Citation Nr: 1312896 Decision Date: 04/18/13 Archive Date: 05/02/13 DOCKET NO. 10-06 843 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Chicago, Illinois THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for a traumatic brain injury (TBI). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: AMVETS ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD T. Sherrard, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran, who is the Appellant in this case, had active service from January 2001 to June 2005, with service in Iraq from March 2004 to March 2005. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) from a June 2009 rating decision by the above Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). The Board has not only reviewed the Veteran's physical claims file but also the Veteran's file on the "Virtual VA" system to insure a total review of the evidence. FINDINGS OF FACT The Veteran did not incur a relevant injury or event manifesting a TBI during active service, TBI symptoms were not chronic in service, and TBI symptoms have not been continuous since service separation. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for a TBI have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 1101, 1110, 5103(a), 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). For the showing of chronic disease in service, there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. With chronic disease as such in service, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. The claimed condition at issue is not a "chronic disease" listed under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a); therefore, 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(b) (requiring continuity of a condition after service if chronicity is not found in service) does not apply. See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Establishing service connection generally requires (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Court has held that "Congress specifically limits entitlement for service-connected disease or injury to cases where such incidents have resulted in a disability. In the absence of proof of a present disability there can be no valid claim." Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992); see also Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141, 143-44 (1992). In rendering a decision on appeal, the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant. See Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36, 39-40 (1994); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 57 (1990). Competency of evidence differs from weight and credibility. Competency is a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered by the trier of fact, while credibility is a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) ("although interest may affect the credibility of testimony, it does not affect competency to testify"). Lay testimony is competent when it regards the readily observable features or symptoms of injury or illness and "may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection." See Layno, 6 Vet. App. at 469; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2). The Court has emphasized that when a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. In such cases, the Board is within its province to weigh that testimony and to make a credibility determination as to whether that evidence supports a finding of service incurrence and continuity of symptomatology sufficient to establish service connection. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009). Lay statements may serve to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (addressing lay evidence as potentially competent to support presence of disability even where not corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence). Generally, the degree of probative value which may be attributed to a medical opinion issued by a VA or private treatment provider takes into account such factors as its thoroughness and degree of detail, and whether there was review of a veteran's claims file. See Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444, 448-9 (2000). Also significant is whether the examining medical provider had a sufficiently clear and well-reasoned rationale, as well as a basis in objective supporting clinical data. See Bloom v. West, 12 Vet. App. 185, 187 (1999); Hernandez-Toyens v. West, 11 Vet. App. 379, 382 (1998); see also Claiborne v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 181, 186 (2005) (rejecting medical opinions that did not indicate whether the physicians actually examined the veteran, did not provide the extent of any examination, and did not provide any supporting clinical data). The Court has held that a bare conclusion, even one reached by a health care professional, is not probative without a factual predicate in the record. Miller v. West, 11 Vet. App. 345, 348 (1998). A significant factor to be considered for any opinion is the accuracy of the factual predicate, regardless of whether the information supporting the opinion is obtained by review of medical records or lay reports of injury, symptoms and/or treatment. See Harris v. West, 203 F.3d 1347, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (examiner opinion based on accurate lay history deemed competent medical evidence in support of the claim); Kowalski v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 171, 177 (2005) (holding that a medical opinion cannot be disregarded solely on the rationale that the medical opinion was based on history given by the veteran); Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458, 461 (1993) (holding that the Board may reject a medical opinion based on an inaccurate factual basis). When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with a veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against a claim, in which case, the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. The Board has reviewed all the evidence in the Veteran's claims file. Although the Board has an obligation to provide adequate reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no requirement that the evidence submitted by a veteran or obtained on his behalf be discussed in detail. Rather, the Board's analysis below will focus specifically on what evidence is needed to substantiate the claim and what the evidence in the claims file shows, or fails to show, with respect to the claim. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122, 128-30 (2000). In this case, the Veteran contends that his current TBI is due to two separate head injuries that occurred during active service. First, he avers that, during the summer of 2004, while stationed in Iraq, he was knocked onto his back/buttocks by a rocket that landed three or four feet away from him. Sometime after this incident, a second head injury occurred when he fell off of his bicycle and may have been knocked unconscious. Following these incidents, he states he began to suffer ringing in his ears, headaches, and memory loss. After a review of all the evidence of record, lay and medical, the Board finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that no relevant injury or disease occurred during active service, and that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that symptoms of a TBI were not chronic in service. At a March 2005 Post-Deployment Health Assessment, the Veteran indicated that, during his deployment from March 2004 to March 2005, his health stayed about the same or got better, providing evidence against his own claim. He also specifically denied symptoms including headaches, difficulty remembering, and ringing of the ears, providing more evidence against this own claim. In addition, at a June 2005 separation examination, the Veteran specifically denied the occurrence of a head injury, memory loss, amnesia, headaches, or a period of unconsciousness or concussion, providing more evidence against this claim. In short, there are no complaints, symptoms, findings, history, diagnoses, or treatment of a head injury or a TBI during active service. While the Board clearly concedes the fact that head injuries may have gone untreated or unreported during the Veteran's honorable service in Iraq, the Veteran's own in-service statements in which he denied head injuries or related symptoms are highly probative evidence against his current claim. In addition, a February 2009 VA treatment note indicates that the Veteran stated he "might have hit [his] head" when the rocket exploded in the summer of 2004, but that he was not really paying attention. Further, he stated that he checked himself for injuries and, at the time, did not feel that he had injured himself. Thus, even his later, post-service statements contradict his current contentions as to the occurrence of an in-service head injury (two of them). The Board next finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that symptoms of a head injury or TBI have not been continuous since separation from active service in June 2005. Following service separation in June 2005, the evidence of record does not show any complaints, diagnosis, or treatment for a head injury or TBI until January 2009, when VA treatment records show that during a TBI screening, the Veteran reported a blow to the head followed by a loss of consciousness during his deployment to Iraq, followed by symptoms of dizziness, memory loss, and sleep problems. The absence of post-service complaints, findings, diagnosis, or treatment for three-and-a-half years after service separation until 2009 is one factor that tends to weigh against a finding of continuous symptoms of a head injury or TBI after service separation. See Buchanan, 451 F.3d 1336 (the lack of contemporaneous medical records is one fact the Board can consider and weigh against the other evidence, although the lack of such medical records does not, in and of itself, render the lay evidence not credible). With regard to the Veteran's more recent assertions made as part of the current compensation claim that he has had symptoms of a TBI since separation from service in June 2005, the Board finds that, while the Veteran is competent to report the onset of TBI symptoms, his recent report of continuous TBI symptoms since service is outweighed by the other, more contemporaneous, lay and medical evidence of record, both in service and after service, and is not reliable. See Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370, 374-75 (2002). The Board finds that the Veteran's statements as to continuous TBI symptoms after service are not accurate because they are outweighed by other evidence of record that includes the more contemporaneous service treatment records which are negative for any complaints, findings or diagnoses of either a head injury or TBI symptoms, the lack of any post-service documentation of treatment or diagnoses of a head injury or TBI symptoms until 2009, and the Veteran's claim for service connection for multiple disabilities in July 2005 with no mention of a head injury or TBI symptoms. Some of the Veteran's own statements provide evidence against this current claim and those prior statements are found to have higher probative value then his current recollection of events from several years ago. The Board acknowledges that symptoms, not treatment, are the essence of any evidence of continuity of symptomatology (Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 496 (1997)); however, here, the Veteran filed a claim for service connection for seventeen disorders in July 2005, but did not mention any head injuries or TBI symptoms at that time. This suggests to the Board that there was no pertinent TBI symptomatology at that time. While inaction regarding filing a claim is not necessarily indicative of the absence of symptomatology, where, as here, a veteran takes action regarding other claims, it becomes reasonable to expect that the Veteran is presenting all issues for which he is experiencing symptoms that he believes are related to service. In other words, the Veteran demonstrated that he understood the procedure for filing a claims for VA disability compensation, and he followed that procedure in other instances where he believed he was entitled to those benefits. In such circumstances, it is more reasonable to expect a complete reporting than for certain symptomatology to be omitted. Thus, the Veteran's inaction regarding a claim for a TBI, when viewed in the context of his action regarding other claims for compensation, may reasonably be interpreted as indicative of the Veteran's belief that he did not sustain a TBI in service, or the lack of TBI symptomatology at the time he filed the claim, or both. The Board acknowledges the argument of the Veteran's representative in the February 2013 statement that the Veteran has been diagnosed with a TBI in current VA treatment records. Indeed, a January 2013 VA treatment note indicates that a February 2009 evaluation that stated the Veteran did not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of a TBI was in error, and that the Veteran clearly meets the criteria for a TBI diagnosis. However, even if the Veteran has a current diagnosis and symptomatology of a TBI, as explained above, the weight of the evidence is against a finding that there was a relevant in-service event or injury or other evidence of a nexus between the current TBI symptoms and active service, such as in-service TBI symptomatology or continuous TBI symptoms since service separation. Simply stated, based on the Veteran's past credible statements, the injury in service did not occur. Based on the evidence of record, the weight of the competent evidence demonstrates no relationship between the Veteran's current TBI and his military service, including no credible evidence of either a relevant in-service disease or injury, chronic symptoms of a TBI during active service, or continuity of symptomatology of a TBI, which would serve either as a nexus to service or as the factual basis for a favorable medical nexus opinion. Therefore, the Board finds that a preponderance of the lay and medical evidence that is of record weighs against the claim for service connection for a TBI, and outweighs the Veteran's more recent contentions regarding in-service chronic TBI symptoms and post-service TBI symptoms. For these reasons, the claim must be denied. Because the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. Duties to Notify and Assist The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) and implementing regulations imposes obligations on VA to provide claimants with notice and assistance. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102 , 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2012). The notice requirements of VCAA require VA to notify the claimant of what information or evidence is necessary to substantiate the claim; what subset of the necessary information or evidence, if any, the claimant is to provide; and what subset of the necessary information or evidence, if any, the VA will attempt to obtain. The Board notes that a "fourth element" of the notice requirement requesting the claimant to provide any evidence in the claimant's possession that pertains to the claim was removed from the language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). See 73 Fed. Reg. 23,353 -356 (April 30, 2008). The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) issued a decision in the appeal of Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), which held that the notice requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of a service connection claim, including the degree of disability and the effective date of an award. Those five elements include: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between a veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. The notice included provisions for disability ratings and for the effective date of the claim. In a timely April 2009 letter, the RO provided notice to the Veteran regarding what information and evidence is needed to substantiate a claim for service connection, what information and evidence must be submitted by the Veteran, and what information or evidence VA will attempt to obtain. The letter also described how VA determines disability ratings and effective dates. The Board is also satisfied VA has made reasonable efforts to obtain relevant records and evidence. Specifically, the information and evidence that has been associated with the claims file includes the Veteran's service treatment records, post-service VA treatment records, and the Veteran's statements. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran has not been afforded a VA medical examination specifically geared to the claimed service connection for a TBI; however, the Board finds that a VA examination is not necessary in order to decide this issue. Two pivotal Court cases exist that address the need for a VA examination. Those are Duenas v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 512 (2004) and McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). In McLendon, the Court held that in disability compensation claims, the Secretary must provide a VA medical examination when there is: (1) competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurring symptoms of a disability, and (2) evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service or establishing certain diseases manifesting during an applicable presumptive period for which the claimant qualifies, and (3) an indication that the disability or persistent recurrent symptoms of a disability may be associated with the veteran's service or with another service-connected disability, but (4) insufficient competent medical evidence on file for the Secretary to make a decision on a claim. In Duenas, the Court held that a VA examination is necessary when the record: (1) contains competent evidence that the veteran has persistent or recurrent symptoms of the claimed disability, and (2) indicate that those symptoms may be associated with her active military service. In this case, the Veteran's service treatment records are negative for any complaints of or treatment for either a head injury or symptoms of a TBI. Thus, the weight of the evidence demonstrates that the Veteran did not sustain an injury, disease, or event relating to a TBI in service, and there is no duty to provide a VA medical examination. See Bardwell v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 36, 40 (2010) (holding that that where the evidence has failed to establish an in-service injury, disease, or event, VA is not obligated to provide a medical examination). As explained in this decision, the Board also finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates no chronic symptoms of a TBI in service and no continuity of symptoms of a TBI since service separation. Because there is no in-service injury or disease to which a competent medical opinion could relate the current disability, there is no reasonable possibility that a VA examination or opinion could aid in substantiating the current claim for service connection for a TBI. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(a)(2) (VA "is not required to provide assistance to a claimant . . . if no reasonable possibility exists that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim"); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(d) (VA to discontinue assistance where there is "no reasonable possibility that further assistance would substantiate the claim"). The Board has considered the decision in Charles, 16 Vet. App. at 374-75; however, in the absence of evidence of an in-service disease or injury, referral of this case to obtain an examination and/or an opinion as to the etiology of the Veteran's TBI would in essence place the examining physician in the role of a fact finder, would suggest reliance on an inaccurate history of occurrence of an in-service injury or disease, and could only result in a speculative opinion or purported opinion of no probative value. In other words, any medical opinion which purported to provide a nexus between the Veteran's TBI and military service would necessarily be based on an inaccurate history regarding what occurred in service, so would be of no probative value. The Court has held on a number of occasions that a medical opinion premised upon an unsubstantiated account of a claimant is of no probative value. See, e.g., Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229, 233 (1993) (generally observing that a medical opinion premised upon an unsubstantiated account is of no probative value, and does not serve to verify the occurrences described); Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458, 461 (1993) (the Board is not bound to accept a physician's opinion when it is based exclusively on the recitations of a claimant that have been previously rejected). The holding in Charles was clearly predicated on the existence of evidence of an in-service injury, disease, or event and a current diagnosis. Referral of this case for an examination or to obtain a medical opinion would be a useless act. The duty to assist by providing a VA examination or opinion is not invoked in this case because there is no reasonable possibility that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(a)(2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(d). Notably, the Veteran has not identified, and the record does not otherwise indicate, any additional existing evidence that is necessary for a fair adjudication of the claim that has not been obtained. Hence, no further notice or assistance to the Veteran is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist in the development of the claim. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). ORDER Service connection for a TBI is denied. ____________________________________________ JOHN J. CROWLEY Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs