Citation Nr: 1038868 Decision Date: 10/18/10 Archive Date: 10/22/10 DOCKET NO. 08-00 844 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Huntington, West Virginia THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to an initial disability rating in excess of 10 percent for degenerative joint disease, right knee. 2. Entitlement to a disability rating in excess of 10 percent for residuals of a left knee injury, post meniscus surgery. 3. Whether new and material evidence has been presented to reopen a claim of service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, and if so, whether service connection is warranted. 4. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of a head injury to include as secondary to service-connected knee disabilities. 5. Entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J.M. Seay, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active service from February 1964 to October 1967. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an August 2006 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Huntington, West Virginia. A hearing was held on June 29, 2010, in Huntington, West Virginia, before Kathleen K. Gallagher, a Veterans Law Judge who was designated by the Chairman to conduct the hearing pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(c) (West 2002) and who is rendering the determination in this case. A transcript of the hearing is in the claims file. After the hearing, the appellant submitted additional evidence to the Board, along with a written waiver of initial RO review of this evidence. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1304 (2009). The Board recognizes the Veteran's September 2009 statement that he did not receive a local hearing before a Decision Review officer (DRO). However, the record shows that the Veteran was indeed afforded a hearing before a DRO in March 2009. Although it appears that the DRO hearing was scheduled with respect to a pending claim that is not before the Board at this time, the Veteran also discussed the issues on appeal before the DRO. The transcript of the hearing is associated with the claims file. The record shows that the September 2008 rating decision denied service connection for status post rotator cuff repair, left shoulder with limitation of motion to include as secondary to the service-connected disability of residuals of a left knee injury, post meniscus surgery by a September 2008 rating decision. The Veteran submitted a timely notice of disagreement in September 2008 and the RO issued a Statement of the Case in April 2009. However, the Veteran did not perfect a timely appeal with respect to the issue and, therefore, the matter is not now before the Board for appellate consideration. The issues of entitlement to service connection for residuals of a head injury to include as secondary to service-connected knee disabilities and entitlement to a TDIU are addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and are REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The service-connected degenerative joint disease, right knee manifested by complaints of pain, weakness, locking, giving way, and instability. The objective evidence of range of motion, at its worst, was zero to 115 degrees. There is no clinical evidence of ankylosis, instability, subluxation, symptomatic cartilage, tibia or fibula impairment or genu recurvatum. 2. The left knee is manifested by complaints of pain, weakness, locking, giving way, and instability. The objective evidence of range of motion, at its worst, was zero to 110 degrees. There is no clinical evidence of ankylosis, instability, subluxation, symptomatic cartilage, tibia or fibula impairment or genu recurvatum. 3. The June 1981 and July 2005 rating decisions are final. 4. The evidence received since the July 2005 rating decision, by itself or in conjunction with previously considered evidence, does relate to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder to include PTSD. 5. The preponderance of the evidence in the claims folder establishes that the Veteran does not have a diagnosis of PTSD in accordance with the American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1994) (DSM- IV). 6. There is no evidence of a psychiatric disorder during active service and there is no medical evidence relating any psychiatric disorder to active service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for entitlement to an initial disability rating in excess of 10 percent for service-connected degenerative joint disease, right knee have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, Diagnostic Codes 5010, 5003 (2009). 2. The criteria for entitlement to an initial disability rating in excess of 10 percent for the Veteran's service-connected residuals of a left knee injury, post meniscus surgery have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.7, 4.71a, Diagnostic Code 5260 (2009). 3. The June 1981 and July 2005 rating decisions are final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 20.1103 (2009). 4. The evidence received subsequent to the July 2005 rating decision is new and material and the claim of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, is reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2009). 5. An acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, was not incurred in active military service and may not be presumed to have been incurred. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 1137, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS VA's Duties to Notify and Assist Upon receipt of a substantially complete application for benefits, VA must notify the claimant what information or evidence is needed in order to substantiate the claim and it must assist the claimant by making reasonable efforts to get the evidence needed. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103(a), 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); see Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002). The notice required must be provided to the claimant before the initial unfavorable decision on a claim for VA benefits, and it must (1) inform the claimant about the information and evidence not of record that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) inform the claimant about the information and evidence that VA will seek to provide; and (3) inform the claimant about the information and evidence the claimant is expected to provide. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120 (2004). The notice requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of a service connection claim. Those five elements include: 1) Veteran status; 2) existence of a disability; 3) a connection between the Veteran's service and the disability; 4) degree of disability; and 5) effective date of the disability. Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Upon receipt of an application for a service-connection claim, 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) require VA to review the information and the evidence presented with the claim and to provide the claimant with notice of what information and evidence not previously provided, if any, will assist in substantiating or is necessary to substantiate the elements of the claim as reasonably contemplated by the application. Additionally, this notice must include notice that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded. In this case, the Board finds that VA's duty to notify was satisfied by a letter sent to the Veteran in September 2005 and March 2006 with regard to the claims for service connection for residuals of a head injury and an acquired psychiatric disorder to include PTSD. The letter addressed all of the notice requirements and was sent prior to the initial unfavorable decision by the AOJ in August 2006. Concerning applications to reopen claims that have been the subject of a prior final denial by VA, nothing pertaining to the duty to assist claimants shall be construed to require VA to reopen a claim that has been disallowed except when new and material evidence is presented or secured. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(f). To provide adequate notice with regard to a claim to reopen, VA must look at the bases for the denial in the prior decision and respond with a notice letter that describes what evidence would be necessary to substantiate the element or elements required to establish service connection that were found insufficient in the previous denial. Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006). In the decision below, the Board has reopened the Veteran's claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD and, therefore, regardless of whether the requirements of Kent have been met in this case, no harm or prejudice to the appellant has resulted. Thus, the Board concludes that the current laws and regulations as they pertain to new and material evidence have been complied with, a defect, if any, in providing notice and assistance to the Veteran was at worst harmless error in that it did not affect the essential fairness of the adjudication. Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 119- 120 (2004); Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993); VAOPGCPREC 16-92. With regard to claims for increased disability ratings for service-connected disabilities, the law requires VA to notify the claimant that, to substantiate a claim, the claimant must provide, or ask VA to obtain, medical or lay evidence demonstrating a worsening or increase in severity of the disability. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Vazquez-Flores v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 37 (2008), vacated and remanded sub nom. Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The claimant must be notified that, should an increase in disability be found, a disability rating will be determined by applying relevant Diagnostic Codes, which typically provide for a range in severity of a particular disability from noncompensable to as much as 100 percent (depending on the disability involved), based on the nature of the symptoms of the condition for which disability compensation is being sought, their severity and duration. Finally, the notice must provide examples of the types of medical and lay evidence that the Veteran may submit (or ask the VA to obtain) that are relevant to establishing her or his entitlement to increased compensation. However, the notice required by section 5103(a) need not be specific to the particular Veteran's circumstances; that is, VA need not notify a Veteran of alternative diagnostic codes that may be considered or notify of any need for evidence demonstrating the effect that the worsening of the disability has on the particular Veteran's daily life. Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision by the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ). Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). With respect to the Veteran's claim for an increased disability rating for residuals of a left knee injury, post meniscus surgery, the notification requirements have been met. The Veteran was sent a letter in June 2008, which notified him that, to substantiate a claim for increased compensation, the claimant must provide, or ask VA to obtain, medical or lay evidence demonstrating a worsening or increase in severity of the disability. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Vazquez-Flores v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 37 (2008), vacated and remanded sub nom. Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The notice also provided examples of the types of medical and lay evidence that the Veteran may submit (or ask the VA to obtain) that are relevant to establishing his or her entitlement to increased compensation. Specifically, he was informed in the letter of the types of evidence that might show such a worsening, including statements from a doctor containing the physical and clinical findings; results of laboratory tests or x-rays; the dates of examinations and tests; and statements from other individuals who were able to describe from their knowledge and personal observations in what manner the disability had become worse. The Board recognizes that the Veteran was not provided notification prior to the rating decision on appeal. However, the Veteran's claim was readjudicated by the April 2009 Supplemental Statement of the Case and, therefore, any timing error is cured. See Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006) (the issuance of a fully compliant VCAA notification followed by readjudication of the claim, such as signified in a statement of the case or supplemental statement of the case, is sufficient to cure a possible timing defect). With respect to the Veteran's claim for a higher initial disability rating for service-connected degenerative joint disease of the right knee, the Veteran is challenging the initial evaluation assigned following the grant of service connection. In Dingess, the Court held that in cases where service connection has been granted and an initial disability rating and effective date have been assigned, the typical service-connection claim has been more than substantiated, it has been proven, thereby rendering section 5103(a) notice no longer required because the purpose that the notice is intended to serve has been fulfilled. Id. at 490-91. Thus, because the notice that was provided before service connection was granted was legally sufficient, VA's duty to notify has been satisfied. VA has also fulfilled its duty to assist the Veteran by obtaining identified and available evidence needed to substantiate the claims, including VA treatment records, and private treatment records. In addition, with respect to the Veteran's claim for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, the RO contacted the CURR (U.S. Armed Services Center for Unit Records Research) to confirm the Veteran's reported stressor. The Board acknowledges that the RO did not submit the Veteran's reported time frame of October 1966 to December 1966 when requesting verification of the stressor. However, as the record is completely absent for any diagnosis of PTSD, remanding this issue to the RO for further development and verification of the Veteran's stressor would result only in additional delay with no benefit to the appellant. See Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994) (remands which would only result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the Veteran are to be avoided), see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(2). In addition, the Veteran was afforded VA examinations in June 2006, December 2007, and April 2009 with respect to his claims for higher disability ratings for degenerative joint disease of the right knee and for residuals of a left knee injury, post meniscus surgery. Concerning this, when VA undertakes to provide a VA examination or obtain a VA opinion, it must ensure that the examination or opinion is adequate. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 312 (2007). The Board finds that the VA examinations obtained in this case were adequate, as they were predicated on a review of the claims file and all pertinent evidence of record as well as on physical examinations, and provide medical information needed to address the rating criteria relevant to this case. The Board recognizes the Veteran's complaints that several of his VA examinations were inadequate. Specifically, the Veteran stated that the December 2007 VA examiner was incorrect when stating that the Veteran's gait was normal. However, in reviewing the examination reports, the Board finds nothing to indicate that the examinations were cursory or that the examiners did not give adequate attention to the Veteran's complaints or provided history. The examiner provided the necessary information, including range of motion findings, to evaluate the Veteran's disability in accordance with the pertinent rating criteria. Finally, the Veteran was afforded a new VA examination in April 2009 which included review of the claims file and addressed the information necessary to evaluate the Veteran's disabilities. The Veteran has not alleged any inadequacies with respect to the April 2009 VA examination. Accordingly, the Board finds that VA's duty to assist with respect to obtaining a VA examination or opinion has been met. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (4). The Board recognizes that the Veteran was not provided a VA examination in connection with his claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder to include PTSD. The case of McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006), held that an examination is required when (1) there is evidence of a current disability, (2) evidence establishing an "in-service event, injury or disease," or a disease manifested in accordance with presumptive service connection regulations occurred which would support incurrence or aggravation, (3) an indication that the current disability may be related to the in-service event, and (4) insufficient evidence to decide the case. First, with respect to an acquired psychiatric disorder, the Board concludes that an examination is not needed as the Veteran's service treatment records are absent for any evidence of a psychiatric disorder and there is no objective medical evidence relating the Veteran's current psychiatric disorder to active service. See Duenas v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 512, 519 (2004). Furthermore, an examination is not warranted for the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD because there is no evidence of a diagnosis of PTSD. See McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). Therefore, a VA examination is not required to adjudicate this issue. For these reasons, the Board concludes that VA has fulfilled the duty to assist the appellant in this case. The Board concludes the Veteran was provided the opportunity to meaningfully participate in the adjudication of his claims and did in fact participate. Washington v. Nicolson, 21 Vet. App. 191 (2007). Hence, there is no error or issue that precludes the Board from addressing the merits of this appeal. LAW AND ANALYSIS Disability Ratings Disability ratings are determined by applying the criteria set forth in the VA Schedule for Rating Disabilities, found in 38 C.F.R., Part 4. The rating schedule is primarily a guide in the evaluation of disability resulting from all types of diseases and injuries encountered as a result of or incident to military service. The ratings are intended to compensate, as far as can practicably be determined, the average impairment of earning capacity resulting from such diseases and injuries and their residual conditions in civilian occupations. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1155; 38 C.F.R. § 4.1. Where there is a question as to which of two evaluations shall be applied, the higher evaluation will be assigned if the disability picture more nearly approximates the criteria for that rating. 38 C.F.R. § 4.7. In considering the severity of a disability, it is essential to trace the medical history of the Veteran. 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.2, 4.41. Consideration of the whole-recorded history is necessary so that a rating may accurately reflect the elements of disability present. 38 C.F.R. § 4.2; Peyton v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 282 (1991). While the regulations require review of the recorded history of a disability by the adjudicator to ensure a more accurate evaluation, the regulations do not give past medical reports precedence over the current medical findings. Where an increase in the disability rating is at issue, the "present level" of the Veteran's disability is the primary concern. Francisco v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 55, 58 (1994). Where a Veteran appeals the initial rating assigned for a disability at the time that service connection for that disability is granted, evidence contemporaneous with the claim and with the initial rating decision granting service connection would be most probative of the degree of disability existing at the time that the initial rating was assigned and should be the evidence "used to decide whether an original rating on appeal was erroneous . . . ." Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119, 126 (1999). If later evidence indicates that the degree of disability increased or decreased following the assignment of the initial rating, "staged" ratings may be assigned for separate periods of time based on facts found. Id. Disability of the musculoskeletal system is primarily the inability, due to damage or infection in the parts of the system, to perform the normal working movements of the body with normal excursion, strength, speed, coordination, and endurance. It is essential that the examination on which ratings are based adequately portray the anatomical damage and the functional loss with respect to all of these elements. In evaluating disabilities of the musculoskeletal system, it is necessary to consider, along with the schedular criteria, functional loss due to flare-ups of pain, fatigability, incoordination, pain on movement, and weakness. DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202 (1995). The functional loss may be due to absence of part, or all, of the necessary bones, joints and muscles, or associated innervation, or other pathology and evidenced by visible behavior of the claimant undertaking the motion. Weakness is as important as limitation of motion, and a part that becomes painful on use must be regarded as seriously disabled. 38 C.F.R. § 4.40. Pain on movement, swelling, deformity or atrophy of disuse as well as instability of station, disturbance of locomotion, interference with sitting, standing and weight bearing are relevant considerations for determination of joint disabilities. 38 C.F.R. § 4.45. Painful, unstable, or malaligned joints, due to healed injury, are entitled to at least the minimal compensable rating for the joint. 38 C.F.R. § 4.59. The knee is considered a major joint. 38 C.F.R. § 4.45(f). The normal range of motion of the knee is from zero to 140 degrees. 38 C.F.R. § 4.71, Plate II (2009). Under Diagnostic Code 5260, 10 percent rating is assigned for flexion limited to 45 degrees, a 20 percent rating is assigned for flexion limited to 30 degrees, and a 30 percent rating is assigned for flexion limited to 15 degrees. 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a (2009). In VAOPGCPREC 23-97, 62 Fed. Reg. 63604 (1997), VA's General Counsel determined that, when a claimant has arthritis and instability of the knee, multiple ratings may be assigned under Codes 5003 and 5257. Moreover, in VAOPGCPREC 9-98, 63 Fed. Reg. 56704 (1998), it was found that, even if the Veteran did not have limitation of motion of the knee meeting the criteria for a noncompensable evaluation under Codes 5260 or 5261, a separate evaluation could be assigned if there was evidence of a full range of motion "inhibited by pain." Lichtenfels v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 484, 488 (1991). The General Counsel has directed that separate ratings are available if a particular knee condition causes both the limitation of extension and limitation of flexion of the same joint. VAOPGCPREC 9-04 (Sept. 17, 2004). The Veteran has contended that his service-connected knee disabilities have gotten worse. He testified that he has trouble getting up the stairs and, therefore, had to move to a single level home. He stated that he has had increased pain and instability in his knees and, therefore, higher disability ratings are warranted. The Veteran was afforded a VA examination in June 2005. The Veteran did not require assistive aids to walk and there were no constitutional symptoms of arthritis and no incapacitating episodes of arthritis. There were functional limitations on standing and the Veteran was able to stand for 15 to 30 minutes. There were functional limitations on walking and the Veteran was able to walk more than 1/4 mile but less than 1 mile. The Veteran reported that he experienced giving way, pain, and weakness of the left knee. He did not report any instability, stiffness, episodes of dislocation or subluxation, or effusion. On physical examination, the Veteran's left knee exhibited flexion from 0 to 140 degrees with pain beginning at 90 degrees. The Veteran had no additional limitation of motion on repetitive use. The Veteran's exhibited extension to 0 degrees with no additional limitation of motion on repetitive use. The summary of general joint conditions included tenderness and painful movement. On examination, there was no crepitation, no clicks or snaps, no grinding, no instability, no patellar abnormality, no effusion, no dislocation, and no locking. There was a positive McMurray's test and the Veteran's meniscus was noted to be surgically absent. The Veteran was afforded a VA examination with respect to his left knee in June 2006. The Veteran had functional limitations on standing and could stand up to one hour. The Veteran also had functional limitations on walking and was able to walk more than 1/4 mile but less than 1 mile. The Veteran reported giving way, instability, pain, stiffness, and weakness in his left knee. There were no episodes of dislocation or subluxation, no locking episodes, and no effusion. The Veteran reported experiencing severe flare-ups of joint disease. The Veteran had a normal gait, but there was evidence of abnormal weight bearing including an abnormal shoe wear pattern of the right and left shoes. The Veteran demonstrated 110 degrees of flexion and 0 degrees of extension. The Veteran was diagnosed with residuals of left knee injury, post meniscus surgery. The examiner noted that the Veteran was unable to do activities requiring kneeling and if he did kneel to do something, his left knee pain would flare for 1 to 2 weeks. The Veteran was afforded another VA examination in December 2007. The Veteran reported that he currently receives medication and that he required draining of his right knee last year because of severe fluid accumulation. There were functional limitations on standing and he could not stand longer than 15 minutes and is able to walk more than 1/4 mile but less than 1 mile. The Veteran reported giving way, pain, stiffness, episodes of locking and effusion, and inflammation. The Veteran denied experiencing instability, weakness, episodes of locking and effusion, and inflammation. The examiner noted that the Veteran had an antalgic gait. With respect to the right knee, the Veteran had flexion to 140 degrees and the pain began at 140 degrees. There was no additional limitation of motion on repetitive use. With respect to the left knee, the Veteran exhibited flexion to 120 degrees and there was no additional limitation of motion on repetitive use. There was no joint ankylosis. A summary of the general joint conditions included bony joint enlargement, crepitus, tenderness, and painful movement. The right knee had crepitation with clicks or snaps, grinding. There was no instability, no patellar abnormality, and no meniscus abnormality. There were degenerative changes on both knees but right knee is greater than the left knee. With respect to the left knee, there was crepitation, but no clicks or snaps, no grinding, no instability, no patellar abnormality and no meniscus abnormality. The x-rays disclosed advanced degenerative changes bilaterally. The examiner noted that there is objective evidence of advanced degenerative disease of both knees and the condition was limiting his ability to engage in gainful employability as a crane operator or any other job requiring use of his knees. This problem also affected his quality of living in that it restricted prolonged walking, standing, or driving. The Veteran was afforded another VA examination in April 2009. At this time, walking 1/2 mile, he has to sit down. He stated that his knees hurt when he squats and bothered him more often and caused more pain. The Veteran reported joint symptoms, with respect to the left knee, of giving way, instability, pain, stiffness, and weakness. He did not report incoordination, episodes of dislocation or subluxation, or locking episodes. The Veteran experienced inflammation including swelling and tenderness, and the condition affected the motion of his joint. With respect to the right knee, the Veteran reported giving way, instability, pain, stiffness, weakness, incoordination, and decreased speed of joint motion. He did not report any episodes of dislocation or subluxation, and denied any locking episodes. He had symptoms of inflammation including swelling and tenderness and that the condition affected the motion of the joint. He stated that he had severe flare-ups of joint disease every 1 to 2 months with a duration of 1 to 2 days. The examiner noted that there were no incapacitating episodes of arthritis. The Veteran was noted to have a gait that favored the right knee and there was evidence of abnormal weight bearing including increased wear outside the edges of the heels of the left and right shoes. On physical examination, the Veteran's right knee was tender. There was no crepitation, no instability, no patellar abnormality, no meniscus abnormality, and no other knee abnormalities. On physical examination, the Veteran's left knee was tender, and there was no crepitation, no grinding, no instability, no patellar abnormality, and no meniscus abnormality and no locking. The Mcmurray's test of the left knee was negative. The Veteran's left knee exhibited flexion to 125 degrees and the left knee extension was normal (0 degrees). There was objective evidence of pain with active motion on the left side. The right knee exhibited flexion to 115 degrees and the right knee extension was normal (0 degrees). There was objective evidence of pain following repetitive motion, but there were no other additional limitations after three repetitions of range of motion. There was no joint ankylosis. It was noted that the Veteran was retired in 1983 when his knee was injured. The Veteran was diagnosed with degenerative joint disease of the left knee with chrondrocalcinosis. The examiner noted that the Veteran can do light physical and sedentary employment. The examiner provided a diagnosis of degenerative joint disease of the right knee with chondrocalcinosis. It was noted that the right knee was a post- military injury and was a work related workers compensation injury. As noted above, the Veteran is service-connected for degenerative joint disease of the right knee, which is rated under Diagnostic Code 5010. Diagnostic Code 5010 refers the rater to Diagnostic Code 5003. Diagnostic Code 5003 states that the severity of degenerative arthritis, established by X-ray findings, is to be rated on the basis of limitation of motion under the appropriate diagnostic code for the specific joint or joints affected, which in this case would be Diagnostic Code 5260. When there is arthritis with at least some limitation of motion, but to a degree which would be noncompensable under a limitation-of-motion code, a 10 percent rating will be assigned for each affected major joint or group of minor joints. Limitation of motion must be objectively confirmed by findings such as swelling, muscle spasm, or satisfactory evidence of painful motion. In the absence of limitation of motion, a 10 percent evaluation is warranted if there is X-ray evidence of involvement of 2 or more major joints or 2 or more minor joint groups and a 20 percent evaluation is authorized if there is X- ray evidence of involvement of 2 or more major joints or 2 or more minor joint groups and there are occasional incapacitating exacerbations. 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, Diagnostic Code 5003. The knee is considered a major joint. 38 C.F.R. § 4.45(f). The evidence shows that although the Veteran has limitation of motion of the right knee, the Veteran's flexion and extension would be rated as noncompensable under Diagnostic Codes 5260 and 5261and, therefore, the Veteran was rated as 10 percent disabling under Diagnostic Code 5003. The Veteran does not warrant a disability rating in excess of 10 percent as the Veteran's flexion, at its worst, was 115 degrees, which does not warrant a compensable disability rating under 5260 and he has normal extension of the right knee which also would not warrant a compensable disability rating under Diagnostic Code 5261. Moreover, a rating based on x-ray findings cannot be combined with ratings based on limitation of motion. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, Diagnostic Code 5003 Note (1). Therefore, a higher disability rating is not warranted. As noted above, the Veteran's left knee is rated as 10 percent disabling under Diagnostic Code 5260. In reviewing the aforementioned medical evidence, the Board finds that the Veteran is not entitled to a disability rating in excess of 10 percent. Under Diagnostic Code 5260, a 20 percent disability rating is warranted for flexion limited to 30 degrees. The VA examination reports do not reveal any range of motion findings that would warrant a higher disability rating. The June 2005 VA examination report shows that the Veteran's left knee exhibited 140 degrees of flexion, which is normal. 38 C.F.R. § 4.71, Plate II (2009). The June 2006 VA examination report shows that the Veteran's left knee exhibited 110 degrees of flexion. The December 2007 VA examination report reveals that the Veteran's left knee exhibited 120 degrees of flexion. Lastly, the April 2009 VA examination report shows that the Veteran's left knee exhibited 125 degrees of flexion. Thus, the Veteran, at his worst, exhibited 110 degrees of flexion, which is not sufficient for a 10 percent disability rating under Diagnostic Code 5260. As a result, the Veteran does not meet the criteria for a higher disability rating for the left knee under Diagnostic Code 5260. The Board has considered the provisions of 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40, 4.45, 4.59, and the holding in DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202 (1995). However, it appears that the RO has considered DeLuca in rating the Veteran's left knee disability. In this regard, the Board observes that the Veteran has complained of constant pain, weakness, and incoordination. However, the VA examination reports did not reveal any loss of range of motion on repetitive motion, increased fatigability, or incoordination. Consequently, the Board finds that the Veteran is not entitled to disability ratings in excess of 10 percent under Deluca, supra. Turning to the appropriate Diagnostic Codes applicable to knee disabilities, the Board notes that they are not for application. The medical evidence of record shows that the Veteran does not have ankylosis of the knees, limitation of extension, dislocated semilunar cartilage, symptomatic removal of semilunar cartilage, impairment of the tibia and fibula, or genu recurvatum to warrant compensable disability ratings under 5256, 5258, 5259, 5261, 5262 and 5263, respectively. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71(a), Diagnostic Codes 5256, 5258, 5259, 5261, 5262 and 5263. The Board notes that the Veteran has complained of instability and giving way of his left knee. Diagnostic Code 5257 provides compensable ratings based on "slight," "moderate" and "severe" lateral instability. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, Diagnostic Code 5257 (2009). However, this has not been shown by the objective medical evidence of record. Although there was a positive McMurray's test on examination in June 2005, the June 2005 VA examiner specifically noted that there was no instability and no episodes of subluxation. The subsequent VA examination reports all show that there were no episodes of subluxation and no clinical findings of instability. Thus, the Veteran does not warrant separate/higher disability ratings under Diagnostic Code 5257. The Board acknowledges the Veteran's statements regarding the severity of his knee pain. In Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) stated that lay evidence is competent and sufficient in certain instances related to medical matters. Specifically, the Federal Circuit commented that such instances include to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Id. Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held that, when a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007). While lay witnesses are generally not competent to offer evidence which requires medical knowledge, such as opinions regarding medical causation or a diagnosis, they may provide competent testimony as to visible symptoms and manifestations of a disorder. Jones v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 134, 137 (1994); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). Although the Board acknowledges the Veteran's complaints of pain, locking, giving way, and swelling, there is no competent medical evidence of record showing that the Veteran has met the rating criteria for a higher disability rating for the left knee. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, Diagnostic Codes 5256-5263 (2009). Based on the above, the Board finds that increased disability ratings are not warranted at any time during the pertinent appeal period. Therefore, staged ratings for the Veteran's service- connected disabilities are also not warranted. Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119 (1999). The Board has considered the benefit of the doubt doctrine; however, the preponderance of the evidence is against the assignment of a disability rating in excess of 10 percent for right knee degenerative joint disease and is against the assignment of a disability rating in excess of 10 percent for left knee injury, post meniscus surgery. Thus, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not applicable and the claims are denied. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55-57 (1991). The Board has also considered whether a referral for extraschedular rating is warranted. See Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 111, 115 (2008). Initially, there must be a comparison between the level of severity and symptomatology of the claimant's service-connected disability with the established criteria found in the rating schedule for that disability. Under the approach prescribed by VA, if the criteria reasonably describe the claimant's disability level and symptomatology, then the claimant's disability picture is contemplated by the rating schedule; therefore, the assigned schedular evaluation is adequate, and no referral is required. See VAOPGCPREC 6-96; see also Fisher v. Principi, 4 Vet.App. 57, 60 (1993) (a threshold finding that the evidence before VA presents such an exceptional disability picture that the available schedular evaluations for that service-connected disability are inadequate is required for extraschedular consideration referral). The schedular evaluations for the Veteran's service-connected knee disabilities are not inadequate. The rating criteria reasonably describes the Veteran's disability level and symptomatology as due to his service-connected knee disabilities. The Veteran has not submitted evidence indicating that his service-connected knee disabilities or the difficulties flowing from it constitute "such an exceptional or unusual disability picture . . . as to render impractical the application of the regular schedular standards." 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b). The Board further observes that, even if the available schedular evaluation for the disabilities on appeal are inadequate (which they manifestly are not), the Veteran does not exhibit other related factors such as those provided by the regulation as "governing norms." The record does not show that the Veteran has required frequent hospitalizations for his knee disabilities. In addition, the Veteran has not shown that his disabilities have caused marked interference with employment. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran has been retired since 1983 after suffering a right knee injury while on the job and currently receives workers compensation benefits. However, the Board finds that the knee disabilities do not constitute marked interference with employment as to warrant referral for extraschedular consideration. Although the December 2007 VA examiner explained that the Veteran's knee disabilities would limit the Veteran's employability as a crane operator or in a job that would require prolonged standing or sitting, the April 2009 VA examiner explained that the Veteran could do light sedentary work with his left knee. That a knee disability might limit one's ability to work in a position requiring prolonged standing or walking is a predictable consequence of such a disability and is therefore anticipated by the rating schedule. See VAOPGCPREC 6-96. The Board therefore has determined that referral of this case for extraschedular consideration pursuant to 38 C.F.R. 3.321(b)(1) is not warranted. Further, 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 specifically sets out that "[g]enerally, the degrees of disability specified are considered adequate to compensate for considerable loss of working time from exacerbations or illnesses proportionate to the severity of the several grades of disability." Factors such as requiring periodic medical attention are clearly contemplated in the Schedule and provided for in the evaluations assigned herein. What the evidence does not demonstrate in this case is that the manifestations of the Veteran's service-connected disabilities have resulted in unusual disability or impairment that has rendered the criteria and/or degrees of disability contemplated in the Schedule impractical or inadequate. Accordingly, consideration of 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1) is not warranted in this case. New and Material Evidence With respect to the Veteran's application to reopen his claim of service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, the Board notes that the claim of service connection for PTSD was denied by the RO in a June 1981 rating decision. Although the Board recognizes that the issue is now framed as entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder to include PTSD, the Board finds that the Veteran's current claim is based upon the same factual basis as his previous claim, which was first denied in the June 1981 rating decision. In the decision, the RO acknowledged the Veteran's complaint of a nervous condition, however, the RO noted that there was no evidence of a chronic nervous condition and, therefore, service connection for PTSD was denied. The Veteran was informed of his appellate and procedural rights with respect to the decision and the Veteran submitted a timely notice of disagreement. The RO issued a Statement of the Case in October 1981; however, the Veteran did not perfect the appeal. Therefore, the decision became final. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1103. As the June 1981 rating decision took into account the other psychiatric diagnoses, it is appropriate for the Board to consider this claim as a request to reopen the previously denied claim. Boggs v. Peake, 520 F.3d. 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Thereafter, the Veteran submitted an application to reopen his claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD in June 2004. The July 2005 rating decision denied the Veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD (also claimed as nerves). The Veteran was notified of the decision and informed of his appellate and procedural rights; however, he did not submit a notice of disagreement with respect to the decision and, therefore, the decision became final. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1103. The Veteran submitted a petition to reopen his previously denied claim for a psychiatric disorder in September 2005. In order to reopen a claim which has been denied by a final decision, the claimant must present new and material evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108. For applications to reopen filed after August 29, 2001, as was the application to reopen the claim in this case, new and material evidence means evidence not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers; which relates, either by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim; which is neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and which raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). To reopen a previously disallowed claim, new and material evidence must be presented or secured since the last final disallowance of the claim on any basis, including on the basis that there was no new and material evidence to reopen the claim since a prior final disallowance. See Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 273, 285 (1996). For purposes of reopening a claim, the credibility of newly submitted evidence is generally presumed. See Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992) (in determining whether evidence is new and material, 'credibility' of newly presented evidence is to be presumed unless evidence is inherently incredible or beyond competence of witness). The Veteran's claim for service connection was last denied by the July 2005 rating decision. At the time of the decision, the record included the service treatment records, VA treatment records, and private treatment records. The RO explained that the Veteran's claim to reopen was denied because there was only one notation, by history, of a psychiatric condition and there was no diagnosis of a nervous condition related to any injury, event, or disease occurring on active duty service. As the previous denial of service connection were premised on a finding that the Veteran did not have a chronic disability that was related to active service, for evidence to be new and material (i.e., relating to unestablished facts necessary to substantiate the claim and raising a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim), the evidence would have to tend to show that the Veteran had a current psychiatric disability and/or evidence relating the current disability to active service. The evidence associated with the claims file subsequent to the July 2005 rating decision includes VA treatment records, private treatment records, and the Veteran's assertions and testimony. The Board has thoroughly reviewed the evidence associated with the claims file subsequent to the July 2005 rating decision and finds that the evidence constitutes new and material evidence which is sufficient to reopen the previously denied claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder to include PTSD. The majority of this evidence is certainly new, in that it was not previously of record. The Board also finds that the private treatment records are material. Specifically, the June 1999 private treatment record noted an anxiety reaction and the records also showed several impressions of anxiety. The records also show that the Veteran was prescribed medication for his anxiety. Therefore, as the private treatment records reveal that the Veteran has a current diagnosis of anxiety and he is being treated with medication for the disability, the evidence relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. Accordingly, the Board finds that new and material evidence has been presented to reopen the Veteran's previously denied claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder to include PTSD. The Board finds that there is no prejudice to the appellant by the Board proceeding to address the merits of the claim. Although the RO did not reopen the Veteran's claim, the RO also discussed the merits of the claim in the Statement of the Case and Supplemental Statement of the case. In addition, as discussed above, VA has already met all notice and assistance obligations to the appellant. Moreover, the Veteran has been offered the opportunity to submit evidence and argument on the merits of the issues on appeal, and he has done so. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 392- 94 (1993). Acquired Psychiatric Disorder to include PTSD Service connection may be established for disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131. That an injury or disease occurred in service is not enough; there must be chronic disability resulting from that injury or disease. If there is no showing of a resulting chronic condition during service, then a showing of continuity of symptomatology after service is required to support a finding of chronicity. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). In order to establish direct service connection for a disorder, there must be (1) competent evidence of the current existence of the disability for which service connection is being claimed; (2) competent evidence of a disease contracted, an injury suffered, or an event witnessed or experienced in active service; and (3) competent evidence of a nexus or connection between the disease, injury, or event in service and the current disability. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009); cf. Gutierrez v. Principi, 19 Vet. App. 1, 5 (2004) (citing Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999)). In many cases, medical evidence is required to meet the requirement that the evidence be "competent." However, when a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 309 (2007). In addition to the general rules of service connection noted above, service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Further, 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) requires that diagnoses of mental disorders conform to the DSM-IV and that if a diagnosis is not supported by the findings on the examination report, the rating agency shall return the report to the examiner to substantiate the diagnosis. In considering the evidence of record under the laws and regulations as set forth above, the Board concludes that the Veteran is not entitled to service connection for PTSD. The Veteran's service treatment records do not reveal any treatment, notation, or documentation of any psychiatric problems during active service. Following service, the records appear to indicate that the Veteran was first treated for psychiatric problems in 1979 when he was diagnosed with manic depressive personality and in 1981 when the Veteran requested medication for his nerves. In this regard, the Board notes that service connection may not be granted for personality disorders because they are not considered diseases or injuries under the law. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c). He has been treated over the years for alcoholism. Service connection may be granted for alcoholism only where it is shown to be secondary to a service-connected disorder; service connection may not be granted for primary alcoholism. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a); Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001). There is no indication here that alcoholism is secondary to any other disorder. The post-service medical evidence is completely absent for any diagnosis of PTSD. The Board recognizes the Veteran's testimony that he has been told by physicians that he does have a diagnosis of PTSD. Nonetheless, the medical evidence does not show any diagnosis of PTSD. The existence of a current disability is the cornerstone of a claim for VA disability compensation. See Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F. 3d 1328 (1997) (holding that the VA's and the Court's interpretation of sections 1110 and 1131 of the statute as requiring the existence of a present disability for VA compensation purposes cannot be considered arbitrary and therefore the decision based on that interpretation must be affirmed); see also Gilpin v. West, 155 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). In the absence of proof of a present disability, there can be no valid claim. Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141, 143- 44 (1992). The Board acknowledges the Veteran's personal assertions that he suffers from PTSD. Lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007), see also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2007). While the Veteran is competent to state that he has a long history of anxiety, the Veteran is not competent to provide a diagnosis of PTSD, which requires medical expertise. Without evidence of a current diagnosis of PTSD which conforms to diagnostic criteria under DSM-IV, a preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD. No further discussion of the two remaining elements of a PTSD service connection claim is necessary. See Gilpin v. West, 155 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The benefit of the doubt rule does not apply, and the claim for PTSD must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Gilbert, supra. In addition to PTSD, VA treatment records disclose the Veteran has been diagnosed with anxiety. Here, the service treatment records are completely absent for any notation, complaint or documentation of psychiatric problems. In the August 1967 report of medical history, the Veteran checked no as to having experienced any nervous trouble, frequent or terrifying nightmares, and checked no as to having experienced any depression or excessive worry. In addition, the August 1967 separation examination report shows that the Veteran's psychiatric condition was clinically evaluated as normal and the report is absent for any complaints or documentation with respect to a psychiatric disorder. After separation from service, the Veteran contends that he has experienced a nervous condition and anxiety since service and that he was first treated for anxiety within 1 year of separation from service. However, as noted above, the first objective evidence of any psychiatric problems is in 1979, more than 10 years after separation from active service. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In addition to the lack of evidence of a psychiatric disorder during active service or for years after separation from service, there is no medical evidence relating any current psychiatric disorder to active service. In fact, the only evidence relating a current psychiatric disorder to active service is the Veteran's personal statements. There is no indication in the record that the Veteran is a physician or other health care professional. The Board acknowledges that lay assertions may serve to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay- observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F. 3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (addressing lay evidence as potentially competent to support presence of disability even where not corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence). For example, when a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 309 (2007). Moreover, the Board is mindful that competent medical evidence is not necessarily required where the determinative issue in a case involves medical causation or a medical diagnosis. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009), citing Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet App 303 (2007) (lay testimony is competent to establish the presence of varicose veins); Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456, 462 (2007) (unlike varicose veins or a dislocated shoulder, rheumatic fever is not a condition capable of lay diagnosis). However, in this case, the Veteran is not providing statements related to the diagnosis of a simple disorder or about symptomatology but is instead rendering an opinion as to the etiology of his psychiatric disorder. Unlike the varicose veins in Barr or dislocated shoulder in Jandreau, a psychiatric disorder is not a condition generally capable of lay diagnosis, although its symptoms might be described by a lay person, nor is it the type of condition that can be causally related to military service without medical expertise. Davidson, 581 F.3d 1313; Buchanan, 451 F.3d 1331; Jandreau, 492 F.3d 1372. In this regard, the origin of a psychiatric disability is a matter of medical complexity and is often the subject of conflicting opinions even among mental health professionals. See Ephraim v. Brown, 82 F.3d 399, 401 (1996) (recognizing the complexity of determining diagnoses and etiologies within the field of mental disorders). Thus, the Board concludes that, although the Veteran is competent to report symptoms he experienced while in service and after service, his statements as to the onset or origin of a psychiatric disorder do not constitute competent evidence. As a layperson, he is not competent to provide evidence that requires medical knowledge because he lacks the requisite professional medical training, certification and expertise to present opinions regarding such matters. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494-95 (1992) (holding that matters involving special experience or special knowledge require the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or trade). Therefore, the Veteran's statements regarding etiology of a psychiatric disorder in this case do not constitute competent medical evidence on which the Board can make a service connection determination. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran stated that he was nervous and anxious during active service and that he continued to be until the present. See hearing transcript. The Board recognizes that the Veteran is competent to report observable symptoms. While lay persons are generally not competent to offer evidence which requires medical knowledge, such as opinions regarding medical causation or a diagnosis, they may provide competent testimony as to visible symptoms and manifestations of a disorder. Jones v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 134, 137 (1994); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); Buchanan v. Nicolson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). A Veteran can attest to factual matters of which he or she had had first-hand knowledge, e.g., experiencing pain in service, reporting to sick call, being placed on limited duty, and undergoing physical therapy. See Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 368 (2005). Lay evidence is one type of evidence that must be considered and competent lay evidence can be sufficient in and of itself to form the basis of a decision. The Board, however, retains the discretion to make credibility determinations and otherwise weigh the evidence submitted, including lay evidence. See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994) (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted")); see also Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007). In this case, the Veteran is not competent to render a diagnosis or to opine as to the etiology of the specific disorder involved. However, the Veteran is competent to state that he has had psychiatric problems or symptoms since service. Nevertheless, this history is not credible evidence because it is contradicted by written evidence contemporaneous with service and is of less probative value than that evidence. Contrary to the Veteran's assertions that he has been symptomatic since active service, the August 1967 examination report did not reveal any psychiatric symptoms or disorder when he separated. Furthermore, the Veteran specifically denied experiencing any nervous trouble, depression, or worry in the August 1967 report of medical history completed upon separation. Thus, the allegations of the Veteran are inconsistent with the contemporaneous record. Contemporaneous evidence has greater probative value than history as reported by the Veteran. See Curry v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 59, 68 (1994); see also Burns v. HHS, 3 F.3d 415, 417 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (testimony was impeached by witness' "inconsistent affidavits" and "expressed recognition of the difficulties of remembering specific dates of events that happened . . . long ago"); Mings v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 384, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (impeachment by testimony which was inconsistent with prior written statements). In addition, there is no documentation of any complaints, treatment, or diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder until 1979. A prolonged period without medical complaint can be considered, along with other factors concerning a claimant's health and medical treatment during and after military service, as evidence of whether an injury or a disease was incurred in service which resulted in any chronic or persistent disability. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Board must consider all the evidence including the availability of medical records, the nature and course of the disease or disability, the amount of time that elapsed since military service, and any other relevant facts in considering a claim for service connection. Id. For these reasons, the Board finds that the Veteran's contention that he has suffered from a chronic psychiatric disorder since service is not as credible as the contemporaneous evidence contradicting those contentions and is also not credible given the absence of any complaints of the disorder for such a long period of time after service. Therefore, the Board concludes that the Veteran did not have a chronic psychiatric disorder since his period of active service. Finally, where a Veteran served continuously for ninety (90) days or more during a period of war, or during peacetime service after December 31, 1946, and a psychosis becomes manifest to a degree of 10 percent within one year from date of termination of such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2009). In this case, there is no evidence of psychosis or any psychiatric problems within one year of service to a compensable degree. Therefore, presumptive service connection is not warranted. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD. Because the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim, the benefit of the doubt provision does not apply. Therefore, the Board concludes that service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, is not warranted. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). ORDER Entitlement to an initial disability rating in excess of 10 percent for degenerative joint disease, right knee disorder is denied. Entitlement to a disability rating in excess of 10 percent for residuals of a left knee injury, post meniscus surgery is denied. Having received new and material evidence to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, the appeal is granted to this extent only. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, is denied. REMAND The law provides that VA shall make reasonable efforts to notify a claimant of the evidence necessary to substantiate a claim and requires VA to assist a claimant in obtaining that evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2009). Such assistance includes providing the claimant a medical examination or obtaining a medical opinion when such an examination or opinion is necessary to make a decision on a claim. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2009). With respect to the Veteran's claim for service connection for residuals of a head injury, the Board finds that a remand is necessary. The Veteran has stated that he injured his head in September 2006 and received emergency treatment at Thomas Memorial Hospital. The Veteran also testified that he injured his head in 2008. See hearing transcript. Although the record shows that the Veteran submitted medical evidence from Thomas Memorial Hospital in September 2005, there are no other records from Thomas Memorial Hospital dated in September 2006. When VA is put on notice of the existence of private medical records, VA must attempt to obtain those records before proceeding with the appeal. See Lind v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 493, 494 (1992); Murincsak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 363 (1992). Hence, on remand, VA should request that the Veteran provide authorization to enable it to obtain outstanding copies of the Veteran's records from Thomas Memorial Hospital. In addition, the Board observes that if the Veteran is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation due solely to impairment resulting from his or her service-connected disabilities, a TDIU may be assigned. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b); see also Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that once a Veteran submits evidence of medical disability and additionally submits evidence of unemployability, VA must consider total rating for compensation based upon individual unemployability). As stated in Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447 (2009), a claim for TDIU is not a separate claim for benefits but rather is an attempt to obtain an appropriate rating for a disability as part of an initial adjudication of a claim or as part of a claim for increased compensation. In this case, the medical evidence, consisting of the December 2007 VA examination report, intimates that the Veteran is precluded from gainful employment as a result of his service-connected knee disabilities. Thus, the Board finds that a claim of entitlement to a TDIU is reasonably raised by the record. However, the RO has not expressly adjudicated the issue of entitlement to a TDIU. The Veteran would therefore be prejudiced if the Board were to decide this claim without prior adjudication by the RO. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 394 (1993) (where the Board addresses a question that has not been addressed by the agency of original jurisdiction, the Board must consider whether the Veteran has been prejudiced thereby). Accordingly, the claim for entitlement to TDIU must be remanded to the RO for adjudication prior to the rendering of a decision by the Board on this claim. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. The RO/AMC must consider whether the Veteran is entitled to TDIU under the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 4.16, based on impairment attributable to his service- connected disabilities. See Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447 (2009). In so doing, the RO may decide to pursue further development of the Veteran's employment history, or to obtain additional medical evidence or medical opinion, as is deemed necessary. 2. The AMC/RO should contact the Veteran and ask that he provide the information necessary to obtain the records from Thomas Memorial Hospital. After obtaining any necessary authorization for the release of information, the AMC/RO should request such records. 3. After conducting any additional development deemed necessary, the RO should readjudicate the claims, to include the issue of TDIU, considering all the evidence of record. If the benefits requested on appeal are not granted to the Veteran's satisfaction, the Veteran and his representative should be furnished a supplemental statement of the case and be provided an opportunity to respond. The case should then be returned to the Board for further appellate consideration, if in order. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2009). ______________________________________________ KATHLEEN K. GALLAGHER Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs