Citation Nr: 1037312 Decision Date: 09/30/10 Archive Date: 10/05/10 DOCKET NO. 07-10 418 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Los Angeles, California THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for left below the knee amputation. REPRESENTATION Veteran represented by: California Department of Veterans Affairs WITNESSES AT HEARING ON APPEAL Veteran and Niece ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD L. L. Mollan, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from January 1949 to March 1950 and September 1950 to February 1952. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a July 2004 rating decision of the Tiger Team special processing unit at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Cleveland, Ohio, which denied service connection for left below the knee amputation. In May 2009, a Travel Board hearing was held at the RO before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A transcript of that proceeding has been associated with the claims file. In June 2010, this issue was remanded by the Board for further development. Please note this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2009). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a)(2) (West 2002). FINDING OF FACT The Veteran is not shown by the most probative evidence of record to have left below the knee amputation that is etiologically related to a disease, injury, or event in service. CONCLUSION OF LAW Left below the knee amputation was not incurred in or aggravated by active service. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110, 1131, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) With respect to the Veteran's claim, VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326 (2009). Under the VCAA, when VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, it is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative, if any, of any information and medical or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2009); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). In Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004) (Pelegrini II), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. A VCAA letter dated in November 2006 fully satisfied the duty to notify provisions. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1) (2009); Quartuccio, at 187. The Veteran was aware that it was ultimately his responsibility to give VA any evidence pertaining to the claim. This letter informed him that additional information or evidence was needed to support his claim, and asked him to send the information or evidence to VA. See Pelegrini II, at 120-121. Since the Board has concluded that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for left below the knee amputation, any questions as to the appropriate disability rating or effective date to be assigned are rendered moot, and no further notice is needed. See Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). The Board also concludes VA's duty to assist has been satisfied. The Veteran's available service treatment record and relevant, available private medical records are in the file. The Board notes that this issue was remanded in June 2010 in order to attempt to obtain additional records that have not been associated with the claims file. Specifically, the Veteran was sent a letter in June 2010 requesting that he provide Authorization and Consent to Release Information forms for Dr. R.W.H. and for Mercy Hospital, as well as for each private health care provider that has treated the Veteran for his disability. The Veteran submitted no such authorization forms. Additionally, this letter requested that the Veteran provide further detail regarding his claimed injury at Fort Huachuca during his first period of active duty, as well as the approximate dates of his transfer to Fort Sill in Oklahoma and the dates of medical treatment there. No response was given to these requests for more information. The Board also notes that records were requested from the Raymond W. Bliss Army Health Center in Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and the Reynolds Army Community Hospital in Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Both requests yielded negative responses. Additionally, a June 2010 letter from the VA Appeals Management Center (AMC) in response to a request for records indicated that all available service treatment records have already been associated with the claims file. Finally, the Board notes that the record reflects that the Veteran was previously asked to fill out and return a National Archives and Records Administration, NA Form 13055, Request for Information Needed to Reconstruct Medical Data. In doing so, the Veteran indicated that he had received treatment for his left leg from 1950 to 1952 on base at Fort Huachuca and "David Moffit AFB." Thereafter, the Veteran was notified that more specific treatment dates were needed because the service department was not able to search for records over a two-year period. He was asked to limit his treatment dates to a three-month period and to provide the exact dates, if possible. As the Veteran did not respond with the requested information, the Board finds that no further development can be conducted with regard to the assertion of treatment at "David Moffit AFB". As such, the Board finds that all records identified by the Veteran as relating to this claim have been obtained, to the extent possible. The record contains sufficient evidence to make a decision on the claim. VA has fulfilled its duty to assist. With regard to claims for service connection, the duty to assist also includes providing a medical examination or obtaining a medical opinion when such is necessary to make a decision on the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(i) (2009). In this case, a VA examination was considered necessary to evaluate the Veteran's claim, due to the fact that the evidence of record has been determined to be inadequate to grant this claim, as will be discussed in further detail below. As such, the Veteran was scheduled for a VA examination in July 2010. However, he failed to report for this examination. The Board notes that the Veteran was specifically informed in the June 2010 Board remand that his cooperation in VA's efforts to develop his claim, including reporting for any scheduled VA examination, was critical. The Veteran was also advised in this remand that failure to report for any scheduled examination may result in the denial of a claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.655 (2009). The Veteran has offered no good cause for his failure to report for the July 2010 scheduled examination and has not requested that this examination be rescheduled. The Board notes that "[t]he duty to assist is not always a one-way street. If a veteran wishes help, he cannot passively wait for it in those circumstances where he may or should have information that is essential in obtaining the putative evidence." Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). Therefore, as the Veteran has been scheduled for a VA examination for which he failed to report, has offered no good reason for his failure to report to this scheduled examination, and has not requested that he be rescheduled for another VA examination, the Board finds that the duty to assist with regard to providing the Veteran a medical examination has been met in this case. VA has made diligent efforts to provide the Veteran with an appropriate examination and may proceed to adjudicate the claim on the basis of the evidence which is of record. As there is no indication that any failure on the part of VA to provide additional notice or assistance reasonably affects the outcome of this case, the Board finds that any such failure is harmless. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). II. Analysis The Board must assess the credibility and weight of all evidence, including the medical evidence, to determine its probative value, accounting for evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and providing reasons for rejecting any evidence favorable to the claimant. Equal weight is not accorded to each piece of evidence contained in the record; every item of evidence does not have the same probative value. When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the Veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case, the claim is denied. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Service connection may be established for disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002). That an injury or disease occurred in service is not enough; there must be chronic disability resulting from that injury or disease. If there is no showing of a resulting chronic condition during service, then a showing of continuity of symptomatology after service is required to support a finding of chronicity. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2009). Service connection may also be granted for any injury or disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease or injury was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2009). To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a Veteran must show: "(1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service"- the so-called "nexus" requirement. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Veteran is seeking entitlement to service connection for amputation of his left leg. Specifically, at the May 2009 Travel Board hearing, the Veteran testified that he injured his left leg on two different occasions in service. The first injury took place during his first period of service, between January 1949 and March 1950, when he broke his left leg while stationed at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. See Travel Board hearing transcript, May 2009, at 13-15. Thereafter, he was transferred to Fort Sill, Oklahoma. See id. As to the second injury, which took place in December 1950 while he was at home on leave, the Veteran testified that he was involved in a motorcycle accident that caused his left leg, specifically the area below the knee and including the calf, to get bruised and skinned up. See id, at 5, 8-10, 13- 14, 16. Although the Veteran's testimony concerning his treatment for injuries following the accident is somewhat unclear, he seems to indicate that he was initially treated for his injury at Mercy Hospital in Bakersfield before returning to Fort Huachuca and receiving further treatment at the hospital on base. See id, at 9-10, 16; Veteran's statement, July 2009. The Board notes that the Veteran's complete service treatment records are not of record. The only records from his first period of service are a March 1950 separation examination report, a separation qualification record, and DD Form 214. These records show that the Veteran was stationed at Fort Sill at the time of his separation, but mention nothing about him having suffered a broken left leg in service. It is unclear when the Veteran was transferred from Fort Huachuca to Fort Sill. The DD Form 214 for his second period of service shows that he was stationed at Fort Huachuca at the time of separation. The Board observes that the Veteran's post-service private treatment records have been associated with the claims file. These records show that the Veteran underwent guillotine left below-knee amputation in July 1999, as a result of diffuse tibial artery occlusive disease. It was noted at the time that the Veteran was an insulin-dependent diabetic. Subsequent treatment records reflect that the Veteran continued to be monitored for his diabetes, which for the most part appeared to be under good control. In addition, there is a medical opinion of record, dated in October 2003, from Dr. R.W.H., M.D. which reflects that the Veteran's left leg amputation below the knee was due to peripheral vascular disease and that his claimed in-service motorcycle accident at approximately 20 years of age may have and likely did cause some of the problems with his left leg circulation. The physician noted that he had treated the Veteran for many years and by the Veteran's account he had extensive bruising and damage to his left leg from the motorcycle accident. Recent Doppler testing showed normal flow in the right leg. The physician concluded by stating "[p]lease check to see if this can be service related." In spite of the aforementioned medical evidence, the Board notes that the Veteran asserted at the May 2009 hearing that he has never been diagnosed with diabetes. Regulations provide that service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disability was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. 3.303(d) (2009). As noted, the claims file contains an October 2003 private treatment record from Dr. R.W.H., M.D., which reflects that the Veteran's left leg amputation below the knee was due to peripheral vascular disease and that his claimed in-service motorcycle accident at approximately 20 years of age may have and likely did cause some of the problems with his left leg circulation. However, it appears that this statement relies upon the Veteran's unsubstantiated reports of suffering extensive bruising and damage to his left leg in service. The Board notes that the Veteran is competent to report bruising of the leg. However, the Veteran's account of suffering "damage" to his leg following an accident in 1950 is extremely vague and, therefore, not sufficient as a basis for an opinion regarding the etiology of a current disability. Additionally, the Board finds the physician's use of the language "may have" to be speculative. The Court has held that opinions that are speculative, general or inconclusive in nature are of no probative value. See Bostain v. West, 11 Vet. App. 127 (1998); Libertine v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 521, 523 (1996); Obert v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 30, 33 (1993). To the extent that this physician stated that the Veteran's motorcycle accident "likely did cause some of the problems with his left leg circulation", the Board finds that this opinion is not supported by a detailed rationale. Specifically, while this physician did note that the Veteran had normal flow in the right leg, he did not address the nearly 50-year gap between the Veteran's claimed in-service accident and his amputation, nor did he describe what sort of "damage" from a motorcycle accident could have resulted in an amputation 50 years after the fact. Furthermore, the Board finds the physician's use of the phrase "some of the problems with his left leg circulation" to be too vague in terms of describing a specific disability for VA compensation purposes. As noted, the Veteran's leg was amputated in 1999, nearly 50 years after his claimed in-service motorcycle incident. A prolonged period without medical complaint can be considered, along with other factors concerning a claimant's health and medical treatment during and after military service, as evidence of whether an injury or disease was incurred in service, which resulted in any chronic or persistent disability. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Moreover, the Veteran has not asserted that he has had a continuity of symptoms since his claimed 1950 accident. The Veteran reported at the May 2009 hearing that he did not think that he sought treatment for his leg after service until approximately the early 1990's. In summary, the Board has thoroughly reviewed all evidence of record. In consideration of the evidence in its entirety, the Board notes that the Veteran's leg was amputated nearly 50 years after his claimed motorcycle accident and approximately 47 years after his discharge from service. As such, there is a large gap in time from the Veteran's claimed in-service injuries and the amputation of his left leg below the knee. Further, the claims file is negative for treatment of the leg until 1999. While the physician who rendered the October 2003 opinion indicated that he has treated the Veteran for many years, the claims file does not contain evidence of this treatment and the Veteran failed to respond to the June 2010 letter which requested an Authorization and Consent to Release Information form for this physician and other private medical care providers. The claims file does contain the July 1999 operative report for his left below the knee amputation; however, there is nothing in this record reflecting that this operation was in any way related to an in- service motorcycle accident or any other in-service injury. Additionally, the Veteran has not asserted a continuity of symptomatology related to this disability. The Veteran was unable to recall at the May 2009 hearing the exact year that he began receiving treatment for his current disability, but he has not asserted that he has had continuous symptoms of this disability since service. Moreover, the Board notes that the only medical opinion of record on the matter is speculative in some aspect and not supported by a detailed rationale in another aspect. As noted above, the physician used certain language that was equivocal in nature. Additionally, he based his opinion on an unsubstantiated account of the Veteran that referred to "damage" to the leg. This damage was not described in any detail in this private treatment record, and the claims file contains no evidence detailing exactly what sort of damage was inflicted upon this leg in service. As such, the Board finds that the evidence of record weighs against the Veteran's claim for service connection for left below the knee amputation. While the Board took measures to attempt to obtain evidence in the form of a VA examination that could have possibly furthered the Veteran's claim, as noted above, the Veteran failed to report for this examination. Again, the Board notes that "If a veteran wishes help, he cannot passively wait for it in those circumstances where he may or should have information that is essential in obtaining the putative evidence." Wood, supra. Additionally, the Board notes that the Veteran indicated in his September 2004 notice of disagreement (NOD) that he believes he is entitled to Veterans benefits due to the accident he suffered in service, combined with the smoking habit he developed as a result of cigarettes that were issued to him on a regular basis during service. He asserted that these things played a large role in his development of blood circulation problems, which led to his left leg being amputated. However, the Board notes that, to the extent that the Veteran's disability may be related to a history of tobacco use, service connection for a disability on the basis that it resulted from disease or injury attributable to the use of tobacco products during active service is prohibited by law. 38 U.S.C.A § 1103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.300(b) (2009). As such, service connection for left below the knee amputation based on in-service tobacco use or the development of tobacco addiction from in-service use cannot be granted. The Board acknowledges the Veteran's contention that he suffered a left below the knee amputation as a result of his active duty service. The Veteran can attest to factual matters of which he had first-hand knowledge. See Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 368 (2005). However, the Veteran as a lay person has not been shown to have the medical expertise necessary to provide competent medical evidence relating a current disability to an in-service injury; thus, his statements linking his current disability to an in-service injury are not probative. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 495 (1992). The Board acknowledges that the Veteran asserted in a July 2009 statement that he worked in the paramedics department in service. However, the Veteran did not assert specifically in what capacity he worked in the paramedics department. His DD-214 Form reflects that he served in the medical department and attended Medical Field Service School. A Separation Qualification Record indicated that the Veteran's military occupation included service as a surgical technician. This Separation Qualification Record specifically indicated that this occupation required him to do various odd jobs on the hospital wards, such as police of wards. This record also indicated that he assisted in treatment of minor injuries - hospital orderly. Further, this record reflected that, while in Medical Field Service School, he assisted in setting up an operating room and sterilization of instruments. While the Board recognizes the Veteran's military occupation, the Board does not find there is any evidence of record reflecting that the Veteran has any current specialized medical expertise or knowledge that would qualify his statements with regard to his leg amputation as anything more than lay assertions. In view of the above, the Board has determined that the evidence of record does not support the Veteran's claim for service connection for left below the knee amputation. As the preponderance of the evidence is against this claim, the benefit-of-the-doubt rule does not apply, and the claim for service connection for left below the knee amputation must be denied. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). ORDER Entitlement to service connection for left below the knee amputation is denied. ____________________________________________ STEVEN L. COHN Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs