Citation Nr: 1304922 Decision Date: 02/11/13 Archive Date: 02/21/13 DOCKET NO. 11-30 534 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Winston-Salem, North Carolina THE ISSUES 1. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 2. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD. REPRESENTATION Veteran represented by: Jan Dils, Attorney at Law WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD E. Pomeranz, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from December 1977 to December 1983 and was honorably discharged. The Veteran served again from November 1987 to July 1990 "under other than honorable conditions." In a February 2006 Administrative Decision, the RO determined that the Veteran's second period of service was a bar to VA compensation benefits. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal of a November 2010 rating action by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) located in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, in which the RO determined that new and material evidence had not been received to reopen the claim for service connection for PTSD. The Veteran submitted a notice of disagreement (NOD) in December 2010 and the RO issued a statement of the case (SOC) in October 2011. In the October 2011 SOC, the RO determined that new and material evidence had been submitted and reopened the Veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD. In addition, the RO denied the underlying service connection claim. The Veteran filed a timely substantive appeal (VA Form 9) in November 2011. The Board must still determine whether new and material evidence has been received to reopen the claim. See Jackson v. Principi, 265 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (reopening after a prior unappealed RO denial); Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reopening after a prior Board denial); Wakeford v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 237 (1995) (VA failed to comply with its own regulations by ignoring issue of whether any new and material evidence had been submitted to reopen the veteran's previously and finally denied claims). Thus, the new and material issue is before the Board for appellate consideration. The Veteran's underlying claim for service connection for PTSD, which is a psychiatric disability, has been rephrased on the title page to encompass any mental disorder. Brokowski v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 79 (2009) (a claimant may satisfy this requirement of identifying a benefit sought by referring to a body part or system that is disabled or by describing symptoms of the disability); Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 5 (2009) (stating that, when determining the scope of a claim, the Board must consider "the claimant's description of the claim; the symptoms the claimant describes; and the information the claimant submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of that claim.") In November 2012, the Veteran testified at a videoconference hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A transcript of that hearing has been associated with the claims file. The Veteran is represented by a private attorney. See VA Form 21-22, Appointment of Individual as Claimant's Representative, dated in February 2010. In October 2012, the RO received a letter from the Veteran's attorney-representative in which she cancelled the Veteran's appeal. However, in the November 2012 videoconference, the Veteran was represented by his attorney-representative and testified. Thus, the Board does not accept the October 2012 letter from the Veteran's attorney-representative as a withdrawal of his appeal. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.202, 20.204 (2012). The issue of whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD is still pending and in appellate status. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran's original claim of service connection for PTSD was denied by an unappealed rating decision in August 2006, of which the Veteran was advised in August 2006. 2. In September 2010, the Veteran filed an application to reopen the claim for service connection for PTSD. 3. The evidence received since the August 2006 rating decision relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim for PTSD and raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 4. The Veteran has alleged in-service stressors that are consistent with the circumstances of his service. 5. The competent medical evidence on the question of whether the Veteran meets the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD related to military service is in relative balance. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The unappealed August 2006 rating decision, which denied service connection for PTSD, is final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(b), (c) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.158, 3.160(d), 20.201, 20.302, 20.1103 (2012). 2. New and material evidence has been received, and the claim for service connection for PTSD is reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2012). 3. Resolving all reasonable doubt in the Veteran's favor, the criteria for service connection for PTSD, are met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131, 1154(a), 5103, 5103A, 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304(f) (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS In this decision, the Board will discuss the relevant law it is required to apply. This includes statutes enacted by Congress and published in Title 38, United States Code ("38 U.S.C.A."); regulations promulgated by VA under the law and published in the Title 38 of the Code of Federal Regulations ("38 C.F.R."); and the precedential rulings of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (as noted by citations to "Fed. Cir.") and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (as noted by citations to "Vet. App."). The Board is bound by statute to set forth specifically the issue under appellate consideration and its decision must also include separately stated findings of fact and conclusions of law on all material issues of fact and law presented on the record, and the reasons or bases for those findings and conclusions. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(d); see also 38 C.F.R. § 19.7 (implementing the cited statute); Vargas-Gonzalez v. West, 12 Vet. App. 321, 328 (1999); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 56-57 (1990) (Board's statement of reasons and bases for its findings and conclusions on all material facts and law presented on the record must be sufficient to enable the claimant to understand the precise basis for the Board's decision, as well as to facilitate review of the decision by courts of competent appellate jurisdiction; the Board must also consider and discuss all applicable statutory and regulatory law, as well as the controlling decisions of the appellate courts). VA's Duty to Notify and Assist Review of the claims folder shows compliance with the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA), 38 U.S.C.A. § 5100 et seq. See also 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a). As to the new and material evidence issue, the September 2010 VCAA notice letter is compliant with the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court's) decision in Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006), since it sufficiently explains the bases of the prior denial (i.e., the deficiencies in the evidence when the claim was previously considered). If any defect in VCAA notice or assistance is found, such defect is not prejudicial to the Veteran, given the completely favorable disposition of the new and material evidence and service connection issue. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1102; Benard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 392-94 (1993). New and Material Evidence The establishment of service connection for PTSD generally requires: (1) medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) (i.e., DSM-IV); (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a link between current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). See also Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997). The RO originally denied service connection for PTSD in an August 2006 rating decision. The Veteran was duly notified of this action and apprised of his appellate rights. He did not appeal the decision in a timely manner, and the August 2006 denial of the claim is final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105, (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.160(d), 20.200, 20.201, 20.202, 20.302, 20.1103 (2012). The RO denied service connection for PTSD in the final August 2006 rating decision because there was no medical evidence of record of a PTSD diagnosis, no medical evidence linking PTSD to a confirmed in-service stressor, and no credible supporting evidence for claimed in-service stressors including serving off the coast of Beirut, Lebanon in 1983 during a period of hostile activity. Because the Veteran had failed to provide specific information regarding his claimed in-service stressors, the RO determined that it could not seek verification from the Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC). In addition, one of his claimed stressors occurred in 1990 which was not during his Honorable period of service. In the October 2011 SOC, the RO reopened the claim and considered service connection on the merits. Regardless of the RO's actions, the Board has jurisdictional responsibility to determine whether a claim previously denied by the RO is properly reopened. See Jackson v. Principi, 265 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105(c)). See also Barnett v. Brown, 83 F. 3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1996) and VAOPGCPREC 05-92 (March 4, 1992). Accordingly, the Board must initially determine on its own whether there is new and material evidence to reopen the PTSD claim before proceeding to readjudicate the underlying merits of the claim. If the Board finds that no new and material evidence has been offered, that is where the analysis must end. The Veteran filed his application to reopen his claim by the submission of new and material evidence in September 2010. Under the current law, new evidence means existing evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2012). In determining whether evidence is new and material, the credibility of the evidence in question is presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). But see Duran v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 216 (1994) ("Justus does not require the Secretary [of VA] to consider the patently incredible to be credible"). In Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110, 118-19 (2010), the Court recently held that new evidence would raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim if when considered with the old evidence it would at least trigger the Secretary's duty to assist by providing a medical opinion. New and material evidence within the meaning of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) has been received since the August 2006 rating decision. A private psychological evaluation from J.A., M.A., a licensed clinical psychologist, dated in March 2010, confirmed a diagnosis of PTSD. This record now demonstrates medical evidence of PTSD. The March 2010 private psychological evaluation also provides medical evidence of a link between current PTSD symptomatology and specific in-service stressors. The Veteran has also provided additional, credible information regarding his alleged in-service stressors. The new stressor information is presumed credible only for the purposes of reopening his new and material evidence claim. Justus, 3 Vet. App. at 513. The RO further received the Veteran's personnel records which show that the Veteran was awarded the Navy Expeditionary Medal for the 1983 Lebanon campaign/engagement. At that time, the Veteran was serving aboard the USS Portland. The evidence relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate his claim and raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating his claim; that is to say, this evidence is new and material and his PTSD claim is reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). Service Connection Upon review of the evidence of record, the Board grants the appeal for service connection for PTSD under the amended July 2010 PTSD regulation. The Veteran contends that he has PTSD as the result of several traumatic stressors that occurred while he was in the Navy and was aboard the USS Portland. In a February 2012 statement from the Veteran, and also in his November 2012 videoconference hearing, he indicated that in 1983, the USS Portland was stationed off the coast of Beirut, Lebanon for approximately four months. Specifically, the ship was anchored only about a mile from the beach. He noted that his Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) was as a quartermaster (i.e., a ship's steerman). Due to his MOS, he was responsible for the location of the ship and was aware of incoming fire. The Veteran reported that he witnessed enemy rocket and missile fire hit the beach. On one occasion, a shell hit the beach and the ship went to general quarters. On another occasion, while he was on patrol, a shell was fired across the bow, narrowly missing the ship. Due to these attacks, the ship was in a state of combat readiness. According to the Veteran, "at random times," percussion grenades were dropped over the side in case divers were attempting to attach mines to the ship. The ship's .20 caliber guns were loaded and manned in case the ship experienced enemy attack. Sentries were posted at various areas around the ship to repel boarders. According to the Veteran, because he was worried that his ship would be attacked, he feared for his life and safety. The Veteran stated that about once a month, he would watch a plane fly over the airport and drop a bomb. In October 1983, Marines who were attached to his ship and who were a part of the U.S. Multinational Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon, were staying in a hotel at the airport when a suicide bomber detonated a truck full of explosives in the lobby of the hotel and approximately 232 Marines were killed. The Veteran indicated that his ship had previously gone ashore to drop off the Marines and then the crew was released for four days. When they came back and were anchored offshore, they learned of the explosion and sent people to help with the remains and put the deceased in body bags. According to the Veteran, he lost friends in the attack. He noted that he watched television news programs where survivors were interviewed. The Veteran stated that after the incident, he experienced flashbacks and nightmares. He stated that "to this day," he could picture what the airport looked like and what the beach looked like, and "watching the rockets and stuff go back and forth." He alleges continuous PTSD-related symptoms since service to include hypervigilance, depression, nightmares, flashbacks, anger issues, and social avoidance. Service connection may be granted if it is shown the Veteran suffers from a disability resulting from an injury sustained or disease contracted in the line of duty, or for aggravation during service of a pre-existing condition beyond its natural progression. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 1153 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.306 (2012). Generally, service connection requires evidence of a current disability with a relationship or connection to an injury or disease or some other manifestation of the disability during service. Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). The establishment of service connection for PTSD has unique evidentiary requirements. It generally requires: (1) medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) (i.e., DSM-IV); (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a link between current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). See also Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 128. If it is established through military citation or other supportive evidence that the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran's service, the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(2). See also 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d); Gaines v. West, 11 Vet. App. 353 (1998) (Board must make a specific finding as to whether the Veteran engaged in combat). To gain the benefit of a relaxed standard for proof of service incurrence of an injury or disease, 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) requires that the Veteran have actually participated in combat with the enemy. See VAOPGCPREC 12-99. If VA determines either that the Veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy or that the Veteran did engage in combat, but that the alleged stressor is not combat related, the Veteran's lay testimony, by itself, is not sufficient to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. Instead, the record must contain credible supporting evidence that corroborates the Veteran's testimony or statements. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Stone v. Nicholson, 480 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 128; Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395 (1996). However, corroboration of every detail of a claimed stressor, including the Veteran's personal participation, is not required; rather, a Veteran only needs to offer independent evidence of a stressful event that is sufficient to imply his or her personal exposure. See Pentecost v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 124, 128 (2002) (quoting Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 307 (1997)). On July 13, 2010, VA amended its regulations governing service connection for PTSD by liberalizing, in certain circumstances, the evidentiary standard for establishing the required in-service stressor. This revision adds to the types of PTSD claims that VA will accept through credible lay testimony alone as being sufficient to establish occurrence of an in-service stressor without undertaking other development to verify the Veteran's account. The primary effect of the amendment of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) is the elimination of the requirement for corroborating evidence of a claimed in-service stressor if it is related to the Veteran's "fear of hostile military or terrorist activity." Specifically, the final rule amends 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) by redesignating current paragraphs (f)(3) and (f)(4) as paragraphs (f)(4) and (f)(5), respectively, and by adding a new paragraph (f)(3) that reads as follows: If a stressor claimed by a Veteran is related to the Veteran's fear of hostile military or terrorist activity and a VA psychiatrist or psychologist, or a psychiatrist or psychologist with whom VA has contracted, confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of [PTSD] and that the Veteran's symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the Veteran's service, the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. For purposes of this paragraph, "fear of hostile military or terrorist activity" means that a Veteran experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or circumstance that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of the Veteran or others, such as from an actual or potential improvised explosive device; vehicle-imbedded explosive device; incoming artillery, rocket, or mortar fire; grenade; small arms fire, including suspected sniper fire; or attack upon friendly military aircraft, and the Veteran's response to the event or circumstance involved a psychological or psycho-physiological state of fear, helplessness, or horror. See Stressor Determinations for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 75 Fed. Reg. 39,843-39,852 (July 13, 2010) (codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3), corrected by 75 Fed. Reg. 41,092 (July 15, 2010). As to the effective date of this amendment, the new provisions apply to applications for service connection for PTSD that: (1) are received by VA on or after July 13, 2010; (2) were received by VA before July 13, 2010 but have not been decided by a VA regional office as of July 13, 2010; (3) are appealed to the Board on or after July 13, 2010; (4) were appealed to the Board before July 13, 2010 but have not been decided by the Board as of July 13, 2010; or (5) are pending before VA on or after July 13, 2010 because the Court vacated a Board decision on an application and remanded it for readjudication. See Stressor Determinations for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 75 Fed. Reg. 39,843 (July 13, 2010) (codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3)), corrected by 75 Fed. Reg. 41,092 (July 15, 2010). Therefore, since the Veteran filed an application to reopen the claim for service connection for PTSD in September 2010, the amended PTSD regulation could potentially apply in this case if its substantive criteria are also met. The final requirement of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) is medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service stressor and the current disability. However, such after-the-fact medical nexus evidence cannot also be the sole evidence of the occurrence of the claimed stressor. Moreau, 9 Vet. App. at 396. In determining whether service connection is warranted, the Board shall consider the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine. 38 U.S.C.A. 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1991); Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518 (1996). The Veteran served on active duty from December 1977 to December 1983 and was honorably discharged. The Veteran served again from November 1987 to July 1990 "under other than honorable conditions." In a February 2006 Administrative Decision, the RO determined that the Veteran's second period of service was a bar to VA compensation benefits. Thus, the Board will only consider the Veteran's period of honorable service from December 1977 to December 1983. The Veteran's DD Form 214, Certificate of Release or Discharge From Active Duty, confirms that he served in the Navy from December 1977 to December 1983. The DD Form 214 also confirms that his MOS was as a quartermaster. He had 4 years, 9 months, and 23 days of Sea Service. The Veteran received the Battle Efficiency "E" Award, Sea Service Deployment Ribbon (First), Sea Service Deployment Ribbon (Second), Sea Service Ribbon (Third), the Meritorious Unit Commendation, and the Navy Expeditionary Medal. With respect to the Veteran's Navy Expeditionary Medal, the Veteran's personnel records show that he received that award for the 1983 Lebanon campaign/ engagement. At that time, he was serving aboard the USS Portland. In November 2012, the Veteran submitted articles from Wikipedia regarding the 1983 bombing attacks on barracks in Beirut. In 1983, two carriers were tethered to Lebanon to provide support for the Marine Corps forces ashore. The Marines were a part of a Multinational Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon and they were increasingly under fire. The Marines Headquarters building was located at the airport in Beirut, Lebanon. In October 1983, a suicide bomber drove a truck into the building which caused an explosion and 241 Marines were killed. The Board finds that the Veteran's stressors while serving on the USS Portland off the coast of Beirut involved a fear of hostile military activity, and are consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a). Specifically, the Veteran's personnel records confirm that in 1983, the Veteran was aboard the USS Portland and participated in the Lebanon campaign. He was awarded the Navy Expeditionary Medal for such participation. Clearly, the Lebanon campaign involved hostile military activity. The Veteran has credibly and consistently reported witnessing enemy rocket and missile fire which hit the beach approximately one mile away from his ship or landed very close to his ship. As quartermaster, he was responsible for the location of the ship and would be aware of incoming fire. Internet research also confirms that in 1983, two carriers were stationed off the coast of Lebanon to provide support for the Marine Corps forces ashore who were a part of a multinational peacekeeping force and who were increasingly under fire. Clearly, the USS Portland was one of the vessels which was providing support to the Marines. There is no clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. With respect to the October 1983 bombing of the Marine Headquarters building (the Veteran claimed the building was a hotel), the Veteran does not allege, nor does the evidence show, that he witnessed the bombing. Rather, his stressor involves the fact that due to the bombing, he was afraid that hostile activity would be directed towards his ship. Thus, the bombing relates to his fear of hostile military activity. The Courts have held that a stressor need not be corroborated in every detail. Pentecost v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 124, 128 (2002). With resolution of the benefit of the doubt in the Veteran's favor, the Veteran's personnel records and his account establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressors in the present case. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3) (effective July 13, 2010). The Veteran's service treatment records are negative for any complaints or findings of PTSD. The records show that in July 1979, the Veteran underwent a psychological evaluation after certain irrational behavior. For example, the Veteran called a security violation when none existed. The Veteran's explanation for that act was that it was just impulsive and not intentional. There were also some questions about entries in the watch log made by the Veteran. He stated that he made the entries out of boredom. The impression was situational reaction immature personality. A personality disorder is not an injury or disease that is cognizable within the meaning of VA legislation or for VA compensation purposes. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 4.127 (2012). Thus, a personality disorder is not a disability warranting service connection under VA applicable law. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c). The threshold consideration for any service connection claim is the existence of a current disability. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303; Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). In particular, aside from credible evidence of an in-service stressor, current medical evidence diagnosing PTSD in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) (i.e., DSM-IV) is required, as well as competent evidence of a nexus between current PTSD symptomatology and his verified in-service stressors. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). See also Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 128. The medical evidence as to whether the Veteran currently meets the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD under the DSM-IV is conflicting. In the March 2010 private psychological evaluation report, Mr. A., a licensed clinical psychologist, stated that the Veteran had a history of alcohol abuse. The Veteran had been divorced three times and was currently married to his fourth wife. He had a history of unstable relationships, substance abuse, and other problems suggestive of a borderline personality disorder. He had been arrested on a charge of DUI and had been arrested for domestic violence in 1999. The Veteran served two periods of service in the Navy. The Veteran's first discharge was honorable and his second discharge was other than honorable due to marijuana use. In regard to his stressors, the Veteran stated that in 1983, he was stationed off the coast of Beirut and watched rockets going back and forth from planes, bombing the airport. He reported that after the October 1983 bombing of the airport, he saw videos where bodies were being carried away. According to the Veteran, some of his shipmates were killed in the attack. He noted that his immediate reaction to the bombing was "fright, horror." With respect to intrusive recollections of the event, the Veteran stated that he had dreams about it and flashbacks. He indicated that he would "see airplanes bombing the airport, like a movie." According to the Veteran, similar things bothered him "like news about war on television." He noted that he had crying spells. The Veteran avoided thoughts, feelings or conversations associated with the event and avoided places, activities or people that would remind him of it. He felt alienated from others and admitted to feelings of derealization and depersonalization. The Veteran also admitted to elements of increased arousal including sleep problems, anger, concentration difficulties, hypervigilance, and startle response. The diagnosis was the following: (Axis I) major depressive disorder, recurrent, severe, with psychotic features; PTSD, chronic; alcohol abuse, (Axis II) borderline personality disorder, (Axis IV) no acute event relevant to disorder, and (Axis V) Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 50. In October 2010, the Veteran underwent a VA PTSD evaluation. At that time, the examiner stated that according to the Veteran, in 1996 or 1997, he checked himself into a private hospital in Florida and was treated for depression, panic attacks, and problems sleeping. He was also having suicidal thoughts. The Veteran stayed for three days. He denied any current treatment for psychiatric problems. With respect to in-service stressors, the Veteran stated that in 1983, he was aboard the USS Portland and they were anchored a mile off the coast of Beirut. The ship was within range of guns and rockets and the Veteran was scared because they were "a sitting target." The Veteran endorsed that he feared for his life. He also described the October 1983 bombing incident when 241 Marines were killed. According to the Veteran, he never felt safe during his Beirut service. He noted that approximately once a month, he had dreams about being on a ship. The Veteran indicated that he had nightmares unrelated to the Navy. He denied any intrusive memories or unwanted thoughts that disrupted his day or kept him from doing what he wanted to do. The Veteran did have memories of bombs from Beirut. When asked the frequency, the Veteran estimated 5-6 times in the past 5 years. The examiner noted that the re-experiencing criteria for PTSD were not met. The Veteran also denied hypervigilance and exaggerated startle response. He noted that he had concentration problems. Following the mental status evaluation, the examiner noted that the Veteran had a valid stressor which was fear of hostile military activity when fired upon in his Navy ship. However, the examiner concluded that the Veteran did not meet the DSM-IV criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. The diagnosis was the following: (Axis I) depressive disorder; alcohol abuse in early remission, (Axis IV) lack of interpersonal relationships, loss of work, financial strain, and (Axis V) GAF score of 50. The examiner stated that it was not possible for him to determine, without resorting to undue speculation, if the Veteran's current conditions were related to his fear of hostile military activity while he was in the Navy. In light of the above, in the March 2010 report, Mr. A., the private psychologist, diagnosed the Veteran with PTSD. However, in the October 2010 VA examination report, the examiner concluded that the Veteran did not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. Resolving reasonable doubt in favor of the Veteran, the Board finds that the Veteran has a current diagnosis of PTSD. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). With respect to a nexus, there is also medical evidence of a link between current PTSD symptomatology and the traumatic in-service stressor of experiencing fear of hostile military activity while aboard the USS Portland off the coast of Beirut in 1983. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Specifically, in the March 2010 private psychological evaluation report, Mr. A. concluded that the Veteran had PTSD as the result of this in-service stressor. After a comprehensive interview with the Veteran and psychiatric testing, the PTSD diagnosis was rendered. Giving the Veteran the benefit of the doubt, the Veteran's in-service stressor is sufficiently corroborated due to the recent liberalizing PTSD regulation. Accordingly, service connection for PTSD is warranted. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. In the March 2010 private psychological evaluation report, Mr. A. diagnosed the Veteran with major depressive disorder. In addition, in the October 2010 VA examination report, the examiner diagnosed the Veteran with depressive disorder. Mr. A. did not offer an opinion on whether the Veteran's major depressive disorder was related to his Navy service, to specifically include his confirmed stressor of fear of hostile military activity. Moreover, the VA examiner stated that he could not provide a nexus opinion without resorting to speculation. A finding of service connection may not be based on a resort to speculation or remote possibility. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2012). Nevertheless, even if the examiner provided a positive nexus opinion, the Veteran's service connection claim encompasses all of his currently diagnosed psychiatric disabilities. See Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009). In light of the fact that the Board is granting service connection for PTSD, and both PTSD and a depressive disorder are rated according to the General Rating Formula for Mental Disorders (38 C.F.R. § 4.130, Diagnostic Codes 9201-9440), a separate discussion as to the Veteran's depressive disorder is unnecessary. See DSM-IV; 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.125, 4.130 (2011); see also Amberman v. Shinseki, 570 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (regarding whether separate ratings would ever be warranted for variously diagnosed psychiatric disabilities). ORDER As new and material evidence has been received, the claim for service connection for PTSD is reopened. Service connection for PTSD is granted. ____________________________________________ VITO A. CLEMENTI Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs