Citation Nr: 1037828 Decision Date: 10/06/10 Archive Date: 10/15/10 DOCKET NO. 99-08 679 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Cleveland, Ohio THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for a left knee disorder, claimed as secondary to service-connected orthopedic disabilities, including arthritis of the cervical and lumbar spine with limitation of motion, a chip fracture of the left ankle and chondromalacia of the right knee. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD T. Y. Hawkins, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from January 1966 to May 1986. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals ("Board") on appeal from a November 1998 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") Regional Office ("RO") in Cleveland, Ohio, which denied the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for a left knee disorder. In February 2001, the Veteran testified at a Board video conference hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge sitting in Washington, DC. A transcript of this proceeding has been associated with the claims folder. The Board has previously considered this appeal. In May 2001, January 2004, January 2007, October 2008 and June 2009, the Board remanded the Veteran's claim for further development, most recently, to obtain an opinion concerning the etiology of his claimed left knee disorder. This was accomplished, and in November 2009, the VA Appeals Management Center issued a Supplemental Statement of the Case, in which it continued to deny the Veteran's claim. The claims folder has been returned to the Board for further appellate proceedings. FINDING OF FACT The probative evidence of record is against finding that the Veteran's left knee disorder is etiologically related to a disease, injury or event in service, or to a service-connected disability. CONCLUSION OF LAW The Veteran's left knee disorder was neither incurred in, nor aggravated by, active military service, arthritis did not manifest to a compensable degree within one year from the date of separation from service, and a left knee disorder is not proximately due to, or the result of, any service-connected disability. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1153, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2010); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307(a)(3), 3.309, 3.310(a) (2010). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 ("VCAA") With respect to the Veteran's claim, VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2010); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326 (2010). a.) Duty to Notify Under the VCAA, when VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, it is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative, if any, of any information and medical or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2010); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). In Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004) ("Pelegrini II"), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ("Court") held that VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; (3) that the claimant is expected to provide; and (4) request that the claimant provide any evidence in his or her possession that pertains to the claim. Element (4), however, the requirement of requesting that the claimant provide any evidence in his possession that pertains to the claim, was eliminated by the Secretary during the course of this appeal. See 73 Fed. Reg. 23353 (final rule eliminating fourth element notice as required under Pelegrini, effective May 30, 2008). The VCAA notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service connection claim. These are: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between a veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), aff'd, Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Of particular importance, in Dingess/Hartman, the Court held that the VCAA notice must include notice that a disability rating and an effective date of the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection was awarded. VA essentially satisfied the notification requirements of the VCAA by means of letters dated May 2004, December 2004, February 2008 and August 2009. The RO informed the appellant of the types of evidence needed in order to substantiate his claim for service connection, the division of responsibility between the appellant and VA for obtaining the required evidence, and requested that the appellant provide any information or evidence in his possession that pertained to such claim. 38 U.S.C.A. §5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). In addition, the February 2008 letter provided the appellant with notice of how to substantiate his claim of entitlement to service connection based on an already service-connected disorder. The Board notes that letters dated February 2007 and November 2008 satisfied the requirements of Dingess/Hartman and informed the Veteran of how VA determines the disability rating and effective date elements of a claim. The Board recognizes that the aforementioned letters were provided to the Veteran after the initial adjudication of his claim, as VCAA notice was not required at the time the Veteran applied for service connection or at the time of the initial adjudication. Nonetheless, the record reflects that the Veteran's claim was substantially readjudicated in multiple Supplemental Statements of the Case ("SSOC"). See Dingess/Hartman, supra; see also Mayfield v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 537 (2006), citing Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d at 1333- 34 (holding that providing the claimant with notice followed by a readjudication of the claim in a Statement of the Case or SSOC "cures" any timing problem associated with the lack of notice prior to an initial adjudication). Furthermore, even if the above letters did not provide adequate 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) notice, the Board finds that the notice problem does not constitute prejudicial error in this case because the record reflects that a reasonable person could be expected to understand what was needed to substantiate the claim after reading the aforementioned letters, as well as the SSOCs. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S.Ct. 1696 (2009). In addition, based on statements made by the Veteran during his hearing before the Board and by his service representative on his behalf, it is clear that the Veteran was well-informed on the information necessary to substantiate his claim. b.) Duty to Assist The Board is satisfied that VA's duty to assist has been satisfied. The claims folder contains the Veteran's service and post-service treatment records, and VA examination/examination addendum reports dated July 2005, February 2008, December 2008 and August 2009, respectively. Additionally, the claims file contains the Veteran's statements in support of his claim. The Veteran has not referenced any available treatment records pertaining to his claim that he wished to have considered that have not already been obtained and associated with the claims folder. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the July 2005 examination report shows that the VA examiner reviewed the complete claims folder, including the Veteran's service and post- service treatment records, elicited from the Veteran his history of left knee complaints and symptoms, reviewed diagnostic test results and conducted a thorough physical examination. However, while he opined that the Veteran's left knee disorder was not etiologically related to, or aggravated by service or a service- connected disability, he did not provide a complete rationale for his underlying conclusion. Accordingly, in June 2009, the claims folder was remanded to allow the examiner who performed the July 2005 examination to provide a rationale for his opinion. As this has now been accomplished, the Board concludes that the examination report, supplemented by the subsequent addendums, is adequate upon which to base a decision in this case. In short, the Board has carefully considered the provisions of the VCAA in light of the record on appeal and, for the reasons expressed above, finds that the development of the claim has been consistent with the provisions of the VCAA. The appellant has been provided every opportunity to submit evidence and argument in support of his claim and to respond to the VCAA notice. The purpose behind the notice requirement has been satisfied because the appellant has been afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his appealed claim. Accordingly, the Board will proceed to a decision on the merits. II. Applicable laws and regulations The Board has thoroughly reviewed all of the evidence in the Veteran's claims folder. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, the evidence submitted by the Veteran or on his behalf. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). The analysis below focuses on the most salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claim. The Veteran must not assume that the Board has overlooked pieces of evidence that are not explicitly discussed herein. See Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122 (2000) (the law requires only that the Board address its reasons for rejecting evidence favorable to the Veteran). The Board must assess the credibility and weight of all evidence, including the medical evidence, to determine its probative value, accounting for evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and providing reasons for rejecting any evidence favorable to the claimant. Equal weight is not accorded to each piece of evidence contained in the record; every item of evidence does not have the same probative value. When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the Veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case, the claim is denied. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a), VA is also required to give "due consideration" to "all pertinent medical and lay evidence" in evaluating a claim for disability or death benefits. In Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") held that "[l]ay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3), lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional." (footnote omitted). However, the Court has held that "[t]he type of evidence that will suffice to demonstrate entitlement to service connection, and the determination of whether lay evidence may be competent to satisfy any necessary evidentiary hurdles, depends on the type of disability claimed." Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 308 (2007). In order to establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a veteran must show: "(1) the existence of a present disability; (2) the in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service"- the so-called "nexus" requirement. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Alternatively, under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), service connection may be awarded for a "chronic" condition when (1) a chronic disease manifests itself and is identified as such in service, or within the presumptive period under 38 C.F.R. § 3.307, and the veteran presently has the same condition; or (2) a disease manifests itself during service, or during the presumptive period, but is not identified until later, and there is a showing of continuity of related symptomatology after discharge, and medical evidence relates that symptomatology to the Veteran's present condition. Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-98 (1997). Additionally, service connection for certain chronic diseases, such as arthritis, may be established on a presumptive basis by showing that the disease manifested itself to a degree of 10 percent or more within one (1) year from the date of separation from service. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a)(3), 3.309(a) (2010). Service connection may also be established on a secondary basis for a disability which is proximately due to, or the result of, a service-connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) (2010). The Court has construed this provision as entailing "any additional impairment of earning capacity resulting from an already service connected condition, regardless of whether or not the additional impairment is itself a separate disease or injury caused by the service connected condition." Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995). Establishing service connection on a secondary basis essentially requires evidence sufficient to show (1) that a current disability exists and (2) that the current disability was either (a) caused by, or (b) aggravated by a service connected disability. Id; see also Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995) (en banc); Wallin v. West, 11 Vet. App. 509, 512 (1998). The Board observes that the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 were amended, effective October 20, 2006, during the pendency of the instant appeal. See 71 Fed. Reg. 52744-47 (Sept. 7, 2006). The amendment sets a standard by which a claim based on aggravation of a non-service-connected disability by a service-connected disability is judged. Although the VA has indicated that the purpose of the regulation was merely to apply the Court's ruling in Allen, it was made clear in the comments to the regulation that the changes were intended to place a burden on the claimant to establish a pre-aggravation baseline level of disability for the non-service-connected disability before an award of service connection based on aggravation may be made. This had not been the VA's practice, and thus suggests that the recent change amounts to a substantive change in the regulation. For this reason, and as the Veteran's claim was pending before the regulatory change was made, the Board will consider his claim under the prior version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 as it is more favorable to the Veteran. III. Analysis The Veteran contends that he suffers from a left knee disability as a result of multiple parachute jumps made during service. Alternatively, he claims that his left knee disorder is secondary to one of his service-connected orthopedic disabilities. As an initial matter, the Board observes that the Veteran's service treatment reports are negative for complaints of, treatment for, or a diagnosis of a left knee disorder in service. While these records show that he sustained separate injuries to his left foot and ankle in the 1970's, there is no indication that either of these injuries resulted in a left knee disorder. A review of the Veteran's post-service treatment reports shows that he was not diagnosed with arthritis of the left knee within one year of his May 1986 retirement from service. Accordingly, service connection on a presumptive basis for arthritis is not warranted. In July 2005, the Veteran was afforded a VA examination to ascertain the etiology of his claimed left knee condition. At that time, he told the examiner that, although he did not recall having injured his left knee in any specific incident during service, he did participate in multiple parachute jumps, resulting in service-connected injuries to his left foot and ankle. He added that, while he experienced joint pain and could not squat or kneel, he did not experience any left knee swelling. Upon examination, it was noted that he had a normal gait without a limp, and there was no tenderness upon palpation or evidence of effusion. X-rays of the left knee were negative, without evidence of bone or joint disease. The diagnosis was left knee strain without any objective findings of physical abnormalities or x-ray evidence of joint disease. The examining VA physician concluded that, while the Veteran's left knee did not objectively appear to have any abnormalities, his left knee condition appeared to be unrelated to his service-connected left ankle disorder. In February 2008, the claims folder was returned to the same physician who performed the July 2005 examination to obtain additional information pertaining to the etiology of the Veteran's left knee disorder. At that time, he opined that the Veteran's left knee condition was neither caused, nor aggravated, by his service-connected left ankle chip fracture. In March 2009, the appellant, through his service representative, submitted a statement suggesting that his left knee condition had either been caused or aggravated by one of his other service- connected disabilities, to include his right knee, cervical spine and/or lumbar spine disabilities. In August 2009, following the Board's remand for clarification of his opinion, the VA examiner wrote that, after again reviewing the complete claims folder, it was his opinion that the Veteran's left knee condition was neither caused, nor aggravated by any of his already service-connected disabilities, to include his cervical and lumbar spine disorders. Rather, he opined that, given the Veteran's age of 63, it was more likely that his left knee condition was the result of the normal aging process, and was unrelated to any of his service-connected disorders. Based on a review of the complete evidence of record, the Board concludes that the probative evidence is against the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for a left knee disorder. In this regard, as noted above, the Board has considered whether service connection is warranted either on a direct, presumptive or secondary basis. With regard to granting service connection on a direct or secondary basis, the Board finds the most probative evidence to be the July 2005 examination report and subsequent addendum reports from the VA examiner, who opined that the Veteran's left knee condition was neither related to service, nor to any of his service-connected disabilities. In arriving at the conclusion that the Veteran's left knee disorder was more likely than not the result of the natural aging process, the examiner provided a well-reasoned opinion, specifically noting that his conclusion was based on a review of the Veteran's service and post-service treatment reports and a comprehensive physical examination, as well as a review of his left knee x-ray reports, which demonstrated normal findings without evidence of any bone or joint abnormalities. Moreover, although the examiner took into consideration the Veteran's personal statements regarding his left knee symptomatology and purported symptomatology , he nonetheless found that it was not likely that his condition was related to service or a service-connected disorder. In addition to the medical evidence, the Board has also considered the Veteran's contention that he has a left knee disability as a result of service or a service-connected disability. In this regard, the Board notes that, despite his later assertions over the course of his appeal that he had a left knee disorder caused by an incident in service or an already service-connected disability, during his February 2001 video conference hearing before the Board, the Veteran himself appeared to relate his left knee pain to the natural aging process. He said "I think it's just the arthritis setting in the left knee. It was never actually injured, injured to where I had to have a cast. I bruised it up quite a few times in [parachute] jumps and stuff but I think it's just age and arthritis setting in." Board hearing transcript, February 2001. In this regard, the Board is cognizant that the Court has repeatedly held that a veteran is competent to describe symptoms of which he or she has first-hand knowledge. See Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370, 374-75 (2002). The Board finds that joint pain is the type of symptom the Veteran is competent to describe. See Barr v Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); see also Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 398, 405 (1995). As such, his assertions are entitled to some probative weight. See Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 368 (2005). However, the Court has also held that mere pain alone, without a diagnosed or identifiable underlying malady or condition, does not in and of itself constitute a disability for which service connection may be granted. See Sanchez-Benitez v. West, 13 Vet. App. 282, 285 (1999), appeal dismissed in part, and vacated and remanded in part sub nom. Sanchez-Benitez v. Principi, 259 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001). As noted above, following the July 2005 examination, although the VA examiner diagnosed the Veteran as having a left knee "strain," he categorically stated that he found no objective evidence of a disease, including arthritis, or any other left knee abnormality either on physical examination or on x-rays. In Clyburn v. West, 12 Vet. App. 296, 301 (1999), the Court held that continued complaints of pain after service do not suffice to establish a medical nexus where the issue at hand is of etiology, and requires a medical opinion. In this case, the fact remains that the only competent medical opinion of record failed to relate any current left knee disorder to service; rather the Veteran's current complaints were related to a non- service-connected cause. Finally, as noted above, although service connection for a left knee disorder on a presumptive basis has also been considered, because there is no probative evidence that the Veteran was diagnosed with arthritis within the one-year period following his separation from service, presumptive service connection for a left knee condition is not warranted. Accordingly, the Board concludes that the competent evidence of record is against the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for a left knee disorder. In arriving at the decision to deny the claim, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule enunciated in 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). However, as there is not an approximate balance of evidence, that rule is not applicable in this case. See generally Gilbert, supra; Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). ORDER Entitlement to service connection for a left knee disorder, to include as secondary to a service-connected disability, is denied. ____________________________________________ BARBARA B. COPELAND Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs