Citation Nr: 1314657 Decision Date: 05/03/13 Archive Date: 05/15/13 DOCKET NO. 11-02 958 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Buffalo, New York THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for kidney cancer, claimed as due to herbicide exposure. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD T. Sherrard, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran, who is the Appellant in this case, had active service from March 1964 to March 1966. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) from a July 2010 rating decision by the above Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). The Veteran provided testimony at a January 2013 videoconference hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge at the RO. A transcript of the hearing is associated with the claims folder. The Board has not only reviewed the Veteran's physical claims file but also the Veteran's file on the "Virtual VA" system to insure a total review of the evidence. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran served in Vietnam during active service, and is thus presumed to have been exposed to herbicides. 2. The claimed condition (kidney cancer) is not presumptively associated with herbicide exposure. 3. The Veteran did not incur an injury or disease manifesting in kidney problems or cancer during active service. 4. Symptoms of kidney cancer were not chronic in service. 5. Symptoms of kidney cancer have not been continuous since service separation. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for kidney cancer have not been met, including presumptively based on herbicide exposure. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1116, 1131, 1137, 5103(a), 5103A, 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Service Connection for Kidney Cancer Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). For the showing of chronic disease in service, there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. With chronic disease as such in service, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. The claimed condition at issue is not a "chronic disease" listed under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a); therefore, 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(b) (requiring continuity of a condition after service if chronicity is not found in service) does not apply. See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Establishing service connection generally requires (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Court has held that "Congress specifically limits entitlement for service-connected disease or injury to cases where such incidents have resulted in a disability. In the absence of proof of a present disability there can be no valid claim." Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992); see also Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141, 143-44 (1992). In certain cases, service connection can be presumed if a veteran was exposed to a herbicide agent during active service. Under the current Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), presumptive service connection is warranted for the following disorders: AL amyloidosis; chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne; Type II diabetes; Hodgkin's disease; chronic lymphocytic leukemia; multiple myeloma; non-Hodgkin's lymphoma; acute and subacute peripheral neuropathy; porphyria cutanea tarda; prostate cancer; respiratory cancers (cancer of the lung, bronchus, larynx, or trachea); ischemic heart disease; Parkinson's disease; hairy cell leukemia; and soft-tissue sarcoma (other than osteosarcoma, chondrosarcoma, Kaposi's sarcoma, or mesothelioma). 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) (2012). Presumptive service connection for these disorders as a result of Agent Orange exposure is warranted if the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6) are met. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116; 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e). The governing law provides that a "veteran who, during active military, naval, or air service, served in the Republic of Vietnam during the period beginning on January 9, 1962, and ending on May 7, 1975, shall be presumed to have been exposed during such service to an herbicide agent . . . unless there is affirmative evidence to establish that the veteran was not exposed to any such agent during that service." 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(f). Pursuant to Section 3 of the Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (Secretary) entered into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to review and summarize the scientific evidence concerning the association between exposure to herbicides used in Vietnam and various diseases suspected to be associated with such exposure. The NAS was to determine, to the extent possible, whether there was a statistical association between the suspect disease and herbicide exposure, taking into account the strength of the scientific evidence and the appropriateness of the methods used to detect the association; the increased risk of disease among individuals exposed to herbicides during the service in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era; and whether there is a plausible biological mechanism or other evidence of a causal relationship between herbicide exposure and the suspect disease. The NAS was required to submit reports of its activities every two years. The Secretary, under the authority of the Agent Orange Act of 1991 and based on studies by the NAS, has determined that there is no positive association between exposure to herbicides and any condition for which the Secretary has not specifically determined that a presumption of service connection is warranted. See Notice, 59 Fed. Reg. 341-346 (1994); see also Notice, 61 Fed. Reg. 41,442-449, and 61 Fed. Reg. 57,586-589 (1996); Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,232-243 (Nov. 2, 1999); Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 42,600-608 (June 24, 2002); Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 32,395-407 (June 12, 2007); 74 Fed. Reg. 21,258-260 (May 7, 2009). When a disease is first diagnosed after service but not within an applicable presumptive period, service connection may nevertheless be established by evidence demonstrating that disease was in fact incurred during service. See Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (Fed. Cir. 1994). If there is no presumptive service connection available, direct service connection can be established if the record contains competent medical evidence of a current disease process with a relationship to exposure to an herbicide agent while in military service. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303; Combee at 1043-44. In rendering a decision on appeal, the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant. See Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36, 39-40 (1994); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 57 (1990). Competency of evidence differs from weight and credibility. Competency is a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered by the trier of fact, while credibility is a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) ("although interest may affect the credibility of testimony, it does not affect competency to testify"). Lay testimony is competent when it regards the readily observable features or symptoms of injury or illness and "may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection." See Layno, 6 Vet. App. at 469; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2). The Court has emphasized that when a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. In such cases, the Board is within its province to weigh that testimony and to make a credibility determination as to whether that evidence supports a finding of service incurrence and continuity of symptomatology sufficient to establish service connection. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009). Lay statements may serve to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (addressing lay evidence as potentially competent to support presence of disability even where not corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence). Generally, the degree of probative value which may be attributed to a medical opinion issued by a VA or private treatment provider takes into account such factors as its thoroughness and degree of detail, and whether there was review of a veteran's claims file. See Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444, 448-9 (2000). Also significant is whether the examining medical provider had a sufficiently clear and well-reasoned rationale, as well as a basis in objective supporting clinical data. See Bloom v. West, 12 Vet. App. 185, 187 (1999); Hernandez-Toyens v. West, 11 Vet. App. 379, 382 (1998); see also Claiborne v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 181, 186 (2005) (rejecting medical opinions that did not indicate whether the physicians actually examined the veteran, did not provide the extent of any examination, and did not provide any supporting clinical data). The Court has held that a bare conclusion, even one reached by a health care professional, is not probative without a factual predicate in the record. Miller v. West, 11 Vet. App. 345, 348 (1998). A significant factor to be considered for any opinion is the accuracy of the factual predicate, regardless of whether the information supporting the opinion is obtained by review of medical records or lay reports of injury, symptoms and/or treatment. See Harris v. West, 203 F.3d 1347, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (examiner opinion based on accurate lay history deemed competent medical evidence in support of the claim); Kowalski v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 171, 177 (2005) (holding that a medical opinion cannot be disregarded solely on the rationale that the medical opinion was based on history given by the veteran); Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458, 461 (1993) (holding that the Board may reject a medical opinion based on an inaccurate factual basis). When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with a veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against a claim, in which case, the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. The Board has reviewed all the evidence in the Veteran's claims file. Although the Board has an obligation to provide adequate reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no requirement that the evidence submitted by a veteran or obtained on his behalf be discussed in detail. Rather, the Board's analysis below will focus specifically on what evidence is needed to substantiate the claim and what the evidence in the claims file shows, or fails to show, with respect to the claim. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122, 128-30 (2000). The Veteran contends that his current kidney cancer is due to exposure to Agent Orange during active service. His service personnel records confirm that he served in Vietnam; therefore, he is entitled to a presumption of exposure to herbicides. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(f). The Board first considers whether a grant of presumptive service connection is warranted under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) for herbicide exposure. This regulation enables an allowance of presumptive service connection only for the diseases listed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e), as set forth above. The Veteran in this case has been diagnosed with, and treated for, malignant lesions of the kidney, for which he underwent a partial nephrectomy in April 2010. Kidney cancer is not among the diseases specified in section 3.309(e) for diseases specific to herbicide-exposed veterans. Thus, even though he served in Vietnam, a grant of presumptive service connection based on herbicide exposure is not permissible here, because his kidney cancer is not one of the diseases listed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e). The Board has also considered whether there is any other evidence linking the Veteran's current kidney cancer to herbicide exposure on a direct (as opposed to a presumptive) basis, so as to allow for a grant of direct service connection, and finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against such a grant. After a review of all the evidence of record, lay and medical, the Board finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that no relevant injury or disease occurred during active service, and that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that symptoms of kidney cancer were not chronic in service. The March 1966 separation examination report is negative for any kidney problems, nor is there any mention of kidney problems or diagnoses of cancer in the service treatment records. In short, there are no complaints, symptoms, findings, history, diagnoses, or treatment of kidney cancer during active service. The Board next finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that symptoms of kidney cancer have not been continuous since separation from active service in March 1966. Following service separation in March 1966, the evidence of record does not show any complaints, diagnosis, or treatment for kidney cancer until June 2009, when VA treatment records show that a CT scan demonstrated nodules on both the right and left kidneys, which were later determined to be malignant. At the January 2013 Board hearing, the Veteran testified that he was diagnosed with kidney cancer in 2005, although the post-service treatment records do not show a diagnosis until 2009. In any case, the absence of post-service complaints, findings, diagnosis, or treatment for nearly 40 years after service separation until at least 2005 is one factor that tends to weigh against a finding of continuous symptoms of kidney cancer after service separation. See Buchanan, 451 F.3d 1336 (the lack of contemporaneous medical records is one fact the Board can consider and weigh against the other evidence, although the lack of such medical records does not, in and of itself, render the lay evidence not credible). Additional evidence demonstrating that kidney cancer has not been continuous since service separation includes a negative September 1980 VA examination report and negative VA treatment records from 1966 to 1981. The Veteran does not contend that he has had kidney cancer since active service. However, to the extent that his more recent assertions made as part of the current compensation claim can be interpreted as a contention of symptoms of kidney cancer since separation from service in March 1966, the Board finds that, while the Veteran is competent to report the onset of observable symptoms caused by kidney cancer, his recent report of continuous kidney cancer symptoms since service is outweighed by the other, more contemporaneous, lay and medical evidence of record, both in service and after service, and is not reliable. See Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370, 374-75 (2002). The Board finds that the Veteran's statements as to continuous kidney cancer symptoms after service are not accurate because they are outweighed by other evidence of record that includes the more contemporaneous service treatment records which are negative for any complaints, findings or diagnoses of kidney cancer, and the lack of any post-service documentation of treatment or diagnoses of kidney cancer until 2009. Regarding the Veteran's statements as to the cause of the current kidney cancer, the Board recognizes that lay witnesses may, in some circumstances, opine on questions of diagnosis and etiology. See Davidson, 581 F.3d at 1316 (Board's categorical statement that "a valid medical opinion" was required to establish nexus, and that a layperson was "not competent" to provide testimony as to nexus because she was a layperson, conflicts with Jandreau, 492 F.3d 1372). However, in this case, the cause of the Veteran's kidney cancer involves a complex medical etiological question because it deals with the origin and progression of the Veteran's renal and hematological system and disorder of such internal and complex disease process (cancer) is diagnosed primarily on clinical findings and physiological testing. The Veteran is competent to relate symptoms of kidney cancer that he experienced at any time, but is not competent to opine on whether there is a link between the current kidney cancer and herbicide exposure, because such diagnosis requires specific medical knowledge and training. See Rucker, 10 Vet. App. at 74 (stating that a lay person is not competent to diagnose or make a competent nexus opinion about a disorder as complex as cancer). For these reasons, the Board finds that weight of the lay and medical evidence that is of record outweighs the Veteran's more recent contentions regarding the relationship between his kidney cancer and herbicide exposure. The Board acknowledges the Veteran's testimony at the January 2013 Board hearing that a VA doctor related his kidney cancer to exposure to herbicides during active service. However, the Veteran was unable to provide the name of the physician who allegedly made this statement. Moreover, none of the medical records suggest that the Veteran's kidney cancer was caused by herbicide exposure, nor do they suggest that the kidney cancer metastasized from his service-connected prostate cancer. Therefore, the Board finds that the weight of the evidence is against a finding that there is a relationship between the Veteran's kidney cancer and either herbicide exposure or a service-connected disability. Further, the Veteran has not contended that his kidney cancer metastasized or is otherwise related to his service-connected prostate cancer. Based on the evidence of record, the weight of the competent evidence demonstrates no relationship between the Veteran's current kidney cancer and his military service, including no credible evidence of either a relevant in-service disease or injury, chronic symptoms of kidney cancer during active service, or continuity of symptomatology of kidney cancer, which would serve either as a nexus to service or as the factual basis for a favorable medical nexus opinion. Therefore, the Board finds that a preponderance of the lay and medical evidence that is of record weighs against the claim for service connection for kidney cancer, and outweighs the Veteran's more recent contentions regarding in-service chronic kidney cancer symptoms and post-service kidney cancer symptoms. For these reasons, the claim must be denied. Because the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. Duties to Notify and Assist The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) and implementing regulations imposes obligations on VA to provide claimants with notice and assistance. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102 , 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2012). The notice requirements of VCAA require VA to notify the claimant of what information or evidence is necessary to substantiate the claim; what subset of the necessary information or evidence, if any, the claimant is to provide; and what subset of the necessary information or evidence, if any, the VA will attempt to obtain. The Board notes that a "fourth element" of the notice requirement requesting the claimant to provide any evidence in the claimant's possession that pertains to the claim was removed from the language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). See 73 Fed. Reg. 23,353 -356 (April 30, 2008). The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) issued a decision in the appeal of Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), which held that the notice requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of a service connection claim, including the degree of disability and the effective date of an award. Those five elements include: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between a veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. The notice included provisions for disability ratings and for the effective date of the claim. In a timely June 2010 letter, the RO provided notice to the Veteran regarding what information and evidence is needed to substantiate a claim for service connection, what information and evidence must be submitted by the Veteran, and what information or evidence VA will attempt to obtain. The letter also described how VA determines disability ratings and effective dates. The Board is also satisfied VA has made reasonable efforts to obtain relevant records and evidence. Specifically, the information and evidence that has been associated with the claims file includes the Veteran's service treatment records, post-service VA treatment records, and the Veteran's statements. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran has not been afforded a VA medical examination specifically geared to the claimed service connection for kidney cancer; however, the Board finds that a VA examination is not necessary in order to decide this issue. Two pivotal Court cases exist that address the need for a VA examination. Those are Duenas v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 512 (2004) and McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). In McLendon, the Court held that in disability compensation claims, the Secretary must provide a VA medical examination when there is: (1) competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurring symptoms of a disability, and (2) evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service or establishing certain diseases manifesting during an applicable presumptive period for which the claimant qualifies, and (3) an indication that the disability or persistent recurrent symptoms of a disability may be associated with the veteran's service or with another service-connected disability, but (4) insufficient competent medical evidence on file for the Secretary to make a decision on a claim. In Duenas, the Court held that a VA examination is necessary when the record: (1) contains competent evidence that the veteran has persistent or recurrent symptoms of the claimed disability, and (2) indicate that those symptoms may be associated with her active military service. In this case, the Veteran's service treatment records are negative for any complaints of or treatment for kidney cancer. Thus, the weight of the evidence demonstrates that the Veteran did not sustain an injury, disease, or event relating to kidney cancer in service, and there is no duty to provide a VA medical examination. See Bardwell v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 36, 40 (2010) (holding that that where the evidence has failed to establish an in-service injury, disease, or event, VA is not obligated to provide a medical examination). As explained in this decision, the Board also finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates no chronic symptoms of kidney cancer in service and no continuity of symptoms of kidney cancer since service separation. Because there is no in-service injury or disease to which a competent medical opinion could relate the current disability, there is no reasonable possibility that a VA examination or opinion could aid in substantiating the current claim for service connection for kidney cancer. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(a)(2) (VA "is not required to provide assistance to a claimant . . . if no reasonable possibility exists that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim"); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(d) (VA to discontinue assistance where there is "no reasonable possibility that further assistance would substantiate the claim"). The Board has considered the decision in Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370, 374-75 (2002); however, in the absence of evidence of an in-service disease or injury, referral of this case to obtain an examination and/or an opinion as to the etiology of the Veteran's kidney cancer would in essence place the examining physician in the role of a fact finder, would suggest reliance on an inaccurate history of occurrence of an in-service injury or disease, and could only result in a speculative opinion or purported opinion of no probative value. In other words, any medical opinion which purported to provide a nexus between the Veteran's kidney cancer and military service would necessarily be based on an inaccurate history regarding what occurred in service, so would be of no probative value. The Court has held on a number of occasions that a medical opinion premised upon an unsubstantiated account of a claimant is of no probative value. See, e.g., Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229, 233 (1993) (generally observing that a medical opinion premised upon an unsubstantiated account is of no probative value, and does not serve to verify the occurrences described); Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458, 461 (1993) (the Board is not bound to accept a physician's opinion when it is based exclusively on the recitations of a claimant that have been previously rejected). The holding in Charles was clearly predicated on the existence of evidence of an in-service injury, disease, or event and a current diagnosis. Moreover, the medical evidence does not suggest a causal relationship between the Veteran's current kidney cancer and herbicide exposure. Referral of this case for an examination or to obtain a medical opinion would be a useless act. The duty to assist by providing a VA examination or opinion is not invoked in this case because there is no reasonable possibility that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(a)(2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(d). Notably, the Veteran has not identified, and the record does not otherwise indicate, any additional existing evidence that is necessary for a fair adjudication of the claim that has not been obtained. Hence, no further notice or assistance to the Veteran is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist in the development of the claim. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). ORDER Service connection for kidney cancer is denied. ____________________________________________ MARK W. GREENSTREET Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs