Citation Nr: 1038313 Decision Date: 10/12/10 Archive Date: 10/22/10 DOCKET NO. 10-38 085 ) DATE ) ) THE ISSUE Whether there was clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in the November 1999 Board decision which denied entitlement to service connection for a right knee disability. REPRESENTATION Moving party represented by: John Stevens Berry, Attorney-at-Law ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD L.J. Bakke, Counsel INTRODUCTION The moving party (the Veteran) served on active duty from September 1986 to November 1991. This matter before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) arises from an original action on the motion of the Veteran, received in August 2010. FINDINGS OF FACT The Board's November 1999 decision was reasonably supported by the evidence then of record, and it is not shown that the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions existing at that time were either not considered or were misapplied. CONCLUSION OF LAW The November 1999 Board decision which denied service connection for a right knee disability does not contain CUE. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400, 20.1403, 20.1404 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION As an initial matter, the Board notes that the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) does not apply to claims alleging CUE. Livesay v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 165 (2001). When a claim is disallowed by the Board, it may not be thereafter be reopened and allowed, and no claim based upon the same factual basis shall be considered. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(b) (West 2002). However, a decision by the Board is subject to revision on the grounds of CUE. If the evidence established an error, the prior decision shall be reversed or revised. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111(a) (West 2002). CUE is a very specific and rare kind of error. It is the kind of error, of fact or of law, that when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the error. Generally, either the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the Board, or the statutory and regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a) (2009). If a claimant wishes to reasonably raise a claim of CUE, there must be some degree of specificity as to what the alleged error is and, unless it is the kind of error that, if true, would be CUE on its face, persuasive reasons must be given as to why one would be compelled to reach the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the alleged error. Bustos v. West, 179 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 405 (1999); Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40 (1993). If it is not absolutely clear that a different result would have ensued, the error complained of cannot be clear and unmistakable. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(c). CUE does not include VA's failure to fulfill the duty to assist, or a disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(d); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003). CUE does not include the otherwise correct application of a statute or regulation where, subsequent to the Board decision challenged, there has been a change in the interpretation of the statute or regulation. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(e). In order for there to be a valid claim of CUE, the correct facts, as they were known at the time of the original decision, must not have been before the adjudicator, or the proper statutory or regulatory provisions must have been misapplied. The Veteran must assert more than a disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated. The error must be undebatable, so that it can be said that reasonable minds could only conclude that the original decision was fatally flawed at the time it was made. Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313 (1992). CUE is the kind of error, of fact or law, that when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the error. See Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40, 43 (1993), en banc review denied Feb. 3, 1994 (per curium). The Court has set forth a three-pronged test for finding CUE. First, either the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the adjudicator (i.e., more than a simple disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated) or the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied. Second, the error must be "undebatable" and of the sort "which, had it not been made, would have manifestly changed the outcome at the time it was made." Third, a determination that there was clear and unmistakable error must be based on the record and law that existed at the time of the prior adjudication in question. Damrel v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 242, 245 (1994), (quoting Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313-14 (1992) (en banc)). Evidence that was not of record at the time of the decision cannot be used to determine if clear and unmistakable error occurred. See Porter v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 233 (1993). The pertinent evidence of record at the time of the Board's prior decision included service treatment records revealing complaints of and treatment for right knee pain in 1990 following a running injury. Secondary knee sprain versus meniscus tear, knee sprain, and resolving knee sprain was assessed. In January 1997, the Veteran filed his initial claim for service connection for a right knee disability. On VA examination in April 1997, the Veteran reported no history of injury or complaints of any knee symptomatology. The examiner noted objective observations of negative straight leg raising bilaterally. No knee disability was diagnosed. On VA examination in July 1997, the Veteran reported a history of injury to his right knee in 1990 and treatment with an immobilizer, bedrest, and nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medications. He reported current complaints of a popping sensation in the right knee that worsened with stair climbing. He reported re-injuring his right knee in an assault while on duty as a bouncer at a drinking establishment. He received similar treatment. The examiner noted objective observations of range of motion in the right knee from zero to 140 degrees. There was no edema, and McMurray's, anterior/posterior Drawer Sign were found to be normal. The examiner diagnosed a history of right knee injury, in remission today. An August 1997 rating decision denied service connection for a right knee disability. The rating decision noted that while service treatment records showed treatment in service for a right knee condition, no permanent residual or chronic disability subject to service connection was shown or demonstrated by evidence during active service or following active service. The RO acknowledged that the Veteran reported current symptoms of popping that worsened when going up or down steps, but observed that VA examination found no right knee disability. The Veteran appealed the August 1997 rating decision to the Board. A subsequent VA examination conducted in January 1998 shows findings of motor strength in the knees measured 5 of 5 and was symmetrical, bilaterally in flexion/extension, ankle dorsiflexion, plantar flexion, and eversion. Deep tendon reflexes were symmetric, bilaterally, and equal at 2 of 4. No right knee disability was diagnosed. A VA examination conducted in May 1998 reflected complaints of right knee pain secondary to continued twisted ankles (the Veteran had been granted service-connection in an August 1997 rating decision for left and right ankle sprain, effective in January 1997). The examiner objectively observed mild crepitus to the right patella with pressure but no pain, and strength in the lower right extremity measured at 4 of 5 in all ranges of motion. However, heel and toe walk was found to be normal, there was no atrophy, and range of right knee motion was zero to 140 degrees. McMurray's and anterior/posterior Drawer Sign were found to be normal. Again, no right knee disability was diagnosed. A VA examination conducted in March 1999 showed no complaints of right knee symptoms and no findings of right knee disability. In the November 1999 decision, the Board addressed the Veteran's in-service treatment for right knee pain and noted that right knee sprain and meniscus tear were possible diagnosis. However, the Board observed that in 1997, 1998 and 1999 VA examinations no right knee disability was diagnosed. The Board concluded that absent medical evidence of a diagnosis of a right knee disability, the Veteran's service connection for a right knee disability could not be granted. The regulations at the time of the November 1999 Board decision required that, for service connection to be granted, the claimed disability must have been the result of a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by the Veteran's active service. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110, 1131 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (1999). This required evidence of incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in-service, the existence of a current disability, and a nexus between the in-service injury or disease and the current disability. Medical evidence was required to provide the existing of a current disability and to fulfill the nexus requirements. Lay or medical evidence, as appropriate, may have been used to substantiate service incurrence. Epps v. Gober, 126 F.3d 1464 (1997). In the alternative, the chronicity provision of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) was applicable where evidence, regardless of its date, showed that the Veteran had a chronic condition in service or during an applicable presumption period and still had such condition. Such evidence must have been medical unless it related to a condition as to which lay observation was competent. If the chronicity provision was not applicable, 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) may still have applied where the condition claimed was observed during service or any applicable presumption period, continuity of symptomatology was demonstrated thereafter, and competent medical evidence related the present condition to that symptomatology. Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 498 (1997). It is noted that, in the November 1999 decision denying the claim for service connection for a right knee disability, the Board found the Veteran's claim was not well-grounded because the medical evidence did not establish the presence of a current right knee disability. The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000), enacted November 9, 2000 (codified at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002), eliminated the concept of a well-grounded claim. However, the principles of service-connection articulated by 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 have not changed since the time of the November 1999 Board decision. Evidence of a current disability, now, as then, was required in order to grant service connection. See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992) ( "in the absence of proof of a present disability, there can be no valid claim."). The board relied upon the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303, and the requirement of medical evidence of a disability (see Brammer, supra) in denying service connection for a right knee disability in its November 1999 decision. The Veteran and his representative have argued that the VA examiners in 1997, 1998, and 1999 ignored the Veteran's complaints of pain and popping, observations of crepitus, and of a causal connection reported between pain and instability in the service-connected ankles when the VA examiner reported in 1997 that the Veteran's right knee injury was in remission, and when VA examiners in 1997, 1998, and 1999 failed to diagnose a right knee injury. The Veteran and his representative rely on 38 C.F.R. § 4.2, 4.10, and 4.59; and DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202 (1995) (holding that evidence of pain, weakened movement, excess fatigability, or incoordination must be considered in assessing the level of associated functional loss in light of 38 C.F.R. § 4.40 and 4.45) and on Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589, 594 (1991) (holding that it is necessary to consider the complete medical history of the Veteran's disability in order to evaluate the level of disability). However, the Board notes that these regulations and DeLuca, supra, concern the evaluation of disabilities that are already service-connected and do not apply to the service-connected of disabilities. The Veteran and his representative also rely on principles in the law requiring that VA must significantly and sympathetically consider the Veteran's lay statements, citing Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006), but also referencing Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 46-57 (1990). The Board notes that the language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 itself requires consideration of all pertinent medical and lay evidence. Review of the November 1999 Board decision shows that the Board did consider the Veteran's assertions. VA examiners in 1997, 1998, and 1999 reported the Veteran's reports of right knee injury during active service and his reported right knee symptoms. Notwithstanding, the medical evidence, including the 1997, 1998, and 1999 VA examinations do not show a diagnosis of a right knee disability. The argument that the Board did not appropriately weigh the Veteran's lay statements or evaluate the medical evidence in finding that the Veteran did not have a right knee disability amounts fundamentally to a disagreement as to how the Board should have evaluated the evidence, arguing that the medical evidence warranted a different outcome. This argument does not suffice to establish CUE. There is no indication that the Board did not properly consider all evidence before it in 1999, or that it did not properly apply the appropriate laws and regulations to the Veteran's claim. The Board found that the medical evidence at the time of the November 1999 decision did not show that the Veteran had been diagnosed with a right knee disability. The Board noted the Veteran's complaints of pain and popping and the VA examiner's observations of same, but observed that the VA examiners had not diagnosed a right knee disability and that a right knee disability was not otherwise established by the medical evidence. Absent such a diagnosis, service connection could not be granted. There is no indication that the Board did not properly consider all evidence before it in 1999, nor that they did not properly apply the appropriate laws and regulations to the Veteran's claim. Under these circumstances, the determination made by the Board in November 1999 was reasonable with respect to the facts shown, and the law was not misapplied. The Veteran's complaints were clearly considered. Disagreement with how the facts were weighed or evaluated does not constitute CUE. Russell, supra, at 311. The Veteran and his representative have failed to establish that "[e]ither the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the adjudicator or the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied." See Russell, supra. Thus, the Board finds that the Veteran and his representative have not alleged any error(s) that are the kind of error that would be CUE on its face. See Fugo, 6 Vet. App. at 44. Rather, the Veteran and his representative are effectively asserting disagreement with how the Board evaluated the facts before it in November 1999. Such is inadequate to raise a CUE claim. In sum, the Board finds that in November 1999, the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were before the Board and the statutory and regulatory provisions extant at the time were correctly applied. ORDER A November 1999 Board decision did not contain CUE in denying entitlement to service connection for right knee disability, and the motion to revise or reverse that decision is denied. ____________________________________________ DAVID L. WIGHT Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs