Citation Nr: 1319498 Decision Date: 06/17/13 Archive Date: 06/27/13 DOCKET NO. 04-41 521 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Winston-Salem, North Carolina THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). (The issue of entitlement to a disability rating in excess of 30 percent for tinea unguium, tinea pedis, and tinea versicolor, involves a hearing conducted by a different Veterans Law Judge and will therefore be addressed in a separate decision) REPRESENTATION Appellant (the Veteran) is represented by: The American Legion WITNESSES AT HEARING ON APPEAL The Veteran and his daughter ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD L. Cramp, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active service from September 1966 to October 1968. This appeal comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from an April 2003 rating decision of the RO in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The appeal was remanded in July 2006 to fulfill the Veteran's request for a Board hearing. In November 2006, the Veteran and his daughter presented testimony at a Board hearing, chaired by the undersigned Veterans Law Judge, seated at the RO. A transcript of the hearing is associated with the claims file. In December 2007, the Board remanded this issue for additional evidentiary development. The issue was again remanded in July 2010 and in April 2012. In addition to remanding this issue, in July 2010, the Board also granted an increased initial rating of 30 percent for service-connected headaches and denied any higher rating for service-connected headaches. The Board's decision with respect to that issue is final. In reviewing this case the Board has not only reviewed the Veteran's physical claims file, but also his file on the "Virtual VA" system to insure a total review of the evidence. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. All notification and development action needed to fairly adjudicate the appeal has been accomplished. 2. The Veteran does not have a psychosis. 3. PTSD and depressive disorder are not listed among the diseases for which the presumption of service connection for certain chronic diseases, and the provisions regarding chronicity in service and continuity of symptomatology after service must be considered. 4. No in-service stressors are verified. 5. Symptoms of a psychiatric disability were not chronic in service. 6. No current psychiatric disability is related to service. CONCLUSION OF LAW An acquired psychiatric disability, to include PTSD, was not incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 7104 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Duties to Notify and Assist The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) and implementing regulations impose obligations on VA to provide claimants with notice and assistance. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2012). The notice requirements of the VCAA require VA to notify the claimant of what information or evidence is necessary to substantiate the claim; what subset of the necessary information or evidence, if any, the claimant is to provide; and what subset of the necessary information or evidence, if any, VA will attempt to obtain. The Board notes that a "fourth element" of the notice requirement requesting the claimant to provide any evidence in the claimant's possession that pertains to the claim was removed from the language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). See 73 Fed. Reg. 23,353-356 (April 30, 2008). The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) issued a decision in the appeal of Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), which held that the notice requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of a service connection claim, including the degree of disability and the effective date of an award. Those five elements include: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between a veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. In this case, the Veteran submitted his claim for service connection in November 2002. He was sent a letter in November 2002, which advised him of the information and evidence necessary to substantiate his claim for a nervous condition. Subsequent letters in May 2005, August 2006, and January 2008 included notice of the information necessary to substantiate a claim of service connection for PTSD, as well as notice as to how disability ratings and effective dates were assigned in the event of a successful claim seeking service connection. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). The Veteran's claim for PTSD is based in part on an alleged personal assault. The In Patton v. West, 12 Vet. App. 272 (1999), the CAVC held that special consideration must be given to claims for PTSD based on personal assault. In particular, the CAVC held that the provisions in M21-1MR, Part III, 5.14(c), which address PTSD claims based on personal assault are substantive rules which are the equivalent of VA regulations and must be considered. See also YR v. West, 11 Vet. App. 393, 398-99 (1998). VA will not deny a PTSD claim that is based on in-service personal assault without first advising the claimant that evidence from sources other than the veteran's service records or evidence of behavior changes may constitute credible supporting evidence of the stressor and allowing him or her the opportunity to furnish this type of evidence or advise VA of potential sources of such evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The Board remanded this issue in July 2010 in part to afford the Veteran notice of evidence necessary to substantiate a claim of service connection for PTSD based on a personal assault. The RO sent an appropriate notice letter in August 2010, and the claim was subsequently readjudicated by the RO. When conducting a hearing, a hearing officer, to include a Veterans Law Judge, must suggest that a claimant submit evidence on any issue material to substantiating the claim when the record is missing any evidence on that issue or when the testimony at the hearing raises an issue for which there is no evidence in the record. See Bryant v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 488 (2010); 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (2012). The hearing officer also must suggest the submission of evidence when testimony during the hearing indicates that it exists (or could be reduced to writing) but is not of record. Here, during the hearing, the Veteran was asked to provide details of his alleged stressors. Moreover, the file was left open for 90 days in order to supplement the record. Such actions supplement the VCAA and comply with 38 C.F.R. § 3.103. The Board is satisfied that VA has made reasonable efforts to obtain relevant records and evidence. Specifically, the information and evidence that has been associated with the claims file includes the Veteran's service treatment records, service personnel records, post-service VA and private treatment records, and the Veteran's written assertions and personal hearing testimony. In addition, the Veteran was afforded VA examinations to address the validity of a PTSD diagnosis, and to address nexus. The Board finds that an adequate examination has been provided because the examinations were performed by medical professionals based on a review of claims file, solicitation of history and symptomatology from the Veteran, and a thorough examination of the Veteran. Moreover, the resulting diagnoses, opinions, and rationales were consistent with the examination and the record. Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App 295 (2008). As noted above, this appeal involves a remand by the Board for additional evidentiary development. A remand by the Board confers on the claimant, as a matter of law, the right to compliance with the remand orders. Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998). While substantial compliance is required, strict compliance is not. D'Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 97, 105 (2008) citing Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141, 146-47 (1999). In this case, the RO substantially complied with the Board's April 2012 remand instructions by obtaining a copy of the investigation report into the death of 2nd Lieutenant W.E.B, Jr. (as noted on the DA Form 1 associated with the claims file) from a self-inflicted gun wound, and by obtaining verification of the deaths of servicemen who were killed in a lightning strike while undergoing Ranger training at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. The RO also substantially complied with the Board's July 2010 and December 2007 remands by providing the Veteran and his representative with the notice required in 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3) with regard to the claim for service connection for PTSD based on personal assault and an appropriate opportunity to respond. The Veteran did not respond to the letter, and no additional notice or development is warranted. The CAVC has held that VA's duty to assist is not a one-way street. See Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). It is the responsibility of veterans to cooperate with VA. See Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 377, 383 (1994); Olson v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 480, 483 (1992). While VA may submit any evidence that it receives to an appropriate medical or mental health professional for an opinion as to whether it indicates that a personal assault actually occurred, it is not required to do so. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The Board emphasizes that the use of the term "may" in the regulation makes this provision optional and places that decision in the hands of the VA adjudicator. Here, the Board finds that such an opinion is not necessary. As discussed in detail below, the Veteran's service personnel records reflect only that the Veteran punched another individual. They do not support his assertions as to involvement of other individuals, or being "ganged up on." The Board has reviewed the evidence for other markers or evidence of behavioral changes but finds none. As noted above, the Veteran did not respond to a letter requesting that he provide such evidence. The Board finds that it is not reasonable to expect credible opinion evidence to be forthcoming based on these facts. The RO also obtained additional mental health treatment records from the Salisbury VA Medical Center and contacted the U.S. Army and Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC) for verification of the Veteran's stressors. While none of the stressors could be verified, the Board's April 2012 remand resulted in verification of certain details of 2 stressors. As will be discussed in detail below, while the events were verified, the Veteran's account of his participation in those events, and thus his experience of a stressor is not substantiated. The RO also obtained a VA examination as to the validity of the PTSD diagnosis. The examiner's opinion that a PTSD diagnosis was not appropriate obviated the need for the remainder of the Board's instructions regarding a nexus opinion. While the Board has found that the evidence supports a diagnosis of PTSD, this does not render the VA examination inadequate. As will be discussed in more detail below, the Board has found that no stressor has been verified. Therefore, notwithstanding the Board's remand instructions, an opinion regarding nexus is not necessary. The July 2006 remand was to afford the Veteran a Board hearing, which was also accomplished. Thus, there is substantial compliance with the Board's remand instructions, and no additional development or corrective action is necessary. Service Connection - Laws and Regulations Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Establishing service connection generally requires (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The CAVC has held that "Congress specifically limits entitlement for service-connected disease or injury to cases where such incidents have resulted in a disability. In the absence of proof of a present disability there can be no valid claim." Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992); see also Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141, 143-44 (1992). Certain specific conditions are considered chronic diseases under VA Law. These include the following: Anemia, primary; Arteriosclerosis; Arthritis; Atrophy, progressive muscular; Brain hemorrhage; Brain thrombosis; Bronchiectasis; Calculi of the kidney, bladder, or gallbladder; Cardiovascular-renal disease, including hypertension. (This term applies to combination involvement of the type of arteriosclerosis, nephritis, and organic heart disease, and since hypertension is an early symptom long preceding the development of those diseases in their more obvious forms, a disabling hypertension within the 1-year period will be given the same benefit of service connection as any of the chronic diseases listed); Cirrhosis of the liver; Coccidioidomycosis; Diabetes mellitus; Encephalitis lethargica residuals; Endocarditis. (This term covers all forms of valvular heart disease); Endocrinopathies; Epilepsies; Hansen's disease; Hodgkin's disease; Leukemia; Lupus erythematosus, systemic; Myasthenia gravis; Myelitis; Myocarditis; Nephritis; Other organic diseases of the nervous system; Osteitis deformans (Paget's disease); Osteomalacia; Palsy, bulbar; Paralysis agitans; Psychoses; Purpura idiopathic, hemorrhagic; Raynaud's disease; Sarcoidosis; Scleroderma; Sclerosis, amyotrophic lateral; Sclerosis, multiple; Syringomyelia; Thromboangiitis obliterans (Buerger's disease); Tuberculosis, active; Tumors, malignant, or of the brain or spinal cord or peripheral nerves; Ulcers, peptic (gastric or duodenal)(A proper diagnosis of gastric or duodenal ulcer (peptic ulcer) is to be considered established if it represents a medically sound interpretation of sufficient clinical findings warranting such diagnosis and provides an adequate basis for a differential diagnosis from other conditions with like symptomatology; in short, where the preponderance of evidence indicates gastric or peptic ulcer). Whenever possible, of course, laboratory findings should be used in corroboration of the clinical data. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). Where one of the above chronic diseases is shown to be chronic in service (or within the presumptive period under § 3.307) so as to permit a finding of service connection, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). For the showing of chronic disease in service there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "Chronic." When the disease identity is established (leprosy, tuberculosis, multiple sclerosis, etc.), there is no requirement of evidentiary showing of continuity. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Continuity of symptomatology is required only where the condition noted during service (or in the presumptive period) is not, in fact, shown to be chronic or where the diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. When the fact of chronicity in service is not adequately supported, then a showing of continuity after discharge is required to support the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Where a veteran served 90 days or more during a period of war or after December 31, 1946, and any of the chronic diseases listed above becomes manifest to a degree of 10 percent within 1 year from date of termination of such service (for Hansen's disease (leprosy) and tuberculosis, within 3 years; multiple sclerosis, within 7 years), such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. In rendering a decision on appeal the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant. Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36, 39-40 (1994); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 57 (1990). Competency of evidence differs from weight and credibility. Competency is a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered by the trier of fact, while credibility is a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) ("although interest may affect the credibility of testimony, it does not affect competency to testify"). Lay statements may serve to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1336(Fed. Cir. 2006) (addressing lay evidence as potentially competent to support presence of disability even where not corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence). The CAVC has emphasized that when a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. In such cases, the Board is within its province to weigh that testimony and to make a credibility determination as to whether that evidence supports a finding of service incurrence and continuity of symptomatology sufficient to establish service connection. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303(2007); Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313(Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009). Analysis The Veteran asserts that he has PTSD based on stressors experienced in service. The record demonstrates that the Veteran has been diagnosed with depressive disorder NOS and with PTSD. The record also substantiates certain elements of 2 of the claimed stressors. The Board finds that the Veteran's assertions as to his involvement in the claimed stressor events is substantially false, and therefore, a stressor is not verified for purposes of the claim. Service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the condition, credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred, and a link, established by medical evidence, between the current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). In this case, there are several medical reports which include a diagnosis of PTSD. A September 2002 private psychological evaluation recounts the Veteran's in-service stressors. The examiner's diagnoses included PTSD and adjustment disorder with depressed mood. A June 2004 psychological evaluation from the North Carolina Department Of Health And Human Services, Disability Determination Services notes that the Veteran remains preoccupied with old conflicts associated with the military; however, the examiner did not include a diagnosis of PTSD, but diagnosed somatization disorder, generalized Anxiety, depression, not otherwise specified, and a personality disorder. A VA examination in September 2004 included a diagnosis of PTSD. The Veteran recounted stressors involving the suicide of a fellow serviceman, a personal assault, and being about 50 yards from two servicemen who were killed by lightning. The Veteran's VA treatment records, including notes from his participation in the "Moving On With Life" program, include a running diagnosis of PTSD as well as positive PTSD screens. The VA initial psychiatric assessment in August 2003 includes diagnoses of PTSD, alcohol dependence, and depressive disorder NOS. The Veteran noted that he had been depressed for a very long time, even in the service. The Veteran's stressors were not discussed and no rationale was provided for the diagnoses. The Veteran was afforded a VA examination in December 2009. The VA examiner opined that, overall, at this time, the Veteran's reported symptoms do not meet DSM-4 criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. The report of VA examination in March 2011 includes diagnoses of depressive disorder NOS, alcohol abuse, and episodic PTSD. Despite several reports that do not include a PTSD diagnosis, or that specifically refute the appropriateness of such a diagnosis, the Board finds that a current diagnosis of PTSD must be acknowledged. However, the existence of a diagnosis of PTSD that is linked by a clinician to asserted events in service does not establish entitlement to service connection for PTSD unless and until the asserted in-service events are verified or substantiated. Where, as here, a claimed stressor is not related to combat, a veteran's lay testimony alone will not be enough to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395 (1996); Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1996). In such cases, the record must contain service records or other corroborative evidence which substantiates or verifies the Veteran's testimony or statements as to the occurrence of the claimed stressor. See West (Carlton) v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70, 76 (1994); Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91, 98 (1993). Moreover, a medical opinion diagnosing PTSD does not suffice to verify the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressors. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395-396 (1996); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 142 (1997). Effective July 13, 2010, VA amended its adjudication regulations governing service connection for PTSD by liberalizing, in certain circumstances, the evidentiary standard for establishing the required in-service stressor. Specifically, the amendment to 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) provides that, if a stressor claimed by a veteran is related to such veteran's fear of hostile military or terrorist activity and a VA psychiatrist or psychologist, or a psychiatrist or psychologist with whom VA has contracted, confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of PTSD, and that the Veteran's symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the Veteran's service, the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. The Veteran has reported stressors involving witnessing deaths of follow servicemen as a result of a suicide and a lightning strike, as well as a personal assault and having been stung in the face by bees. Thus, the Veteran's report of stressors does not involve fear of hostile military or terrorist activity, and the amended provisions are not applicable. As the Veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy, the record must contain service records or other corroborative evidence which substantiates or verifies the Veteran's testimony or statements as to the occurrence of the claimed stressor. After a review of all of the evidence, the Board finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that, while certain aspects of the Veteran's reported stressors have been verified, the essential aspect - his participation and/or exposure to the stressor - has not been verified. Further, the Board finds that the Veteran's account of his participation and/or exposure to these events is not accurate. Regarding the Veteran's account as to the suicide of a fellow serviceman, his retelling of this incident has been inconsistent as to details, and many of the details he has reported are contradicted by the official incident report prepared at the time. In the May 2004 Notice of Disagreement, the Veteran reported that he was out in the field in South Korea when his Battery X.O. took his service revolver and blew his brains out. The report of VA examination in September 2004 reveals the Veteran's account that, when he was in Korea in the spring of 1967, he had just gotten off guard duty when the 2nd Lieutenant killed himself. He said he was about 200 yards away, heard the shot and went there, but he was kept from the scene, and later found out what had happened. In a May 2005 evaluation, a private psychologist noted the Veteran's account that, in June, 1967, his unit was on a field exercise. The Veteran was pulling guard duty, making his rounds, when he heard a noise and went to investigate. When he arrived at where he heard the noise he witnessed a 2nd Lieutenant from his unit shooting himself with his pistol. He said that the Lieutenant died of his wound and it really threw the Veteran for a loop. In a stressor statement in November 2006, the Veteran reported that a 1st Lieutenant committed suicide. The Veteran testified at the Board hearing in 2006 that he was on guard duty that night and guarding the Fort. "You have to guard your perimeters that's around the officers and quarters or -- and around the tents, you know." Around midnight, he heard a loud noise and when he ran up to the tent, "it was -- and when I called the other guard that was on duty we both ran up to one of the tent[s] and when we got there and opened up the tent we see the Lieutenant lying back on the -- his cot. And he had shot hi[m]self." The report of VA examination in December 2009 reveals the Veteran's account that he witnessed the dead body in the immediate aftermath of a 2nd Lieutenant who committed suicide while serving in Korea (dead body and heard gunshot but was 200 yards away). A September 2010 stressor statement indicates that he was on guard duty when a 2nd Lieutenant committed suicide. According to the Veteran, he heard the gunshot and ran up to his tent, and saw him lying there with his head blown off. According to the account, "I do not know his name, but I walked into his tent and I can still see his body lying there with his head blown off in a pool of blood." The Veteran reported that this incident occurred sometime between July and August 1967. The report of VA examination in March 2011 reveals the Veteran's account that, while in the field for a training exercise, the Veteran was on guard duty along with someone identified as Private Sykes, when he heard a shot, ran to the Lieutenant's tent and found him lying on the ground after having shot himself under the chin, with blood all over the tent. The accounts above differ in significant details. The Veteran has reported both that he was on guard duty, and that he had finished guard duty. He has reported that he witnessed the actually suicide, that he did not witness the suicide, but saw the body shortly after the suicide, and that he did not witness the suicide or see the body, but was kept from the scene, and only later found out what had happened. He has reported that he individually went to the scene following the suicide, and that he and another serviceman went to the scene together. He has reported that he found the individual who committed suicide lying on a cot, and, in another account, that he found the individual who committed suicide lying on the ground. The details the Veteran has reported in his various accounts are irreconcilable. If any details are true, others must be false. The Veteran is certainly competent to describe the details of this event as he experienced and remembers them. His competency is not at issue. The Veteran's account is self contradictory and can be assigned no credibility. As set out above, there is not doubt as to certain aspects of the stressor event. It has been confirmed that an individual committed suicide in the area in which the Veteran's unit was stationed, at the time his unit was stationed there. However, simply verifying that an event occurred does not substantiate or verify that the event was a stressor. The Veteran's connection to the event is a significant factor in determining whether an event is in fact a stressor. In this case, the Veteran's connection to the event is not substantiated or verified. His assertions of a direct connection are inconsistent and self-contradictory. Moreover, they substantially conflict with the official record of the incident. The RO obtained an investigation report from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, U.S. Army Crime Records Center regarding the May 1967 suicide. The cover letter for the report specifically states that the information is privileged and that reproduction of any portion of the report must not be made without permission. Therefore, the specific details of the report will not be transcribed into this decision. Nevertheless, an investigation was undertaken, and interviews of witnesses to the event, and the immediate aftermath of the event were conducted. All of the individuals interviewed were listed in the report. The Veteran was not interviewed and his name appears nowhere in the report. The Veteran's assertion that he was on guard duty at the time of the incident is contradicted by the report. The individuals who were on guard duty were interviewed. Even the Veteran's assertion as to the individual having shot himself under the chin, and/or that his head was blown off, is directly contradicted by the report. In sum, the credible evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the Veteran's accounts as to this stressor are false. Turning to the second stressor, involving individuals having been struck by lightning, the report of a VA examination September 2004 reveals the Veteran's account that, in the summer of 1968, he was on temporary duty assignment to Eglin Air Force Base and was sitting in a truck and "they" were taking Rangers out into the field when lightning struck about 50 yards away, hit a tree, and killed one solider underneath it. A May 2005 report of a private psychologist reveals that, in August 1968, the Veteran was TDY (temporary duty assignment) at Elgin Air Force Base in Florida and during a heavy rain storm two of the men he was with were killed by lightening. The report of VA examination in December 2009 reveals the Veteran's account that, during a TDY to Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, sometime during August 1968, during some training with Army Rangers, his unit was transporting the Ranger trainees in the field and there was a lighting strike that killed two of the soldiers. The Veteran said he was watching while it occurred. The report of VA examination in March 2011 reveals the Veteran's account that he was sent to Florida to train Rangers when lightning struck and killed one soldier. A newspaper article from the time period confirms that 2 individuals were killed by a lightning strike at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. A report entitled Florida Hazardous Weather By Day indicates that on August 29, 1968, 2 Army Rangers were killed and 7 were injured by lightning at Eglin Air Force Base. While the newspaper article confirms that the incident occurred, as discussed above, this does not confirm that the Veteran played any part in, or had any exposure to, the incident. The Board finds that the Veteran was not involved in any way in the incident and therefore his account is not credible. In so finding, the Board notes that the Veteran's service personnel records document each of his duty assignments, but do not reflect any assignment, temporary or otherwise, to Eglin Air Force Base. At the time of the incident (August 1968), the Veteran was assigned to Fort Benning, Georgia. There are also conflicts in the Veteran's various accounts. He has alternately reported having seen 1 person killed and having seen 2 people killed. This is not a minor detail. His account is also lacking in specifics. Indeed, the details he reported could easily have been gleaned from the newspaper article. For someone who was allegedly present at, and a witness to a traumatic event, it is reasonable to expect a detailed accounting of what was witnessed. Finally, the Board notes that the account in Florida Hazardous Weather By Day notes that 7 individuals were injured in the strike, in addition to the 2 who were killed. The Veteran never mentioned any additional injuries. This too is not a minor detail. In sum, while the incident of the 2 Army Rangers having been killed by lightning at Eglin Air Force Base in August 1968 has been confirmed, the Veteran's assertion that he was in any way involved in or exposed to the incident is false. Regarding the 2 stressors discussed above, this case is thus distinguished from the facts of Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 307 (1997), or Pentecost v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 124 (2002). In those cases, as here, the general fact of the claimed events was confirmed by official sources and only the Veteran's involvement was questioned. However, in those cases, there was no evidence that undermined the credibility of the Veteran's account of his involvement. There was essentially a lack of corroborating evidence. In this case, the Veteran's accounts are self-contradictory and not credible. The Veteran has also reported 2 other incidents, although he has been contradictory regarding whether he believes that they contributed to his PTSD. In the May 2004 Notice of Disagreement, the Veteran reported that he was abused and assaulted while in "B" Co. 2nd Bn. 17th Infantry Division. The report of a VA examination in September 2004 reflects that, when he was transferred from B company to A company, he was the only black person in the platoon. One day he got in a fight with the motor pool and a bunch of people ganged up on him and he was court-martialed for it. In the report of VA examination in December 2009 the Veteran described an altercation with a NCO in a motor pool. In this telling, he did not mention a group of people ganging up on him; however, according to the examiner, this was the same incident he previously alleged as PTSD stressor, i.e. was "ganged up" on by other soldiers included in the NCO whom he alleges was treating him unfairly. The report of VA examination in March 2011 reveals that, while prepping for inspection, he made a remark because he was doing all the work. He ended up being called a racial epithet by an individual, to which the Veteran reacted by hitting him. Again, the Veteran did not refer to a gang of individuals. Moreover, the examiner noted that the Veteran did not contend that his PTSD was related to this incident. There does not appear to be any medical opinion that relates PTSD specifically to the alleged personal assault. The March 2011 VA examiner specifically noted that the Veteran did not assert any such relationship, and the examiner found no such relationship. Other PTSD diagnoses are non-specific as to the stressors supporting the diagnosis. In any event, while there is evidence substantiating the Veteran's assertion that he struck a fellow serviceman and was put before a summary Court Marital, the evidence does not substantiates or verify the specifics of the personal assault which is the essential element of the stressor. The service personnel records document a summary Court Marital order dated March 25, 1968, which found the Veteran guilty of violation of Article 91 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in that he struck an acting Sergeant in the face with his fist on February 12, 1968. Again, it is not having struck another individual that the Veteran asserts is a stressor, it is the events that he alleges caused this reaction. Those events are to be found nowhere in the record. This is not a silent record. The details of the alleged incident are documented in the service records. The Veteran's account of having been assaulted by a gang of individuals is not mentioned. In fact, the Veteran is the only individual mentioned as having committed a personal assault. In light of the discrepancies in the Veteran's account as compared to the service records, the Board finds that the Veteran's account is false. The Veteran did not respond to a letter requesting additional information regarding the alleged personal assault. The Veteran's account alone, even if true, is not sufficient to corroborate this asserted stressor. Based on the evidence, the Board finds that the stressor is not verified or substantiated, and there is no basis for further development. A May 2005 private psychologist noted the Veteran's account that, while stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, he got stung in the face by bees. He said that his eyes were swollen shut and he was hospitalized for two weeks. In a February 2008 written statement, the Veteran reported that, while stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, from January 1967 to March 1967, he was stung by some type of bees or ground hornets and was hospitalized for 14 days. His eyes were swollen shut for 4 days because of the stings. As with the alleged assault, there is no medical opinion that specifically attributes PTSD to this incident. Moreover, there is no record of the incident in the Veteran's service treatment records. If the Veteran had been treated for 2 weeks, it is reasonable to expect some notation in the service treatment records, in the separation examination, or on the report of medical history at service separation. Although the service treatment records contain two entries in February 1967, and other entries later in 1967, there is no reference to bee stings, eye swelling, or a 2-week hospitalization. Indeed, while the Veteran now contends that the was hospitalized for 2 weeks, on the report of medical history at service separation, he reported that the had not consulted or been treated by clinics, physicians, healers, or other practitioners within the past 5 years. In sum, the evidence pertinent to service contradicts the Veteran's account. The account is neither verified nor substantiated. As there is no verified stressor in this case, the criteria for service connection for PTSD are not met, notwithstanding a diagnosis of PTSD. The Board acknowledges that there are other diagnoses in addition to PTSD. The Board has considered whether service connection can be granted for an acquired psychiatric disorder other than PTSD. The Veteran has not been diagnosed with a psychosis and there is no manifestation of psychosis within 1 year of service separation. Therefore, the provisions regarding the presumption of service connection for certain chronic diseases, to include psychoses, are not applicable, nor are the provisions regarding continuity of symptomatology. After a review of all of the evidence, the Board finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that symptoms of a psychiatric disability were not chronic in service, and no current psychiatric disability is related to service. The report of VA examination in September 2004 reveals the Veteran's account that he has had difficulty since 1967. Thus, he asserts that he had onset of psychiatric symptoms in service. The service treatment records reflect no treatment for psychiatric complaints during service. The Veteran was found to be psychiatrically normal when examined for service separation. He was assigned a physical profile (PULHES) rank of S-1. PULHES is the six categories into which a physical profile is divided. The P stands for physical capacity or stamina; the U for upper extremities; the L for lower extremities; the H for hearing and ear; the E for eyes; and the S stands for psychiatric). The number 1 indicates that an individual possesses a high level of medical fitness and, consequently, is medically fit for any military assignment. Odiorne v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 456, 457 (1992). The Veteran completed a report of medical history at service separation and reported no history of depression, excessive worry, or nervous trouble of any sort. Thus, to the extent that he now reports onset of symptoms in service, this directly conflicts with report at service separation. In weighing the conflicting statements provided by the Veteran at various times, the point in time in which the statement was made is important because a recounting of an event which is closer to the time that event occurred is naturally less likely to be diluted by the shortcomings of human memory. Thus, the contemporaneousness of the statement of medical history at discharge is significant. Furthermore, because the Veteran was then seeking only medical evaluation, it seems likely that he would report events carefully and accurately. Statements made to physicians for purposes of diagnosis and treatment are exceptionally trustworthy because the declarant has a strong motive to tell the truth in order to receive proper care. In contrast, when the Veteran thereafter presented his account, he was seeking VA benefits rather than medical treatment. The Board is of course cognizant of possible self interest which any veteran has in promoting a claim for monetary benefits. The Board may properly consider the personal interest a claimant has in his or her own case, but the Board is not free to ignore his assertion as to any matter upon which he is competent to offer an opinion. See Pond v. West, 12 Vet. App. 341, 345 (1999); and see Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991). There is no question that the Veteran is competent to relate events as he remembers them. Thus, his competency is not at issue with regard to recounting the events of service. Rather, it is the accuracy of the Veteran's recent account which the Board finds is lacking. Simply put, the report of medical history at separation from service is more convincing than the Veteran's later statements made in support of a claim for monetary benefits. The accuracy of the report of medical history is also bolstered by the normal clinical findings and the lack of in-service treatment. There is no medical opinion that purports to relate any psychiatric diagnosis other than PTSD to service. Although the September 2002 private psychological evaluation included a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with depressed mood, the examiner did not explicitly link the diagnosis to service. Similarly, while a June 2004 psychological evaluation from the North Carolina Department Of Health And Human Services, Disability Determination Services, notes that the Veteran remains preoccupied with old conflicts associated with the military and includes diagnoses of somatization disorder, generalized anxiety, and depression, not otherwise specified, none of these diagnoses was explicitly linked to service. The VA initial psychiatric assessment in August 2003 includes a diagnosis of depressive disorder NOS, and the Veteran's account that he had been depressed for a very long time, even in the service. However, the examiner did not explicitly link the diagnosis to service. Moreover, to the extent any link might be inferred from the assertion that his symptoms began in service, the Board has found that assertion to be inaccurate. An opinion based on a false factual predicate is not credible evidence. The Veteran was afforded a VA examination in December 2009. The examiner found some mild depressive symptoms, which have been adequately treated with medication and group therapy in the past. The examiner opined that these resulted from the post-military death of his brother, which the Veteran reported had a significant impact on his life. The examiner opined that it is at least as likely as not that his depressive symptoms were caused by post- military stressors rather than events occurring on active duty. The report of VA examination in March 2011 includes a diagnosis of depressive disorder NOS. However, the diagnosis is not explicitly linked to service. Regarding the diagnoses of a personality disorder and alcohol dependence, the Board notes that these disorders are subject to important restrictions regarding service connection. Governing regulations provide that personality disorders are not diseases within the meaning of applicable legislation providing for payment of VA disability compensation benefits. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c), Part 4, § 4.9 (2012); see also Winn v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 510, 516 (1996), and cases cited therein. In addition, no compensation shall be paid if a disability is the result of a veteran's own willful misconduct, including the abuse of alcohol and drugs. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 105, 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(n), 3.301 (2012); see also VAOPGPREC 2-97 (January 16, 1997). The law also precludes compensation for primary alcohol abuse disabilities, and secondary disabilities that result from primary alcohol abuse. Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Veteran believes and asserts that he has an acquired psychiatric disability that is related to service. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issue in this case, determining the etiology of a psychiatric disability falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (lay persons not competent to diagnose cancer). In summary of the Board's findings, although the Veteran has been diagnosed with PTSD, no in-service stressors are verified. Symptoms of a psychiatric disability were not chronic in service; and, no current psychiatric disability is related to service. In light of these findings, the Board concludes that service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include PTSD, is not warranted. In reaching this conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, that doctrine is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 53-56. ORDER Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include PTSD, is denied. ____________________________________________ MARK W. GREENSTREET Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs