Citation Nr: 1040441 Decision Date: 10/27/10 Archive Date: 11/01/10 DOCKET NO. 06-29 331 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Muskogee, Oklahoma THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Oklahoma Department of Veterans Affairs WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD M. Moore, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from March 1952 to March 1954. He died in June 2005. The appellant is the Veteran's surviving spouse. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a September 2005 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Muskogee, Oklahoma, which denied service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death, accrued benefits, and Dependency and Indemnity Compensation under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1318; and established basic eligibility to Dependents' Educational Assistance. In April 2006, the appellant submitted a notice of disagreement for the issue of entitlement to service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death and subsequently perfected her appeal in September 2006. In January 2008, the appellant presented sworn testimony during a video conference hearing in Muskogee, Oklahoma, which was chaired by the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A transcript of the hearing has been associated with the Veteran's claims file. In February 2008, the Board remanded the appellant's claim of entitlement to service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death to the Appeals Management Center (AMC) for further evidentiary development, including additional notice, obtaining outstanding VA and private treatment records, and obtaining a medical opinion as to the cause of the Veteran's death. The Board is obligated by law to ensure that the AMC complies with its directives; where the remand orders of the Board are not complied with, the Board errs as a matter of law when it fails to ensure compliance. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998). A review of the record reflects that the AMC provided the appellant with notice compliant with Hupp v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 342 (2007) in a July 2010 letter. Additionally, outstanding treatment records from the Omaha VA Medical Center have been associated with the claims file. The AMC also requested that the appellant submit a Consent to Release Information for any outstanding private treatment records, including the Eastern Oklahoma Medical Center (also referred to as Poteau Hospital). However, the appellant did not respond with a signed consent form. Finally, in July 2010, the AMC obtained a VA medical opinion regarding the cause of the Veteran's death. Accordingly, all remand instructions issued by the Board have been complied with and this matter is once again before the Board. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran died in June 2005 as the result of respiratory failure due to multilobar pneumonia. 2. Multilobar pneumonia was not incurred in or aggravated by military service or otherwise related thereto. 3. At the time of his death, the Veteran was service connected for depression, evaluated as 30 percent disabling, left third toe amputation, evaluated as 20 percent disabling, and lumbar strain, evaluated as 20 percent disabling. 4. The Veteran's service-connected disabilities did not cause or aggravate any of the medical conditions that caused his death, nor did the service-connected disabilities cause or contribute substantially or materially to cause the Veteran's death. CONCLUSION OF LAW The cause of the Veteran's death was not incurred in or aggravated by military service and a service-connected disability neither caused nor contributed to the cause of the Veteran's death. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1310, 1312, 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304, 3.312 (2010). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The Board has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence in the claims file. While the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, the evidence submitted by the appellant or on her behalf. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). The analysis below focuses on the most salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claim. The appellant must not assume that the Board has overlooked pieces of evidence that are not explicitly discussed herein. See Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122 (2000) (the law requires only that the Board address its reasons for rejecting evidence favorable to the claimant). The Board must assess the credibility and weight of all evidence, including the medical evidence, to determine its probative value, accounting for evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and providing reasons for rejecting any evidence favorable to the appellant. Equal weight is not accorded to each piece of evidence contained in the record; every item of evidence does not have the same probative value. When all the evidence is assembled, the Board is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the appellant prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against a claim, in which case, the claim is denied. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) With respect to the appellant's claim decided herein, VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326 (2010). Under the VCAA, when VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, it is required to notify the claimant and his representative, if any, of any information and medical or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2010); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). In Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004) (Pelegrini II), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. Prior to initial adjudication of the Veteran's claim, a letter dated in June 2005 fully satisfied the duty to notify provisions. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1) (2010); Quartuccio at 187. Additionally, a January 2008 letter informed the Veteran of how VA determines the appropriate disability rating or effective date to be assigned when a claim is granted, consistent with the holding in Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Further, specifically in the context of a claim for cause of death benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1310 Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC), the Court held that section 5103(a) notice must include (1) a statement of the conditions, if any, for which a veteran was service connected at the time of his death; (2) an explanation of the evidence and information required to substantiate a DIC claim based on a previously service-connected condition; and (3) an explanation of the evidence and information required to substantiate a DIC claim based on a condition not yet service connected. See Hupp, supra. The Court also held that a DIC claim imposes upon VA no obligation to inform a DIC claimant who submits a nondetailed application of the specific reasons why any claim made during the deceased Veteran's lifetime was not granted. Id. A July 2010 letter complied with the requirements set forth in Hupp. The Board also concludes VA's duty to assist has been satisfied. The Veteran's service treatment records and VA treatment records are in the file. Private treatment records identified by the appellant have been obtained, to the extent possible. As noted above, the Board's February 2008 remand ordered the AMC to attempt to obtain private treatment records from the Poteau Hospital (also known as Eastern Oklahoma Medical Center). However, the appellant failed to respond to multiple requests from the AMC to provide a signed consent to release information. The Board notes that the duty to assist is not always a one-way street. If the appellant wants help, she cannot passively wait for it in those circumstances where she may or should have information that is essential in obtaining the putative evidence. See Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). Thus, the Board finds that the duty to assist is satisfied on this point. The duty to assist also includes providing a medical examination or obtaining a medical opinion when such is necessary to make a decision on the claim, as defined by law. The record indicates that a VA examiner provided a medical opinion on the cause of the Veteran's death in July 2010. The examiner reviewed the claims file and provided a conclusion based on sufficient rationale. Therefore, the Board finds that the opinion is adequate for rating purposes. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 311 (2007) (affirming that a medical opinion is adequate if it provides sufficient detail so that the Board can perform a fully informed evaluation of the claim). Given the foregoing, the Board finds that the VA has substantially complied with the duty to obtain the requisite medical information necessary to make a decision on the appellant's claim. As there is no indication that any failure on the part of VA to provide additional notice or assistance reasonably affects the outcome of this case, the Board finds that any such failure is harmless. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). II. Merits of the Claim The appellant contends that the Veteran's death was caused or contributed to by his service-connected disabilities. Specifically, she contends that the Veteran's death was caused by pneumonia, resulting from a fall. She alleges that his fall was the result of instability and balance problems, due to his service-connected left third toe amputation. Therefore, she believes that service connection is warranted for the cause of the Veteran's death. Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in the line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002). However, that an injury or disease occurred in service is not enough; there must also be a chronic disability resulting from that injury or disease. If there is no showing of the chronic disability during service, then a showing of continuous symptoms after service is required to support a finding of chronicity. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2010). Service connection may also be granted for any injury or disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease or injury was incurred in service. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2010). In order to establish service connection for a disability, there must be (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999). The death of a veteran will be considered as having been due to a service-connected disability where the evidence establishes that such disability was either the principal or contributory cause of death. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(a) (2010). A principal cause of death is one which, singularly or jointly with some other condition, was the immediate or underlying cause of death, or was etiologically related thereto. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(b) (2010). A contributory cause of death is one which contributes substantially or materially to death, or aided or lent assistance to the production of death. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(c) (2010). Service-connected disabilities or injuries involving active processes affecting vital organs should receive careful consideration as a contributory cause of death, the primary cause being unrelated, from the viewpoint of whether there was resulting debilitating effects and general impairment of health to the extent that would render the person less capable of resisting the effects of either disease or injury primarily causing death. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(c)(3) (2010). There are primary causes of death which by their very nature are so overwhelming that eventual death can be anticipated irrespective of co-existing conditions, but, even in such cases, there is for consideration whether there may be reasonable basis for holding that a service-connected condition was of such severity as to have a material influence in accelerating death. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(c)(4) (2010). In considering the evidence of record under the laws and regulations as set forth above, the Board concludes that service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death is not warranted. A certificate of death indicates that the Veteran died in June 2005. The cause of death was listed as respiratory failure due to multilobar pneumonia. There were no other significant conditions or underlying causes listed. At the time of his death, the Veteran was not service-connected for pneumonia. There is no evidence of in-service pneumonia or breathing problems, no evidence of continuous symptoms of pneumonia or breathing problems since service, and no medical evidence directly linking the Veteran's cause of death - respiratory failure due to multilobar pneumonia - to his active military service. Accordingly, the Board finds that multilobar pneumonia was not incurred in or aggravated by the Veteran's active service. At the time of the Veteran's death, service connection had been established for depression, a left third toe amputation, and lumbar strain. However, the evidence does not show that the Veteran's service-connected disabilities were a principal cause of his death. The Veteran's death certificate did not mention any of his service-connected disabilities, nor is there any other medical evidence that lists depression, a left third toe amputation, or lumbar strain as a principal or contributory cause of death. Further, the appellant does not assert that the Veteran's service-connected disabilities directly caused his death. Rather, as discussed more fully below, she relies on a July 2005 physician statement to link the Veteran's fall to his eventual pneumonia and respiratory failure, and then asserts that his fall was due to his service-connected left third toe amputation. The appellant has submitted a July 2005 Mutual of Omaha Physician's Statement for Accidental Death. The form, completed by a VA physician, indicates that the Veteran had multiple chronic illnesses, but that his health rapidly deteriorated following two falls in April and May 2005. These falls resulted in a hip fracture and a spinal compression fracture. The VA physician concluded that, as the Veteran's health rapidly deteriorated following the April and May 2005 falls, the injuries resulting from these falls were a direct cause of his death. She did not mention any other contributing disabilities, including depression, a left third toe amputation, or lumbar strain, and specifically indicated that, to the best of her knowledge, no disease or injury, other than those resulting from the April and May 2005 falls, complicated or contributed to the Veteran's cause of death. She did not link the Veteran's falls or cause of death to his service-connected disabilities, nor did she opine on the reason for his falls. As the July 2005 Physician's Statement does not link the cause of the Veteran's death or the cause of his falls to his military service or service-connected disabilities, it does not provide a basis for granting service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death. The only medical evidence of record to specifically address the relationship between the Veteran's service-connected disabilities and his death is a July 2010 VA medical opinion. The July 2010 examiner reviewed the claims file and the Veteran's VA treatment records. He concluded that the Veteran's fall, which led to his eventual pneumonia, was less likely than not the result of or significantly related to his service-connected left third toe amputation, service-connected lumbar strain, or posture or gait disturbances from his service-connected disabilities. Rather, the examiner opined that the fall was the result of one or more of several risk factors, including right hemiparesis, a nonservice-connected left leg condition, a balance deficit that worsened after a cerebral vascular accident (CVA), osteoarthritis of both knees, the activity of shoveling gravel, and an increased risk of falls for older people. The examiner cited medical literature to support his opinion. He also indicated that the Veteran's lumbar disease did not result in gait abnormality or balance deficits. The July 2010 examiner's opinion is supported by the other medical evidence of record, including VA treatment records. Notably, the VA treatment records indicate that the Veteran had no signs of lumbar radiculopathy and attributed his right foot sensory deficits to his nonservice-connected CVAs. Specifically, September 1994 electromyography testing results found no evidence of lumbar radiculopathy. A December 1995 VA spine examination report also indicated that the Veteran's low back disability did not result in any neurological involvement. A July 1998 VA examination report indicated that the Veteran's right foot had some sensory deficit that was probably related to his CVA, not lumbar radiculopathy. Finally, a January 2000 VA treatment record noted that the Veteran had suffered two strokes with residual weakness on the right side. These treatment records and examination reports support the July 2010 examiner's conclusion that the Veteran had several risk factors for falls that were not related to his service or service-connected disabilities. The Board notes that the VA treatment records and VA examination reports also indicate that the Veteran complained on multiple occasions of his left foot "giving out" and falls due to his left third toe amputation. Although the Veteran attributed his falls to the left third toe amputation, no healthcare professional has made this connection. There is no medical evidence whatsoever of the Veteran's left foot giving out or supporting his belief that his left third toe was the cause of his instability and falls. Further, the Board notes that there is no evidence that the Veteran experienced any falls or balance problems until the 1990s, 40 years after his separation from service and left third toe amputation. There is simply no evidence to support the appellant's contention that the Veteran's fall was due to his service-connected left third toe amputation or lumbar strain. In this case, the only evidence which purports to relate the cause of the Veteran's death to his military service or service- connected disabilities consists of the statements of the appellant and her representative. However, it is now well established that laypersons, such as the appellant and her representative, without medical training are not competent to make such a medical conclusion. See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(1) (2010) (competent medical evidence means evidence provided by a person who is qualified through education, training, or experience to offer medical diagnoses, statements, or opinions). While the appellant can describe what she observed, she is not able to provide competent evidence as to the cause of the Veteran's death. Her assertions are accorded less weight than the competent medical evidence, the July 2010 VA examiner's opinion, that is against her claim. In sum, the Board finds that there is no probative evidence that any service-connected disability, "contributed substantially or materially" to the Veteran's death, or "combined to cause death," or "aided or lent assistance to the production of death." See 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(c)(1) (2010); see generally Harvey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 390, 393 (1994). Accordingly, the Board finds that the claim of entitlement to service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death must be denied. In reaching this conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the appellant's claim, that doctrine is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2010); see also Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001). ORDER Entitlement to service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death is denied. ____________________________________________ BARBARA B. COPELAND Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs