Citation Nr: 1303602 Decision Date: 02/01/13 Archive Date: 02/08/13 DOCKET NO. 09-18 341 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Waco, Texas THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus, type II. 2. Entitlement to service connection for a prostate disability. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a spleen disability. 4. Entitlement to service connection for a liver disability. 5. Entitlement to service connection for peripheral neuropathy. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Vietnam Veterans of America WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL The appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Hallie E. Brokowsky, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active duty service from August 1967 to August 1969. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a September 2006 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Waco, Texas. The Veteran testified at a Board hearing at the RO in June 2011 before the undersigned Acting Veterans Law Judge. A copy of the transcript of that hearing has been associated with the record on appeal. In a decision dated in November 2011, the Board denied entitlement to service connection for each of the disabilities at issue. The Veteran appealed the determination to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). In August 2012, the Court issued an order granting an August 2012 Joint Motion for Remand (Joint Motion), which had the effect of vacating and remanding the Board decision. The Board has not only reviewed the Veteran's physical claims file, but also the Veteran's file on Virtual VA, to ensure a total review of the available evidence. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. A presumption of herbicide exposure is not applicable, as the Veteran did not set foot on land in the Republic of Vietnam; exposure to herbicides is not otherwise substantiated. 2. The Veteran has a current diagnosis of diabetes mellitus, type II. 3. The Veteran did not experience chronic symptoms of diabetes mellitus during service or continuous symptoms of diabetes mellitus since separation from service. 4. The Veteran's diabetes mellitus did not manifest within one year of separation from service. 5. The Veteran's diabetes mellitus is not causally or etiologically related to service. 6. The Veteran did not experience chronic symptoms of a prostate condition during service or continuous symptoms of a prostate condition since separation from service. 7. A current prostate condition did not manifest within one year of separation from service. 8. A current prostate condition is not causally or etiologically related to service. 9. The Veteran did not experience chronic symptoms of a spleen condition during service or continuous symptoms of a spleen condition since separation from service. 10. A current spleen condition did not manifest within one year of separation from service. 11. A current spleen condition is not causally or etiologically related to service. 12. The Veteran has a current diagnosis of cirrhosis of the liver. 13. The Veteran did not experience chronic symptoms of a liver disorder during service or continuous symptoms of a condition since separation from service. 14. Cirrhosis of the liver did not manifest within one year of separation from service. 15. Cirrhosis of the liver is not causally or etiologically related to service. 16. The Veteran did not experience chronic symptoms of peripheral neuropathy during service or continuous symptoms of peripheral neuropathy since separation from service. 17. Peripheral neuropathy did not manifest within one year of separation from service. 18. Peripheral neuropathy is not causally or etiologically related to service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for service connection for diabetes mellitus on any basis have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2012). 2. The criteria for service connection for a prostate disability on any basis have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2012). 3. The criteria for service connection for a spleen disability on any basis have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2012). 4. The criteria for service connection for a liver disability on any basis have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2012). 5. The criteria for service connection for peripheral neuropathy on any basis have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Duties to Assist and Notify Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative, if any, of any information and medical or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). In accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1), proper notice must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. Such notice should also address VA's practices in assigning disability evaluations and effective dates for those evaluations. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). In this case, the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) issued a notice letter, dated in May 2006, to the Veteran. This letter explained the evidence necessary to substantiate the Veteran's claims. The letter also informed him of his and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence. In addition, the May 2006 letter from VA explained how a disability rating is determined for a service-connected disorder and the basis for determining an effective date upon the grant of any benefit sought, in compliance with Dingess/Hartman. The unfavorable AOJ decision that is the basis of this appeal was decided after the issuance of an initial, appropriate VCAA notice. As such, there was no defect with respect to timing of the VCAA notice. See Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). VA also has a duty to assist the Veteran with the development of facts pertinent to the appeal. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c). This duty includes the obtaining of "relevant" records in the custody of a Federal department or agency under 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(2), as well as records not in Federal custody (e.g., private medical records) under 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(1). VA will also provide a medical examination if such examination is determined to be "necessary" to decide the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). In this case, the claims file contains the Veteran's service treatment records and reports post-service treatment, as well as the Veteran's own statements in support of his claims. The Veteran has not been examined by VA in connection with his claims for service connection, but as will be explained below, the Veteran does not meet the criteria for presumptive service connection for diabetes mellitus, nor has he demonstrated that he has a current spleen or prostate disability, or otherwise indicated that his peripheral neuropathy and liver disorder are related to service; thus no examination is required. Therefore, a remand to provide the Veteran with a medical examination and/or obtain a medical opinion is not required with respect to his claims of entitlement to service connection. See Bardwell v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 36 (2010) (where the Board makes a finding that lay evidence regarding an in-service event or injury is not credible, a VA examination is not required). The Board has reviewed the Veteran's statements and medical evidence of record and concludes that there is no outstanding evidence with respect to the Veteran's claims. Overall, there is no evidence of any VA error in notifying or assisting the Veteran that reasonably affects the fairness of this adjudication. Legal Criteria It is the Board's responsibility to evaluate the entire record on appeal. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a). In this case, the Board has thoroughly reviewed all of the evidence in the Veteran's claims folder. It is noted, however, that although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, all of the evidence submitted by the Veteran or on his behalf. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). When there is an approximate balance in the evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. In Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990), the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims held that an appellant need only demonstrate that there is an "approximate balance of positive and negative evidence" in order to prevail. The Court has also stated, "It is clear that to deny a claim on its merits, the evidence must preponderate against the claim." Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996), citing Gilbert. Service connection may be granted for disability or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). As a general matter, service connection for a disability on the basis of the merits of such claim requires (1) the existence of a current disability; (2) the existence of the disease or injury in service, and; (3) a relationship or nexus between the current disability and any injury or disease during service. Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999), citing Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996). If a condition noted during service is not shown to be chronic, then generally a showing of continuity of symptoms after service is required for service connection. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection may be established on a secondary basis for a disability that is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a); Harder v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 183, 187 (1993). Additional disability resulting from the aggravation of a nonservice-connected condition by a service-connected condition is also compensable under 38 C.F.R. §3.310(a). See Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995). Competency of evidence differs from weight and credibility. The former is a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered by the trier of fact, while the latter is a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) ("although interest may affect the credibility of testimony, it does not affect competency to testify"). In rendering a decision on appeal, the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant. See Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36, 39-40 (1994); Gilbert, supra, 1 Vet. App. at 57. A veteran who served in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam War shall be presumed to have been exposed during such service to an herbicide agent (i.e., Agent Orange). 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a). Furthermore, the diseases listed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) shall, in turn, be presumptively service connected if this requirement is met, even though there is no record of such disease during service. Prostate cancer and Type-II diabetes mellitus are among the diseases listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 for which presumptive service connection is available based on in-service herbicide exposure. A presumption of service connection based on exposure to herbicides is not warranted, however, for any condition for which the Secretary of VA has not specifically determined a presumption of service connection is warranted. See Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 59232-59243 (1999). Analysis Diabetes Mellitus The Veteran contends that his diabetes mellitus may have resulted from Agent Orange exposure during his Vietnam service. Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(a)(2) and 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a)(6), 3.309(e), for Veterans who served in Vietnam between January 9, 1962, and May 7, 1975, certain diseases, to include diabetes mellitus, type II, and prostate cancer, may be presumed to have resulted from exposure to certain herbicide agents such as Agent Orange. The Veteran served on the U.S.S. Joseph Strauss (DDG-16) from January 1968 to March 1968, on the U.S.S. John A. Bole (DD-755) from March 1968 to July 1968, and on the U.S.S. Leonard F. Mason (DD-852) from August 1968 to July 1969. The Board notes that in January 2010, VA issued a document, "Compensation and Pension Bulletin" that listed information regarding vessels identified as traveling in the "brown waters" of the Republic of Vietnam. The Veteran's ships are not among those listed. In June 2010, VA issued a Compensation and Pension Bulletin that expanded the list of vessels identified as traveling in the "brown waters" of the Republic of Vietnam. The U.S.S. Joseph Strauss is listed as having operated on the Mekong River Delta on March 4, 1966 and in Ganh Rai Bay from November 7, 1968 to December 7, 1968. These time periods are prior to and after the Veteran's service on the U.S.S. Joseph Strauss. The U.S.S. John A. Bole is not included on the list of vessels. The U.S.S. Leonard F. Mason is listed as having operated in Vung Ganh Rai Bay and its channels during August 1969. This time period is after the Veteran's service on the U.S.S. Leonard F. Mason. The Board notes that although the Veteran remained assigned to the ship until July 31, 1969, personnel records show that the Veteran was in California on August 1, 1969. Therefore, the Board finds that the Veteran is not entitled to a presumption of exposure to herbicides based on his service on a ship during the Vietnam Era. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) issued a decision in Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008) that addresses the issue presented in this case. In essence, the Federal Circuit upheld the VA practice of requiring a service member's presence at some point on the landmass or inland waters of the Republic Vietnam in order to benefit from the presumption of herbicide exposure during service in the Republic of Vietnam. Previously, an opinion of the General Counsel for VA held that service on a deep-water naval vessel off the shores of Vietnam may not be considered service in the Republic of Vietnam for purposes of 38 U.S.C. § 101(29)(A), which defines the Vietnam era as the period beginning on February 28, 1961, and ending on May 7, 1975, and that this was not inconsistent with the definition of service in the Republic of Vietnam found in 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii). VAOPGCPREC 27-97 (July 23, 1997). In this case, the Veteran has asserted that on one occasion the Veteran went to DaNang to pick up the mail when another man could not do it. He stated that it was in late 1967 or 1968. In this case, after a review of all the lay evidence, the Board finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that the Veteran's statements regarding his single trip to DaNang, while competent, are not credible. The Veteran did not provide testimony regarding a trip into the Republic of Vietnam until after he was denied service connection based upon exposure to herbicides. The Veteran's statements regarding this incident are made for the sole purpose of obtaining compensation. See Pond v. West, 12 Vet. App. 341 (1999) (although Board must take into consideration the veteran's statements, it may consider whether self-interest may be a factor in making such statements). The Board also notes that the Veteran's statements are extraordinarily vague. The Veteran did not provide a precise date, what ship he was on, or any supporting evidence. The statement was provided over 40 years after the incident. Additionally, the Board notes that the Veteran's recollection on other aspects of his claim related to that time period are also unreliable. For example, the Veteran notes that the diabetic symptoms began within a few months after separation from service, yet his treatment records show a history of diabetes dating back only to 1989, a 20 year difference. See Harvey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 390, 394 (1994) (upholding a Board decision assigning more probative value to a contemporaneous medical record report of cause of a fall than subsequent lay statements asserting different etiology). These inconsistencies in the record weigh against the Veteran's credibility. See Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Board entitled to discount the credibility of evidence in light of its own inherent characteristics and its relationship to other items of evidence); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 512 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (upholding Board's finding that a veteran was not credible because lay evidence about a wound in service was internally inconsistent with other lay statements that he had not received any wounds in service). The Board has weighed the Veteran's statements and finds that the Veteran is not credible regarding his claim that he set foot upon land in the Republic of Vietnam one time during active service. Therefore, after considering the current state of the law and regulations and weighing the evidence of record, the Board finds that the Veteran did not step foot on land in Vietnam and the Veteran's service does not qualify as service in the Republic of Vietnam. As exposure to herbicides may not be presumed and the evidence fails to substantiate any claimed individual exposure to herbicides, the Board finds that the Veteran was not exposed to herbicides during service. In Combee v. Brown, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that when a Veteran is found not to be entitled to a regulatory presumption of service connection for a given disability, the claim must nevertheless be reviewed to determine whether service connection can be established on a direct basis. See Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043-1044 (Fed.Cir. 1994), reversing in part Combee v. Principi, 4 Vet.App. 78 (1993). The Veteran's service treatment records are silent regarding any evidence of diabetes mellitus. The August 1969 separation report of medical examination showed a clinically normal endocrine system. Laboratory findings showed no sugar or albumin in the Veteran's urine. The record is silent regarding any complaints, treatment, or diagnosis of diabetes or symptoms of diabetes during active service. Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that the Veteran did not experience chronic symptoms of diabetes mellitus during service. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran contends that symptoms of diabetes showed up within a few months after separation from service. The Board finds the Veteran's contentions not to be credible. The Board finds that the Veteran's more recently-reported history of continued symptoms of diabetes within one year after separation from active service is inconsistent with the other lay and medical evidence of record. Indeed, while he now asserts that his disorder began immediately after service; however, he has not provided any medical evidence demonstrating any history or complaints of symptoms of diabetes prior to 1989. In this regard, the Veteran's VA treatment records shows, that upon seeking VA treatment in 2002, he reported a history of diabetes since 1989, and made no assertions relating it to his service. The Veteran did not report the onset of diabetes symptomatology during or soon after service or even indicate that the symptoms were of longstanding duration. Such histories reported by the Veteran for treatment purposes are of more probative value than the more recent assertions and histories given for VA disability compensation purposes. See Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 73 (1997) (lay statements found in medical records when medical treatment was being rendered may be afforded greater probative value; statements made to physicians for purposes of diagnosis and treatment are exceptionally trustworthy because the declarant has a strong motive to tell the truth in order to receive proper care). The only evidence indicating the onset of diabetic symptoms within one year from separation from service is the Veteran's own testimony. Treatment records show that he did not claim that symptoms of his disorder began in or soon after service until he filed his current VA disability compensation claim. Such statements made for VA disability compensation purposes are of lesser probative value than his previous more contemporaneous in-service and post-service histories and his previous statements made for treatment purposes. See Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) (personal interest may affect the credibility of testimony). The Board has weighed the Veteran's statements as to onset of diabetes within one year of service and continuity of symptomatology and finds his current recollections and statements made in connection with a claim for VA compensation benefits to be of lesser probative value than his previous more contemporaneous in-service history and findings at service separation, the absence of complaints or treatment for years after service, his previous statements made for treatment purposes, and his own previous histories of onset of symptoms given after service. Therefore, the Board finds that the Veteran did not experience continuous symptoms of diabetes mellitus since separation from service and that the Veteran's diabetes mellitus did not manifest within one year of separation from service. Finally, the Board notes that no evidence of record relates the Veteran's current diagnosis of diabetes mellitus to his active service. Without evidence of exposure to herbicides, the Veteran's diabetes mellitus may not be service connected based on exposure to herbicides. The record contains no competent evidence of a causal connection between the Veteran's diabetes and his active service. Based on the totality of the evidence, the Board finds that a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt rule is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 54-56 (1990). Prostate Disability The Veteran contends that he has a prostate disability that is secondary to his diabetes mellitus. Disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury shall be service connected. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. The Board also notes that secondary service connection on the basis of aggravation is permitted under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310, and compensation is payable for that degree of aggravation of a non-service-connected disability caused by a service-connected disability. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 439 (1995). As seen in the analysis above, diabetes mellitus is not service-connected. Therefore, a claim for service connection as secondary to diabetes mellitus is not possible. The Board will address service connection for a prostate disability on a direct basis only. The Veteran's service treatment records are silent regarding any complaints, treatment, or diagnosis of a prostate disorder or symptoms of a prostate disorder. The August 1969 report of medical examination shows a clinically normal genitourinary system. The Veteran does not contend that his prostate disorder began during service. Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that the Veteran's disorder did not manifest during service. Moreover, the Board notes that there is no evidence demonstrating that the Veteran has been treated for complaints related to his prostate or diagnosed with any sort of prostate disorder during the period since his separation from service. A veteran is not competent to provide evidence as to more complex medical questions and, specifically, is not competent to provide a diagnosis or an opinion as to etiology in such cases. See Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456, 462 (2007) (concerning rheumatic fever); see also Routen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 183, 186 (1997) ("a layperson is generally not capable of opining on matters requiring medical knowledge"). The Court has indicated that in the absence of proof of a present disability, there can be no valid claim for service connection. See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet.App. 223 (1992). No evidence of record relates any current prostate disorder to the Veteran's active service. Therefore, the Board finds that a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim of service connection. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt rule is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. Spleen Disability The Veteran contends that he has a spleen disorder that is secondary to his diabetes mellitus. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. Again, as seen in the analysis above, diabetes mellitus is not service-connected. Therefore, a claim for service connection as secondary to diabetes mellitus is not possible. The Board will address service connection for a spleen disorder on a direct basis only. In January 2003, the Veteran's treating physician, D. M., M.D. noted that the Veteran had an enlarged spleen, but he did not diagnosis a current disability. The Court has indicated that in the absence of proof of a present disability, there can be no valid claim for service connection. See Brammer, supra. In any event, the Veteran's service treatment records are still silent regarding any complaints, treatment, or diagnosis of a spleen disorder or symptoms of a spleen disorder. The August 1969 report of medical examination shows a clinically normal lymphatic system. The Veteran does not contend that a spleen disorder began during service. Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that the Veteran's spleen disability did not manifest during service. Moreover, there are no records showing treatment for the Veteran's spleen until the aforementioned January 2003 treatment record. Therefore, the Board finds that the Veteran did not experience continuous symptoms of a spleen disorder from separation from service. No evidence of record relates a current spleen disorder to the Veteran's active service. Therefore, the Board finds that a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim of service connection. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt rule is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. Liver Disease The Veteran contends that he has a liver disorder that is secondary to his diabetes mellitus. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. Again, as seen in the analysis above, diabetes mellitus is not service-connected. Therefore, a claim for service connection as secondary to diabetes mellitus is not possible. The Board will address service connection for a liver disability on a direct basis only. The Board notes that the RO described the Veteran's disability as sclerosis of the liver in an April 2009 statement of the case. The Board notes that the Veteran has a sclerotic liver. As seen in a June 2003 private treatment record, the Veteran has a current diagnosis of cirrhosis of the liver. The Veteran's service treatment records are silent regarding any complaints, treatment, or diagnosis of a liver disorder or symptoms of a liver disorder. The August 1969 report of medical examination shows a clinically normal G-U system, abdomen, and viscera. The Veteran does not contend that his liver disorder began during service, or for many years thereafter. There is no medical evidence that the Veteran experienced continuous symptoms of a liver disorder following separation from service. Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that the Veteran's liver disorder did not manifest during or as a result of his service. No competent evidence of record relates the Veteran's cirrhosis of the liver to the Veteran's active service. Therefore, the Board finds that a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim of service connection. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt rule is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. Peripheral Neuropathy The Veteran contends that he has peripheral neuropathy that is secondary to his diabetes mellitus. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. Again, as seen in the analysis above, diabetes mellitus is not service-connected. Therefore, a claim for service connection as secondary to diabetes mellitus is not possible. The Board will address service connection for peripheral neuropathy on a direct basis only. As seen in an October 2002 treatment record, the Veteran has a current diagnosis of peripheral sensorimotor neuropathy. The Veteran's service treatment records are silent regarding any complaints, treatment, or diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy or symptoms of peripheral neuropathy. The August 1969 report of medical examination shows clinically normal lower and upper extremities and feet. The Veteran is competent to describe the nature of his symptoms, but not to provide a diagnosis or link his symptoms to his service. Although the Veteran's contentions have been considered carefully, these contentions are outweighed by the medical evidence of record showing that the Veteran's peripheral neuropathy is not attributable to his active service. See Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (1997) (in evaluating the evidence and rendering a decision on the merits, the Board is required to assess the credibility and probative value of proffered evidence in the context of the record as a whole). The Veteran does not contend that his peripheral neuropathy began during service, and there is no evidence that the Veteran experienced continuous symptoms of peripheral neuropathy for many years following separation from service. Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that the Veteran's peripheral neuropathy did not manifest during service. The Board further notes that peripheral neuropathy is among those disorders for which service connection is presumed for veterans with confirmed herbicide exposure. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e). Because, however, the Veteran's alleged exposure to herbicides has not been confirmed, such a presumption is not applicable to the current appeal. No competent evidence of record relates the Veteran's peripheral neuropathy to the Veteran's active service. Therefore, the Board finds that a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim of service connection. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt rule is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. ORDER Service connection for diabetes mellitus is denied. Service connection for a prostate disability is denied. Service connection for a spleen disability is denied. Service connection for cirrhosis of the liver is denied. Service connection for peripheral neuropathy is denied. ____________________________________________ Thomas D. Jones Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs