Citation Nr: 1021237 Decision Date: 06/08/10 Archive Date: 06/21/10 DOCKET NO. 05-38 714 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Phoenix, Arizona THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for headaches, to include as secondary to service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. 2. Entitlement to service connection for depression, to include as secondary to service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. 3. Entitlement to service connection for alcohol dependence, to include as secondary to service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. 4. Entitlement to an initial rating in excess of 10 percent for the residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD E. Pomeranz, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active military service from December 1971 to June 1974. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal of May and September 2004 rating actions by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) located in Phoenix, Arizona. In a May 2008 decision, the Board remanded this case for additional development. Specifically, in regard to the claims listed on the cover page of this decision, the Board requested that the RO schedule the Veteran for VA examinations that were pertinent to those claims. Pursuant to the May 2008 remand, the Veteran was scheduled to undergo VA examinations in August 2008. However, he failed to report to the examinations. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.655. The Veteran is currently in receipt of a total disability evaluation based on individual unemployability (TDIU). That is, he has been found unemployable due to the totality of his service-connected disabilities and is in receipt of a 100 percent disability evaluation. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.340, 3.341, 4.16(a). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran failed, without good cause, to report to scheduled VA examinations for which he received notice; these examinations were needed to determine the etiology of any headaches that were present, the etiology of any psychiatric disorder that was present, to include depression, whether the Veteran's alcoholism was acquired as secondary to, or as a symptom of his service-connected neck disability, and whether the Veteran met the schedular criteria for an initial rating in excess of 10 percent for the residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. 2. The medical evidence shows that the Veteran's chronic headache disability was first diagnosed many years after his discharge from the military; there is a preponderance of the competent evidence against a causal link between his currently diagnosed chronic headache disability and active service; there is a preponderance of the competent evidence against a finding that the Veteran's service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7, caused or aggravated his chronic headache disability. 3. The medical evidence shows that the Veteran's depression was first diagnosed many years after his discharge from the military; there is a preponderance of the competent evidence against a causal link between his currently diagnosed depression and active service; there is a preponderance of the competent evidence against a finding that the Veteran's service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7, caused or aggravated his depression. 4. The Veteran filed his claim for service connection for alcohol dependence in February 2004, after the passage of congressional legislation prohibiting the grant of direct service connection for alcohol and drug abuse based on claims filed on or after October 31, 1990. 5. The Veteran's alcohol dependence is not etiologically related to, or aggravated by, his service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. A chronic disability manifested by headaches was not incurred in or aggravated by active military service, nor may an organic disability of the nervous system manifested by headaches be presumed to have been incurred therein; a chronic disability manifested by headaches is not proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disability. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2009). 2. Depression was not incurred in or aggravated by active military service, nor is it proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disability. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.310 (2009). 3. Alcohol dependence was not, as a matter of law, incurred in or aggravated by service, and the Veteran's alcohol dependence is not proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disability. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 105, 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1, 3.102, 3.159, 3.301, 3.303, 3.304, 3.310(a) (2009); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). 4. Entitlement to an initial rating in excess of 10 percent for the residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7, is not warranted as a matter of law. 38 C.F.R. § 3.6555 (2009); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) The enactment of the VCAA, codified at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002), significantly changed the law prior to the pendency of these claims. VA has issued final regulations to implement these statutory changes. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2009). The VCAA provisions include an enhanced duty to notify a claimant as to the information and evidence necessary to substantiate a claim for VA benefits, and they redefine the obligations of VA with respect to the duty to assist the veteran with the claim. In regard to the Veteran's claim for an initial rating in excess of 10 percent for the residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7, the Board finds that the provisions of the VCAA are not applicable to this claim on appeal because the appeal turns on a matter of law and not on the underlying facts or development of the facts. See Manning v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 534, 542 (2002). The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans' Claims (Court) found in Manning that the VCAA can have no effect on appeals that are decided on an interpretation of the law as opposed to a determination based on fact. See also Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001). Consequently, the Board is not required to address the RO's efforts to comply with the VCAA with respect to the higher initial rating issue here on appeal. With respect to the Veteran's remaining claims, the Board finds that VA fulfilled its duties to the Veteran under the VCAA. Duty to Notify VA has a duty to notify the veteran of any information and evidence needed to substantiate and complete a claim. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103. The Board concludes that the April 2004, March 2006, May 2008, and June 2008 letters sent to the Veteran by the RO adequately apprised him of the information and evidence needed to substantiate the claims. The RO thus complied with VCAA's notification requirements. In order to meet the requirements of 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b), VCAA notice must: (1) inform the claimant about the information and evidence necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) inform the claimant about the information and evidence that VA will seek to provide; and (3) inform the claimant about the information and evidence the claimant is expected to provide. Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 394, 403 (2005) (outlining VCAA notice requirements). Additionally, during the pendency of this appeal, on March 3, 2006, the Court issued a decision in Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 484, 486 (2006), which held that the VCAA notice requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of a service connection claim. Those five elements include: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. The Court held that upon receipt of an application for a service- connection claim, 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) require VA to review the information and the evidence presented with the claim and to provide the claimant with notice of what information and evidence not previously provided, if any, will assist in substantiating or is necessary to substantiate the elements of the claim as reasonably contemplated by the application. Id., at 486. This notice must also inform the veteran that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is granted. Id. The Board finds that VA has met these duties with regard to the claims adjudicated on the merits in this decision. There is no issue as to providing an appropriate application form or completeness of the application. Written notice provided in April 2004, March 2006, May 2008 and June 2008 fulfills the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a). That is, the Veteran received notice of the evidence needed to substantiate his claims, the avenues by which he might obtain such evidence, and the allocation of responsibilities between himself and VA in obtaining such evidence. See Beverly, 19 Vet. App. at 394, 403; see also Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103, 109-12 (2005) (Mayfield I) rev'd on other grounds, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In addition, the March 2006 letter informed him about how VA determines effective dates and disability ratings, as required by Dingess. The Board also recognizes that, according to Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 119-20 (2004), proper VCAA notice must "precede an initial unfavorable [agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ)] decision on a service-connection claim." Written notice was provided in April 2004, prior to the appealed from rating decisions, along with the subsequent notice provided in March 2006, May 2008, and June 2008, after the decisions that are the subject of this appeal. As to any timing deficiency with respect to this notice, the Board finds no prejudice to the Veteran in proceeding with the issuance of a final decision. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 394 (1993) (where the Board addresses a question that has not been addressed by the agency of original jurisdiction, the Board must consider whether the Veteran has been prejudiced thereby). In this regard, as the Board concludes below that there is a preponderance of evidence against the Veteran's claims for service connection for headaches, depression, and alcohol dependence, all to include as secondary to service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7, any questions as to the appropriate disability rating or effective date to be assigned are rendered moot. The Veteran has been provided the opportunity to respond to VA correspondence and over the course of the appeal has had multiple opportunities to submit and identify evidence. Furthermore, he has been provided a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his claims by VA. Duty to Assist VA also has a duty to assist the veteran in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(a) ("The Secretary shall make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the . . . claim"). This duty to includes assisting the veteran in obtaining records and providing medical examinations or obtaining medical opinions when such are necessary to make a decision on the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(b), (c), (d) (setting forth Secretary's various duties to claimant). VA informed the Veteran of its duty to assist in obtaining records and supportive evidence. In regard to Veteran's service connection claims, the Veteran underwent a VA examination in August 2004. In addition, pursuant to the Board's May 2008 remand, the RO scheduled the Veteran for VA examinations in August 2008 for which he failed to report without providing good cause for said absence. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.655. In fact, the Veteran notified VA that because he was receiving a TDIU disability rating, he would not report to his scheduled VA appointments. The Court has made clear that "[c]orresponding to VA's duty to assist the veteran in obtaining information is a duty on the part of the veteran to cooperate with VA in developing a claim." Turk v. Peake, 21 Vet. App. 565, 568 (2008). That is, as has often been stated, VA's '[d]uty to assist is not always a one-way street.'" Id. (quoting Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991)). As discussed in greater detail below, the Veteran did not appear for the scheduled August 2008 VA medical examinations despite adequate notification and he has presented no good cause for his failure to report. Therefore, the Board must evaluate the service connection claims based on the evidence of record and VA has no further duty to provide an examination or opinion. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159(c)(4), 3.655(a), (b). Based on the foregoing, it is the Board's determination that the VA fulfilled its VCAA duties to notify and to assist the Veteran, and thus, no additional assistance or notification was required. The Veteran has suffered no prejudice that would warrant a remand, and his procedural rights have not been abridged. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384. II. Service Connection Claims A. Pertinent Law and Regulations Service connection may be established for disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a pre-existing injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. "In line of duty" means any injury incurred or aggravated during a period of active military service, unless such injury was the result of the veteran's own willful misconduct or, for claims filed after October 31, 1990, was the result of the veteran's abuse of alcohol or drugs. 38 U.S.C.A. § 105(a); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(m), 3.301. For certain chronic disorders, including organic diseases of the nervous system, service connection may be granted if the disease becomes manifest to a compensable degree within one year following separation from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Service connection generally requires evidence of a current disability with a relationship or connection to an injury or disease or some other manifestation of the disability during service. Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Where the determinative issue involves medical causation or a medical diagnosis, there must be competent medical evidence to the effect that the claim is plausible; lay assertions of medical status do not constitute competent medical evidence. Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494-95 (1992). Alternatively, the nexus between service and the current disability can be satisfied by medical or lay evidence of continuity of symptomatology and medical evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the symptomatology. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303; see also, e.g., Voerth v. West, 13 Vet. App. 117 (1999); Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495 (1997). Service connection may also be established on a secondary basis for a disability which is shown to be proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). Establishing service connection on a secondary basis requires evidence sufficient to show (1) that a current disability exists and (2) that the current disability was either (a) caused by a service-connected disability or (b) aggravated by a service-connected disability. Id.; Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 488 (1995) (en banc). The Court has held that, when aggravation of a veteran's non-service-connected disability is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury, it too shall be service connected, at least to the extent of the aggravation. Allen, 7 Vet. App. at 439. Effective October 10, 2006, 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 was amended to implement the holding in Allen, supra, for secondary service connection on the basis of the aggravation of a nonservice- connected disorder by service-connected disability. See 71 Fed. Reg. 52744 (2006). The amendment essentially codifies Allen with language that requires that a baseline level of severity of the nonservice-connected disease or injury must be established by medical evidence created before the onset of aggravation. B. Factual Background The Veteran's service treatment records are negative for any complaints or findings of headaches, depression, and/or alcohol dependence. In June 1974, the Veteran was given a medical discharge from service after being declared unfit for service due to his cervical and lumbosacral spine fractures which he experienced after a motorcycle accident. VA Medical Center (VAMC) outpatient and inpatient treatment records, dated from November 2002 to December 2003, show that in November 2002, the Veteran was admitted for the first time for an alcohol detox and rehabilitation program. Upon admission, it was reported that the Veteran had been an alcoholic for the past 30 years. He also used marijuana occasionally. The Veteran was diagnosed with the following: (Axis I) alcohol withdrawal; alcohol intoxication; and alcohol dependence, continuous, (Axis IV) financial difficulties; chronic alcohol use; and no established sobriety support system, and (Axis V) Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 60. After approximately five days of hospitalization, the Veteran was discharged. In February 2004, the Veteran filed claims for service connection for headaches, depression, and alcohol dependence. By a May 2004 rating action, the RO granted service connection for the residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. In August 2004, the Veteran underwent a VA examination for mental disorders. The examiner noted that the Veteran had one previous psychiatric hospitalization for alcohol detox in November 2002. The Veteran denied any psychiatric outpatient care. Present symptoms included insomnia and thoughts of suicide related to chronic pain. When asked about symptoms of depression, the veteran stated that he was "not really depressed as much as [he was] frustrated with pain." The examiner indicated that the Veteran denied symptoms of depression when screened for depression at a primary care visit in March 2003. Concerning substance use, with respect to alcohol, the Veteran stated that he was not using alcohol nearly to the same extent as before his November 2002 hospitalization. At present, he reported drinking every few days. Following the mental status evaluation, the diagnoses were the following: (Axis I) alcohol dependence, (Axis III) tendonitis and hemorrhoids, (Axis IV) unemployment and inadequate finances, and (Axis V) GAF score of 70. The examiner stated that the Veteran did not meet the criteria for a DSM-IV (fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders) depressive disorder diagnosis. A VA neurological examination was conducted in August 2004. At that time, the Veteran stated that he had experienced headaches for years. According to the Veteran, his headaches occurred two to three times per week and lasted approximately 24 hours. The diagnoses did not include a disability manifested by headaches. In a private medical statement from Dr. B.S., dated in February 2005, Dr. S. stated that after the Veteran's in- service motorcycle accident, he developed chronic pain in his neck and lower back. Dr. S. indicated that according to the Veteran, due to the continuous and rather severe pain, and inability to perform in gainful employment, he also developed emotional problems and depression. The Veteran reported that he had been consuming alcoholic beverages on a daily basis for pain control. He also noted that he had a headache on a daily basis. According to the Veteran, his headaches were the migraine type associated with dizziness. Following the physical examination, Dr. S. noted that the Veteran had chronic headaches and depression/ emotional problems associated with alcohol dependence. It was further reported that the Veteran's chronic headaches were associated with episodes of dizziness, emotional problems, depression, and recent alcohol consumption (historically secondary to severe pain). According to Dr. S., it should be noted that at the time of the Veteran's in-service motorcycle accident, he sustained a concussion. Dr. S. also observed that it was not unusual in patients with chronic pain syndrome to develop problems reflecting their psychological profile. Dr. S. opined that it would appear that those problems may be caused by the service-connected conditions. Dr. S. stated that he felt that further evaluation by a psychologist and neurologist was appropriate. Pursuant to the Board's May 2008 remand, the RO scheduled the Veteran for VA examinations in August 2008. He failed to report to the examinations. In this regard, the Veteran notified VA that because he was receiving a TDIU disability rating, he would not report to his scheduled VA appointments. C. Analysis At the outset, the Board notes that the Veteran failed to report for scheduled August 2008 VA examinations that were needed to obtain opinions as to the etiology of any headaches that were present, the etiology of any psychiatric disorder that was present, to include depression, and whether the Veteran's alcoholism was acquired as secondary to, or as a symptom of his service-connected neck disability. In regard to the scheduled examinations, the Veteran informed VA that because he was receiving a TDIU rating, he would not appear for any examinations. Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(b) (2009), when a claimant fails to report for an examination that was scheduled in conjunction with an original claim, the claim is decided based on the evidence of record. Headaches In regard to the Veteran's claim for service connection for headaches, to include as secondary to service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7, the Board finds that based on a thorough review of the record, there is a preponderance of evidence against the aforementioned claim. In this regard, the Veteran's service treatment records are negative for any complaints or findings of headaches. The first evidence of record of a medical diagnosis of a chronic disability manifested by headaches is in February 2005, over 30 years after the Veteran's separation from the military. In the February 2005 statement from Dr. B.S., he diagnosed the Veteran with chronic headaches. With respect to negative evidence, the Court has held that the fact that there was no record of any complaint, let alone treatment, involving the veteran's condition for many years could be decisive. See Maxson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 453, 459 (1999), affirmed sub nom. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000), [it was proper to consider the veteran's entire medical history, including a lengthy period of absence of complaints]; see also Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ["negative evidence" could be considered in weighing the evidence]. The Board also notes that there is no medical evidence of a chronic disability manifested by headaches within one year subsequent to service discharge. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. The Board recognizes that the Veteran maintains that he initially experienced headaches during service, and that after his discharge, he continued to experience chronic headaches. However, while the Veteran can attest to having a headache, as a layperson, he is not competent to diagnose a chronic disability manifested by headaches or provide an opinion on the etiology of such chronic headache disability. See Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 368-69 (2005); Espiritu, 2 Vet. App. at 482. As noted above, the first medical evidence of a diagnosis of a chronic disability manifested by headaches is in February 2005, over 30 years after the Veteran's discharge from the military. Thus, there is a preponderance of evidence against a finding that the Veteran's chronic disability manifested by headaches was present during or within one year of service. The Board has considered the Veteran's statements to the effect that he currently has a chronic disability manifested by headaches that is related to his period of active military service, or, in the alternative, that his chronic headache disability was caused or aggravated by his service-connected neck disability. In this regard, lay statements are considered to be competent evidence when describing the features or symptoms of an injury or illness. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994); Washington, supra; see also Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 398, 405 (1995). The Veteran is certainly competent to report what comes to him through his senses, to include having a history of headaches. He does not, however, have medical expertise to diagnose an underlying disease or disability manifested by headaches. Id.; see also Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The determinative issue here involves questions of medical diagnosis and etiology; only individuals possessing specialized training and knowledge are competent to render an opinion on such matters. Id. The evidence does not show that the Veteran possesses medical expertise and it is not contended otherwise. Therefore, his opinion that he has a chronic disability manifested by headaches that is related to his period of service, or, in the alternative, was caused or aggravated by his service-connected neck disability, is not competent evidence. The Board has considered the February 2005 private medical statement from Dr. B.S., in which he stated that it would appear that the Veteran's chronic headache disability was related to his service-connected conditions. He noted that at the time of the Veteran's in-service motorcycle accident, he sustained a concussion. To the extent that Dr. S.'s opinion is offered to show that the Veteran's currently diagnosed chronic headache disability is related to his period of service, or, in the alternative, was caused or aggravated by his service-connected neck disability, the Board finds that this opinion is speculative in nature and a finding of service connection may not be based on a resort to speculation or remote possibility. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2009). A number of Court cases have provided discussion on this point of weighing medical opinion evidence. See, e.g., Stegman v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 228, 230 (1992) (evidence favorable to the veteran's claim that does little more than suggest a possibility that his illnesses might have been caused by service radiation exposure is insufficient to establish service connection); Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 609, 611 (1992) (medical evidence which merely indicates that the alleged disorder "may or may not" exist or "may or may not" be related, is too speculative to establish the presence of the claimed disorder or any such relationship). As such, the Board does not afford this evidence any weight. In this case, there is no competent medical evidence or competent opinion of record which links the Veteran's chronic disability manifested by headaches, to his period of active military service. In addition, there is also no competent medical evidence of record which shows that the Veteran's service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7 caused or aggravated his headache disability. In view of the foregoing, the Board concludes that there is a preponderance of evidence against the Veteran's claim for service connection for a chronic disability manifested by headaches, to include as secondary to service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1364, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that "the benefit of the doubt rule is inapplicable when the preponderance of the evidence is found to be against the claimant"); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Depression In regard to the Veteran's claim for service connection for depression, to include as secondary to service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7, the Board finds that based on a thorough review of the record, there is a preponderance of evidence against the aforementioned claim. In this regard, the Veteran's service treatment records are negative for any complaints or findings of depression. The first evidence of record of a diagnosis of depression is in February 2005, over 30 years after the Veteran's separation from the military. The Board recognizes that following the August 2004 VA examination, the examiner specifically concluded that the Veteran did not meet the criteria for a DSM-IV depressive disorder diagnosis. However, in the private medical statement from Dr. B.S., dated in February 2005, the physician diagnosed the Veteran with depression. With respect to negative evidence, the Court has held that the fact that there was no record of any complaint, let alone treatment, involving the veteran's condition for many years could be decisive. See Maxson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 453, 459 (1999), affirmed sub nom. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000), [it was proper to consider the veteran's entire medical history, including a lengthy period of absence of complaints]; see also Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ["negative evidence" could be considered in weighing the evidence]. The Board has considered the February 2005 private medical statement from Dr. B.S., in which he stated that it would appear that the Veteran's depression was related to his service-connected conditions. To the extent that Dr. S.'s opinion is offered to show that the Veteran's depression is related to his period of service, or, in the alternative, was caused or aggravated by his service-connected neck disability, the Board finds that this opinion is speculative in nature and a finding of service connection may not be based on a resort to speculation or remote possibility. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2009). As such, the Board does not afford this evidence any weight. In this case, there is no competent medical evidence or competent opinion of record which links the Veteran's depression to his period of active military service. In addition, there is also no competent medical evidence of record which shows that the Veteran's service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7 caused or aggravated his depression. The Board has considered the Veteran's statements to the effect that he currently has depression that is related to his period of active military service, or, in the alternative, that his depression was caused or aggravated by his service-connected neck disability. The Veteran is competent as a layperson to report that on which he has personal knowledge. See Layno, 6 Vet. App. at 465, 470. While a layperson is competent to provide evidence on the occurrence of observable symptoms during and following service, such a layperson is not competent to make a medical diagnosis or render a medical opinion, which relates a medical disorder to a specific cause. Espiritu, supra. There is no evidence of record indicating that the Veteran has specialized medical training so as to be competent to render a medical opinion. Therefore, his opinion that his currently diagnosed depression is related to his period of service, or, in the alternative, was caused or aggravated by his service-connected neck disability, is not competent evidence. In view of the foregoing, the Board concludes that there is a preponderance of evidence is against the Veteran's claim for service connection for depression, to include as secondary to service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1364, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Alcohol Dependence In regard to the Veteran's claim for service connection for alcohol dependence, the Board notes that the law and regulations provide that compensation shall not be paid if the disability was the result of the person's own willful misconduct or abuse of alcohol or drugs. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 105, 1110; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1, 3.301. With respect to claims filed after October 31, 1990, as in this case, an injury or disease incurred during active service will not be deemed to have been incurred in the line of duty if the injury or disease was the result of the person's own willful misconduct, including abuse of alcohol or drugs. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(m), 3.301. However, the Veteran is also claiming secondary service connection. He contends, in essence that he has a long history of self medicating the pain associated with his service-connected connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7 with alcohol, which eventually culminated in his chronic alcoholism. In this regard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that while 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 precludes compensation for primary alcohol abuse disabilities and secondary disabilities that result from primary alcohol abuse, this statute does permit compensation for an alcohol or drug abuse disability acquired as secondary to, or as a symptom of, a service-connected disability. Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001), reh'g denied, 268 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (en banc order). The above-referenced legislation expressly prohibits the grant of direct service connection for alcohol or drug abuse based on claims filed on or after October 31, 1990. Therefore, service connection for alcohol dependence on a direct basis must be denied as a matter of law. See Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. at 429 (1991). The Veteran, however, also maintains that his alcohol disability is secondary to his service-connected neck disability. In this regard, the Board recognizes that in the February 2005 private medical statement from Dr. B.S., he opined that the Veteran's alcohol dependence may have been caused or made worse by his service-connected disabilities. To the extent that Dr. S.'s opinion is offered to show that the Veteran's alcohol dependence was caused or aggravated by his service-connected neck disability, the Board finds that this opinion is speculative in nature and a finding of service connection may not be based on a resort to speculation or remote possibility. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2009). As such, the Board does not afford this evidence any weight. In this case, there is no competent medical evidence which establishes that the Veteran's alcohol dependence was due to, the result of, or aggravated by, his service-connected neck disability, as required by Allen, 237 F.3d at 1381. Therefore, service connection is not warranted for alcohol dependence, as secondary to the service-connected neck disability. While the Veteran maintains that he has alcohol dependence as a result of his service-connected neck disability, as a lay person without the appropriate medical training and expertise, he is not competent to provide a probative opinion on a medical matter. See Bostain v. West, 11 Vet. App. 124, 127 (1998); see also Routen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 183, 186 (1997) ("a layperson is generally not capable of opining on matters requiring medical knowledge"). In sum, the claim for service connection for alcohol dependence on a direct basis must be denied as a matter of law. In addition, there is a preponderance of evidence against the Veteran's claim for service connection for alcohol dependence as secondary to the service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. The benefit-of-the- doubt doctrine is therefore not for application, and the claim for service connection for alcohol dependence, to include as secondary to service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7, must be denied. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518 (1996). III. Increased Rating A. Factual Background The Veteran filed his initial claim for service connection for a neck disability in October 2003. In August 2004, the Veteran underwent a VA examination. Following the physical examination, the examiner diagnosed the Veteran with residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. By a May 2004 rating decision, the RO granted service connection for the residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. At that time, the RO assigned a noncompensable disability rating under Diagnostic Code 5235, effective from October 28, 2003, for the Veteran's service-connected neck disability. In a September 2004 rating decision, the RO increased the disability rating for the Veteran's service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7 from noncompensable to 10 percent disabling under Diagnostic Code 5235, effective from October 28, 2003. The Veteran disagreed with the evaluation and subsequently filed a timely appeal. In May 2008, the Board remanded this case. The Board noted that the evidence of record showed that there had been a decrease in the extension of the Veteran's cervical spine since his last VA examination. Thus, the Board determined that an additional examination would be helpful in resolving the issues raised by the instant appeal. Upon remand, the Board requested that the RO schedule the Veteran for a VA examination in order to determine the current severity of his service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. Pursuant to the Board's May 2008 remand, the RO scheduled the Veteran for a VA examination in August 2008 for which he failed to report. Specifically, the Veteran notified VA that because he was receiving a TDIU disability rating, he would not report to his scheduled VA appointments. B. Analysis In this case, the Board notes that the Veteran failed to report to the August 2008 VA examination. This examination was needed to determine whether the Veteran met the schedular criteria for an initial rating in excess of 10 percent for residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7. Specifically, the August 2008 VA examination was scheduled pursuant to the Board's May 2008 decision that remanded the appeal in order to obtain an examination. The Veteran did not provide good cause for not reporting to this examination. In fact, the Veteran notified VA that because he was receiving a TDIU disability rating, he would not report to his scheduled VA appointments. Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.655, when the examination was scheduled in conjunction with any other original claim, a reopened claim for a benefit which was previously disallowed, or a claim for increase, the claim shall be denied. 38 C.F.R. § 3.655 (2009). As the record indicates that the Veteran failed to report to the examination that was scheduled in relation to his claim for a higher initial rating, deemed necessary by the Board in its remand to adjudicate this claim for a higher initial rating, and the Veteran did not provide good cause for not reporting to this examination, the Board finds that the Veteran's claim for entitlement to an initial rating in excess of 10 percent for the residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7, must be denied as a matter of law. 38 C.F.R. § 3.655; Sabonis, 6 Vet. App. at 426, 430. ORDER Entitlement to service connection for a chronic disability manifested by headaches, to include as secondary to service- connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for depression, to include as secondary to service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for alcohol dependence, to include as secondary to service-connected residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7, is denied. Entitlement to an initial rating in excess of 10 percent for the residuals of fractures of C-1 and C-7, is denied. ____________________________________________ V. L. JORDAN Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs