Citation Nr: 1319145 Decision Date: 06/12/13 Archive Date: 06/21/13 DOCKET NO. 07-13 213 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Manchester, New Hampshire THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for a demyelinating disease, to include multiple sclerosis (MS). 2. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to included posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESSES AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant and spouse ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD M. Prem, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from March 1968 to April 1971. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an August 2006 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Manchester, New Hampshire, which, in relevant part, denied entitlement to service connection for multiple sclerosis or other demyelinating disease and PTSD. The Board remanded the Veteran's claims in May 2008, May 2010, and December 2012. The Veteran and his wife testified at a hearing before the undersigned in September 2007. A transcript of the hearing is of record. In May 2010, the Board expanded the Veteran's original claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD to include any acquired psychiatric disability. Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009). The Board remanded the current issues for additional development in May 2010 and December 2012. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. A demyelinating disease, to include MS was not manifested until more than seven years after service, and is not otherwise related to service. 2. The Veteran's current mood/depressive disorder is not related to a disease or injury in service. 3. There has been no medical diagnosis of PTSD. 4. The Veteran's psychiatric disorder, manifested by a phobia of electricity, is due to an incident arising during service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. A demyelinating disease, to include MS, was not incurred in or aggravated by the Veteran's active duty service, and may not be presumed to have been incurred in such service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1112(a), 1113, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2012). 2. The Veteran's current depressive/mood disorder was not incurred in or aggravated by the Veteran's active duty service, nor may it be presumed to have been incurred in or aggravated by such service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2012). 3. PTSD was not incurred in or aggravated by the Veteran's active duty service, nor may it be presumed to have been incurred in or aggravated by such service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2012). 4. A psychiatric disorder, manifested by a phobia of electricity, is due to the Veteran's active duty service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) - Duty to Notify As provided for by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2013); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2012). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and medical or lay evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). In addition, the notice requirements of the VCAA apply to all elements of a service-connection claim, including the degree of disability and the effective date of the disability. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Further, this notice must include information that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded. Id. at 486. VCAA notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the RO. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). Where complete notice is not timely accomplished, such error may be cured by issuance of a fully compliant notice, followed by readjudication of the claim. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006). Here, the Veteran was sent letters in April 2006 and June 2006 that provided information as to what evidence was required to substantiate the claims and of the division of responsibilities between VA and a claimant in developing an appeal. The letter also explained what type of information and evidence was needed to establish a disability rating and effective date. Accordingly, no further development is required with respect to the duty to notify. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) - Duty to Assist Next, VA has a duty to assist the Veteran in the development of the claim. This duty includes assisting him in the procurement of service treatment records and pertinent treatment records and providing an examination when necessary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. All necessary development has been accomplished, and there is no further action that would be reasonably likely to assist the Veteran in substantiating his claims. The claims file contains the Veteran's service treatment records, as well as post-service reports of VA and private treatment and examination. Moreover, his statements in support of the claim are of record, including testimony provided at a September 2007 hearing before the undersigned. The Board has carefully reviewed such statements and concludes that no available outstanding evidence has been identified. The Board has also perused the medical records for references to additional treatment reports not of record, but has found nothing to suggest that there is any outstanding evidence with respect to the Veteran's claim. The provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2) (2012) impose two distinct duties on VA employees, including Board personnel, in conducting hearings: the duty to explain fully the issues and the duty to suggest the submission of evidence that may have been overlooked. Bryant v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 488 (2010) (per curiam). At the Veteran's September 2007 hearing, the undersigned identified the issues on appeal and discussed evidence that could aid in substantiating the claims and the reasons why the claims had been denied. The Board then remanded the claims in an effort to obtain evidence suggested by the hearing testimony and which could substantiate the claims. The duties imposed by Bryant were thereby met. There has been substantial compliance with the Board's remand instructions. The May 2010 remand was for additional efforts to obtain records pertaining to a reported in-service electrical shock and to afford the Veteran VA examinations. Ship logs were searched and an entry mentioning a rope burn was obtained, but no other pertinent records were found. The Veteran was afforded VA examinations in October 2010. The examiner relied on a history supplied by the Veteran and reported that symptoms of MS had begun in approximately 2003. The subsequently obtained private treatment records show symptoms beginning around December 2001. The examiner had the opportunity to review these records and provide an addendum opinion. The examiner discussed the records in the addendum, noting treatment in July 2002. While he did not specifically mention the December 2001 onset, the approximately six month earlier date would not have changed the operative facts considered by the examiner, namely that the onset was approximately 30 years after service. Accordingly, the examiner considered a history that was accurate in in relevant part. In the December 2012 remand the Board sought to obtain private treatment records and records pertaining to a claim for Social Security Administration disability benefits; to obtain clarifying information from the Veteran regarding the location of the in-service electrical shock, and for the VA examiner who provided the May 2010 opinion to review internet literature submitted by the Veteran. The private treatment and SSA records were obtained. The Veteran did not provide additional information with regard to the in-service electrical shock, and the VA examiner reviewed the newly obtained records and the internet articles and provided an extensive explanation. There has thus been substantial compliance with the remand instructions. For the above reasons, no further notice or assistance to the appellant is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist the appellant in the development of the claim. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd, 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Service Connection Service connection will be granted if it is shown that the Veteran suffers from disability resulting from an injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, in the active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. For Veterans who have served 90 days or more of active service during a war period or after December 31, 1946, certain chronic diseases, such as psychosis demonstrated to a compensable degree within one year of service or multiple sclerosis demonstrated to a compensable degree within seven years of service; are presumed to have been incurred in service if manifest to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Additionally, disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury shall be service connected. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. The Board also notes that secondary service connection on the basis of aggravation is permitted under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310, and compensation is payable for that degree of aggravation of a non-service-connected disability caused by a service-connected disability. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). Establishing service connection generally requires evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed.Cir.1996) (table); see also Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), an alternative method of establishing the second and third Shedden/Caluza element for a chronic disease is through a demonstration of continuity of symptomatology. See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2013). Continuity of symptomatology may be established if a claimant can demonstrate (1) that a condition was "noted" during service; (2) evidence of post-service continuity of the same symptomatology; and (3) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the post-service symptomatology. Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 495-96; see Hickson, 12 Vet. App. at 253 (lay evidence of in-service incurrence sufficient in some circumstances for purposes of establishing service connection); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Lay testimony is competent, however, to establish the presence of observable symptomatology and "may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection." Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 398, 405 (1995) (lay person competent to testify to pain and visible flatness of his feet). "Symptoms, not treatment, are the essence of any evidence of continuity of symptomatology." Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 496 (citing Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 16, 19 (1991). Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible. See Layno, supra (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted"). In addition, service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that a disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Demyelinating disease/MS The Veteran contends that he developed MS as a result of an electrical shock that he suffered in service. At his September 2007 Board hearing, he testified that he began experiencing MS symptoms in 2001 or 2002, and that he was diagnosed with MS in November 2006. He admitted that no medical examiner told him that his MS is due to an electrical shock. Instead, he stated that no one in his family has ever gotten MS, and that he couldn't think of what else might have caused it. He also testified that he read (on the internet) that transverse myelitis can develop from electrical shock, and that the transverse myelitis can turn into MS. The service treatment records do not document an electrical shock. They do reflect that in September 1969, the Veteran sustained 1st and 2nd degree burns on the palm of his left hand. The burns were attributed to the Veteran having placed his hand on a steam pipe in the laundry. The burn was cleansed, dressed, and treated with icepacks. A January 1971 treatment report reflects that the Veteran injured the palm of his left hand with a screwdriver while working on the activation of an electrical shop aboard the U.S.S. Vermillion. The first treatment report pertaining to MS is a December 2001 private outpatient treatment report showing the Veteran reported a sensation of burning on the right side of his body. He reported that it began seven months earlier. The examiner wondered if, in addition to cervical spine stenosis, there was another underlying diagnosis of a myelinating disease. A June 2002 treatment report included findings that the examiner felt made it likely that the Veteran had multiple sclerosis. VA treatment records list multiple sclerosis beginning in approximately 2009. The Veteran underwent a VA examination in October 2010. The examiner reviewed the claims file in conjunction with the examination. The Veteran reported that he suffered from an electric shock. He reported that he felt the shock throughout his entire body and then woke in sick bay. He didn't remember much about the incident; but he remembered subsequent treatment for electrical burns to his left hand and patchy loss of hair. The Veteran reported that his MS was ultimately diagnosed in approximately 2003. The examiner diagnosed multiple sclerosis with primarily lower extremity involvement with paresthesia sensations and lower extremity weakness. The condition was stable per the Veteran's history and review of the medical records. The disability had significant effects on his activities. He was unable to do chores; and he took medical retirement due to the impact on his ability to stand and balance for prolonged periods of time. The examiner noted that based on the evidence reviewed and the Veteran's current history; there was no evidence of MS in the several years following military service. He was discharged in 1971 and did not develop MS until approximately 2003. The examiner opined that MS was less likely than not caused by or a result of the electrical shock sustained in service. He reasoned that the current etiology of MS remains unknown despite considerable medical research. However, he was unaware of any connection between electrical shock and the later development of MS, especially given a time lag that was evident in the Veteran's history. He noted that a quick internet search failed to reveal any immediate search results in regard to this cause-and effect relationship. Additionally, there was no mention of electrical shock as a cause of MS on the National Institute of Health website (NIH.gov) The Veteran submitted three internet articles in order to substantiate his claim. The Veteran's records were once again reviewed by the October 2010 examiner. Though the electric shock had not been verified, the examiner noted that the Veteran's consistent reported history (when seeking treatment and in testimony before the Board) appeared credible. He stated that for the purposes of his medical opinion, he would assume that such an electric shock did occur. The examiner commented on the internet articles submitted by the Veteran. He noted that the first article "Transverse Myelitis: Symptoms, Causes and Diagnosis" did not mention electric shock. It stated that transverse myelitis (TM) symptoms developed rapidly over several hours to several weeks; and that the cause was unknown, but most evidence supported an autoimmune process. The examiner noted that the Veteran was not diagnosed with TM, and that his presentation was one of slower onset of symptoms over time and not acute symptoms as would be seen with TM. The examiner stated that the slower presentation was consistent with his current diagnosis of MS. The examiner noted that the second article at www.hypertesnion-consult.com simply stated that central nervous system (CNS) dysfunction was a prominent feature of high tension electrical injuries; and that manifestations of electrical injuries include delayed neurological complications (including ascending paralysis, transverse myelitis, and ALS). He noted that the article failed to mention MS specifically and that the article was not pertinent to the Veteran's case. He once again pointed out that the Veteran had not been diagnosed as having TM or ascending paralysis; and the Veteran's clinical course is not consistent with a diagnosis of ascending paralysis. Finally, he pointed out that ALS is a degenerative neurologic condition and is not considered to be a demyelinating condition in any way related to MS. The examiner reviewed the third article submitted by the Veteran ("Excerpt from Burns, Electrical"). He noted that the only relevant statement in the article was that "Spinal cord involvement may result in transverse myelitis. TM may have delayed onset and was associated with poor prognosis for recovery." The examiner once again pointed out that the Veteran was not diagnosed as having TM. He reviewed multiple on-line references which revealed no scientific evidence that acute or distant electrical shock is a cause or risk factor for the development of MS. Consequently, he once again opined that it is less likely than not that the Veteran's MS was caused by or was the result of an electrical shock received in military service. Analysis The private and VA treatment records and findings on VA examination clearly demonstrate current MS. The Veteran's credible testimony and the assessment by the VA examiner serve to establish the incurrence of an in-service injury, namely an electrical shock. The remaining question is whether the evidence shows a link between the current disability and the in-service shock or other disease or injury. Treatment records reflect that the Veteran was not diagnosed with MS until 2002. The first treatment report pertaining to MS is a December 2001 outpatient treatment report in which the Veteran reported a sensation of burning on the right side of his body. The testimony by the Veteran and his spouse is consistent with the clinical record in that they acknowledge that MS was not present until approximately 2001. The gap of approximately 3 decades between the Veteran's separation from service and the first documented treatment for MS disorder. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (a significant lapse in time between service and post-service medical treatment may be considered as part of the analysis of a service connection claim. However, such absence of documented treatment, in and of itself, is not a basis for discrediting his lay statements of continuity. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Thus, the Board must consider the totality of the record, and not just the absence of clinical treatment, in weighing the Veteran's statements asserting continuity of symptomatology. The Veteran has never asserted that his MS symptoms date back to service. To the contrary, when he first reported symptoms (in December 2001), he reported that they began seven months earlier. Additionally, it is noted that the Veteran did not file a claim of service connection for MS until decades after he separated from service. Had he been experiencing symptoms of MS since service it would be reasonable to expect that he would have filed a claim sooner. Indeed, in 1971 he sought service connection for hair loss (alopecia). Thus, he was clearly aware of the process for applying for benefits. The fact that he did not seek service connection for MS at that time very strongly suggests that he was not indeed experiencing any symptoms at that time. Finally, at the Veteran's Board hearing, he admitted that MS symptoms did not begin until 2001 or 2002. For the above reasons the evidence is against finding a continuity of symptomatology to service, either by the clinical record or by the Veteran's own statements. If the competent evidence indicated that the current MS was related to the Veteran's active service, then an award of service connection would be appropriate. In this regard, the VA examiner in October 2010 concluded that the Veteran's MS was less likely than not related to service because there was no evidence of it at the time of the Veteran's separation from service or for many years after. He explained that the current etiology of MS remained unknown despite considerable medical research. He was; however, unaware of any connection between electrical shock and the later development of MS, especially given a time lag that was evident in the Veteran's history. He noted that a quick internet search failed to reveal any immediate search results in regard to this cause-and effect relationship. Additionally, there was no mention of electrical shock as a cause of MS on the National Institute of Health website (NIH.gov). Finally, he adequately addressed the internet articles provided by the Veteran. The Board finds the opinion of the VA physician to be persuasive evidence. It was based on consideration of an essentially accurate record was definitive and supported by an extensive rationale. There is no other competent evidence of record refutes that opinion. The Veteran himself believes that his MS is related to the in-service electrical shock; but this is a complex question requiring medical expertise. The question extends beyond an immediately observable cause-and-effect relationship, such as a fall leading to a broken leg. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Jandreau)). Here, MS is not a simple medical condition that the Veteran can identify based on mere personal observation, that is, by visual observation or by any other of the senses. In sum, his statements as to etiology in this case are not competent and therefore lack probative value. As noted earlier, service connection is also available on a presumptive basis for MS shown to a compensable degree within seven years of service or in service and at any time thereafter. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. There is no evidence MS was present during the presumptive period. The Veteran and his spouse have not reported any pertinent symptoms during this period, and there is no clinical evidence of MS prior to 2001, decades after service. Hence, the evidence is against presumptive service connection. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim under the applicable theories of service connection, the benefit of-the-doubt standard of proof does not apply. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). Psychiatric disability At the Veteran's September 2007 Board hearing, he testified that ever since the alleged incident in which he received an electrical shock, he had had on and off depression. He also stated that he did not like thunderstorms, electrical things like plugs, saws, etc. As noted above, while the electrical shock is not documented, his report has been deemed competent and credible. The Veteran underwent a VA examination in October 2010. The examiner reviewed the claims file in conjunction with the examination. He noted that the Veteran was hospitalized during service for depression stemming from a separation with his girlfriend. The Veteran reported that his father was physically abusive. He also reported being beaten by a first grade teacher. However, he reported that prior to military service; he had not had any psychological problems that required treatment. The Veteran seemed somewhat paranoid. He spoke about conspiracies against him and a fear that his stepsons are stealing from him. The examiner noted that the Veteran's temper is such that he yells when he is angry and is short fused. When the Veteran was asked about the worst traumatic event of his military service, he reported sustaining an electric shock. He could not remember the month or year that it happened. He thought it happened when he was aboard the U.S.S. Capricornus. He stated that he was working on a generator; and trying to tighten a buss bar. There was a hole in his glove, and he was sweating. When the electricity hit his skin, he was knocked out from the shock. He remembered waking up in Sick Bay. When he thinks about the incident, he reported that he feels sad. He denied bad dreams; but he did not want anything to do with electricity. The examiner found that the Veteran did not meet the full criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, he stated that the Veteran did meet the criteria for a specific phobia. In this case, the Veteran had a phobia of anything to do with electricity. He also met the criteria for a mood disorder with depressive features secondary to MS. Regarding the phobia of anything electric, the examiner noted that the Veteran cannot even change a light bulb; and he is afraid of electrical storms. The examiner opined that it is at least as likely as not that this phobia is due to an event in military service where he sustained an electric shock. The examiner opined that the Veteran did not have PTSD; and that the Veteran's mood disorder was secondary to MS. Consistent with the VA examiner's opinion, VA outpatient treatment records show that in April 2012, a PTSD screen was negative. In March 2013, the October 2010 examiner reviewed the claims file again. He reiterated his opinion that the Veteran's phobia of electricity had its origins in service. His rationale was that he did not have this phobia prior to the in service event. The examiner once again opined that the Veteran's depression in the military was due to a separation with his girlfriend; and that it had nothing to do with the electric shock incident. Additionally, his mood disorder is secondary to MS. The Board acknowledges that the alleged electric shock incident has not been confirmed. However, the Veteran has provided relatively consistent statements regarding the alleged shock for 40+ years. He first alleged that he sustained an electric shock in April 1971 (the same month that he was discharged from service). Additionally, the Board notes that the Veteran sustained two in-service injuries to the palm of his left hand. The first occurred in September 1969 and consisted of 1st and 2nd degree burns as a result of a steam pipe. The Veteran has contended that the treatment report is erroneous with regards to the cause of the burns. The second occurred in January 1971 and involved injuring his hand with a screwdriver while working on the activation of an electrical shop aboard the U.S.S. Vermillion. The Board finds the consistent statements of the Veteran to be credible. The VA examiner has linked the current phobia to be the result of the in service electric shock. There is no competent opinion to the contrary. Consequently, the Board finds that the Veteran is entitled to service connection for a psychiatric disability manifested by a phobia of electricity. Regarding PTSD, service connection for PTSD requires (i) medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the condition, (ii) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred, and (iii) a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor, is required. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The evidence necessary to establish the occurrence of a stressor during service to support a diagnosis of PTSD will vary depending upon whether the Veteran engaged in "combat with the enemy" as established by official records, including recognized military combat citations, or other supportive evidence; whether the stressor is related to a personal assault, fear of hostile military or terrorist activity; or status of a prisoner of war. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). In any event, service connection for PTSD requires a diagnosis. There is no such diagnosis in the Veteran's case. Hence, the evidence is against the grant of service connection for PTSD The preponderance of the evidence weighs against a finding that his other psychiatric disabilities are related to service. The outpatient treatment reports (in the Virtual VA) reflect that his mood disorder has been attributed to his general medical condition, or specifically his MS. Likewise, the October 2010 examiner found that the Veteran's mood disorder was secondary to his non-service connected MS; and that the Veteran did not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. While the Veteran did have an episode of depression in service, this has not been linked to the current disability by the treatment providers or examiner. The Veteran has reported intermittent depression since service, but has not clearly reported continuing symptomatology extending from service. More importantly, continuity of symptomatology could not service to establish a link between current depression and service, because depression is not a listed chronic disease. Walker v. Shinseki. Consequently, the weight of the evidence is against service connection for a mood disorder, depressive disorder, or PTSD. Reasonable doubt does not arise and the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) ORDER Entitlement to service connection for MS is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability to include a mood disorder, a depressive disorder, and PTSD is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability manifested by a phobia of electricity is granted. ______________________________________________ Mark D. Hindin Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs