Citation Nr: 1304083 Decision Date: 02/05/13 Archive Date: 02/08/13 DOCKET NO. 10-11 064 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Reno, Nevada THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for chloracne, to include as due to exposure to herbicides. 2. Entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer, to include as due to exposure to herbicides. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: AMVETS WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD K. Marenna, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The appellant had active service from April 1971 to January 1974. These matters come before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a September 2009 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Reno, Nevada. In March 2011, a Travel Board hearing was held before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge and a transcript of that hearing is of record. In December 2011, the Board reopened the appellant's claim for service connection for chloracne, to include as due to exposure to herbicides, and remanded the reopened claim and the claim for service connection for prostate cancer for additional development. For the reasons discussed below, the Board finds that there was substantial compliance with the remand order. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The competent and credible evidence of record is against a finding that the appellant was present on the landmass or the inland waters of Vietnam during service and, therefore, he is not presumed to have been exposed to herbicides, including Agent Orange; exposure to herbicides is not otherwise shown by competent and credible evidence. 2. There has been no demonstration by competent medical, or competent and credible lay, evidence of record that the appellant has chloracne that is related to service. 3. There has been no demonstration by competent medical, or competent and credible lay, evidence of record that the appellant has prostate cancer that is related to service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Chloracne was not incurred in, or aggravated by, active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1154, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304 (2012). 2. Prostate cancer was not incurred in, or aggravated by, active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1154, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Board has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence in the appellant's claims folder. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, each piece of evidence of record. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). The analysis below focuses on the most salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claim. The appellant must not assume that the Board has overlooked pieces of evidence that are not explicitly discussed herein. See Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122 (2000) (the law requires only that the Board address its reasons for rejecting evidence favorable to the appellant). The Board must assess the credibility and weight of all evidence, including the medical evidence, to determine its probative value, accounting for evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and providing reasons for rejecting any evidence favorable to the claimant. Equal weight is not accorded to each piece of evidence contained in the record; every item of evidence does not have the same probative value. When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the appellant prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against a claim, in which case, the claim is denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). I. Notice and Assistance VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions as to the appellant's claims. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326 (2012). Under the VCAA, when VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, it is required to notify the claimant and his representative, if any, of any information and medical or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2012). The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004); Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Court observed that a claim of entitlement to service connection consists of five elements, of which notice must be provided prior to the initial adjudication: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 490 (2006); see also 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a). Compliance with the first Quartuccio element requires notice of these five elements. See id. Prior to initial adjudication of the appellant's claims, letters dated in November 2006 and March 2009 fully satisfied the duty to notify provisions. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); Quartuccio, 16 Vet. App. at 187; Dingess/Hartman, 19 Vet. App. at 490. VA's duty to assist has been satisfied. The appellant's service treatment records and VA medical records are in the file. The appellant's VA treatment records from December 2010 to December 2012 were associated with the claims file, as requested in the December 2011 remand. The appellant's Social Security Administration records have been associated with the file, in compliance with the December 2011 remand. See Stegall, 11 Vet. App. at 268. The appellant has at no time referenced outstanding records that he wanted VA to obtain or that he felt were relevant to the claims. With respect to the herbicide exposure aspect of the claim, associated with the claims file is a May 2009 Memorandum from the Department of the Army, U.S. Army and Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC), on the subject of research findings regarding Navy and Coast Guard Ships during the Vietnam Era. The Memorandum states that to date, the JSRRC has found no evidence that indicates Navy or Coast Guard ships transported tactical herbicides from the United States to the Republic of Vietnam or that ships operating off the coast of Vietnam used, stored, tested or transported tactical herbicides. Additionally, the JSRRC could not document or verify that a shipboard Veteran was exposed to tactical herbicides based on contact with aircraft that flew over Vietnam or equipment that was used in Vietnam. Therefore, the JSRRC could provide no evidence to support a appellant's claim of exposure to tactical herbicide agents while serving aboard a Navy ship during the Vietnam era. An August 2009 List of Ships Identified in Vietnam Inland Waterways by C&P has also been associated with the claims file. Hence, any further attempt to corroborate the Veteran's claimed herbicide exposure in this case would be futile as he has admitted to only being exposed to herbicides while exclusively serving on board ships operating in the offshore waters of Vietnam. Further, the Board itself has no competence to speak to issues of medical or scientific fact. Thus, the Board defers to the Secretary's legal definition, cited to below, as it pertains to blue water Vietnam Veterans. Based on the evidence provided, the Board finds no basis for obtaining any further scientific opinion. As for the duty to get a VA examination, 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(i) states that a medical examination or medical opinion is necessary if the information and evidence of record does not contain sufficient competent medical evidence to decide the claim, but: (A) Contains competent lay or medical evidence of a current diagnosed disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of disability; (B) establishes that the veteran suffered an event, injury or disease in service, or has a disease or symptoms of a disease listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309, 3.313, 3.16, and 3.317 manifesting during an applicable presumptive period provided the claimant has the required service or triggering event to qualify for that presumption; and (C) indicates that the claimed disability or symptoms may be associated with the established event, injury, or disease in service or with another service-connected disability. Part (C) could be satisfied by competent evidence showing post-service treatment for a condition, or other possible association with military service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(i). Chloracne and prostate cancer are diseases recognized by VA as associated with herbicide exposure. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e). The appellant does not otherwise allege that his chloracne and prostate cancer had their onset in service or within a year after his discharge from service or that he has had recurrent symptoms of chloracne or prostate cancer ever since service. As discussed below, the Board finds that the appellant was not exposed to herbicides. Therefore, a VA examination is not necessary. As there is no indication that any failure on the part of VA to provide additional notice or assistance reasonably affects the outcome of this case, the Board finds that any such failure is harmless. See Newhouse v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2007). II. Legal Criteria Establishing service connection generally requires medical evidence or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of the following: (1) A current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) nexus between the claimed in-service disease and the present disability. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed.Cir.2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed.Cir.2007); Hickson v. West, 12 Vet.App. 247 (1999); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 498 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed.Cir.1996) (table). Pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), a claimant may establish the second and third elements by demonstrating continuity of symptomatology. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 303 (2007). Continuity of symptomatology can be demonstrated by showing (1) that a condition was "noted" during service; (2) evidence of continuous symptoms after service; and (3) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of a nexus between the current disability and the post service symptoms. Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 488 (1997). A presumption also exists for certain diseases associated with exposure to herbicide agents, which may be presumed to have been incurred in service even if there is no evidence of the disease in service, provided the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6) are met. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e). The term "herbicide agent" means a chemical in an herbicide, including Agent Orange, used in support of the United States and allied military operations in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era. The diseases for which service connection may be presumed to be due to an association with herbicide agents include AL amyloidosis, chloracne or other acne form disease consistent with chloracne, Type 2 diabetes, Hodgkin's disease, ischemic heart disease, all chronic B-cell leukemias, multiple myeloma, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, Parkinson's disease, acute and subacute peripheral neuropathy, porphyria cutanea tarda, prostate cancer, respiratory cancers, and soft-tissue sarcoma other than osteosarcoma, chondrosarcoma, Kaposi's sarcoma, mesothelioma. Service connection may be presumed for residuals of Agent Orange exposure by showing two elements. First, it must be shown that the Veteran served in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116; 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6). Second, the Veteran must have been diagnosed with one of the specific diseases listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e). "Service in the Republic of Vietnam" includes service in the waters offshore and service in other locations if the conditions of service involve duty or visitation in the Republic of Vietnam. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii). An opinion of the General Counsel for VA held that service on a deep-water naval vessel off the shores of Vietnam ("blue water" service) may not be considered service in the Republic of Vietnam for purposes of 38 U.S.C.A. § 101(29)(A) (West 2002). See VAOPGCPREC 27-97 (July 23, 1997). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clearly held that VA's requirement that a claimant must have been present within the land borders of Vietnam at some point in the course of duty in order to be entitled to a presumption of herbicide exposure and service connection for diseases associated with that exposure constitutes a permissible interpretation of 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(a)(1) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii). Haas v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 257 (2006), rev'd sub nom. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1002 (2009). Service on inland waterways (also called "brown water" service) is also considered to be sufficient to invoke the presumption. Although operations on the inland waterways of Vietnam were primarily conducted by brown water Navy and Coast Guard vessels, some larger blue water Navy vessels periodically entered the inland waterways to provide gunfire support or deliver troops or destroyers that entered a river such as the Saigon River in the southern delta area. Following these temporary inland waterway operations, destroyers would return to patrolling the offshore gun line or travel farther out to sea for aircraft carrier escort duty. A number of blue water Navy amphibious assault and supply vessels also periodically entered inland waterways to deliver troops for combat missions or supplies for units stationed on the rivers. See Training Letter 10-06, Adjudicating Disability Claims Based on Herbicide Exposure from U.S. Navy and Coast Guard Veterans of the Vietnam Era, Sept. 9, 2010 (letter issued by VA Compensation and Pension Service). In order for the presumption of exposure to Agent Orange to be extended to a blue water Navy veteran, development must provide evidence that the veteran's ship operated temporarily on the inland waterways of Vietnam or that the veteran's ship docked to the shore or a pier. "Inland waterways" are not defined in VA regulations; however, the Board may refer to the VA Adjudication Procedure Manual for interpretive guidance. Inland waterways include rivers, canals, estuaries, and delta areas, such as those on which the Vietnam "brown water" Navy operated. VA Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1MR, pt. IV, sub pt. ii, ch. 2, § C.10.k. Service aboard a ship that anchored in an open deep-water harbor, such as Da Nang, Vung Tau, or Cam Ranh Bay, along the Vietnam coast, does not constitute inland waterway service or qualify as docking to the shore. Id. Additionally, certain chronic diseases, including tumors, are presumed to have been incurred in service if manifest to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from active duty. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3,307, 3.309(a). Even if a veteran is found not entitled to a regulatory presumption of service connection, the claim must still be reviewed to determine if service connection can be established on a direct basis. See Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the Veteran's Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards (Radiation Compensable) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, § 5, 98 Stat. 2724, 2727-29 (1994), does not preclude a veteran from establishing service connection with proof of actual direct causation). III. Analysis The appellant claims that he is entitled to service connection for chloracne and prostate cancer as a result of exposure to herbicides in service. For the reasons discussed below, the Board finds that service connection is not warranted. The appellant specifically claims that he has chloracne and prostate cancer that were caused by his exposure to Agent Orange while aboard the U.S.S. Basilone from June 1972 to December 1972. The Board notes that VA has recognized that certain Navy ships sailed into "brown" water areas of the Republic of Vietnam, such as the Saigon River. These ships were identified in the Compensation and Pension Service Bulletin in January and June 2010. A List of Ships Identified in Vietnam Inland Waterways includes the U.S.S. Basilone from May 7 to 24, 1966. The appellant's service personnel records reflect that he was on the U.S.S. Basilone from June 1972 to December 1972. The records indicate the U.S.S. Basilone entered the waters of the Vietnam combat zone on July 7, 1972. However, as the U.S.S. Basilone was in the inland waterways of Vietnam in May 1966, several years prior to the appellant's service on the ship, the evidence does not demonstrate that the appellant was on the U.S.S. Basilone when it was in the inland waterways of Vietnam. At the March 2011 hearing, the appellant stated that he had not had boots on the ground in Vietnam. See March 2011 Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 4. He did not assert that he served in the brown waters of Vietnam. He stated that he believed he was exposed to Agent Orange due to contamination of the waters in the ship. Id. He testified that an Australian study showed that after the process of making potable water on the ship, the heating of the waters makes contact and stays adhered to the tubes on the ship. He believed that toxins came in through the water supply system. He stated that as a cook, he was constantly using the water for food, drinks and everything onboard. Tr. at 5. He also stated that he believed he was exposed to Agent Orange toxins through the process of cleaning the ship after it came back to port in the United States. Tr. at 6. During the hearing, the appellant stated that he believed the ship became contaminated while it was sailing in the blue waters of Vietnam. Tr. at 9. He did not assert that the contamination was due to the U.S.S. Basilone's time in the inland waterways from May 7 to 24, 1966. He also stated that he had temporary active duty to the U.S.S. Point Defiance which had previously had continuous deployments and service in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. See March 2008 statement. He did not assert that he was on the U.S.S. Point Defiance in the inland waters of Vietnam. A study by Australian scientists said the dioxin in Agent Orange could not be eliminated by a ship's infiltration system. A Medical Report submitted by the appellant noted that no measurements of dioxin concentrations in seawater were collected during the Vietnam conflict, so it is not possible to ascertain the extent which drinking water on US vessels may have been contaminated through the distillation process. The report stated that it seemed likely that vessels with such distillation processes that traveled near land or even at some distance from river deltas would periodically collect water that contained dioxin. The appellant has asserted that he should be presumed to have been exposed to herbicides in Vietnam as a blue water veteran. This was the same argument overruled in Haas, 525 F.3d at 1193, before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). In fact, the Australian study that the appellant referred to was discussed by the Federal Circuit in Haas. See 525 F.3d at 1193-94. The Federal Circuit pointed out that this study had already been considered by VA and declined to change the regulation to expand the presumption. In the Federal Register, VA explained why reliance on such a study was flawed: VA scientists and experts have noted many problems with the study that caution against reliance on the study to change our long-held position regarding veterans who served off shore. First, as the authors of the Australian study themselves noted, there was substantial uncertainty in their assumptions regarding the concentration of dioxin that may have been present in estuarine waters during the Vietnam War . . . Second, even with the concentrating effect found in the Australian study, the levels of exposure estimated in this study are not at all comparable to the exposure experienced by veterans who served on land where herbicides were applied. . . Third, it is not clear that U.S. ships used distilled drinking water drawn from or near estuarine sources or, if they did, whether the distillation process was similar to that used by the Australian Navy. 73 Fed. Reg. 20,566, 20,568 (Apr. 16, 2008). Also considered by VA was that none of those studies specifically addressed "whether herbicides used, and as administered, by the U.S. military during the Vietnam Era could have been blown by the wind into the ocean, or into inland waters that then carried the chemical into the ocean, to reach a boat offshore and result in any significant risk of herbicide exposure." 73 Fed.Reg. 20, 363, 20,364 (Apr. 15, 2008). Given the lack of scientific evidence, VA declined to change the regulation. The Board defers to the Secretary's reasonable interpretation regarding the reliability and soundness of the various scientific studies purporting to establish actual herbicide exposure to blue water Vietnam Veterans. The appellant also contended that other places he visited in service, including Guam, the Panama Canal, the Subic Bay and Singapore were contaminated by Agent Orange. Id. at 4. He stated that the U.S.S. Basilone traveled through the Panama Canal with stops in Hawaii, Guam and Subic Bay, Philippines, before entering the territorial waters of Vietnam. See March 2008 statement. He also noted that the ship stopped in Singapore. The Department of Defense (DoD) has compiled a list containing sites within the U.S. and in foreign countries where tactical herbicides, such as Agent Orange, were used, tested, or stored. DoD records reveal no evidence of tactical herbicides being used, stored, or tested in the places referenced by the appellant. Moreover, the appellant's service personnel records indicate he was stationed on a submarine and ship during service. Such evidence is more probative than the appellant's lay assertion that he was exposed to Agent Orange in those locations while in the Navy. After considering the evidence of record, including the evidence showing the appellant was not in Vietnam or its inland waterways at any point, the Board finds that the presumption is not warranted and the weight of the evidence does not otherwise show by competent and credible evidence that the appellant was exposed to herbicides in service. The evidence does not show that the appellant was present on the landmass or the inland waters of Vietnam during the Vietnam era. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii); Haas, 525 F.3d 1168. The evidence indicates the appellant was stationed on the U.S.S. Basilone when it was in the deep waters of Vietnam. The only record of the U.S.S. Basilone entering the inland waterways of Vietnam was in May 1966, several years prior to the appellant's service. The Board finds the appellant has not described coming into personal contact with an herbicide substance in any tangible way, but has only asserted that he believed he was exposed through water on his ship while it was stationed in the blue waters of Vietnam. The Board finds that the appellant is not competent to make such a statement due to the complexities involved. The probative value of the appellant's allegations is outweighed by the Secretary's determination. The appellant may still be entitled to service connection on a direct basis. The Board initially notes that although a November 1993 VA examination report indicates the appellant had chloracne, the appellant's VA treatment records do not reflect that he has had a diagnosis of chloracne during the current period on appeal. Additionally, the appellant has not asserted and his service treatment records do not reflect that he had chloracne or prostate cancer in service. A February 1971 VA examination report indicates the appellant's skin was normal. He denied having had any skin diseases or cancer. An April 1971 service treatment record reflects that the appellant complained of a rash on the groin. He was diagnosed with cellulitis and given Lanolin for the rash. A May 1971 service treatment record also indicates the appellant had a rash on his groin. Another May 1971 service treatment record indicated the appellant had cellulitis in the left foot. A July 1972 examination report does not note any skin or prostate conditions. In a June 1972 report of medical history, the appellant denied having any skin diseases. However, the appellant did note a history of cellulitis in the left foot in May 1971. A January 1974 discharge examination report does not note any skin or prostate conditions. Although the appellant's service treatment records indicated the appellant had a rash in the groin and cellulitis in the left foot, the records do not indicate the appellant had symptoms of chloracne during service. The records also do not indicate he had symptoms of prostate cancer. Significantly, the appellant has not asserted that he had symptoms of chloracne or prostate cancer in service. In a November 1993 statement, the appellant stated that his skin condition started in 1981 with the initial notice of a large bump on his nose. He stated that after that, he stated that he had continuous itching bubbles on his arms and face from the sun. A November 1993 VA examination report reflects that the appellant reported that he had noticed skin lesions on his arms, nose, face and buttocks area since 1981. The VA examiner found the appellant had chloracne. Although the VA examiner stated that the appellant had chloracne secondary to Agent Orange, he did not provide a rationale for the opinion. Thus, the opinion is inadequate and lacks probative value. The appellant has not asserted that he had chloracne prior to 1981. He has also not asserted that he had any chronic skin disabilities other than chloracne. The appellant's VA treatment records indicate the appellant's prostate cancer was diagnosed following a biopsy in February 2006. The appellant has not asserted that he had prostate cancer in service or that he has had symptoms of prostate cancer since service. Based on the above evidence, there is no showing that chloracne or prostate cancer manifested to a degree of 10 percent within a year from separation from service. The evidence, including the appellant's own statements, show he was diagnosed with chloracne in 1981 and prostate cancer in 2006. Consequently, he is not entitled to service connection on a presumptive basis. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. If there is no evidence of a chronic condition during service, or during an applicable presumptive period, then a showing of continuity of symptomatology after service is required to support the claim. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Evidence of a chronic condition must be medical, unless it relates to a condition to which lay observation is competent. See Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-498 (1997). As the appellant has not asserted that he had continuous symptoms of chloracne or prostate cancer since service, he is also not entitled to service connection on the basis of evidence of a chronic condition. The Board finds the appellant is competent to state what he experienced in service. Lay statements may be competent to support a claim for service connection where the events or the presence of disability, or symptoms of a disability are subject to lay observation. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Although a lay person may be competent to report the etiology of a disability, prostate cancer and chloracne are not the type of disorders which are susceptible to lay opinion concerning etiology. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The appellant has made general assertions about exposure to herbicides via the water aboard his ship. The Board finds that VA has already considered this possibility. There is no basis in the record for finding that further investigation of the claimed herbicide exposure is warranted. The Board finds the general VA findings discussed above regarding herbicide exposure and the Australian study to be more probative than the appellant's assertions as he does not have the scientific expertise to assert that he was exposed to herbicides through the water aboard his ship. Thus, the evidence is against a finding that the appellant was exposed to herbicides in service. Finally, the appellant does not contend, and the evidence of record does not otherwise show, that he had chloracne or prostate cancer in service. The appellant's chloracne was diagnosed seven years after the appellant's discharge from service and his prostate cancer was diagnosed more than thirty years after his discharge from service. There is also no evidence of a nexus between the appellant's chloracne or prostate cancer and service. Although the appellant has asserted that there is a nexus, as discussed above, the Board finds that he is not competent to report the etiology of the disabilities. Accordingly, service connection is not warranted for chloracne or prostate cancer. Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that service connection for chloracne and prostate cancer is not warranted. In reaching this conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit of the doubt doctrine. However, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the appellant's claim. Consequently, the benefit-of-the-doubt rule is not applicable, and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55 (1990). ORDER Entitlement to service connection for chloracne, to include as due to exposure to herbicides is denied. Entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer, to include as due to exposure to herbicides is denied. ____________________________________________ MILO H. HAWLEY Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs