Citation Nr: 1237792	
Decision Date: 11/05/12    Archive Date: 11/09/12

DOCKET NO.  12-14 849	)	DATE
	)
	)

On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Houston, Texas


THE ISSUES

1.  Entitlement to a rating in excess of 10 percent for right cubital tunnel syndrome and right carpal tunnel syndrome, to include whether a separate rating is warranted for right carpal tunnel syndrome.

2.  Entitlement to a rating in excess of 10 percent for left cubital tunnel syndrome and left carpal tunnel syndrome, to include whether a separate rating is warranted for left carpal tunnel syndrome.

3.  Entitlement to a rating in excess of 10 percent for post-traumatic arthropathy of the right wrist.

4.  Entitlement to a rating in excess of 10 percent for post-traumatic arthropathy of the left wrist.


REPRESENTATION

Appellant represented by:	Disabled American Veterans

ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD

B. Ogilvie, Counsel


INTRODUCTION

The Veteran served on active duty from October 1989 to April 1992.

This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from November 2009 and February 2012 rating decisions by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Houston, Texas.

In the November 2009 rating decision, the RO established service connection for right and left carpal tunnel syndrome, and rated it together with the evaluations for service-connected right and left cubital tunnel syndrome, denying ratings in excess of 10 percent for each disability.  In his January 2010 Notice of Disagreement, the Veteran requested separate ratings for his bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome and carpal tunnel syndrome.  He also noted that he believed his cubital tunnel syndrome should be afforded a higher evaluation.  In the February 2012 rating decision, the RO denied claims of entitlement to ratings in excess of 10 percent for post-traumatic arthropathy of the right wrist and in excess of 10 percent for post-traumatic arthropathy of the left wrist.  The Board has characterized the issues as set forth on the title page, to accurately reflect the Veteran's arguments on appeal.

The appeal is REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, D.C.  VA will notify the appellant if further action is required.


REMAND

On the Veteran's May 2012 substantive appeal, he checked a box indicating that he desired a hearing before a Veterans Law Judge by live videoconference.  However, no such hearing has been scheduled.

Pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.700 (2012), a hearing on appeal will be granted to an appellant who requests a hearing and is willing to appear in person.  See also 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107 (West 2002) (pertaining specifically to hearings before the Board).  Because the RO schedules videoconference hearings, a remand of this matter for the requested hearing is warranted. 

Accordingly, this matter is hereby REMANDED to the RO for the following action:

The RO should schedule the Veteran for a Board hearing by videoconference at the earliest available opportunity.  The RO should notify the Veteran and his representative of the date and time of the hearing.  See 38 C.F.R. § 20.704(b) (2012).  After the hearing, the claims file should be returned to the Board in accordance with current appellate procedures. 

The purpose of this REMAND is to afford due process; it is not the Board's intent to imply whether the benefit requested should be granted or denied.  The Veteran need take no action until otherwise notified, but he may furnish additional evidence and/or argument during the appropriate time frame.  See Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999); Colon v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 104, 108 (1996); Booth v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 109 (1995); Quarles v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 129, 141 (1992).



_________________________________________________
JOHN Z. JONES
Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals

Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 2002), only a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals is appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.  This remand is in the nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board on the merits of your appeal.  38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (2012).