Citation Nr: 1306045 Decision Date: 02/21/13 Archive Date: 02/27/13 DOCKET NO. 09-32 371 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Louisville, Kentucky THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 2. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder other than PTSD. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Kentucky Department of Veterans Affairs ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Rebecca Feinberg, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from November 1980 to November 1983 with subsequent reserve service. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a January 2009 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Louisville, Kentucky. The Veteran's claims, then characterized as one issue, were previously before the Board and remanded in May 2011 for additional development, to include providing the Veteran with notice regarding what the evidence needs to show in order to substantiate a claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD based on personal assault, obtaining any outstanding VA treatment records, requesting the Veteran to submit releases for any private records not already obtained, and affording her a VA examination. With regard to the claim being decided herein, all of these directives were completed, the remand has been complied with, and the Veteran's appeal is properly before the Board at this time. Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998). In addition to the paper claims file, there is a Virtual VA electronic claims file associated with the Veteran's claim that contains some evidence not associated with her physical file. This evidence, along with all evidence in the Veteran's physical file, has been reviewed by the RO and the Board prior to their last adjudication. As the Board noted in the May 2011 remand, the Veteran's claims have been characterized as stated above in order to encompass all acquired psychiatric disorders raised directly by the Veteran or indirectly by the record. Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App 1 (2009). The issue of entitlement to service connection for PTSD is addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and is REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran does not have a currently diagnosed acquired psychiatric disorder other than PTSD that is related to her military service. CONCLUSION OF LAW An acquired psychiatric disorder other than PTSD was not incurred in active service, nor may it be presumed to have been incurred by such service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION I. Duties to Notify and Assist As provided for by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2012). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and medical or lay evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). In addition, the notice requirements of the VCAA apply to all elements of a service-connection claim, including the degree of disability and the effective date of the disability. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Further, this notice must include information that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded. Id. at 486. VCAA notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the RO. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). Where complete notice is not timely accomplished, such error may be cured by issuance of a fully compliant notice, followed by readjudication of the claim. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006). In this case, regarding the duty to notify, the Veteran was sent a letter in August 2007 that provided information as to what evidence was required to substantiate the claim and of the division of responsibilities between VA and a claimant in developing an appeal. The letter also explained what type of information and evidence was needed to establish a disability rating and effective date. Therefore, with regard to the claim decided herein, notice consistent with the requirements of the VCAA was provided prior to the initial adjudication of the claim. Accordingly, no further development is required with respect to the duty to notify. In addition, VA has a duty to assist a claimant in the development of a claim. This duty includes assisting in the procurement of service treatment records, all pertinent pre-and post-service treatment records, and by providing an examination, when necessary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. The Board finds that all necessary development has been accomplished in this case, and therefore appellate review may proceed without prejudice to the Veteran. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). In particular, the claims file contains the Veteran's service treatment and personnel records, as well as post-service reports of VA and private treatment and examinations. Moreover, her own lay statements in support of the claim are of record. The Board has carefully reviewed these records and statements, but finds that they identify no available, pertinent evidence, such as additional medical records, that remain outstanding. The Veteran was afforded VA examinations in January 2009 and June 2011 to address the claim decided herein. The Board finds that the VA examinations and medical opinions, when considered together, are adequate to decide the case because, as shown below, they were based upon consideration of the Veteran's pertinent history, lay assertions, and current complaints and because they are supported by a complete rationale sufficient to allow the Board to make a fully informed determination. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007) (citing Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 405, 407 (1994)). For the above reasons, no further notice or assistance to the Veteran is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist in the development of the appeal. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd, 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). II. Law and Analysis The Veteran contends that service connection is warranted for an acquired psychiatric disorder. As explained above, the Board will confine this decision to a determination of whether service connection is warranted for any acquired psychiatric disorder other than PTSD. At the outset, the Board also notes that the Veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy. Therefore, the combat provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154 (West 2002) are not applicable. In this case, the Veteran raised the claim as one for stress-related anxiety. Nonetheless, a review of the record reveals diagnoses of several psychiatric disorders. In light of these considerations, the Board finds that the scope the Veteran's present claim is not limited to a claim of service connection for stress-related anxiety alone, but also encompasses a claim of service connection for any acquired psychiatric disorder. Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Service connection generally requires credible and competent evidence showing: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Hickson v. West, 12 Vet .App. 247, 253 (1999); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995). "Congress specifically limits entitlement to service-connected disease or injury where such cases have resulted in a disability. In the absence of a proof of present disability there can be no claim." Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). The requirement of a "current disability" is satisfied if a disorder is diagnosed at the time a claim is filed or at any time during the pendency of the appeal; service connection may be awarded even though the disability resolves prior to adjudication of the claim. See McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007). The second and third service connection requirements may be satisfied with evidence of a chronic disease shown during service or a continuity of symptomatology. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b); see Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-96 (1997). Service connection may also be established where a chronic disease is shown as such in service; subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). For the showing of chronic disease in service, there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. However, if chronicity in service is not established or where the diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned, a showing of continuity of symptoms after discharge is required to support the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all of the evidence establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Finally, certain chronic diseases, which are listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a), including psychoses, may be presumed to have been incurred during service if manifested to a compensable degree within one year of separation from active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1112, 1113, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. A Veteran bears the "'evidentiary burden' to establish all elements of his claim, including the nexus requirement." Fagan v. Shinseki, 573 F. 3d 1282, 1287-88 (2009). The Board's duty is to assign probative value to all pertinent medical and lay evidence of record based on its credibility and competency, and then weigh the evidence regarding all material elements of a claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(d); Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 433 (2011); see also Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994) (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted"). A "veteran is given the 'benefit of the doubt' 'regarding any issue material' to the veteran's claim 'when there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence.'" Fagan, 573 F.3d at 1287 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b)). Thus, if there is conflicting medical evidence, the Board may not ignore or disregard any medical professional's opinion, but may favor one medical opinion over by providing an adequate statement of reasons or bases. See Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429, 433 (1995); Willis v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 66, 70 (1991). A medical opinion is most probative if it is factually accurate, fully articulated, and based on sound reasoning. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008). In making all determinations, the Board must also fully consider the lay assertions of record. If credible, competent lay evidence means any evidence not requiring that the proponent have specialized education, training, or experience. Lay evidence is competent if it is provided by a person who has knowledge of facts or circumstances and conveys matters that can be observed and described by a lay person. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a). Thus, a layperson is competent to report on the onset and continuity of his symptomatology. See Kahana, 24 Vet. App. at 438; Layno, 6 Vet. App. at 470 (a veteran is competent to report on that of which he or she has personal knowledge). Lay evidence can also be competent and sufficient evidence of a diagnosis if (1) the medical issue is within the competence of a layperson, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. See Kahana, 24 Vet. App. at 433; Davidson, 581 F.3d at 1316; Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For instance, a lay person may speak to etiology in those limited circumstances where a nexus is obvious merely through observation, such as a fall leading to a broken leg. Jandreau, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77. In weighing credibility, VA may consider interest, bias, inconsistent statements, bad character, internal inconsistency, facial plausibility, self-interest, consistency with other evidence of record, malingering, desire for monetary gain, and demeanor of the witness. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 511 (1995). In the present case, the Board finds that the weight of the probative evidence is against the claim for the following reasons. A May 1982 service record shows that the Veteran was diagnosed as having anxiety neurosis stress headaches. She was under severe stress due to her roommate and work. However, a psychiatric examination conducted upon separation in November 1983 shows that the Veteran did not have any psychiatric abnormalities. At that time, she also denied having frequent trouble sleeping, depression, excessive worry, and nervous trouble of any sort. Identical findings were noted in August 1987 reserve reports of medical examination and medical history. In her May 2007 claim, the Veteran raised the issue of entitlement to service connection for stress-related anxiety and noted that it was first found in 1982. In an August 2007 written statement, the Veteran related the sexual harassment incident during service and opined that her psychiatric disorders were related to that event. Private and VA treatment records dated from 1992 to the present reveal diagnoses of major depression, anxiety, and adjustment disorder. To the extent that they also contain diagnoses of PTSD, that specific disorder will be addressed in the remand below. When the Veteran was privately hospitalized in February 1992, she reported the onset of her illness to having a depressive episode in 1988. There was no prior history of inpatient or outpatient psychiatric treatment. When she reported her history of having service in the Army, she said nothing other than that she was given an honorable discharge. In January 2009, the Veteran was provided a VA examination. She detailed the incident during service when she was sexually harassed by another servicemember. She filed a complaint against him and was initially issued an Article 15 for comments she made about this person, but that was eventually dropped. She felt powerless and that no one supported or believed her. The Veteran felt that this affected her desire to pursue a long-term military career and also had other far-reaching effects on her life that she did not realize until now. She did not undergo any psychiatric treatment during service. The VA examiner detailed the Veteran's past treatment, which began with the 1992 hospitalization. Following a thorough examination, the Axis I diagnoses were adjustment disorder with anxiety and alcohol abuse in early partial remission. The Axis II diagnosis was obsession-compulsive personality disorder with prominent histrionic features. The examiner commented that the 1982 entry in the Veteran's service records would likely reflect a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with anxiety if it used today's psychiatric nomenclature. Therefore, the only psychiatric treatment consisted of one consultation with a general physician, and the examiner opined that it was in response to situational stress that was related to the Veteran's job and roommate. Notably, this occurred prior to the described incident of sexual harassment. The examiner opined that this 1982 consultation had no lasting impact on the Veteran's psychological well-being or psychosocial adjustment. Thus, it was the examiner's clinical opinion that her current diagnosis of adjustment disorder is not related to this event. The examiner also opined that the reported event during service of being subject to sexual harassment did not cause the Veteran's adjustment disorder with anxiety symptoms that has been diagnosed on a consistent basis for at least six years. The Veteran described feeling disillusioned at all of the jobs that she had since she left service. The examiner conceded that the event may have been a contributor to this disillusionment. However, it was suspected that her father's alcoholism, violence towards her mother following his Vietnam service, and his PTSD may have also contributed to this disillusionment with authority figures. It was the examiner's clinical impression that the Veteran's current psychological diagnosis had more to do with stressors that have occurred since service, including the tenuous health of her father, her mother's alcoholism, financial difficulties, and being separated from her husband. The unwelcome and flirtatious comments made to her during service were not directly related to the adjustment difficulties she experienced now. In June 2011, the Veteran underwent another VA examination. Her family and military history were given, and the examiner provided a detailed review of the Veteran's treatment history. She provided a thorough explanation of the sexual harassment incident during service. Following a thorough examination, the Veteran was diagnosed as having a history of brief psychotic episodes, but it was noted that she did not currently have a psychiatric condition. The examiner opined that this diagnosis was not related to her treatment for stress and anxiety neurosis in 1982. This incident was not indicative of psychiatric disorder or personal assault. As the previous examiner had stated, this would be called adjustment disorder today, which is given in situations where the individual is experiencing mild psychiatric symptoms in response to situational stress. The examiner also noted that the Veteran did not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. She is not diagnosed by this examiner with any current psychiatric condition because neither her test data, nor her description of the current level of functioning, was suggestive of any psychopathology. She described some mild and intermittent periods of anxiety and depressed mood, but these were summarized as expected reactions to the stressors she currently experienced, including multi-year separation from her husband, an alcoholic mother, a physically ill father, and a lack of social support in her life. These symptoms did not rise to the level of being considered pathological or a clinically diagnosable condition in accordance with the DSM-IV. The record showed treatment for two brief psychotic episodes in the past, but there was no indication that they were related to her claimed stressor from 1982. The Veteran told the examiner that, after she separated from service, she put the sexual harassment incident behind her and did not think much about it until four years ago, when she attended a retreat and met with a military sexual trauma representative. The examiner suggests that the Veteran's longstanding difficulty with authority was reflective of the configuration of her personality and not the in-service incident. These difficulties were not so severe as to necessitate a diagnosis of a personality disorder. Service connection needs to be considered for any acquired psychiatric disability diagnosed during the appeal period. See McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319 (2007). However, the evidence of record weighs against a finding that any acquired psychiatric disorder diagnosed during the appeal period is related to service. None of the VA or private treatment records regarding acquired psychiatric diagnoses contain opinions relating the diagnosis to the Veteran's service. Furthermore, the January 2009 VA examiner determined that the currently-diagnosed acquired psychiatric disorder was not related to service, to include the sexual harassment incident the Veteran described as having occurred. This opinion is provided by a medical professional who reviewed the claims file, conducted a thorough examination, obtained history from the Veteran, and provided diagnoses with opinions supported by the record. The Board finds that this opinion is both competent and adequate and should be afforded significant probative weight. The Veteran asserts that her currently diagnosed acquired psychiatric disorder is due to her description of sexual harassment during service. While lay persons may provide competent testimony as to visible symptoms and manifestations of a disorder, they are generally not competent to offer evidence which requires medical knowledge, such as opinions regarding medical causation or a diagnosis. Jones v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 134, 137 (1994); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); Buchanan v. Nicolson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, even if the Veteran is competent to provide such an opinion in this instance, the opinion given by the January 2009 VA examiner is afforded greater probative weight, as it was provided by a psychologist who included a rationale supportive of his conclusion. Furthermore, the Board finds that the Veteran has not alleged continuity of symptomatology since separation from service. She recounted her one incident during service of having sought treatment for an orthopedic disorder when the doctor found her to be anxious and prescribed medication. However, her post-service medical records contain a psychiatric history that she dates back to having begun in 1988. When the Veteran speaks of the incident of sexual harassment during service, she notes that she did not notice the impact of this event until recently. There is no other evidence of record that suggests continuity of symptomatology, as the first post-service medical evidence of treatment for any psychiatric manifestations is dated in 1992. There are several lay statements contained in the record from the Veteran's family and friends. In these statements, the individuals assert that the Veteran was a different person after she separated from service than she was prior to enlistment. However, in none of these statements do the authors assert continuity. Furthermore, to the extent that they reference service and the possible connection between any acquired psychiatric disorder and its relationship to service, the Board finds that, like the Veteran's statements, they are less probative than the VA examiner's opinion, because they are provided by laypersons who have not examined the Veteran and do not have psychiatric training or expertise. Moreover, to the extent that the Veteran was ever diagnosed as having a personality disorder, such personality disorders are not considered to be disabilities for the purposes of service connection. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(c), 4.9, 4.127; see also Winn v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 510, 516 (1996). In light of the foregoing, the Board finds that the probative evidence of record is not at least in a state of relative equipoise in showing that service connection is warranted for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to exclude PTSD. Accordingly, the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304; Fagan, 573 F.3d at 1287; McClain, 21 Vet. App. at 321. In reaching this conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, that doctrine is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53-56 (1990). ORDER Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder other than PTSD is denied. REMAND The Board finds that additional development is necessary prior to final adjudication of the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD. The claims file contains several VA treatment records containing a diagnosis of PTSD, to include March and June 2010 outpatient entries showing specific consideration of the criteria associated with a diagnosis of PTSD in the DSM-IV. The evaluation was conducted and diagnosis given by a social worker. See Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 153 (1997) (If PTSD was diagnosed by a medical professional, VA must assume that the diagnosis meets the DSM-IV criteria relating to adequacy of the symptomatology and sufficiency of the stressor.). Even though the VA examiners found that the Veteran did not have a diagnosis of PTSD, these treatment reports show that, at some point during the appeal period, she may have possibly had a diagnosis. These diagnoses of PTSD were based upon the Veteran's claimed stressor of having been subject to sexual harassment during service. In written statements and during her VA examinations, the Veteran described the incident in service when her executive officer made what she considered sexually harassing statements towards her. She indicated in an August 2007 written statement that she was advised to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She then filed that claim. While that was being investigated, she stated that she was overheard making a negative statement about her executive officer. He threatened to issue her an Article 15 for this remark, which the Veteran refused to sign. She preferred a court martial, so she would have the chance to report her executive commander's behavior. Thereafter, the court martial was not pursued, and the Article 15 was dropped. The Veteran stated that this incident occurred while she was stationed at Fort Polk. Her service personnel records show that the Veteran was stationed at Fort Polk from December 1, 1982, to August 18, 1983. She also noted during her June 2011 examination that the lieutenant who harassed her was not at Fort Polk for her first three months in that location. She further stated that, after this incident and her raising the EEOC complaint, the Veteran was transferred to a different unit. Her personnel records show that, on June 10, 1983, she was transferred to a different unit but remained at Fort Polk. Therefore, the approximate date range during which this alleged incident is said to have occurred is between March 1, 1983, and June 10, 1983. While the Veteran's service personnel records were obtained and are associated with the physical claims file, there is no evidence in the record that the RO attempted to obtain a copy of the Veteran's EEOC complaint or any evidence related to the Article 15 or court martial associated with this incident. Given the diagnosis of PTSD dated during the appeal period that was given in response to the Veteran's description of this event, the Board finds that a remand is necessary to attempt to verify her claimed stressor. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. The RO/AMC should take all appropriate steps to verify the Veteran's claimed stressor of having been subject to sexual harassment during service. This should include all possible attempts to obtain any evidence of an EEOC complaint, Article 15, or court martial relative to the Veteran. The Veteran has provided information suggesting that these events occurred between March 1, 1983, and June 10, 1983, at Fort Polk, and the Veteran has provided the lieutenant's name. 2. The RO/AMC should refer the Veteran's claims folder to the June 2011 VA examiner or, if she is unavailable, to another suitably qualified VA examiner for a clarifying opinion as to the nature and etiology of any PTSD that may have been present at any time during the pendency of the appeal. The RO should provide the examiner with a summary of any verified in-service stressors, and the examiner must be instructed that only these events and any personal assault he or she determines to have occurred in service may be considered for the purpose of determining whether exposure to an in-service stressor has resulted in PTSD. The examiner is requested to review all pertinent records associated with the claims file, including the Veteran's service treatment records, post-service medical records, and assertions. The examiner should specifically review the post-service treatment records documenting the Veteran as having been previously diagnosed with PTSD. It should be noted that the requirement of a current disability is satisfied when a claimant has a disability at the time a claim for VA disability compensation is filed or at any point during the pendency of that claim. The examiner should indicate whether there is any reason to support or doubt the validity of the prior diagnoses of PTSD. If the examiner determines that the Veteran had PTSD at any point during the pendency of the appeal (even if she does not currently have the disorder), the examiner should then comment upon the link between the current symptomatology and any verified in-service stressor, including personal assault. A clear rationale for all opinions would be helpful and a discussion of the facts and medical principles involved would be of considerable assistance to the Board. Since it is important "that each disability be viewed in relation to its history[,]" 38 C.F.R. § 4.1, copies of all pertinent records in the appellant's claims file, or in the alternative, the claims file, must be made available to the examiner for review. 3. After completing these actions, conduct any other development as may be indicated by a response received as a consequence of the actions taken in the preceding paragraphs. Ensure that there has been compliance with the remand directives. 4. When the development has been completed, review the case on the basis of additional evidence. If any benefit sought is not granted, the Veteran and her representative should be furnished a Supplemental Statement of the Case and be afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond before the record is returned to the Board for further review. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2012). ______________________________________________ JESSICA J. WILLS Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs