Citation Nr: 1037722 Decision Date: 10/06/10 Archive Date: 10/15/10 DOCKET NO. 07-03 654 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Los Angeles, California THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to a rating higher than 20 percent for a left knee and leg (tibia) disability from August 14 to October 23, 2002, and since December 1, 2002. 2. Entitlement to service connection for obesity, including as secondary to this service-connected left knee and leg disability and service-connected dysthymia. 3. Entitlement to service connection for hypertension, including as secondary to obesity. 4. Entitlement to service connection for Type II Diabetes Mellitus, including as secondary to obesity. 5. Entitlement to service connection for hyperlipidemia, including as secondary to obesity. 6. Entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL The Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. P. Swick, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps from February 1970 to August 1977. This appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) originated from an October 2002 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Los Angeles, California, which confirmed and continued the 10 percent rating then in effect for the Veteran's service-connected left knee and tibia disability. During the pendency of this appeal, however, the RO has increased the rating for this disability to 20 percent as of August 14, 2002, the date of receipt of his claim for a higher rating for this disability, and granted a temporary 100 percent convalescent rating (see 38 C.F.R. § 4.30) from October 23, 2002 to November 30, 2002, to additionally compensate him for his recuperation following his left knee surgery. His 20 percent rating resumed as of December 1, 2002. He has continued to appeal, requesting a rating higher than 20 percent for this disability for the periods immediately preceding and succeeding this temporary 100 percent rating. See AB v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 35, 38 (1993). This appeal also is from a May 2005 RO decision that denied additional claims for service connection for diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia (high cholesterol), and an even more recent August 2008 RO decision that denied a TDIU. In June 2010, in support of his claims, the Veteran testified at a hearing at the RO before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge of the Board, commonly referred to as a Travel Board hearing. At the outset of the hearing, the Veteran withdrew his claims for an earlier effective date for the grant of service connection for a psychiatric disorder (dysthymia and pain disorder), and for service connection for kidney stones, so those claims are no longer at issue. 38 C.F.R. § 20.204. Also during the hearing, the Veteran submitted additional evidence concerning his remaining claims and waived his right to have the RO initially consider it. 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.800, 20.1304. In his hearing testimony, the Veteran alleged that his diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia are all the result of his obesity, and that his obesity in turn is the result of his service-connected left knee and tibia disability, also his right knee disability (chondromalacia of the patella) and psychiatric disorder (dysthymia and pain disorder). This issue of his purported entitlement to service connection for obesity, as the intervening condition in this chain link of causation, therefore has been raised by the record, but has not been initially adjudicated by the RO as the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ). This claim for obesity is "inextricably intertwined" with these other claims that relate to it. So the Board is remanding these claims for necessary additional development and consideration. See, e.g., Harris v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 180, 183 (1991) (indicating issues are "inextricably intertwined" when they are so closely tied together that a final decision concerning one or more of the claims cannot be rendered until a decision on another). These types of claims should be considered concurrently to avoid piecemeal adjudication of claims with common parameters). See also Ephraim v. Brown, 82 F.3d 399 (Fed. Cir. 1996) and Smith (Daniel) v. Gober, 236 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Where the facts underlying separate claims are "intimately connected," the interests of judicial economy and avoidance of piecemeal litigation require that the claims be adjudicated together.). The remand of these claims to the RO will be via the Appeals Management Center (AMC) in Washington, DC. Moreover, since the disposition of these claims potentially could affect whether the Veteran is entitled to a TDIU, the Board also is remanding the TDIU claim. However, the Board is going ahead and immediately deciding the claim for a higher rating for the left knee and tibia disability. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Prior to his left knee arthroscopy and meniscectomies in October 2002, the Veteran's left knee and tibia disability was manifested by medial and lateral meniscal tears and painful degenerative arthritis resulting in limitation of extension to 10 degrees. 2. Since those surgical procedures in October 2002, his left knee and tibia disability has continued to be manifested by painful degenerative arthritis and limitation of extension, but now to a lesser 5 degrees. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria are not met for a rating higher than 20 percent for the left knee and tibia disability, either from August 14 to October 23, 2002, or since December 1, 2002. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1155 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1-4.14, 4.71a, Diagnostic Codes (DCs) 5003, 5010, 5257, 5258, 5259, 5260, 5261, 5262 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION I. The Duties to Notify and Assist As provided by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA), VA has duties to notify and assist a claimant in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and medical or lay evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will obtain and assist the claimant in obtaining; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002); Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370, 373-74 (2002). These VCAA notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service-connection claim, including the downstream disability rating and effective date elements. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), aff'd sub nom. Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (2007). Ideally, VCAA notice should be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the RO. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004) (Pelegrini II). If, however, for whatever reason it was not, or the notice provided was inadequate, this timing error can be effectively "cured" by providing any necessary VCAA notice and then going back and readjudicating the claim - such as in a statement of the case (SOC) or supplemental SOC (SSOC), such that the intended purpose of the notice is not frustrated and the Veteran is given an opportunity to participate effectively in the adjudication of the claim. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Mayfield IV); Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006). In Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009), the United States Supreme Court made clear that a reviewing court, in considering the rule of prejudicial error, is precluded from applying a mandatory presumption of prejudice rather than assessing whether, based on the facts of each case, the error was outcome determinative. In Sanders, the Supreme Court rejected the lower Federal Circuit's framework (see Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F. 3d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) that all VA notice errors are presumptively prejudicial, in part, because it was "complex, rigid, and mandatory." Id., at 1704. The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's analysis because it imposed an unreasonable evidentiary burden on VA to rebut the presumption and because it required VA to demonstrate why the error was harmless, rather than requiring the appellant - as the pleading party, to show the error was harmful. Id., at 1705-06. The Supreme Court stated that it had "warned against courts' determining whether an error is harmless through the use of mandatory presumptions and rigid rules rather than case-specific application of judgment, based upon examination of the record." Id., at 1704-05. Thus, it is clear from the Supreme Court's analysis that, while the Veterans Court may conclude generally that a specific type of error is more likely to prejudice an appellant, the error must nonetheless be examined in the context of the facts of the particular case. Id. The Veterans Court initially held in Vazquez-Flores v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 37, 48 (2008), that prejudicial deficiencies in the timing or content of a VCAA notice can be cured by showing the essential fairness of the adjudication will not be affected because: (1) the defect was cured by actual knowledge on the part of the claimant ("Actual knowledge is established by statements or actions by the claimant or the claimant's representative that demonstrates an awareness of what was necessary to substantiate his or her claim.") (citing Dalton v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23, 30-31 (2007)); (2) that a reasonable person could be expected to understand from the notice what was needed; or (3) that a benefit could not have been awarded as a matter of law. Sanders, 487 F. 3d at 889. Additionally, consideration also should be given to "whether the post- adjudicatory notice and opportunity to develop the case that is provided during the extensive administrative appellate proceedings leading to the final Board decision and final Agency adjudication of the claim ... served to render any pre-adjudicatory section 5103(a) notice error non-prejudicial." Vazquez-Flores, 22 Vet. App. at 46. See also Overton v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 427, 435 (2006) (finding the Board had erred by relying on various post- decisional documents for concluding adequate 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) notice had been provided to the appellant, the Veterans Court nonetheless determined the evidence established the Veteran was afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the adjudication of his claims, and therefore found the error harmless). The Veterans Court further held in Vazquez-Flores v. Peake that, for an increased-compensation claim, 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) requires, at a minimum, that VA notify the claimant that, to substantiate the claim, the medical or lay evidence must show a worsening or increase in severity of the disability and the effect that such worsening or increase has on the claimant's employment and daily life. On appeal, however, in Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 2009 WL 2835434 (Fed.Cir.), the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded important aspects of the Veterans Court's holding in Vazquez- Flores, as well as a related case, Schultz v. Peake, No. 03-1235, 2008 WL 2129773, at 5 (Vet. App. Mar. 7, 2008). Significantly, the Federal Circuit concluded that "the notice described in 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) need not be Veteran specific." Similarly, "while a Veteran's 'daily life' evidence might in some cases lead to evidence of impairment in earning capacity, the statutory scheme does not require such evidence for proper claim adjudication." Thus, the Federal Circuit held, "insofar as the notice described by the Veterans Court in Vazquez-Flores requires the VA to notify a Veteran of alternative diagnostic codes or potential "daily life" evidence, we vacate the judgments." Vazquez, 2009 WL 2835434, at 10. In this case, letters satisfying the notice requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1) were sent to the Veteran in August 2002, December 2004, February 2006, October 2007, and February 2008. These letters, especially in combination, informed him of the type of evidence and information required to substantiate his claim for a higher rating and of his and VA's respective responsibilities in obtaining this supporting evidence. The more recent October 2007 and February 2008 letters also complied with Dingess by as well apprising him of the disability rating and downstream effective date elements of his claim. VA also fulfilled its duty to assist the Veteran by obtaining all relevant evidence in support of his claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. The RO obtained all relevant medical and other records that he identified. He was also examined for VA compensation purposes in September 2002, December 2002, May 2006, July 2008, and September 2009. These examination reports and medical and other evidence on file contain the information needed to assess the severity of his left knee and tibia disability, the determinative issue, so reexamination is not needed. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.327, 4.2. See also Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 377 (1994). Accordingly, the Board finds that no further development is required to meet the mandates of the VCAA. II. Whether the Veteran is Entitled to a Higher (Increased) Rating for his Left Knee and Tibia Disability A. Schedular Rating In February 1978, the RO granted service connection for the residuals of a left lateral fracture of the tibial condyle with degenerative arthritis and assigned an initial 0 percent (i.e., noncompensable) rating for this disability. A subsequent September 1993 RO decision, in effect, granted a higher 10 percent rating as of January 28, 1993. The Veteran filed this claim at issue on August 14, 2002, requesting another increase in the rating for this disability since it had worsened. In October 2002, the RO confirmed and continued the 10 percent rating and he appealed. But, as mentioned, during the pendency of his appeal, the RO has both increased the rating for this disability to 20 percent - retroactively effective from the receipt of his August 14, 2002 claim for a higher rating, and granted a temporary 100 percent convalescent rating (see 38 C.F.R. § 4.30) from October 23 to November 30, 2002, to compensate him for his recuperation following left knee surgery. The 20 percent rating resumed as of December 1, 2002. So the times at issue are the periods immediately preceding and succeeding that temporary 100 percent rating. Disability ratings are determined by applying VA's Schedule for Rating Disabilities (Rating Schedule), 38 C.F.R. Part 4. The percentage ratings in the Rating Schedule represent, as far as can be practicably determined, the average impairment in earning capacity resulting from diseases and injuries incurred or aggravated during military service and their residual conditions in civil occupations. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1155; 38 C.F.R. § 4.1. Where there is a question as to which of two evaluations shall be applied, the higher evaluation will be assigned if the disability picture more nearly approximates the criteria required for that rating. Otherwise, the lower rating will be assigned. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.7. After careful consideration of the evidence, any reasonable doubt remaining is resolved in the Veteran's favor. 38 C.F.R. § 4.3. While the Veteran's entire history is reviewed when assigning a disability rating, 38 C.F.R. § 4.1, where service connection already has been established and an increase in the disability rating is at issue, it is the present level of disability that is of primary concern. Francisco v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 55 (1994). However, the Board must consider whether to "stage" the rating. See Hart v. Mansfield, 21 Vet. App. 505 (2007). In other words, where the evidence contains factual findings demonstrating distinct time periods in which the service-connected disability exhibited diverse symptoms meeting the criteria for different ratings during the course of the appeal, the assignment of a staged rating would be necessary. The relevant temporal focus for making this assessment is from one year before the claim for a higher rating was filed - so, in this case, since August 2001 - until VA makes a final decision on the claim. Id. See also 38 U.S.C.A. § 5110(b)(2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2). When determining the severity of a musculoskeletal disability, which is at least partly rated on the basis of range of motion, VA must consider the extent the Veteran may have additional functional impairment above and beyond the limitation of motion objectively shown due to the extent of his pain/painful motion, limited or excess movement, weakness, incoordination, and premature/excess fatigability, etc., particularly during times when his symptoms "flare up," such as during prolonged use, and assuming these factors are not already contemplated in the governing rating criteria. See DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202, 204-7 (1995), citing 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40, 4.45, 4.59. If, however, a Veteran is already receiving the maximum disability rating available based on symptomatology that includes limitation of motion, it is not necessary to consider whether 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40 and 4.45 are applicable. Johnston v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 80 (1997). In addition to these types of symptoms, other considerations include whether there is swelling, deformity or atrophy from disuse. 38 C.F.R. § 4.45. According to 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, DC 5262, for impairment of the tibia and fibula, a 10 percent rating is warranted if malunion of the tibia and fibula results in slight knee or ankle disability; a 20 percent rating is warranted if malunion of the tibia and fibula results in moderate knee or ankle disability; and a 30 percent rating is warranted if malunion of the tibia and fibula results in marked knee or ankle disability. An even higher 40 percent rating requires nonunion of the tibia and fibula with loose motion requiring a brace. Abnormalities of the bone incident to trauma, such as malunion with deformity throwing abnormal stress upon the joints, should be shown by X-ray and observation evidence and should be carefully related to the strain on neighboring joints. 38 C.F.R. § 4.44. So, under DC 5262, the Veteran would only be entitled to a compensable rating (i.e., a rating higher than 0 percent) if he had evidence of a tibia bone abnormality and at least slight knee or ankle disability attributable to that abnormality. But as his September 2002, December 2002, May 2006, July 2008, and September 2009 VA compensation examinations all indicate his fracture was at the end of the bone (tibial plateau) rather than the shaft, and that the fracture healed and there is no malunion or nonunion of the tibia shaft, it would not be appropriate to rate his disability under this DC. The Board therefore will consider other potentially applicable DCs, such as DC 5010 for traumatic arthritis, DC 5259 for removal of symptomatic semilunar cartilage, and DC 5257 for other knee impairment - including recurrent subluxation or lateral instability. But as his particular symptoms predominantly relate to post-traumatic degenerative arthritis and more recently a torn meniscus that, as mentioned, was surgically repaired in October 2002, his left knee disability is most appropriately rated as degenerative arthritis under DC 5003. See Butts v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 532 (1993) (choice of DC should be upheld if supported by explanation and evidence). DC 5010 for traumatic arthritis, incidentally, indicates to rate the disability as degenerative arthritis under DC 5003. Degenerative arthritis, in turn, is rated based on limitation of motion under the appropriate DCs for the specific joint or joints involved, which, here, are DC 5260 for limitation of knee and leg flexion and DC 5261 for limitation of knee and leg extension. According to DC 5003, when limitation of motion would be noncompensable, i.e., 0 percent, under a limitation-of-motion code, but there is at least some limitation of motion, VA assigns a 10 percent rating for each major joint so affected, to be combined, not added. Limitation of motion must be objectively confirmed by findings such as swelling, muscle spasm, or satisfactory evidence of painful motion. Under DC 5260 for evaluation based on limitation of flexion of the knee and leg, a 0 percent rating is warranted if the knee has flexion limited to 60 degrees; 10 percent rating is warranted if the knee has flexion limited to 45 degrees; a 20 percent rating is warranted if the knee has flexion limited to 30 degrees; and a 30 percent rating is warranted if the knee has flexion limited to 15 degrees. Under DC 5261 for evaluation based on limitation of extension of the knee and leg, a 0 percent rating is warranted if extension of the knee is limited to 5 degrees; a 10 percent rating is warranted if extension of the knee is limited to 10 degrees; a 20 percent rating is warranted if extension of the knee is limited to 15 degrees; a 30 percent rating is warranted if extension of the knee is limited to 20 degrees, a 40 percent rating is warranted if extension of the knee is limited to 30 degrees warrants; and a 50 percent rating is warranted if extension of the knee is limited to 45 degrees. For VA compensation purposes, normal range of motion of the knee is from 0 degrees of extension to 140 degrees of flexion. 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, Plate II. Under DC 5257 for evaluation based on recurrent subluxation or lateral instability, a 10 percent rating is warranted if there is recurrent subluxation or lateral instability resulting in a slight knee disability; a 20 percent rating is warranted if there is recurrent subluxation or lateral instability resulting in a moderate knee disability; and 30 percent rating is warranted if there is recurrent subluxation or lateral instability resulting in a severe knee disability. VA's Rating Schedule does not define the words "slight," "moderate" and "severe." Rather than applying a mechanical formula, the Board must evaluate all of the evidence for "equitable and just decisions." 38 C.F.R. § 4.6. DCs 5258 and 5259 provide rating criteria for dislocated and removal of semilunar cartilage, respectively. DC 5258 provides that a 20 percent rating will be assigned when there is dislocated semilunar cartilage with frequent episodes of "locking," pain, and effusion into the joint. DC 5259 provides for a 10 percent rating for removal of symptomatic semilunar cartilage. However, neither of these DCs provides for a schedular rating higher than the Veteran's current 20 percent rating. VA's General Counsel has held that a claimant who has arthritis and instability of the knee may be rated separately under DCs 5003 and 5257, respectively, and that evaluation of a knee disability under both of these codes would not amount to pyramiding under 38 C.F.R. § 4.14. VAOPGCPREC 23-97 (July 1, 1997; revised July 24, 1997), 62 Fed. Reg. 63604 (1997); see also Esteban v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 259 (1994). However, a separate rating must be based on additional disability. In VAOPGCPREC 9-98 (August 14, 1998), VA's General Counsel further explained that, when a Veteran has a knee disability evaluated under DC 5257, to warrant a separate rating for arthritis based on X-ray findings, the limitation of motion need not be compensable under DCs 5260 or 5261, but it must at least meet the criteria for a zero percent rating or there must be objective evidence of painful motion because, read together, DC 5003 and 38 C.F.R. § 4.59 provide that painful motion due to degenerative arthritis, which is established by X-ray, is deemed to be limitation of motion and warrants the minimum rating for a joint, even if there is no actual limitation of motion. See also Lichtenfels v. Derwinski; 1 Vet. App. 484, 488 (1991). In VAOPGCPREC 9-04 (Sept. 17, 2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 59990 (2007), VA's General Counsel held that separate ratings also may be assigned for limitation of flexion and extension of the same knee. Applying these criteria to the facts of this case, the Board finds that the Veteran's left knee and tibia disability does not warrant a rating higher than 20 percent. The evidence supporting this conclusion is the results of his five VA compensation examinations, in September 2002, December 2002, May 2006, July 2008, and September 2009, as well as private treatment records from C.A.Z., M.D., and the Veteran's written statements and testimony during his June 2010 Travel Board hearing. An August 1999 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) showed probable old trauma to the lateral tibial plateau with associated abnormalities in the body and anterior horn of the lateral meniscus suggestive of a chronic tear versus degeneration, small joint effusion, and degenerative changes of the lateral and retropatellar compartments. An August 2002 treatment record from Dr. C.A.Z. lists the Veteran's diagnosis as left knee degenerative joint disease (i.e., arthritis) with a lateral meniscus tear. Dr. C.A.Z. found range of motion from 175 (5) degrees of extension to 130 degrees of flexion. Dr. C.A.Z. found normal alignment of the left knee, no varus or valgus deformity, and the patella midline. Dr. C.A.Z. found a positive McMurrays test and negative anterior and posterior Drawer tests. There was severe lateral crepitus and moderate medial crepitus. The September 2002 VA examination found the Veteran had a limping gait. He had full range of motion of his left knee from 0-140 degrees, but his range of motion was affected by pain from 0 to10 degrees of extension and from 120 to 140 degrees of flexion. The examiner noted no additional loss on range of motion exercises due to weakness, fatigue, lack of endurance, or incoordination. The examiner noted some mild swelling and tenderness. Drawer and McMurray tests were within normal limits, so negative for instability. X-rays revealed degenerative arthritis of the knee and a small tibial exostosis. In October 2002, the Veteran underwent left knee arthroscopy with medial and lateral meniscectomies and chondroplasty of the patellofemoral joint. The postoperative diagnosis was Grade 3-4 degenerative arthritis of the lateral and medial compartments of the left knee, Grade 4 chondromalacia of the patellofemoral joint, and medial and lateral meniscus tears. The December 2002 VA examination found the Veteran had a limping gait. His left knee had mild swelling, a small effusion, mild heat, and drainage. The range of motion in this knee was from 0 degrees of extension to 90 degrees of flexion. The examiner indicated the range of motion was additionally limited by pain, fatigue, weakness, and lack of endurance, but he did not quantify this additional limitation in degrees. The examiner noted joint line tenderness and crepitus. The anterior Drawer sign was negative, but the McMurrays was positive on the lateral and medial side of the knee. X-rays showed degenerative arthritis. A February 2003 treatment record from Dr. C.A.Z. notes the Veteran's left knee had range of motion from 0 degrees of extension to 130 degrees of flexion. He had significant crepitation on range of motion and tenderness along the lateral joint line. Dr. C.A.Z. recommended the cessation of basketball, volleyball and jogging and encouraged the Veteran to take up low- impact activities such as swimming or bicycling for exercise. An April 2003 treatment record from Dr. C.A.Z. list the diagnosis as left knee degenerative joint disease and lateral and medial meniscectomies. The Veteran reported some decrease in his pain in comparison to pre-surgery. However, the physical findings were mostly the same. Dr. C.A.Z. found range of motion from 175 (5) degrees of extension to 130 degrees of flexion. Dr. C.A.Z. found normal alignment of the left knee, no varus or valgus deformity, and the patella midline. Dr. C.A.Z. found positive McMurrays and negative anterior and posterior Drawer tests. There was severe lateral crepitus and moderate medial crepitus. The May 2006 VA examination found the Veteran had a normal gait. His left knee had range of motion from 5 degrees of extension to 120 degrees of flexion with pain at the extremes of the range. The examiner noted that the range of motion was additionally limited by pain, but did not assess the limitation in degrees. The examiner noted minimal tenderness and minimal crepitation. The Drawer, McMurrays and varus/valgus tests were all negative. The examiner stated there was no evidence of instability in the medial collateral ligament, lateral collateral ligament, anterior cruciate ligament, posterior cruciate ligament, medial meniscus, or lateral meniscus. A May 2007 treatment record from Dr. C.A.Z. found range of motion from 175 (5) degrees of extension to 120 degrees of flexion. There was lateral and medial crepitus. There was no specific tenderness. Dr. C.A.Z. found normal alignment of the left knee. Dr. C.A.Z. found positive McMurrays and bounce tests. Dr. C.A.Z. indicated no ligamentous instability. The July 2008 VA examination found no signs of edema, effusion, weakness, tenderness, redness, heat, subluxation or guarding of movement. There was no locking pain, genu recurvatum or crepitus. The Veteran's left knee had full range of motion from 0 degrees extension to 140 degrees flexion. The examiner noted that the range of motion was not additionally limited by pain, fatigue, weakness, lack of endurance or incoordination on repetitive use. Stability tests for the anterior cruciate ligament, posterior cruciate ligament, medial collateral ligament, lateral collateral ligament, lateral meniscus and medial meniscus were all within normal limits. X-rays showed osteoarthritic changes of the proximal end of the tibia. The September 2009 VA examination found the Veteran had a normal gait and did not require an assistive device for ambulation. The examiner indicated there were no signs of edema, instability, abnormal movement, effusion, weakness, tenderness, redness, heat, deformity, malalignment, drainage, subluxation or guarding of movement. There was no locking pain or genu recurvatum. There was left knee crepitus. The Veteran's left knee had full range of motion from 0 degrees extension to 140 degrees flexion, but with pain at the extremes from 5 degrees of extension and from 120 degrees of flexion. The examiner noted that the range of motion was additionally limited by pain and lack of endurance, but indicated no additional loss in degrees. Stability tests for the anterior cruciate ligament, posterior cruciate ligament, medial collateral ligament, lateral collateral ligament, lateral meniscus and medial meniscus were all within normal limits. X- rays showed old post-traumatic changes of the proximal end of the tibia. In his several written statements and June 2010 hearing testimony, the Veteran testified that his left knee causes him significant pain, makes it impossible to exercise, and makes it very difficult to perform any activity where he must stand or walk for any prolonged period. He additionally stated that the pain and the limitations on his activities have made him depressed and caused him to gain weight and become obese. In reviewing all the available evidence, however, the Board does not find any basis to increase the rating for the left knee and tibia disability beyond the 20-percent level, that is, other than when he had the temporary 100 percent convalescent rating for the recuperation following his surgery. Some of the evaluation and testing mainly prior to the surgery raised questions of whether he had instability or laxity in this knee, and even some after his surgery, so as to in turn warrant assigning a separate rating under DC 5257, that is, apart from the 20 percent rating he already has for the arthritis under DCs 5003-5010. As examples of this, in August 2002 Dr. C.A.Z. found a positive McMurrays test and, yet, negative anterior and posterior Drawer tests. Whereas the rather contemporaneous September 2002 VA examination determined both the Drawer and McMurray tests were within normal limits, so entirely unremarkable for instability. There were similarly differing findings during the December 2002 VA examination, when there was a positive McMurray's test, but negative anterior Drawer sign. The same is indicated in the April 2003 record from Dr. C.A.Z., wherein he notes the McMurray's was positive but the anterior and posterior Drawer negative. In any event, virtually all of the additional and repeated testing during the several years since, especially during the May 2006, July 2008, and September 2009 VA examinations, has rather definitively confirmed the Veteran does not have instability of his anterior cruciate ligament, posterior cruciate ligament, medial collateral ligament, lateral collateral ligament, lateral meniscus or medial meniscus. So, on the whole, the Veteran does not have the required evidence of instability apart from his arthritis to warrant assigning a separate rating. See again VAOPGCPRECs 23-97 and 9-98. Regarding his range of motion, the Veteran also does not have the required restrictions contemplated by DCs 5260 and 5261 to warrant a rating higher than 20 percent because his flexion is not limited to 15 degrees or his extension limited to 20 degrees, even considering his pain and its impact on his range of motion. The least amount of flexion he has had was during his December 2002 VA examination, so just two months after his October 2002 surgery, when it was to 90 degrees. But still, that far exceeds by leaps and bounds the required 15 degrees' limitation required for a higher 30 percent rating under DC 5260. His pain during his September 2002 VA examination, the month prior to his October 2002 surgery, only reduced his flexion from the normal 140 degrees to 120 degrees, so also not nearly enough, and there was no indication of a further restriction in his range of motion beyond this point during his more recent May 2006, July 2008 and September 2009 VA examinations. These VA examiners did not quantify that his pain would so drastically lessen his range of motion, even on prolonged repetitive use of this knee or during "flare ups," that he would only in turn have at most 15 degrees of flexion. Similarly, the Veteran usually has had normal extension, to 0 degrees, or at most limited to 5 degrees, which is rated 0 percent (noncompensable) under DC 5261. The one exception was his September 2002 VA examination, the month prior to his October 2002 surgery, when pain greater limited his extension to 10 degrees, but even that is only rated as 10-percent disabling under DC 5261, so less than the 20 percent he already has. Moreover, because he has by and large had normal extension, to 0 degrees, or at most limited to 5 degrees when considering his pain, he generally has not shown he has a compensable level of extension to warrant assigning a separate rating under DC 5261 from that assigned for his limited flexion under DC 5260. See again VAOPGCPREC 9-04. As well, the Veteran does not have malunion of the tibia to alternatively warrant a higher 30 percent rating under DC 5262. And, as already explained, DCs 5258 and 5259 do not provide for a rating higher than his existing 20 percent rating. Moreover, because he has retained some measure of range of motion in his left knee on both flexion and extension, albeit does not have normal range of motion, this knee is not ankylosed so as to in turn warrant application of DC 5256. Ankylosis is the complete immobility and consolidation of a joint due to disease, injury or surgical procedure. See Dinsay v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 79, 81 (1996) and Lewis v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 259 (1992) [citing Saunders Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine, Nursing, and Allied Health at 68 (4th ed. 1987)]. All of this is not to say the Veteran does not have clear impairment of his left knee on account of his disability - indeed, quite the contrary, which is evident from his need to undergo the surgery he had in October 2002. But VA already has compensated him at the highest possible level of 100 percent, albeit just temporarily, for his convalescence following that surgery. So to receive a rating higher than 20 percent immediately before and/or since cessation of that temporary 100 percent convalescent rating, he has to show he meets the requirements for a higher rating on some other basis under one of the potentially applicable DCs. And, unfortunately, he has not shown this required greater level of impairment, so his claim must be denied because the preponderance of the evidence is unfavorable. 38 C.F.R. § 4.3. B. Extra-schedular Rating Pursuant to § 3.321(b)(1), the Under Secretary for Benefits or the Director of Compensation and Pension Service is authorized to approve an extra-schedular evaluation if the case "presents such an exceptional or unusual disability picture with such related factors as marked interference with employment or frequent periods of hospitalization as to render impractical the application of the regular schedular standards." 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1). The question of an extra-schedular rating is a component of a claim for an increased rating. See Bagwell v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 337, 339 (1996). Although the Board may not assign an extra- schedular rating in the first instance, it must specifically adjudicate whether to refer a case for extra-schedular evaluation when the issue either is raised by the claimant or reasonably raised by the evidence of record. Barringer v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 242 (2008). If the evidence raises the question of entitlement to an extraschedular rating, the threshold factor for extraschedular consideration is a finding that the evidence before VA presents such an exceptional disability picture that the available schedular evaluations for that service-connected disability are inadequate. Therefore, initially, there must be a comparison between the level of severity and symptomatology of the claimant's service-connected disability with the established criteria found in the rating schedule for that disability. Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 111 (2008). Under the approach prescribed by VA, if the criteria reasonably describe the claimant's disability level and symptomatology, then the claimant's disability picture is contemplated by the rating schedule, the assigned schedular evaluation is, therefore, adequate, and no referral is required. In the second step of the inquiry, however, if the schedular evaluation does not contemplate the claimant's level of disability and symptomatology and is found inadequate, the RO or Board must determine whether the claimant's exceptional disability picture exhibits other related factors such as those provided by the regulation as "governing norms." 38 C.F.R. 3.321(b)(1) (related factors include "marked interference with employment" and "frequent periods of hospitalization"). Here, because the Board finds that the schedular rating of 20 percent for the Veteran's left knee and tibia disability contemplates the extent and severity of his symptoms and resultant impairment, referral to the Under Secretary for Benefits or the Director of Compensation and Pension Service for consideration of an extra-schedular evaluation is not required. In other words, there is no evidence this disability has caused marked interference with his employment - meaning above and beyond that contemplated by his schedular rating, or required frequent periods of hospitalization so as to render impractical the application of the regular schedular standards. See Thun. The evidence, instead, indicates the Veteran retired from his position with the highway patrol due to a back disability, rather than on account of his left knee disability. Moreover, as concerns his left knee disability, according to 38 C.F.R. § 4.1, generally, the degrees of disability specified in the rating schedule are considered adequate to compensate for considerable loss of working time from exacerbations or illnesses proportionate to the severity of the several grades of disability. Indeed, in Van Hoose v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 361, 363 (1993), the Court reiterated that the disability rating, itself, is recognition that industrial capabilities are impaired. So the Board does not have to refer this case for extra-schedular consideration. See Bagwell v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 337, 339 (1996); Floyd v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 88, 96 (1996); Shipwash v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 218, 227 (1995). ORDER The claim for a rating higher than 20 percent for the left knee and tibia disability is denied. REMAND During the course of this appeal, service connection has been additionally granted for dysthymia and pain disorder and chondromalacia of the patella of the right knee as disabilities associated with the left knee and tibia disability. And the Veteran maintains that the combined effect of these service- connected disabilities, in turn, has prevented him from exercising and such to maintain proper weight, which in turn has resulted in his obesity and problems with diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia. So he believes there is a chain link of causation to warrant also granting secondary service connection for these still additional conditions. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) and (b); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995). One initial point worth noting in this regard, however, is that diagnoses of hyperlipidemia, elevated triglycerides, and elevated cholesterol are actually laboratory results and not, in and of themselves, ratable disabilities for VA compensation purposes. 61 Fed. Reg. 20440, 20445 (May 7, 1996). That said, the Veteran has submitted three supporting medical nexus opinions endorsing this posited theory and chain link of causation. But first and foremost, the RO has not initially adjudicated the issue of whether he is entitled to service connection for obesity, the intervening condition he is citing to link his service-connected disabilities to his diabetes and hypertension. This interceding claim for obesity has to be adjudicated and this condition linked to a service-connected disability before the purported consequent diabetes and hypertension also may be similarly linked to a service-connected disability on the more remote secondary basis alleged. In order to establish entitlement to service connection on this secondary basis, both initially for the obesity and then for the claimed derivative diabetes and hypertension, there must be: (1) evidence of current disability; (2) evidence of a service- connected disability; and (3) medical evidence establishing a nexus (i.e., link) between the service- connected disability and the current disability. See Wallin v. West, 11 Vet. App. 509, 512 (1998); McQueen v. West, 13 Vet. App. 237 (1999); Velez v. West, 11 Vet. App. 148, 158 (1998). The private medical opinions submitted by the Veteran in support of these claims recite an inaccurate medical history. Of note, Dr. C.A.Z.'s opinion states the Veteran wore a cast for six months. The opinion of L.N.B., M.D., states the Veteran gained a substantial amount of weight while wearing the cast, but the STRs instead indicate the Veteran wore a cast for five weeks and that his weight was stable, so relatively unchanged, throughout his recovery and was actually the same weight of 144 pounds at the time of his discharge, over a year after the fracture, as it was when he entered service in 1970. These opinions also appear to indicate the inability to exercise and his depression occurred shortly after the initial injury. which is unsupported by the record. Therefore, the Board is remanding the case for a VA medical opinion based on the Veteran's accurate medical history as reflected by his STRs and VA examinations dated from December 1977 to February 1993. A medical opinion premised upon an unsubstantiated account is of no probative value. Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458, 460 (1993). And although independent review of the claims file for the pertinent medical and other history, not just reliance on the Veteran's self-reported history, is not dispositive or determinative of the probative value of a supporting medical opinion, it does affect the probative value of the opinion when the reported history is inaccurate or, at the very least, not wholly considered or accounted for. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008); Kowalski v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 171 (2005); and Coburn v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 427 (2006). The STRs indicate the Veteran sustained a closed fracture of the left lateral tibial plateau in June 1976 from colliding with another player while playing softball. He wore a long leg, nonweight bearing cast for five weeks followed by range of motion and partial weight bearing on his left lower extremity. In January 1977, his weight was 144 lbs, the same weight as at his earlier entrance examination in January 1970. The examiner noted left knee arthralgia secondary to a healed lateral tibial plateau fracture and recommended six months limited duty. Six months later, in June 1977, the Veteran's weight was still 144 lbs and the examiner noted chronic arthralgia of the left knee secondary to a healed lateral tibial plateau fracture. The Veteran was medically discharged from service in August 1977. The report of a December 1977 VA examination shows the Veteran's weight was up to 177 lbs, so about a 30-pound increase. The examiner noted the Veteran had walked into the office with a normal gait. He had full extension and was able to easily perform a full symmetrical squat and recovery. There was no effusion or instability, but there was fairly course crepitation. The report of a February 1993 VA examination shows the Veteran's weight was up still further, to 204 lbs. He had normal range of motion of the left knee with pain. He had normal gait and posture. The examiner noted no swelling, deformity or instability of the left knee. The Veteran complained of difficulty climbing stairs and stated he took Tylenol with codeine for pain. The examiner observed the Veteran had no history of hypertension, however, since his blood pressure was 140/100 sitting, 135/100 recumbent, and 150/110 standing, the examiner diagnosed hypertension. The Veteran's blood tests showed glucose of 98 mg/dL and his urinalysis was negative for glucose and protein. The examiner noted no endocrine disorder. The examiner also noted no history of a mental disorder. A March 1997 private treatment record from P.L.B., M.D., states the Veteran had increased left knee pain following running on the beach five weeks prior. He reportedly was still working as a police officer at the time. Dr. P.L.B. diagnosed a possible lateral meniscus tear. An August 2002 treatment record from Dr. C.A.Z. indicates the Veteran continued to stay in shape for 15 years after his left tibial plateau fracture and had to jog all the time for his position with the highway patrol. The report of a September 2002 VA examination indicates the Veteran had by that time retired from the state highway patrol, where he had worked as an officer for 17 years. His weight was 212 lbs. He had full range of motion of his left knee with pain. There was tenderness and mild swelling of this knee. He had a limping gait due to the pain in this knee. A February 2003 private treatment record from Dr. C.A.Z. states the Veteran realized he was no longer able to jog or play basketball or volleyball or other sports played on a court since his left knee arthroscopy (in October 2002). He reportedly had since tried to do these type activities, but they caused him too much knee pain. The report also indicates that he had jogged for years to stay in shape for the highway patrol. An October 2003 private treatment record from J.D.B., M.D., indicates the Veteran has dysthymia disorder primary type late onset. Dr. J.D.B. explains that, due to multiple back injuries, several back surgeries, and a left knee injury, the Veteran's functioning was limited and he had become depressed. This evidence indicates the Veteran was still able to run as of March 1997, 20 years after his injury in service, and that he was still playing sports up until shortly before his left knee arthroscopy in October 2002. This evidence also indicates he was a police officer (highway patrolman) for about 17 years and, in that capacity, had to continually train to maintain a certain level of fitness required of that job. Hence, this evidence tends to militate against his being unable to exercise since his left knee and tibia injury in service, in 1976. The February 1993 VA examination reporting no history of mental disorders and the October 2003 treatment record stating late onset dysthymic disorder also would argue against depression since that injury in service. The Veteran all but concedes that his service-connected disabilities did not cause but instead contributed to his obesity, and in turn diabetes and hypertension. The opinions of R.L.G., M.D., and C.A.Z., M.D., use this same "contributed to" language. Under this circumstance it bears mention what the standard is for proving that a condition is secondary to a service-connected disability. The standard set out in 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) is that the secondary disability is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected condition. This would mean that the service-connected disability must be the proximate or main cause of the secondary condition. Alternately under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(b), if the service-connected disability chronically aggravated the secondary condition, then service connection also would be established for that secondary condition. See, too, Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995). This would mean that the service-connected disability must make the secondary condition permanently worse than it would otherwise be. Additional medical comment therefore is needed to assist in making these necessary determinations. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006), 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). Further, as the Veteran currently does not have sufficient ratings for his three service-connected disabilities to meet the threshold minimum rating requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) for consideration of a TDIU (that is, without having to resort to the special extra-schedular provisions of § 4.16(b)), adjudication of his TDIU claim is being deferred pending the resolution of these other claims. Parker v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 116 (1994). Accordingly, these claims are REMANDED for the following additional development and consideration: 1. Schedule the Veteran for a VA compensation examination for a medical nexus opinion concerning the etiology of his diabetes and hypertension (recognizing that his hyperlipidemia, also claimed, is not a ratable disability, rather just a laboratory finding). In particular, the examiner should indicate the likelihood (very likely, as likely as not, or unlikely) that the Veteran's service-connected disabilities, either alone or in combination, those being, his left knee and tibia disability, dysthymia and pain disorder, and chrondromalacia of the patella of the right knee, caused or aggravated his obesity, and that his obesity in turn caused or aggravated his diabetes and hypertension. The term "as likely as not" (at least 50 percent probability) does not mean merely within the realm of medical possibility, rather that the weight of medical evidence both for and against a conclusion is so evenly divided that it is as medically sound to find in favor of causation as it is to find against it. All necessary diagnostic testing and evaluation needed to make these determinations should be performed. The designated examiner must review the claims file, including a complete copy of this remand, for the Veteran's pertinent medical and other history. The examiner must discuss the rationale of the opinion, whether favorable or unfavorable. The Veteran is hereby advised that failure to report for this medical examination, without good cause, may have adverse consequences on these pending claims. 2. Then determine whether the Veteran is entitled to service connection for obesity secondary to his service-connected disabilities. If he is, then additionally readjudicate his derivative claims for service connection for diabetes and hypertension (since hyperlipidemia is instead a mere laboratory finding, not ratable disability) on the premise these additional conditions are also secondary to his service-connected disabilities by way of the obesity. As well, determine whether any of this additional adjudication changes the disposition of the claim for a TDIU. If these claims are not granted to his satisfaction, send him and his representative a SSOC and give them an opportunity to submit additional evidence and/or argument in response before returning the file to the Board for further appellate consideration of these claims. The Veteran has the right to submit additional evidence and argument concerning the claims the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). These claims must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2009). ______________________________________________ KEITH W. ALLEN Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs