Citation Nr: 1306962 Decision Date: 02/28/13 Archive Date: 03/01/13 DOCKET NO. 06-30 738 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Sioux Falls, South Dakota THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for metastatic poorly differentiated squamous cell carcinoma of the left neck lymph node (referred to hereinafter simply as squamous cell carcinoma) or residuals thereof. REPRESENTATION Veteran represented by: The American Legion ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD S. Becker, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from May 1967 to February 1971. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a June 2005 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Among other things, service connection for squamous cell carcinoma, unknown primary site, and for a sinus condition was denied therein. The Veteran appealed each of these determinations. In September 2010, the Board remanded for additional development. In May 2012, the Board denied service connection for a sinus disorder. This issue accordingly no longer is before the Board. Service connection for squamous cell carcinoma once again was remanded for additional development. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran currently does not have squamous cell carcinoma, and any current residuals thereof are not related in any manner to his service or to his only service-connected disability. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for establishing service connection for squamous cell carcinoma or residuals thereof have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1116, 1153, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (2006); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION I. Duties to Notify and Assist Before addressing the merits, the Board notes that VA has a duty to notify and a duty to assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant and his representative, if any, of any information and any medical or lay evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). These notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service-connection claim (Veteran status, existence of a disability, a connection between the Veteran's service and the disability, degree of disability, and effective date of the disability). Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Information that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded must be included. Id. Notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ). However, there is no error in failing to provide such prior notice when it was not required at the time of the initial AOJ decision. A content complying notice and proper subsequent process instead must be provided in these cases. Pelegrini, 18 Vet. App. at 112. Neither the Veteran nor his representative has alleged prejudice with respect to notice, as is required. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009)(overturning the holding in Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881 (Fed. Cir. 2007), that all VCAA errors are presumed prejudicial unless VA shows that the essential fairness of the adjudication was not affected); see also Goodwin v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 128 (2008); Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Dunlap v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 112 (2007). None is found by the Board. Indeed, VA's duty to notify has been satisfied. The Veteran was informed via letters dated in November 2004 and March 2005 of the criteria for establishing service connection, the evidence required in this regard, and his and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence. He accordingly was notified of all notice elements then required prior to the initial adjudication by the AOJ, which in this case also is the RO, in June 2005. Nothing more is required with respect to them. Notification of the disability evaluation and effective date elements was provided after the requirement arose to do so in 2006. Indeed, such was done in an October 2006 letter. Proper process subsequently was achieved by way of November 2011 and December 2012 supplemental statements of the case (SSOCs). Even if there had not been proper VA process, there is no prejudice to the Veteran in the timing of his notification regarding the disability evaluation and effective date elements. No disability evaluation or effective date indeed will be assigned since service connection is denied herein. Via a September 2010 letter, which was sent in compliance with the Board's September 2010 remand, the Veteran again was notified of all of the aforementioned elements. This went above and beyond what is required. He additionally was notified of the criteria for establishing service connection on a secondary basis. A timing error is conceded in that this notification occurred well after instead of before the June 2005 initial adjudication by the AOJ/RO. However, it was cured. The proper process in November 2011 and December 2012 SSOCs indeed consisted of readjudication. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (a notice timing problem can be cured by issuance of notice followed by readjudication such as in a SSOC); see also Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370 (2006). Pursuant to the duty to assist, VA is required to aid the claimant in the procurement of service treatment records and other pertinent treatment records, whether or not they are in Federal custody. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(b-c); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159(c)(1-3). VA also is required to provide a medical examination and/or obtain a medical opinion when necessary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159(c)(4). The Veteran's service treatment records, service personnel records, and identified private treatment records from several physicians and facilities have been obtained. This was through VA's efforts, him submitting them on his own behalf, or both. Identified treatment records from one private physician are not of record. In response to VA's request for such records, the physician indicated "not this pt." The June 2005 rating decision noted that this physician indicated the Veteran was not his patient. Neither the Veteran nor his representative mentioned treatment records from this private physician thereafter. Of further note, no VA treatment records have been obtained. Yet none have been identified by the Veteran. In compliance with the Board's September 2010 remand, a VA medical examination was conducted and a VA medical opinion was rendered in October 2010. The Board's May 2012 remand found the medical opinion to be incomplete. Pursuant thereto, another VA medical opinion was rendered in June 2012. Both examiners reviewed the Veteran's claims file. The June 2012 examiner also reviewed his "electronic record." Both examiners further interviewed the Veteran. A pertinent physical assessment was conducted by the October 2010 examiner. As is discussed below in greater detail, the June 2012 examiner rendered a complete opinion. All questions necessary to render the determination made herein thus have been answered. The October 2010 VA examination, October 2010 VA opinion, and the June 2012 VA opinion accordingly collectively are adequate. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007) (defining adequacy with respect to medical examinations and opinions as providing sufficient detail so that the Board can perform a fully informed evaluation). Acknowledgement is given to the fact that the Board's May 2012 remand directed that the October 2010 examiner, a physician, or any other physician render the second VA medical opinion. The June 2012 examiner is a physician's assistant. Nevertheless, there has been substantial compliance with the remand directives. The main objective of the remand was securing an adequate opinion. The Board felt that a physician would be in a good position to render such an opinion. Yet this does not mean that another medical professional such as a physician's assistant is not also in a good position to render such an opinion. Indeed, the competence of an examiner may be assumed. Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This includes the competence of a physician's assistant. Cox v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 563 (2007). Of final import here is that the Veteran and his representative have not questioned the competence of the June 2012 examiner. See Hilkert v. West, 12 Vet. App. 145 (1999) (the claimant bears the burden of showing that the Board's reliance on an examiner's opinion was erroneous). Significantly, neither the Veteran nor his representative has identified any further development necessary for a fair adjudication of the claim that has not been completed. The record also does not indicate any such development. The Board thus finds that VA's duty to assist has been satisfied. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd, 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio, 16 Vet. App. at 183. The duty to notify and the duty to assist both having been met, appellate review may proceed without prejudice to the Veteran. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). II. Service Connection The Veteran contends that his squamous cell carcinoma is related to his service. Specifically, he claims this carcinoma is the result of his exposure to an herbicide agent during his service. He further claims this carcinoma is the result of his participation in Project Shipboard Hazard and Defense (SHAD) during his service. In the alternative, the Veteran contends that his squamous cell carcinoma is related to his service-connected acne vulgaris of the face and back with cystic formation (referred to hereinafter simply as acne vulgaris). Service connection "basically means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred coincident with service . . . or if preexisting such service, was aggravated therein." 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a); 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110. To establish service connection, there generally must be (1) evidence of a current disability, (2) evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of an injury or disease, and (3) evidence of a nexus between the current disability and the in-service disease or injury. Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247 (1999); Barr, 21 Vet. App. at 303. Service connection also may be established if there is chronicity or continuity. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). If a chronic disease is shown in service, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, may be service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. Id.; Barr, 21 Vet. App. at 303. Continuity of symptomatology post-service is required where a condition in service is noted but is not, in fact, chronic or where a diagnosis of chronicity legitimately may be questioned. Id.; Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488 (1997). Further, service connection may be established for any disease diagnosed after separation when the evidence establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection is presumed for some diseases even when there is no record of such disease during service if certain requirements are met. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Applicable here are those for presumptive service connection for chronic diseases. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112(a); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a), 3.309(a). Also applicable here are those for presumptive service connection for diseases associated with exposure to an herbicide agent. A requirement for both is that the Veteran served 90 days or more during a period of war or after December 31, 1946. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(1). With respect to diseases associated with exposure to an herbicide agent, such exposure during service is required. A Veteran is deemed to have been exposed to an herbicide agent if he served in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) between January 9, 1962, and May 7, 1975. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(f); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii); McCartt v. West, 12 Vet. App. 164 (1999). The manifestation of a chronic disease or disease associated with exposure to an herbicide agent within a particular time period is the final requirement. For malignant tumors, which are considered chronic, manifestation must have been to a compensable degree within one year from the date of separation from service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1101(3), 1112(a)(1); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a)(2-3), 3.309(a). Chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne, porphyria cutanea tarda, and acute and subacute peripheral neuropathy, which have been linked by VA to exposure to an herbicide agent, must have been manifest to a compensable degree within one year of the last date on which there was such exposure during service. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a)(6), 3.309(e). AL amyloidosis, type II diabetes, Hodgkin's disease, ischemic heart disease, all chronic B-cell leukemias, multiply myeloma, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, Parkinson's disease, prostate cancer, respiratory cancers (cancer of the lung, bronchus, larynx, or trachea), and soft tissue sarcoma (other than osteosarcoma, chondrosarcoma, Kaposi's sarcoma, and mesothelioma), which also have been linked by VA to exposure to an herbicide agent, must manifest to a compensable degree at any time after service. Id. Affirmative evidence rebutting in-service incurrence or aggravation of a chronic disease or disease associated with exposure to an herbicide agent must be taken into consideration even if the aforementioned requirements are met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1113, 1153; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(d), 3.309(a). Where service connection cannot be presumed, service connection still may be established with proof of actual direct causation. Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Brock v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 155 (1997); McCartt, 12 Vet. App. at 164. Direct service connection still may be established, in other words. Secondary service connection means that a current non-service-connected disability "is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury." 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). Establishing service connection on a secondary basis requires showing (1) that a current disability exists and (2) that the current disability was either (a) proximately caused by or (b) proximately aggravated by a service-connected disability. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 was amended effective October 10, 2006, during the pendency of this matter. See 71 Fed. Reg. 52,744-52,747 (Sept. 7, 2006). Although the stated intent was merely to implement Allen, the amendment has caused a substantive change in the way VA has applied the regulation. It indeed requires, with respect to aggravation, the establishment of a pre-aggravation baseline level of disability and comparison with the current level of disability. As the former version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 lacking this requirement is more favorable to the Veteran, it will be applied rather than the amended version. See Kuzma v. Principi, 341 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (the earlier version of a regulation is applied for the period prior to and after the effective date of a change when the earlier version is more favorable). The Board must account for evidence that it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive and provide reasons for rejecting any material evidence favorable to the Veteran. See Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36 (1994), Masors v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 181 (1992); Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614 (1992); Hatlestad v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 164 (1991); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Therefore, an assessment of the probative value of the lay evidence in addition to the medical evidence must be undertaken. Lay evidence indeed may be sufficient by itself to support a claim. Barr, 21 Vet. App. at 307. This is the case where the evidence is both competent and credible. Competency is "a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered" whereas credibility is "a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted." Layno v. Brown, 6. Vet. App. 465 (1994). A lay person is competent to provide testimony or statements relating to facts of events that the lay person observed or that is within the realm of his/her personal knowledge. Id. In weighing credibility, discounting of competent testimony or statements from a lay person may occur "in the light of its own inherent characteristics and its relationship to other items of evidence." Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Factors for consideration therefore include a showing of interest, self-interest, bias, inconsistent statements, inconsistency with other evidence of record, facial implausibility, bad character, malingering, desire for monetary gain, and witness demeanor. See Pond v. West, 12 Vet. App. 341 (1999); Macarubbo v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 388 (1997); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995); Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24 (1991). "[T]he Board cannot determine that lay testimony or a lay statement lacks credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence." Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, the lack of such evidence in combination with other factors may lead to the determination the lay testimony or statement is not credible. The benefit of the doubt is given to the Veteran when there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 49. As such, the Veteran prevails when the evidence supports his claim or is in relative equipoise but does not prevail when the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. Id. Although all the evidence has been reviewed, only the most salient and relevant evidence is discussed below. Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the Board must review the entire record but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). The evidence leads the Board to conclude that service connection for squamous cell carcinoma is not warranted. All necessary requirements for establishing entitlement to the benefit are not met. A current disability exists when there is a disability at the time a claim is filed or at any time during the pendency of such claim. McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319 (2007). The Veteran filed his claim in September 2004. He has not had squamous cell carcinoma within the timeframe from then to present. No diagnosis of such carcinoma has been made by any medical professional during this period. Private treatment records show that a diagnosis of such carcinoma was made, but that was in August 1992. They additionally show that the Veteran underwent radiation therapy in September and October 1992. No mention was made in them of his squamous cell carcinoma recurring. There is no indication that the Veteran has medical knowledge, training, or experience, and thus he is a lay person. A lay person is competent to diagnose a condition only when (1) the lay person is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the lay person is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Conditions such as flat feet, a dislocated shoulder, certain skin ailments, tinnitus, and varicose veins are examples of conditions a lay person is competent to identify. Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1372; Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456 (2007); Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370 (2002); Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 398 (1995). Squamous cell carcinoma, in contrast, is not a condition a lay person is competent to identify. It is common knowledge that confirming the presence of cancer and the specific type of cancer if it is present requires diagnostic testing. The Veteran has not reported a contemporaneous medical diagnosis or described symptoms supporting a later medical diagnosis. Indeed, he has not contended that he had squamous cell carcinoma at least at some point from September 2004 onward. He rather indicated there had been no recurrence at the October 2010 VA examination. Reiteration finally is made to the fact that there is no current medical diagnosis. As such, the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that the Veteran currently has squamous cell carcinoma. There can be no valid claim absent a current disability. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223 (1992). Service connection for squamous cell carcinoma accordingly is denied. The Veteran has reported that he currently has residuals of his squamous cell carcinoma. Specifically, he has complained that this carcinoma and/or the radiation therapy that treated it produced loss of taste and smell, impaired swallowing ability, loss of voice occasionally, decreased feeling near the site of the tumor, jaw locking, sinus trouble, tooth decay and ultimate loss, destroyed hair follicles (resulting in the inability to grow a beard), dizziness, high blood pressure, and an arteriovenous malformation (AVM) which in turn produced vision damage, memory loss, and a change in personality. The Veteran is competent to enumerate symptoms because they would be experienced by him personally. He also is credible to enumerate symptoms. Simply put, there is no significant reason to doubt him. His complaints are consistent with one another. The other evidence is not to the contrary. The Veteran's self-interest in gaining financially is recognized. If service connection is granted, he potentially could receive greater VA compensation benefits than he currently receives. Yet this factor does not outweigh the aforementioned factors. It is facially plausible that at least some of the symptoms the Veteran currently complains of constitute residuals of his squamous cell carcinoma. Given that this carcinoma was of the left neck lymph node, this finding particularly applies to the symptoms associated with the neck and head. Whether or not the symptoms of dizziness, AVM, and high blood pressure constitute residuals of the Veteran's squamous cell carcinoma is unclear. Development in this regard has not been undertaken. However, such development is not necessary. That the symptoms the Veteran complains of are residuals of his carcinoma shall be presumed for the sake of argument. In other words, the Board presumes the position most favorable to the Veteran. Service connection nevertheless is denied. Of note at this juncture is that the AOJ/RO's June 2005 rating decision denied service connection for hypertension, AVM, loss of hair follicles, loss of smell, loss of teeth, loss of taste, loss of voice, and lock jaw. The Veteran did not appeal any of these determinations. His appeal of the denial of service connection for a sinus condition/disorder, as set forth above, resulted in a denial by the Board in May 2012. Thus, several of his presumed squamous cell carcinoma residuals no longer are at issue. With respect to the Veteran's presumed squamous cell carcinoma residuals remaining at issue, service connection cannot be awarded outright. Service connection can only be awarded if this carcinoma, when it existed, could have been service-connected. This follows from the fact that the residuals would not exist but for the carcinoma and the radiation therapy used to treat it. There is no indication that the Veteran manifested squamous cell carcinoma or symptoms thereof during his service. He does not contend this to be the case. Service treatment records further are completely silent for carcinoma. The only abnormal findings made at the Veteran's January 1971 separation examination indeed were the presence of identifying body marks, scars, and/or tattoos. Accordingly, the in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease is not found. Regarding the in-service incurrence or aggravation of an injury, the Veteran contends he participated in Project SHAD as well as was exposed to herbicides. He associates the former with his service aboard the USS Berkeley and the latter with his service aboard the USS Long Beach. Service personnel records confirm that the Veteran served aboard the USS Long Beach from at least September to December 1968 and aboard the USS Berkeley from at least March 1969 to October 1970. Immediately following the Veteran's service, the United States Navy confirmed that he served aboard the USS Long Beach from April to December 1968 and aboard the USS Berkeley from December 1968 to January 1971. An article submitted by the Veteran's representative describes Project SHAD as part of a larger effort called Project 112, which was a comprehensive program initiated in 1962 by the Department of Defense (DoD) to protect and defend against potential chemical and biological warfare threats. It notes that Project SHAD encompassed a series of tests by the DoD to determine the vulnerability of United States warships to attack with chemical and biological warfare agents and the potential risk to American forces posed by those agents. The Veteran is competent to state that he participated in Project SHAD because such would have been within his personal experience. However, he is not credible in this regard because the other evidence is to the contrary. The DoD has confirmed that the USS Berkeley was involved with one Project SHAD test, the high low test. It further has been confirmed by the DoD that this test took place in January and February 1965. Because this timeframe is prior to the Veteran's entry into service as well as prior to his service aboard the USS Berkeley, he did not participate in Project SHAD. That leaves for consideration in-service herbicide exposure. There is no indication in the Veteran's service treatment records or service personnel records that he was exposed to herbicides during his service. The National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) responded in November 2004 to a Personnel Information Exchange System (PIES) request for any documents showing his exposure to herbicides was that there were no records in this regard. As such, whether or not the Veteran had such exposure depends on whether it otherwise can be shown that he served in the RVN. "Service in the RVN includes service in the waters offshore . . . if the conditions of service involved duty or visitation in the RVN." 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii). VA's interpretation of this to mean that the Veteran must have been present on the land mass or "brown" inland waters of the RVN at some point during service has been upheld. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In response to another PIES request for the Veteran's dates of service in the RVN, the NPRC in December 2004 was unable to determine whether or not he had in-country service in the RVN. Yet it was noted that both the USS Long Beach and the USS Berkeley were in the official waters of the RVN during the Veteran's service aboard them. One of the periods the USS Long Beach specifically was noted to be in official RVN waters was from May 4, 1968, to June 11, 1968. The deck logs for this ship for May 5, 1968, were reviewed via the Defense Personnel Records Image Retrieval System of the United States Armed Services Center for Unit Records Research (CURR) (now renamed the Joint Service Records Research Center or JSRRC). They indicated that the USS Long Beach came to a stand in Da Nang Harbor and sent a utility boat into port with 31 passengers. The Veteran's presence in Da Nang Harbor does not equate to service in the RVN, as it is an open deep-water harbor. See VA Adjudication Procedure Manual (M21-1MR), Part IV, Subpart ii, Chap. 2, Sec. C, Para. 10.k. It is "blue" water rather than "brown" water, in other words. However, the Veteran asserts that he was one of several crewmembers who went ashore to the land mass for a briefing while the ship was in Da Nang Harbor. He is competent to do so because going ashore would have been in his personal experience. He also is credible. The deck logs prove that 31 crewmembers did go ashore, though names were not specified. There is no evidence that the Veteran was not one of these crewmembers. It is facially plausible that he was one of these crewmembers. He therefore served in the RVN. Because this service on May 5, 1968, was between January 9, 1962, and May 7, 1975, he is presumed to have been exposed to an herbicide agent. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider the other periods the USS Long Beach was in official RVN waters with the Veteran aboard as well as to consider any such periods the USS Berkeley was in official RVN waters with the Veteran aboard. That the Veteran served more than 90 days both during a period of war as well as after December 31, 1946, is undisputed. Indeed, his service was from May 1967 to February 1971. It thus spanned almost four years. All was during the Vietnam era. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 101(29)(A); 38 C.F.R. § 3.2(f) (both defining the Vietnam era as beginning on February 28, 1961, and ending on May 7, 1975, in the case of a Veteran who served in the RVN during that period). Notwithstanding that the Veteran served more than 90 days during a period of war after December 31, 1946, and that he had herbicide exposure therein, service connection for squamous cell carcinoma cannot be presumed. Squamous cell carcinoma is not listed among the diseases associated with exposure to an herbicide agent. The VA Secretary has determined that there is no positive association between such exposure and any condition that is not so listed or for which he has not determined should be so listed. See 67 Fed. Reg. 42,600 (June 24, 2002). Acknowledgement is given to the fact that private treatment records show the Veteran's squamous cell carcinoma was from an unknown primary. However, a physician noted in a September 1992 private treatment record that squamous cell carcinoma commonly "arises from a head and neck primary that may be either nasopharynx or pharynx, oral cavity, hypopharynx[,] or base of the tongue." Cancers of the oral cavity (including lips and tongue), pharynx (including tonsils), and nasal cavity (including ears and sinuses) specifically have been determined by the Secretary not to be positively associated with herbicide exposure. See Determinations Concerning Illnesses Discussed in National Academy of Sciences Report: Veterans and Agent Orange: Update 2010, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,924 (Aug. 10, 2012); see also Health Outcomes Not Associated With Exposure to Certain Herbicide Agents: Veterans and Agent Orange: Update 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,332 (Dec. 27, 2010); Health Effects Not Associated With Exposure to Certain Herbicide Agents, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,540 (June 8, 2010). The same specific determination has been made for cancers at unspecified sites. Id. Service connection also cannot be presumed for the Veteran's squamous cell carcinoma as the chronic disease of malignant tumors. There is no indication that he manifested his squamous cell carcinoma to any degree, much less to a compensable degree, within one year from his February 1971 separation from service. He does not contend this to be the case. Further, no medical evidence confirms this to be the case. There are no treatment records dated between February 1971 and February 1972. A VA medical examination was performed in February 1972, but it is makes no mention whatsoever to squamous cell carcinoma. Regarding chronicity and continuity of symptomatology, it is reiterated that the Veteran did not manifest squamous cell carcinoma or symptoms thereof during his service. It follows that there is neither chronicity, which requires a showing of a chronic disease during service, nor continuity, which requires at least a notation of a condition during service, exists. The lack of any manifestation of squamous cell carcinoma within the first post-service year bolsters this conclusion. So does the lack of any indication of squamous cell carcinoma until August 1992, as discussed above. This equates to over 21 years following the Veteran's separation from service. The passage of many years between service separation and documentation of a claimed disability is a factor that tends to weigh against service connection. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000). What remains is consideration of whether the Veteran's squamous cell carcinoma is due to his service, to include his herbicide exposure, or proximately caused or aggravated by his service-connected acne vulgaris. He clearly believes such a nexus exists. A lay belief sometimes is sufficient to prove nexus. See Davidson, 581 F.3d at 1313) (quoting Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1372, as follows: "explicitly rejected [is] the view ... that 'competent medical evidence is required ... [when] the determinative issue involves ... etiology'"). It indeed is error to suggest that lay evidence can never be sufficient to satisfy the nexus requirement. See Colantonio v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the question of whether there exists a nexus in this particular case falls outside the province of a lay person. It instead is a medical question. Of note in this regard are the numerous potential causes of carcinoma, the number of years that passed between its manifestation and the Veteran's separation from service, and the complexities of the body parts and systems of the head and neck. Only those with specialized medical knowledge, training, and/or experience are competent where the determinative issue is one of medical causation. See Jones v. West, 12 Vet. App. 460 (1999). The Veteran, as a lay person without such knowledge, training, and/or experience, thus is not competent to render an opinion that there exists a nexus between his squamous cell carcinoma and his service or his service-connected acne vulgaris. See Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428 (2011); Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1372. Two medical opinions concerning nexus are of record. Specifically, the October 2010 VA examiner opined that the Veteran's squamous cell carcinoma was not due to his service or due to his service-connected acne vulgaris. This carcinoma was not caused by his service or his service-connected acne vulgaris, in other words. The June 2012 VA examiner opined that the Veteran's squamous cell carcinoma and any residuals thereof was less likely than not incurred in or caused by his service. This includes his in-service herbicide exposure. This examiner additionally opined that the Veteran's squamous cell carcinoma and any residuals thereof was less likely than not proximately due to or the result of his service-connected acne vulgaris. Both causation as well as aggravation were considered in this regard. In addition to lay evidence, the probative value of medical evidence may be discounted "in the light of its own inherent characteristics and its relationship to other items of evidence." Madden, 125 F.3d at 1477. Factors that may be considered in assessing the probative value of a medical opinion include a physician's access to the claims file or other pertinent evidence, the thoroughness and detail of the opinion, the accuracy of the factual premise underlying the opinion, the scope of examination, the rationale for the opinion offered, the degree of certainty provided, and the qualifications and expertise of the examiner. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008); Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120 (2007); Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444 (2000); Black v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 297 (1997); Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 405 (1994); Sklar v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 140 (1993); Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458 (1993); Guerrieri v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 467 (1993). The qualifications and expertise of both VA examiners are not problematic. As discussed above, each is assumed competent. Each indeed is a medical professional since the October 2010 examiner is a physician and the June 2012 examiner is a physician's assistant. Also as discussed above, the claims file was reviewed by each examiner while the June 2012 examination additionally reviewed the Veteran's "electronic record." It further is reiterated that each examiner interviewed the Veteran. The October 2010 examiner additionally performed a pertinent physical assessment. The June 2012 examiner did not, but this examiner had the benefit of reviewing the previous assessment. Review, interview, and examination helps ensure the accuracy of the factual premises underlying an opinion. Here, no inaccuracy is detected in either of the opinions. Both opinions were supported by a rationale. The October 2010 examiner noted that there was no indication of squamous cell carcinoma during the Veteran's service or within the first year thereafter. This examiner also indicated having reviewed medical literature as to the etiology of squamous cell carcinoma unknown primary. It was determined on this basis that "there is no cogent or relevent (sic) pathophysiological medical mechanism or relationship in terms of no cause and effect to link" service or acne vulgaris as causes of squamous cell carcinoma. The June 2012 examiner noted that there was no indication of squamous cell carcinoma during the Veteran's service and that it does not qualify for presumptive service connection due to in-service herbicide exposure. This examiner also indicated having reviewed current medical literature and finding not even a suggestion of a causal or aggravation relationship between squamous cell carcinoma and its residuals and acne vulgaris. It thus was concluded that "there is no medical relationship" between the Veteran's squamous cell carcinoma and any residuals stemming therefrom and his acne vulgaris. Both of the opinions were sufficiently thorough and detailed, as the rationale for each highlighted pertinent evidence as well as current medical knowledge. Finally, no hesitation or uncertainty was expressed by the examiners in rendering the opinions. They therefore are entitled to substantial probative value. Of further import, the opinions of the October 2010 examiner and the June 2012 examiner are in agreement. The June 2012 examiner's opinion is more complete, since it considers aggravation in addition to causation from the Veteran's service-connected acne vulgaris and herbicide exposure in addition to other aspects of the Veteran's service, but the portions of it that overlap with the October 2010 examiner's opinion all are negative. The portions of it that do not overlap also are negative. There are no positive medical opinions, whether regarding a nexus to the Veteran's service including herbicide exposure, a causation nexus to his service-connected acne vulgaris, or an aggravation nexus to his service-connected acne vulgaris. He has not supplied any such opinion. The private treatment records do not contain any such opinion. In sum, the Veteran does not have squamous cell carcinoma currently although he did have it in the past. The symptoms he currently complains of are presumed, for the sake of argument, to be residuals of this carcinoma. Only some of these residuals remain at issue, and they can be service-connected only if the squamous cell carcinoma could have been service-connected. Yet it could not have been. The Veteran did not manifest squamous cell carcinoma or symptoms thereof during service. Service connection for this carcinoma cannot be presumed as a result of his in-service herbicide exposure, and he was not part of Project SHAD in-service. Chronicity and continuity of symptomatology are not shown. A nexus between the Veteran's carcinoma and his service, to include exposure to an herbicide agent, or between his carcinoma and his service-connected acne vulgaris, to include both causation and aggravation, has not been established. It cannot be said, in light of the aforementioned, that his squamous cell carcinoma was incurred during his service despite being diagnosed after his separation therefrom. The preponderance of the evidence is against service connection for squamous cell carcinoma or residuals thereof under all applicable theories of entitlement. As such, this benefit is denied and the doctrine of reasonable doubt is not applicable. ORDER Service connection for squamous cell carcinoma or residuals thereof is denied. ____________________________________________ MATTHEW D. TENNER Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs