Citation Nr: 1037284 Decision Date: 09/30/10 Archive Date: 10/05/10 DOCKET NO. 04-10 887 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Phoenix, Arizona THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for Ehlers-Danlos disease. 2. Entitlement to service connection for a right knee disability. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a left knee disability. 4. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of a left femur fracture. 5. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of a right inferior pubic ramus fracture. 6. Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability. 7. Entitlement to service connection for a right foot disability. 8. Entitlement to service connection for a left foot disability. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Thomas D. Jones, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from February 1956 to December 1956. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a July 2001 rating decision of a Regional Office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). This appeal was originally presented to the Board in April 2008, at which time the issues of entitlement to service connection for Ehlers-Danlos disease, bilateral knee disabilities, a psychiatric disability, and residuals of fractures of the left femur and right pubis were reopened and remanded to the RO for additional development. The issues of service connection for bilateral foot disabilities were also remanded. The required development has been completed and this case is appropriately back before the Board. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998). The issue of entitlement to service connection for a left foot disability is addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and is REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran's Ehlers-Danlos disease is a congenital disorder which did not undergo a permanent increase in severity during active military service. 2. The Veteran's current degenerative joint disease of the right knee did not manifest during military service or within a year thereafter. 3. The Veteran's current degenerative joint disease of the left knee did not manifest during military service or within a year thereafter. 4. The Veteran had onset of a left femur fracture during military service. 5. The Veteran had onset of a right pubis fracture during military service. 6. The Veteran has not presented competent evidence indicating onset of a psychiatric disability during military service. 7. The Veteran has not presented competent evidence of a current right foot disability. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for the award of service connection for Ehlers- Danlos disease have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1111, 1131, 1137, 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 4.9 (2009). 2. The criteria for the award of service connection for a right knee disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1111, 1112, 1131, 1137, 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). 3. The criteria for the award of service connection for a left knee disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1111, 1112, 1131, 1137, 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). 4. The criteria for the award of service connection for residuals of a left femur fracture have been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1111, 1112, 1131, 1137, 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304 (2009). 5. The criteria for the award of service connection for residuals of a right pubis fracture have been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1111, 1131, 1137, 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304 (2009). 6. The criteria for the award of service connection for a psychiatric disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1112, 1131, 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309, 3.384 (2009). 7. The criteria for the award of service connection for a right foot disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1112, 1131, 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) enhanced VA's duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits, as codified in pertinent part at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.326(a) (2009). For the reasons to be discussed below, the Board finds that VA has satisfied its duties to the appellant under the VCAA. A VCAA notice consistent with 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) must (1) inform the claimant about the information and evidence not of record that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) inform the claimant about the information and evidence that VA will seek to provide; and (3) inform the claimant about the information and evidence the claimant is expected to provide. See Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). VCAA notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service connection claim (1) veteran status; (2) existence of disability; (3) connection between service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of benefits where a claim is granted. Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 484 (2006). VA has made all reasonable efforts to assist the Veteran in the development of his claims, has notified him of the information and evidence necessary to substantiate the claims, and has fully disclosed VA's duties to assist him. In March 2001, November and December 2002, September and December 2003, April, July, and September 2008, and December 2009 letters, the Veteran was notified of the information and evidence needed to substantiate and complete the claims on appeal. Additionally, the April 2008 letter provided him with the general criteria for the assignment of an effective date and initial rating. Id. The Board notes that, in the present case, initial notice was issued prior to the July 2001 adverse determination on appeal; thus, no timing issue exists with regard to the notice provided the claimant. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). The Board further finds that VA has complied with the duty to assist by aiding the appellant in obtaining evidence. It appears that all known and available records relevant to the issues on appeal have been obtained and are associated with the Veteran's claims files. The RO has obtained the Veteran's service treatment records, as well as VA and non-VA medical records. VA also attempted to obtain pertinent medical records from the Social Security Administration (SSA); however, in an April 2008 response, the SSA stated no such records were available. See Baker v. West, 11 Vet. App. 163, 169 (1998). He has also been afforded VA medical examination on several occasions, most recently in October 2008. The Board notes that the VA examination reports contain sufficiently specific clinical findings and informed discussion of the pertinent history and clinical features of the disability on appeal and are adequate for purposes of this appeal. The Board is not aware, and the Veteran has not suggested the existence of, any additional pertinent evidence not yet received. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that the Veteran has not been prejudiced by any failure of VA in its duties to notify and assist him, and that any such violations could be no more than harmless error. See Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In any event, the Veteran has neither alleged nor demonstrated any prejudice with regard to the content or timing of VA's notices or other development. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 U.S. 1696 (2009) (reversing prior case law imposing a presumption of prejudice on any notice deficiency, and clarifying that the burden of showing that an error is harmful, or prejudicial, normally falls upon the party attacking the agency's determination). Thus, adjudication of his claims at this time is warranted. II. Service connection Service connection may be awarded for a current disability arising from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2009). Service connection may also be awarded for certain disabilities, such as arthritis or psychoses, which manifest to a compensable degree within a year of service separation. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2009). During the pendency of this appeal, 38 C.F.R. § 3.384 was added to further define "psychoses" as found at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309. 38 C.F.R. § 3.384 (effective August 28, 2006). As with any claim, when there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any matter material to the claim, the claimant shall be given the benefit of the doubt. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 2002). a. Ehlers-Danlos disease The Veteran seeks service connection for Ehlers-Danlos disease. The general criteria for the award of service connection have already been noted above. A veteran is presumed to be in sound condition, except for defects, infirmities, or disorders noted when examined, accepted, and enrolled for service, or when clear and unmistakable evidence establishes that an injury or disease existed prior to service and was not aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1111, 1137. The burden is on the Government to rebut the presumption of sound condition upon induction by clear and unmistakable evidence showing that the disorder existed prior to service and was not aggravated by service. See VAOPGCPREC 3-2003 (holding in part, that 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b) is inconsistent with 38 U.S.C.A. § 1111 to the extent it states that the presumption of sound condition may be rebutted solely by clear and unmistakable evidence that a disease or injury existed prior to service). Congenital or developmental defects are not diseases or injuries within the meaning of applicable legislation concerning service connection. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(c), 4.9, 4.127; see also Winn v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 510, 516 (1996). Service connection for a congenital disability, however, may be awarded if it is shown that such a congenital defect was aggravated through superimposed injury during active service. See VAOPGCPREC 82-90 (July 18, 1990). Congenital or developmental defects automatically rebut the presumption of soundness and are therefore considered to have preexisted service. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(c), 4.9. A pre-existing disease will be considered to have been aggravated by active service where there is an increase in disability during service, unless there is a specific finding that the increase in disability is due to the natural progression of the disease. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1153; 38 C.F.R. § 3.306. Aggravation may not be conceded where the disability underwent no increase in severity during service on the basis of all the evidence of record pertaining to the manifestations of the disability prior to, during, and subsequent to service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.306(a); Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 398, 402 (1995); see also Davis v. Principi, 276 F.3d 1341, 1345-47 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Temporary or intermittent flare-ups of a preexisting disorder are not sufficient to constitute aggravation. Rather, the underlying condition must have worsened. See Hunt v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 292, 297 (1991). According to his February 1956 service entrance examination, no diagnosis or history of Ehlers-Danlos disease was noted at that time. Shortly thereafter, however, the Veteran reported a long- standing history of bilateral knee pain and weakness, with recent exacerbation. Ehlers-Danlos disease was diagnosed, and this disease was found to have existed prior to enlistment. The Veteran was subsequently given a medical discharge in December 1956. In order to determine the etiology of the Veteran's disability, a VA medical examination was afforded him in October 2003. After reviewing the claims file and examining the Veteran, the VA examiner found no evidence of permanent aggravation of the Veteran's Ehlers-Danlos disease during military service. A second VA medical examination was afforded the Veteran in October 2008. A VA physician both examined the Veteran and reviewed his claims file. After examining the Veteran, the VA physician confirmed that a diagnosis of Ehlers-Danlos disease was warranted. The physician noted, however, that Ehlers-Danlos disease was a congenital disorder; therefore, it clearly existed prior to service. Additionally, on review of the claims file and service treatment records, the examiner could find no evidence that this disorder underwent any chronic or permanent increase in severity during military service. The competent medical evidence of record confirms this disorder to be a congenital disorder, for which service connection may not be granted. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c). Additionally, according to the October 2003 and October 2008 medical examinations, this disorder did not exhibit a permanent or chronic increase in severity during military service, such that service connection may be awarded based on aggravation. See VAOPGCPREC 82-90. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, service connection for Ehlers-Danlos disease must be denied. The Veteran has alleged onset and/or aggravation of his Ehlers- Danlos disease during military service. As a layperson, however, the Veteran is not capable of making medical conclusions; thus, his statements regarding causation are not competent evidence. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 495 (1992). It is true that lay statements may be competent to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (addressing lay evidence as potentially competent to support presence of disability even where not corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence). Congenital disorders, however, such as Ehlers-Danlos disease are complex disorders which require specialized training for a determination as to diagnosis and causation, and they are therefore not susceptible of lay opinions on etiology, and the Veteran's statements therein cannot be accepted as competent medical evidence. In conclusion, the evidence is against the award of service connection for Ehlers-Danlos disease, as this disorder is a congenital disorder without evidence of aggravation during military service. As such service connection must be denied. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002). b. Bilateral knee disabilities The Veteran seeks service connection for disabilities of the bilateral knees. The general criteria for the award of service connection have already been noted above. According to his February 1956 service entrance examination, no diagnosis or history of orthopedic disabilities of the bilateral knees was noted at that time. On his concurrent report of medical history, he denied any prior knee trouble or bone or joint pain. Soon after service entrance, however, the Veteran reported bilateral knee pain and swelling in March 1956. On physical examination, his knees were without bony abnormality or abnormal soft tissue calcification. He was hospitalized in April 1956 secondary to his knee pain, at which time physical examination of his knees was essentially negative, with the exception that the Veteran's skin was noted to be hyper-elastic, and his joints were noted to be hyper-mobile. X-rays of his knees were within normal limits. The Veteran denied any specific injury of the knees. Ehlers-Danlos disease was diagnosed. On X- ray in June 1956, the left knee displayed an area of sclerosis on upper end of the tibia. The significance of this finding was not known, however; a healed epiphysitis was suspected. In November 1956, the Veteran was again seen for bilateral knee pain. On this occasion, he gave a history of bilateral knee pain since age 12, after falling out of a truck and being dragged for half a mile. In December 1956, the Veteran was separated from active military service due to physical disability resulting from a fatigue fracture of the left femur. On service separation examination in November 1956, no disability of the bilateral knees was noted. A May 1988 X-ray of the Veteran's bilateral knees was within normal limits. A June 1988 X-ray, however, displayed osteoarthritic changes, according to the examiner. Osteoarthritis of the bilateral knees was diagnosed at that time. A VA medical examination was afforded the Veteran in October 2003. His claims file was reviewed in conjunction with the examination. He reported bilateral knee pain, without specific injury, beginning during military service. After examining the Veteran and reviewing the claims file, the examiner determined any current left knee disorder was unrelated to his Ehlers-Danlos disease. The examiner did not offer an opinion regarding any current right knee disability. A VA examination was afforded the Veteran in October 2008. A VA physician both examined the Veteran and reviewed his claims file. The Veteran reported onset of bilateral knee pain during military service. Evaluation of the Veteran's knees by the examiner yielded a diagnosis of bilateral degenerative joint disease, severe. After reviewing the Veteran's medical history, however, the examiner found no evidence of onset of this disability during military service or within a year thereafter. This opinion was based in part on the fact that no injuries to the Veteran's knees were reported during military service. After considering the totality of the record, the Board finds the preponderance of the evidence to be against the award of service connection for bilateral knee disabilities. As an initial matter, the Board finds that because the Veteran's knees were within normal limits on initial examination for service entrance in February 1956, and evidence sufficient to establish a pre- existing disease or injury of the knees has not been presented, the presumption of soundness attaches in the present case. Although a bilateral knee injury at age 12 was reported by the Veteran in November 1956, the contemporaneous evidence of the time does not reflect any permanent residuals of such an injury; therefore, the Board must conclude this injury was acute and transitory, without residuals at the time of examination and acceptance into military service. Although the Veteran did complain of bilateral knee pain during military service, initial examination of the knees at that time was negative for any objective findings. Admittedly, a June 1956 X-ray indicated an area of sclerosis on upper end of the left tibia; however, the significance of this finding was not known and a healed epiphysitis was suspected. Subsequent examination of the Veteran's knees on service separation in November 1956 was negative for any abnormality, and the Veteran did not report or seek treatment for a disability of either knee for many years following service. The first diagnosis of a bilateral knee disability dates to approximately 1988, when osteoarthritic changes were confirmed on X-ray. This represents a gap of over 30 years after service separation. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (a lengthy period of absence of medical complaints for condition can be considered as a factor in resolving claim); see also Mense v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 354, 356 (1991) (affirming the Board's denial of service connection where a veteran failed to account for a lengthy time period between service and initial symptoms of disability). Additionally, when the Veteran was afforded VA examinations in October 2003 and again in October 2008 to determine the etiology of his current osteoarthritis of the knees, VA examiners found it less likely than not that the Veteran's current knee disorders were related to military service, or had their onset within a year of service separation. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, service connection for bilateral knee disabilities must be denied. The Veteran himself alleges a bilateral knee disability began during military service. As a layperson, however, the Veteran is not capable of making medical conclusions; thus, his statements regarding causation are not competent evidence. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 495 (1992). It is true that lay statements may be competent to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (addressing lay evidence as potentially competent to support presence of disability even where not corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence). Orthopedic disorders, however, such as arthritis are complex disorders which require specialized training for a determination as to diagnosis and causation, and they are therefore not susceptible of lay opinions on etiology, and the Veteran's statements therein cannot be accepted as competent medical evidence. In conclusion, service connection for bilateral knee disabilities must be denied, as the Veteran's current degenerative joint disease of the knees did not manifest during military service or within a year thereafter. As a preponderance of the evidence is against the award of service connection, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not applicable in the instant appeal. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55- 57 (1991). c. Left femur and right pubis fracture The Veteran seeks service connection for residuals of a fracture of the left femur, and of the right pubis. The general criteria for the award of service connection have already been noted above. According to his February 1956 service entrance examination, no diagnosis or history of orthopedic disabilities of the left femur or right pubis was noted at that time. In June 1956, however, the Veteran reported recent onset of thigh pain following marching. Shortly thereafter, he described his pain as severe, and he was afforded an orthopedic examination. X-rays of the right pubis revealed an area of calcification, suggestive of a healing fracture. X-rays of the left femur revealed an area of cortical roughening across the distal femoral shaft. The impression was of subperiosteal and periosteal new bone formation, possibly indicative of a response to an infection. On further treatment and evaluation, however, the impression of his left femur was changed to that of a simple fatigue fracture of the left femur, without artery or nerve involvement. This disorder was found to exist prior to enlistment. Subsequent response to treatment was found inadequate, and the Veteran was separated from service on a medical basis in December 1956. A VA examination was afforded the Veteran in October 2008. A VA physician both examined the Veteran and reviewed his claims file. Regarding his fracture of the left femur and pelvis during military service, this disability was noted to have its onset without definite injury, and did not require surgery or ambulatory aids. Some daily soreness related to this disability was reported by the Veteran. However, he was without swelling or notable functional impairment of the left thigh and/or right pubic region. Current X-rays of the left femur and right pubis were without evidence of fracture. After examination of the Veteran and review of the claims file, including the service treatment records, the examiner, a VA physician, determined the Veteran's left femur and right pubis disabilities were at least as likely as not related to military service, as they first manifested at that time. After considering the totality of the record, the Board finds service connection for residuals of fractures of the left femur and right pubis is warranted, as these disabilities had their onset during military service, and a nexus has been established by the competent evidence of record between these in-service injuries and the current disabilities claimed. The Board notes that at the time of his initial in-service treatment for his left femur fracture in 1956, this disorder was found to have existed prior to service. The Board also notes, however, that his February 1956 service entrance examination was negative for any such disability, and it did not manifest until after several months of rigorous military training. Additionally, the medical record at the time does not give an adequate rationale establishing the clear and unmistakable evidence needed to rebut the presumption of soundness. Thus, the Board does not find the presumption rebutted, and the Veteran is assumed to have been without orthopedic disability of the left femur or right pubis at the time of service entrance. In light of this evidence, service connection is granted for residuals of a left femur fracture and residuals of a right pubis fracture. d. Psychiatric disability The Veteran seeks service connection for a psychiatric disability. The general criteria for the award of service connection have already been noted above. According to his February 1956 service entrance examination, no diagnosis or history of a psychiatric disability was noted at that time. On his concurrent report of medical history, he denied any prior depression, excessive worry, or nervous trouble of any sort. An October 1956 sick call treatment record noted a complaint of nervousness, but was otherwise without a diagnosis of a psychiatric disability. In December 1956, the Veteran was separated from active military service due to physical disability resulting from a fatigue fracture of the left femur. On service separation examination in November 1956, no psychiatric disability was noted. A general medical examination was afforded the Veteran on admission to a private hospital in October 1973. He reported general malaise, back pain, and gastrointestinal upset, with vomiting. No psychiatric disability was noted at that time. The Veteran was afforded hospitalization at a private facility in May 1978 following a drinking binge. A history of alcoholism was noted, as was a prior history of hospitalization in May 1976 for depression. On entrance, he reported various physical complaints. The impression was of a passive-aggressive personality and a history of chronic drug and alcohol abuse. He was again hospitalized in August 1978. He was noted to be depressed, with suicidal thoughts. Depressive neurosis, complicated by anxiety, was diagnosed. In 1981, the Veteran was hospitalized for depression and other psychiatric symptoms. He was noted to have depression and a schizoid personality. Schizoaffective disorder was diagnosed by the Veteran's private physician in 1988. Thereafter, the Veteran sought intermittent private and VA treatment for anxiety, depression, and other psychiatric complaints. A VA psychiatric examination was afforded the Veteran in October 2003. He reported a longstanding history of depression and anxiety. In the Veteran's service treatment records, the examiner noted the complaint of nervousness dated in October 1956. After reviewing the claims file and interviewing the Veteran, the examiner found no indication of onset of a psychiatric disability during military service. Therefore, it was less likely than not that the Veteran's current depressive disorder was related to military service. Another VA examination was afforded the Veteran in October 2008. A VA physician both examined the Veteran and reviewed his claims file. The October 1956 in-service complaint of nervousness was noted by the examiner. After evaluating the Veteran and reviewing the claims file, the examiner determined a current diagnosis of depressive disorder was warranted. The examiner also concluded, however, that it was less likely than not this current disability was related to military service, as the record did not reflect onset of a psychiatric during military service. After considering the totality of the record, the Board finds the preponderance of the evidence to be against the award of service connection for a psychiatric disability, as such a disorder did not manifest during active military service. As noted above, the Veteran complained of nervousness during military service, but a psychiatric disorder was not diagnosed at that time. Additionally, his service separation examination was negative for a psychiatric disorder. Following service, the Veteran was not diagnosed as having and did not seek treatment for a psychiatric disorder until approximately 1976, 20 years after service separation. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (a lengthy period of absence of medical complaints for condition can be considered as a factor in resolving claim); see also Mense v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 354, 356 (1991) (affirming the Board's denial of service connection where a veteran failed to account for a lengthy time period between service and initial symptoms of disability). Finally, when the Veteran was afforded VA examinations in October 2003 and again in October 2008 to determine the etiology of his current depressive disorder, a VA examiner found it less likely than not that the Veteran's current disorder was related to military service. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, service connection for a psychiatric disability must be denied. Additionally, while the Veteran has been diagnosed at one point as having a psychoses (schizoaffective disorder), as defined at 38 C.F.R. § 3.384, this diagnosis was rendered in 1988, more than 30 years after service separation, and has not been shown by the competent medical evidence to have its onset during military service or within a year thereafter. The Veteran has himself asserted his current psychiatric symptoms have existed since military service. He has not, however, adequately explained the lengthy gap between his military service separation and his first diagnosis of a psychiatric disability in approximately 1976. Additionally, the Board notes that although the Veteran sought medical care for a variety of medical complaints prior to 1976, he did not report psychiatric symptoms on those occasions. Thus, the Board does not find his assertions regarding the continuity of his symptomatology to be credible. The Veteran has also asserted his current depressive disorder had its onset during military service. A June 2001 statement was received in 2001 from a layperson, J.H.G., who claimed to have know the Veteran since 1955. He stated the Veteran served in the military "during World War II" and seemed to experience some sort of psychiatric disability therein. As laypersons, however, the Veteran and his friend are not capable of making medical conclusions; thus, his statements regarding causation are not competent evidence. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 495 (1992). It is true that lay statements may be competent to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (addressing lay evidence as potentially competent to support presence of disability even where not corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence). Psychiatric disorders, however, are complex disorders which require specialized training for a determination as to diagnosis and causation, and they are therefore not susceptible of lay opinions on etiology, and the lay statements therein cannot be accepted as competent medical evidence. Additionally, the statement from J.H.G. is of limited probative value where it misstates the time period of the Veteran's service, raising into question the accuracy of the remainder of the statement. In conclusion, service connection for a psychiatric disability must be denied as onset of such a disorder during military service or within a year thereafter has not been demonstrated. As a preponderance of the evidence is against the award of service connection, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is not applicable in the instant appeal. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55-57 (1991). e. Right foot The Veteran seeks service connection for a disability of the right foot. The general criteria for the award of service connection have already been noted above. According to his February 1956 service entrance examination, a diagnosis of pes planus, 2nd degrees, of the feet was noted at that time. On his concurrent report of medical history, he denied any prior foot trouble or bone or joint pain. In December 1956, the Veteran was separated from active military service due to physical disability resulting from a fatigue fracture of the left femur. On service separation examination in November 1956, no disability of the right foot was noted. Following military service, the Veteran sought treatment for a variety of physical disabilities on a regular basis beginning in the early 1970s. He did not, however, report complaints of the right foot until approximately 2000, when he sought service connection for an unspecified foot disorder. A VA examination was afforded the Veteran in October 2008. A VA physician both examined the Veteran and reviewed his claims file. On physical examination, the Veteran was without significant findings of the right foot, and he denied any current right foot disability. After considering the totality of the record, the Board finds service connection for a right foot disability is not warranted. According to the most recent VA examination of record, dated in October 2008, the Veteran does not have a current disability of the right foot. Additionally, the recent VA and private medical records received by VA do not reflect a current disability of the right foot. Central to any service connection claim is a current diagnosis of the claimed disorder. Absent proof of the existence of the disability being claimed, there can be no valid claim. See Gilpin v. West, 155 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Degmitech v. Brown, 104 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223 (1992). The Board recognizes that the Court has held that the presence of a chronic disability at any time during the claim process can justify a grant of service connection, even where the most recent diagnosis is negative. McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319 (2007). Where, however, as here, the overall evidence of record fails to support a diagnosis of the claimed condition at any time during the claim, that holding would not be applicable. Even assuming a current right foot disorder were to be established, the Veteran's service treatment records are negative for any diagnosis of a right foot disease or injury, and he did not complain of or seek treatment for a right foot disability for many years after military service. In light of these facts, service connection for a right foot disability is not warranted. The Veteran himself alleges he has a current right foot disability resulting from an in-service disease or injury. As a laypersons, however, the Veteran is not capable of making medical conclusions; thus, his statements regarding causation are not competent evidence. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 495 (1992). It is true that lay statements may be competent to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (addressing lay evidence as potentially competent to support presence of disability even where not corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence). Orthopedic disorders, however, are complex disorders which require specialized training for a determination as to diagnosis and causation, and they are therefore not susceptible of lay opinions on etiology, and the Veteran's statements therein cannot be accepted as competent medical evidence. In conclusion, the preponderance of the evidence is against the award of service connection for a right foot disability, as a current disability of the right foot has not been established by the competent evidence. As a preponderance of the evidence is against the award of service connection, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is not applicable in the instant appeal. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55- 57 (1991). ORDER Entitlement to service connection for Ehlers-Danlos disease is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a right knee disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a left knee disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of a left femur fracture is granted, subject to the statutes and regulations applicable to the payment of monetary benefits. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of a right pubis fracture is granted, subject to the statutes and regulations applicable to the payment of monetary benefits. Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a right foot disability is denied. REMAND The Veteran seeks service connection for a left foot disability. In August 1957, the Veteran filed a service connection claim for a left foot fracture, claimed as secondary to a hike. He asserted he was hospitalized several months during service for this disability. This claim was denied, however, due to the Veteran's failure to report for examination. On VA examination in October 2008, the Veteran again reported that he fractured his left foot while hiking during military service. Based on this information, a VA examiner determined that the Veteran's current left foot disability, arthralgia and a healed fracture of the second metatarsal of the left foot, was related to his in-service injury. The Board notes, however, that the Veteran's service treatment records are negative for any diagnosis of or treatment for a left foot fracture. Because the Veteran's claimed in- service injury is not established within the record, the Board concludes clarification is required regarding the basis of the examiner's opinion. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. Forward the Veteran's claims file to the examiner who conducted the October 2008 VA podiatry examination. If that examiner is not available, forward the claims file to an expert in podiatric disorders. After reviewing the claims file, the examiner is asked to identify the service treatment record or other source of the medical history of an in-service left foot fracture, as noted within the October 2008 examination report. If the source of this history was the Veteran's own report, the examiner should so state for the record. After reviewing the service treatment records, the examiner should state whether, within these records themselves, a left foot disease or injury is noted. If so, the examiner is requested to state whether it is at least as likely as not any current disability of the left foot is due to or the result of the in-service disease or injury. 2. After undertaking any additional development deemed appropriate, and giving the appellant full opportunity to supplement the record, adjudicate the Veteran's pending claim in light of any additional evidence added to the record. If any benefit sought on appeal remains denied, the Veteran and his representative should be furnished with a supplemental statement of the case and be afforded the applicable opportunity to respond before the record is returned to the Board for further review. The Board offers no opinion at this time regarding the ultimate outcome of this appeal. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2009). ______________________________________________ JAMES L. MARCH Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs