Citation Nr: 1018901 Decision Date: 05/21/10 Archive Date: 06/04/10 DOCKET NO. 03-06 883 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Phoenix, Arizona THE ISSUE 1. Entitlement to service connection for post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 2. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety and depression. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Michael T. Osborne, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active service from August 1963 to July 1966. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal of a February 2006 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Phoenix, Arizona. A Travel Board hearing was held before the undersigned Acting Veterans Law Judge at the RO in August 2006. In February 2007, the Board remanded this claim to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC) in Washington, DC, for additional development. A review of the claims file shows that there has been substantial compliance with the Board's remand directives. The Board notes that, in Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009), the Court held that claims for service connection for PTSD also encompass claims for service connection for all psychiatric disabilities afflicting a Veteran based on a review of the medical evidence. The medical evidence indicates that the Veteran has been diagnosed as having anxiety and depression. Thus, the claims of service connection for PTSD and for an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety and depression, are as stated on the title page of this decision. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. All relevant evidence necessary for an equitable disposition of the Veteran's appeal has been obtained. 2. The Veteran has not provided sufficient information regarding his claimed in-service personal assault in order for the U.S. Army and Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC) to attempt corroboration; nor has he otherwise provided credible supporting evidence that the claimed in- service stressors actually occurred. 4. The competent medical evidence does not contain a diagnosis of PTSD based on a corroborated in-service stressor. 5. The competent medical evidence does not show that the Veteran's current acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety and depression, is related to active service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. PTSD was not incurred in or aggravated by active service or any incident of such service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2009). 2. An acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety and depression, was not incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Before assessing the merits of the appeal, VA's duties under the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) must be examined. The VCAA provides that VA shall apprise a claimant of the evidence necessary to substantiate his claim for benefits and that VA shall make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence unless no reasonable possibility exists that such assistance will aid in substantiating the claim. In letters issued in September 2005 , February and July 2007, and in April 2008, VA notified the appellant of the information and evidence needed to substantiate and complete his claims, including what part of that evidence he was to provide and what part VA would attempt to obtain for him. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002). These letters informed the appellant to submit medical evidence relating PTSD and an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety and depression, to active service. The Veteran was asked to provide detailed information concerning his alleged in-service personal assault and was advised of other types of evidence he could submit in support of his claims. The Veteran also was informed of when and where to send the evidence. The February and July 2007 VCAA notice letters also provided the Veteran with notice of the Dingess requirements. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). After consideration of the contents of these letters, the Board finds that VA has satisfied substantially the requirement that the Veteran be advised to submit any additional information in support of his claims. See Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). The September 2005 and April 2008 letters included a PTSD Questionnaire in an attempt to obtain evidence relevant to the Veteran's claimed in-service personal assault. The Board finds that these letters provided the Veteran with the notice required by 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) for personal assault PTSD claims. See Bradford v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 200 (2006) (holding that 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3) provides "unequivocally" that "VA will not deny a post-traumatic stress disorder claim that is based on in-service personal assault" without first providing the requisite notice). The Veteran submitted a completed PTSD Questionnaire with information concerning his alleged in-service personal assault to the RO in January 2007. As will be explained below in greater detail, the evidence does not support granting service connection for PTSD or for an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety and depression. Thus, any failure to develop these claims under the VCAA cannot be considered prejudicial to the Veteran. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 394 (1993). The claimant also has had the opportunity to submit additional argument and evidence and to participate meaningfully in the adjudication process. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Board notes that the Federal Circuit had held previously that any error in VCAA notice should be presumed prejudicial and VA must bear the burden of proving that such an error did not cause harm. Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881 (2007). The Supreme Court recently reversed the Federal Circuit's decision in Sanders, finding it unlawful in light of 38 U.S.C.A. § 7261(b)(2) which provides that, in conducting review of decision of the Board, a court shall take due account of the rule of prejudicial error. The Supreme Court essentially held in Sanders that, except in cases where VA has failed to meet the first requirement of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) by not informing the claimant of the information and evidence necessary to substantiate the claim, (1) the burden of proving harmful error must rest with the party raising the issue; (2) the Federal Circuit's presumption of prejudicial error in Sanders imposed an unreasonable evidentiary burden upon VA and encouraged abuse of the judicial process; and (3) determinations on the issue of harmless error should be made on a case-by-case basis. Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009). In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sanders, the Board finds that any failure to satisfy the duty to notify is not prejudicial. See Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom., Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009). With respect to the timing of the notice, the Board points out that the Veterans Court held that a VCAA notice, as required by 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a), must be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction decision on a claim for VA benefits. See Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). Because the appellant's claims are being denied in this decision, any question as to the appropriate disability rating or effective date is moot. See Dingess, 19 Vet. App. at 473. The Board also finds that VA has complied with the VCAA's duty to assist by aiding the Veteran in obtaining evidence and affording him the opportunity to give testimony before the Board. It appears that all known and available records relevant to the issues on appeal have been obtained and associated with the Veteran's claims file. The RO has made repeated attempts to obtain any official records concerning the Veteran's alleged in-service personal assault. In this regard, the RO sent several requests to the U.S. Army Crime Records Center for information on whether the Veteran's in-service personal assault was reported to military authorities while he was on active service. Specifically, in July 2009, the RO notified this facility that the Veteran had reported that he had been assaulted on several occasions between February 1, 1965, and July 30, 1965, by a fellow service member. This facility responded in October 2009 that the records requested were outside of its 40-year records retention period. In cases where the Veteran's service treatment records (or other pertinent records, for that matter) are unavailable through no fault of the claimant, there is a heightened obligation to assist the claimant in the development of his or her case. O'Hare v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 365 (1991). VA also must provide an explanation to the appellant regarding VA's inability to obtain his or her service treatment records. Dixon v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 261 (1992). The Court also has held that VA's efforts to obtain service department records shall continue until the records are obtained or unless it is reasonably certain that such records do not exist or that further efforts to obtain those records would be futile. Hayre v. West, 188 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also McCormick v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 39 (2000). The Board notes that a review of the claims file shows that the Veteran is in receipt of Social Security Administration (SSA) disability benefits. Normally, VA has a duty to obtain SSA records when it has actual notice that the Veteran is receiving SSA benefits. Murincsak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 363 (1992). In this case, there is no reasonable possibility that these records would be relevant to the currently appealed claims. Neither the Veteran nor his service representative has identified his SSA records as evidence relevant to the claims on appeal. The Veteran's claims file also contains significant medical evidence, including VA and private examination reports and outpatient treatment records. Because there is no indication in the claims file that the Veteran's SSA records potentially are relevant to the claims on appeal, and because the Veteran has not identified any SSA records as relevant evidence which VA should attempt to obtain under the VCAA's duty to assist, the Board finds that a remand to obtain SSA records is not required. See Golz v. Shinseki, No. 2009-7039 (Fed. Cir. January 4, 2010) (holding that VA is not required to obtain SSA records in all cases but only where potentially relevant to the claim(s) on appeal). As to any duty to provide an examination and/or seek a medical opinion, the Board notes that in the case of a claim for disability compensation, the assistance provided to the claimant shall include providing a medical examination or obtaining a medical opinion when such examination or opinion is necessary to make a decision on the claim. An examination or opinion shall be treated as being necessary to make a decision on the claim if the evidence of record, taking into consideration all information and lay or medical evidence (including statements of the claimant) contains competent evidence that the claimant has a current disability, or persistent or recurring symptoms of disability; and indicates that the disability or symptoms may be associated with the claimant's act of service; but does not contain sufficient medical evidence for VA to make a decision on the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4); McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). In this case, the service treatment records are silent as to any complaints or treatment for PTSD or other psychiatric disorder. Moreover, the post-service evidence does not indicate any current complaints or treatment referable to the claimed disabilities until several decades following separation. Furthermore, the record contains no competent evidence suggesting a causal relationship between the Veteran's current PTSD or his acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD and active service. Nor is there credible lay evidence of continuity of symptomatology. With respect to the Veteran's claim of service connection for PTSD, there is no competent evidence of an in-service stressor. Service connection for PTSD cannot be granted in the absence of an in-service stressor and an after-the-fact medical opinion cannot serve as the basis for corroboration of an in-service stressor. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996). For all of these reasons, the evidence does not indicate that either PTSD or an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety depression, may be related to active service such as to require an examination, even under the low threshold of McLendon. In summary, VA has done everything reasonably possible to notify and to assist the Veteran and no further action is necessary to meet the requirements of the VCAA. The Veteran contends that he incurred PTSD and an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety and depression, as a result of several in-service personal assaults which occurred during active service. Service connection may be granted if the evidence demonstrates that a current disability resulted from an injury or disease incurred or aggravated in active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Additionally, service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with VA regulations; a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. If the evidence establishes that the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran's service, the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d) (pertaining to combat Veterans). If, however, a PTSD claim is based on in-service personal assault, evidence from sources other than the Veteran's service records may corroborate the Veteran's account of the stressor. Examples of such evidence include, but are not limited to, statements from family members, and evidence of behavior changes following the claimed assault. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). In Patton v. West, 12 Vet. App. 272 (1999), the Court held that special consideration must be given to personal assault PTSD claims. In particular, the Court held in Patton that the provisions in M21-1, Part III, 5.14(c), which address PTSD claims based on personal assault, are substantive rules which are the equivalent of VA regulations and must be considered. See also YR v. West, 11 Vet. App. 393, 398-99 (1998). The Board notes that M21-1, Part III, Chapter 5, has been rescinded and replaced, in relevant part, by M21-1MR, Part III, Subpart iv, Chapter 4, Section H30. See generally M21-1MR, Part III, Subpart iv, Chapter 4, Section H30. These M21-1MR provisions on personal assault PTSD claims require that, in cases where available records do not provide objective or supportive evidence of the alleged in-service stressor, it is necessary to develop for this evidence. As to personal assault PTSD claims, more particular requirements are established regarding the development of "alternative sources" of information as service records may be devoid of evidence because many victims of personal assault, especially sexual assault and domestic violence, do not file official reports either with military or civilian authorities. See M21-1MR, Part III, Subpart iv, Chapter 4, Section H30b. Further, the relevant provisions of M21-1MR indicate that behavior changes that occurred around the time of the incident may indicate the occurrence of an in-service stressor and that "[s]econdary evidence may need interpretation by a clinician, especially if the claim involves behavior changes" and "[e]vidence that documents behavior changes may require interpretation in relation to the medical diagnosis by a neuropsychiatric physician". See M21-1MR, Part III, Subpart iv, Chapter 4, Section H30c. The Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim of service connection for PTSD. The Veteran was provided a PTSD Questionnaire in September 2005 and April 2008 in an attempt to obtain evidence relevant to his claimed in-service personal assault. The Veteran submitted a completed PTSD Questionnaire with information concerning his alleged in-service personal assault to the RO in January 2007. Thus, it appears that the appropriate development for PTSD personal assault claims occurred in this case. Id. The competent evidence does not show, nor does the Veteran contend, that he was treated for PTSD during active service. The post-service medical evidence of record contains a diagnosis of PTSD; thus, the central issue in this case is whether the record contains credible supporting evidence that a claimed in-service stressor actually occurred which supports the diagnosis. The evidence necessary to establish the occurrence of a stressor during service varies depending on whether the Veteran was "engaged in combat with the enemy." Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60 (1993). The Veteran also does not contend, and the evidence also does not show, that he "engaged in combat with the enemy" during active service. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). In such cases, the record must contain other evidence that substantiates or corroborates the Veteran's statements as to the occurrence of the claimed stressors. See West (Carlton) v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70 (1994); Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91 (1993). A review of the Veteran's service personnel records shows that proceedings were initiated against the Veteran in October 1965 under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) because he had absented himself from his appointed place of duty without proper authority. Punishment was imposed under the UCMJ in December 1965. At that time, the Veteran was reduced in rank, forfeited 7 days' pay, was restricted to his barracks for 14 days, and was ordered to perform 2 hours' extra duty for 14 days. The Veteran did not appeal from this punishment. The Veteran has not provided sufficient information concerning his claimed in-service personal assault such that corroboration can be attempted by the JSRRC. The Board notes that the Veteran identified several claimed in-service stressors in statements submitted to VA in January 2007 along with a completed PTSD Personal Assault Questionnaire (VA Form 21-0781a). In these statements, the Veteran reported that he was raped on several occasions by another service member whom he identified, E.B.M., while both men were on active service in 1965. The Veteran reported that the first assault had occurred when E.B.M. had come back to the barracks "after a drunken binge" and raped him. He stated that the second assault had occurred when E.B.M. had confronted him in a locked communications center. He also stated that the third attempted assault had occurred when E.B.M. had advanced on him in the communications center again and did not stop his unwanted sexual advances until the Veteran displayed a 45-caliber gun, pointed it at E.B.M., and told him to stop. The JSRRC formally notified the RO in July 2009 that there was insufficient information concerning the Veteran's alleged in-service personal assaults for it to attempt corroboration. The JSRRC suggested that VA contact the U.S. Army Crime Records Center to determine if the Veteran's in-service personal assault had been reported at any time between February 1, 1965, and July 30, 1965. As noted in the Introduction, the U.S. Army Crime Records Center responded in October 2009 with information that the records requested by VA were outside of that facility's 40-year records retention schedule and were not available for review. The Board notes that, despite the Veteran's assertions to the contrary that his in-service personal assaults resulted in declining performance during active service, there is no indication in his service personnel records that his enlisted performance suffered following these incidents. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran received a UCMJ Article 15 punishment in December 1965, several months after the last alleged in-service personal assault had occurred. The Veteran specifically declined to provide any defense or other supporting statements concerning his decision to leave his appointed place of duty in October 1965 (the incident which prompted the Article 15 punishment). He also declined to appeal the punishment when it was issued in December 1965. There is no indication in the Veteran's service treatment records that he reported any of his in-service personal assaults, something that the Veteran conceded in his statements to VA. The Veteran denied any relevant medical history at his separation physical examination in May 1966. The Veteran's service treatment records also show that he was diagnosed as having an immature personality after being examined by an in-service psychiatrist in June 1966; even at that in-service psychiatric examination, the Veteran did not report any of the alleged in-service personal assaults. The Board recognizes the extremely sensitive nature of an in- service personal assault; unfortunately, however, there is no corroborating evidence of these incidents in any of the Veteran's contemporaneous service personnel records or service treatment records. The Veteran has contended that he purposely left his place of duty in October 1965 because he was so upset by the in- service personal assaults which had occurred and he knew that he would be disciplined for leaving his place of duty. When examined by an in-service psychiatrist in June 1966, however, the Veteran stated that he had left his place of duty in October 1965 because "all the work had been left for him and that his 12 [hours] on and 12 [hours] off work schedule was becoming too much for him." The Board finds the Veteran's contemporaneous statements that he left his place of duty in October 1965 because he was overwhelmed by his work more credible than his subsequent statements that he left his place of duty because of the in-service personal assaults. Again, the Board notes that the Veteran did not report any of his alleged in-service personal assaults when he was notified of an Article 15 proceeding in October 1965, when he was punished under Article 15 in December 1965, or at his in- service psychiatric evaluation in June 1966. Further, there is no competent diagnosis of PTSD based on a corroborated in-service stressor. The Veteran has contended that he was diagnosed as having PTSD following VA examination in September 1982. A review of this VA examination report shows that the VA examiner diagnosed the Veteran as suffering from a post-traumatic syndrome as a result of his alleged in- service personal assault. Critically, the VA examiner also stated that the Veteran's post-traumatic syndrome "was self- limited and is no longer present." (Emphasis added.) The VA examiner noted that the Veteran had experienced severe post-traumatic symptoms for one year but his "current degree of disability is not related to" the in-service assault. The final diagnoses in September 1982 included acute post- traumatic stress syndrome which was resolved currently. (Emphasis added.) The Veteran was diagnosed as having PTSD following VA outpatient treatment in June 2005; at that time, the VA examiner concluded that the Veteran's PTSD was "probably related to" military sexual trauma. The Veteran reported in June 2005 that he had experienced a problem during active service "where I was taken advantage of, no not rape but I must have been responsible in some way." The Board observes that the Veteran's statement that he "was taken advantage of" but not raped during active service is inconsistent with his other statements in the record that he was raped on several occasions by E.B.M. while on active service. In any event, an after-the-fact medical opinion cannot serve as the basis for corroboration of an in-service stressor. Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996). Therefore, although the Veteran has been diagnosed as having PTSD, the Board finds that the Veteran's claimed in-service stressors are not credible, are incapable of corroboration by the JSRRC, and are not corroborated by independent evidence. Thus, the Board finds that service connection for PTSD is not warranted. The Board also finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim of service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety and depression. The Veteran's service treatment records show that he denied all relevant medical history at his enlistment physical examination in August 1963. His psychiatric system was normal at that examination. He also was not treated for an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety and depression, during active service. His medical history and clinical evaluation were unchanged at his separation physical examination in May 1966. The Board observes that the Veteran was diagnosed as having an immature personality following an in-service psychiatric evaluation in June 1966 just prior to his discharge from active service. Service connection is prohibited for personality disorders, however. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.127 (2009). The post-service medical evidence shows that, although the Veteran has been diagnosed as having an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, it is not related to active service. It appears that the Veteran first was diagnosed as having an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD in September 1982, or more than 16 years after his service separation in July 1966. The Board notes that evidence of a prolonged period without medical complaint, and the amount of time that elapsed since military service, can be considered as evidence against the claim. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Following VA psychiatric examination in September 1982, the VA examiner diagnosed the Veteran as having, among other things, chronic generalized anxiety. In November 2000, the Veteran complained of work- related stress. Following private outpatient treatment in October 2001, the Veteran was diagnosed as having depression. After being evaluated by a private physician for costochondritis in July 2001, the assessment included suspected significant depression. On VA mental disorders examination in June 2002, the Veteran complained of suffering from depression "and he believes he has had it for quite some time. He attributed it to personal situations and to clinical depression. He stated he has problems adjusting to not being able to do what he would like to do because of medical problems." The Veteran reported experiencing sadness and hopelessness, suicidal thoughts, poor motivation, and a lack of energy. He also reported problems with concentration, poor short-term memory, and some times ignoring self-care for a day or two at a time. He denied hearing voices and being treated for depression during active service. Mental status examination of the Veteran showed slightly slurred speech, spontaneous thought production, relevant thoughts, vague suicidal ideation, and no psychotic symptoms. The Veteran's Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score was 60, indicating moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. The impressions included depressive disorder, not otherwise specified (secondary to medical conditions and life circumstances). Following VA general medical examination that same month, in June 2002, the diagnoses included a history of depression. None of the Veteran's post-service VA treating physicians have related his current acquired psychiatric disability, including anxiety and depression, to active service. In summary, absent objective evidence, to include a medical nexus, relating the Veteran's current acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety and depression, to active service, the Board finds that service connection for this disability is not warranted. In reaching the above conclusions, the Board acknowledges Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007), in which the Federal Circuit determined that lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition (noting that sometimes the layperson will be competent to identify the condition where the condition is simple, for example a broken leg, and sometimes not, for example, a form of cancer), (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. The relevance of lay evidence is not limited to the third situation but extends to the first two as well. Whether lay evidence is competent and sufficient in a particular case is a fact issue. The Veteran has not shown that he has the expertise required to diagnose any psychiatric disability. Nor is the Veteran competent to offer an opinion regarding any causal relationship between any current psychiatric disability and active service. Again, there is no documentation of any findings with respect to a psychiatric disability in service. While the Veteran's contentions have been considered carefully, these contentions are outweighed by the medical evidence of record showing no competent diagnosis of PTSD which could be attributed to active service and no nexus between an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety and depression, and active service. The Board acknowledges that lay evidence concerning continuity of symptoms after service, if credible, ultimately is competent evidence, regardless of the lack of contemporaneous medical evidence. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In the present case, however, to the extent that the Veteran is claiming continuous psychiatric symptomatology since active service, he is not found to be credible. Although the Veteran has contended that in-service personal assault led him to develop PTSD, he was normal clinically at his separation physical examination. No psychiatric disability was reported by the Veteran or noted on his service treatment records or post-service VA treatment records until September 1982, approximately 16 years after his service separation in July 1966. The Veteran also did not raise a claim for PTSD until 2005, several decades after his alleged in-service personal assault. Had the Veteran been experiencing continuous symptoms since service, it is reasonable to expect that he would have filed a claim many years earlier. Accordingly, continuity of symptomatology has not been established either by the clinical record or by the Veteran's own statements. Moreover, no competent medical evidence causally relates his current PTSD or acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety and depression, to active service. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claims, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine does not apply. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1364, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). ORDER Entitlement to service connection for PTSD is denied. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include anxiety and depression, is denied. ____________________________________________ ROBERT E. O'BRIEN Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs