified before the undersigned in April 2005 that he had not been involved in any motor vehicle accidents since the alleged in-service Jeep accident. The Board finds that this statement, made under oath, is utterly false. The reports of the June 1993 and September 2003 VA examinations note that the Veteran was involved in a motor vehicle accident on May 19, 2003, eight days before filing his original claim for VA monetary benefits. See Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) [VA cannot ignore a Veteran's testimony simply because the Veteran is an interested party; personal interest may, however, affect the credibility of the evidence]. Those reports also showed that he complained of neck pain at that time and that his past medical history was "negative," which means he did not relay a history of chronic neck pain or prior neck injury. It is reasonable to assume that had he, in fact, suffered from neck pain for the prior 15 years or more, he would have mentioned such a fact when seeking medical treatment for neck pain. The Board concludes that the Veteran's lay statements regarding the in-service motor vehicle accident to be incredible. In this case, there is no credible evidence to factually support the alleged in-service accident. As noted above, in March 2008, the United States Army Combat Readiness Center reported that a search was conducted of its database for the time period from January 1, 1976, through January 31, 1979. All Army vehicle accidents were searched and no Jeep accidents were found. A search was also conducted of the names of individuals involved in Army vehicle accidents in California during the same time frame which failed to yield any results with the Veteran's last name. The service medical records contain no information that would tend to show such an accident had occurred. In October 1978, the Veteran completed a report of medical history for the purpose of obtaining dental treatment, wherein he denied being seen for any reason by a medical doctor over the prior year or having any prolonged illnesses or hospitalization. Presumably injuries as major as the Veteran describes sustaining in the motor vehicle accident would have been noted by him. Regardless, the separation examination showed no relevant findings or complaints. The Veteran testified in 2005 that he was knocked unconscious during the accident and evacuated by helicopter to Camp Roberts where he was treated for multiple injuries. This treatment involving air evacuation would most likely have been recorded in the service medical records but there is no pertinent record in the service medical records. There is no indication that the service medical records are incomplete. The Veteran also told the private psychologist in 2003 that he was unconscious for several hours and "woke up" in the hospital. This is not consistent with his previous description of the accident in 1993, which was that he was treated with bandages and antiseptic at a first aid station and returned to duty after one day. As support for his current claim, the Veteran implies his service-connected left eye scar was a result of the in-service accident, but service connection was granted based on a 1978 service medical record indicating he fell and hit his head on a desk. There is no indication of a prior scar or injury to the left eye. Another major inconsistency is the Veteran testified in 2005 that he had not had any "other physical trauma...in [his] life." Not only is there evidence of the 1993 motor vehicle accident described above, but the private psychologist's report notes that the Veteran reported he was beat unconscious by police in 1999 and hospitalized in intensive care where he "suffered a clinical death as a result of the beating." If this medical history is accurate, then there was certainly significant post-service physical trauma, and the Veteran's testimony was patently false. If the Veteran's testimony was correct, then he provided a false medical history to the psychologist. Either way, the Veteran is simply an unreliable historian. For all the reasons detailed above - from internal inconsistencies in the Veteran's statements to outright falsehoods - the Board places reduced probative value on the Veteran's descriptions of the events that allegedly occurred during service. The Veteran's representative has argued that VA may not deny the Veteran's claims simply because his reported injuries are not recorded in his service treatment records. See Buchanan, supra. However, the Board, despite the fact that the Veteran's service treatment records are devoid of treatment for or diagnoses of left shoulder, back or psychiatric disorders, finds that the Veteran's statements concerning the in-service motor vehicle accident are incredible due to inconsistencies and the negative reply from the United States Combat Readiness Center. In effect, the only evidence of the Veteran's alleged in-service motor vehicle accident are from the Veteran, himself, and G.D.R., who admits that he did not witness the accident. The Veteran has been accorded ample opportunity to present competent medical evidence in support of his claim, but he has failed to do so. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 2002) [it is a claimant's responsibility to support a claim for VA benefits]. The Court has held that "[t]he duty to assist is not always a one-way street. If a Veteran wishes help, he cannot passively wait for it in those circumstances where he may or should have information that is essential in obtaining the putative evidence." See Wood, supra. As discussed at length above, the evidence concerning the occurrence of this accident is greatly outweighed by the lack of evidence corroborating this accident. As such Hickson element (2) has not been demonstrated, and the Veteran's claims fail on that basis alone. The Board notes that the Veteran has submitted a medical nexus opinion concerning his acquired psychiatric disorder. The examining psychologist attributed the Veteran's pain disorder, at least in part, to a Jeep accident in service. The psychologist presumably based that opinion upon a history provided by the Veteran and not upon a review of the record because the record, as mentioned above, makes no reference to an automobile accident in service. Because the psychologist's diagnosis and opinion are based on unverified facts, the Board does not credit his opinion. The Court has held on a number of occasions that a medical opinion premised upon an unsubstantiated account is of no probative value. See, e.g., Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458, 460 (1993); Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395-396 (1996); Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229, 233 (1993). The October 2003 opinion is further reduced in probative value because it was based, in part, on the Veteran reporting that he had never been without pain since the alleged in-service accident. In contrast, he testified that his neck and shoulder pains began in the 1990s, and review of records for medical treatment between 1988 and 1993 showed no relevant complaints or history. The Veteran might well believe that his physical and psychiatric disorders are attributable to a Jeep accident in service. As detailed above, there is no official record of such an incident. In any event, the Veteran is not shown to be competent to render medical diagnoses, and opinions upon which the Board may rely. See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494-5 (1992); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(1) (competent medical evidence means evidence provided by a person who is qualified through education, training, or experience to offer medical diagnoses, statements, or opinions). This is not a case in which the evidence is in relative equipoise, in which case the Veteran would prevail. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert, supra. The Board, therefore, concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim. As the preponderance of the evidence is against his claim, the benefit of the doubt rule is not for application. Ortiz, 274 F.3d at 1365; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5107. The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (the VCAA) With respect to the Veteran's claims of entitlement to service connection, VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326 (2009). Prior to the adjudication of the Veteran's claims, letters dated in September 2003 and November 2004 fully satisfied the duty to notify provisions. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). The Veteran was aware that it was ultimately his responsibility to give VA any evidence pertaining to his claim. The letter informed the Veteran that additional information or evidence was needed to support his service connection claims. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). The September 2003 and November 2004 VCAA letters notified the Veteran of the elements of a service connection claim. Since the Board has concluded that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claims of service connection, any questions as to the appropriate disability rating or effective dates to be assigned are rendered moot and no further notice is needed. Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Nonetheless, the Board notes that the Veteran was provided proper and complete notice of the Court's decision in Dingess in November 2007. In this case, the Veteran's service, VA and private treatment records have been obtained, to the extent possible. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. There is no indication in the record that any additional evidence, relevant to the issues decided herein, is available and not part of the claims file. As discussed above, the RO has also attempted to obtain various records crucial to the Veteran's claims. The Veteran's representative has asserted that VA failed in its duty to assist the Veteran. First, the Veteran's representative states that VA should attempt to search for records pertaining to Jeep accidents from 1976 to 1979 within the state of California for the veterans whose names the Veteran has asserted were assigned to his Company or were in the Jeep with him. The representative alleges a search was only done under this Veteran's name and that records may be filed under the other names the Veteran has provided. However, as noted above, VA has conducted such an unfruitful search for evidence concerning the motor vehicle accident with regard to the Veteran's name. The negative response indicated that a search was made for "the names of all individuals involved in Army vehicle accidents in California" between 1976 and 1979 (emphasis added). The parameters of such a search would then, also include the various locations the Veteran has identified as the site of the alleged accident. The Veteran also asserts that the in-service motor vehicle accident occurred while the Veteran was on a temporary assignment, and as such, the records regarding this accident are maintained in a different records repository. He also said he "heard" is records were burned. However, neither the Veteran nor his representative has cited any authority to support these statements, so his allegations that records exist that are missing are completely unsubstantiated. Moreover, as discussed above, these allegedly missing records do not negate the fact that the Veteran has provided inconsistent statements as to the alleged in-service accident and that he is simply not credible. The Veteran's representative also asserts that VA should conduct a search for documents relating to the Veteran's reported helicopter flight from the site of the in-service accident to the facility where he received treatment. However, the Veteran has failed to supply consistent information concerning when the incident occurred, where the incident occurred and at what facility he received treatment, let alone the squadron assignment of the helicopter dispatched for his alleged rescue. Indeed, the inconsistencies in the record lead the Board to conclude that further requests would be little more than a fishing expedition. Any "duty to assist" is not, however, a license for a 'fishing expedition' to determine if there might be some unspecified information which could possibly support a claim. In connection with the search for documents, this duty is limited to specifically identified documents that, by their description, would be facially relevant and material to the claim." Gobber v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 470, 472 (1992) (emphasis added). The duty to assist also includes providing a medical examination or obtaining a medical opinion when such is necessary to make a decision on the claim, as defined by law. The Veteran's representative has argued that a remand for VA examinations is necessary in this case due to the Veteran's lay statements that he was involved in an in-service motor vehicle accident. The Board disagrees. The case of McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006), held that an examination is required when (1) there is evidence of a current disability, (2) evidence establishing an "in-service event, injury or disease," or a disease manifested in accordance with presumptive service connection regulations occurred which would support incurrence or aggravation, (3) an indication that the current disability may be related to the in-service event, and (4) insufficient evidence to decide the case. The Board concludes an examination is not needed in this case for the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disorder claim because the only evidence indicating the Veteran "suffered an event, injury or disease in service" is his incredible and uncorroborated lay statements. The Veteran's representative argues that VA must accept the Veteran's lay statements concerning the in-service motor vehicle accident unless affirmative documentary evidence proves otherwise. This is a mis-statement of the law. As noted above, the Board has not denied the Veteran's claims simply because the alleged accident was not reported in the Veteran's service treatment records. This is a very different case than the factual scenario presented in the case of Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In that case, the Federal Circuit held that although "the lack of contemporaneous medical records may be a fact that the Board can consider and weigh against a veteran's lay evidence, the lack of such records does not, in and of itself, render lay evidence not credible." Id. at 1336. In this case, however, it is not the lack of contemporaneous records, standing alone, that renders the Veteran's lay account not credible, but the fact that his lay statements concerning the incident have been inconsistent and, as such, their probative value was outweighed by the March 2008 negative response from the United States Army Combat Readiness Center. See Bardwell v. Shinseki, No. 08-2257 (U.S. Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2010) (a non-combat Veteran's lay statements must be weighed against other evidence, including the absence of military records supporting the Veteran's lay assertions. The Bardwell case, in particular, clearly stands for the proposition that VA does not have to accept the Veteran's statement as to the occurrence of an in-service injury as fact, but that such statement must be weighed against the other evidence. That is what the Board has done in this case, finding the Veteran not credible. Finally, the Veteran's representative is essentially arguing that simply because the Veteran says he suffered an injury during service, VA has a duty to provide him an examination. That is incorrect. The Federal Circuit recently held that since all claimants for VA compensation benefits could simply state that an event happened in service that caused his/her current medical problems, such a statement does not entitle the claimant to a VA examination because it "would eliminate the carefully drafted statutory standards governing the provision of medical examinations and require the Secretary to provide such examinations as a matter of course in virtually every veteran's disability case. See Waters v. Shinseki, --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 1302954 (Fed.Cir.) (April 6, 2010) (rejecting the theory that medical examinations are to be routinely and virtually automatically provided to all Veterans in disability cases involving nexus issues.) The Board notes that the Veteran was afforded VA spine and joint examinations in September 2003 in connection with his cervical spine and left shoulder claims. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). Concerning the September 2003 VA spine and joint examinations, when VA undertakes to provide a VA examination or obtain a VA opinion, it must ensure that the examination or opinion is adequate. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 312 (2007). The reports of September 2003 VA spine and joint examinations reflect that the examiner (who performed both examinations) reviewed the Veteran's complete claims file, to include his service treatment records, past medical history, recorded his current complaints, and conducted an appropriate physical examination and rendered appropriate diagnoses consistent with the remainder of the evidence of record. The Board therefore concludes that the examinations are adequate for the purposes of this decision. As there is no indication that any failure on the part of VA to provide additional notice or assistance reasonably affects the outcome of this case, the Board finds that any such failure is harmless. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). ORDER Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include pain disorder, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a cervical spine disorder is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a left shoulder disorder is denied. ____________________________________________ MICHELLE L. KANE Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs