Citation Nr: 1320101 Decision Date: 06/21/13 Archive Date: 07/02/13 DOCKET NO. 07-34 918 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Nashville, Tennessee THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and psychotic disorder (claimed as schizophrenia). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C.A. Skow, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from November 1963 to November 1965. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an October 2006 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Nashville, Tennessee. In 2007, the Veteran testified before a Decision Review Officer (DRO) at the RO in July 2007. In November 2008, the Veteran testified before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge (VLJ) at a videoconference hearing at the RO. The hearing transcripts are associated with the claims files. The Veteran seeks service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder variously diagnosed and claimed. The Board notes that, when a claimant makes a claim, he is seeking service connection for symptoms regardless of how those symptoms are diagnosed or labeled. Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009). Therefore, the Board has recharacterized the psychiatric claim on appeal to more broadly reflect the benefit sought based on the testimony rendered before the undersigned and the evidence in the claims files. In December 2008, the Board denied the Veteran's claim. He appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). In a May 2010 Order, pursuant to a Joint Motion for Remand, the Court vacated and remanded the Board's decision. In August 2010, the Board remanded this case for action consistent with the Court Order. Following the requested development, the RO returned the case to the Board for consideration of the appeal and disposition. In addition to the paper claims files, there is a Virtual VA electronic claims file associated with the Veteran's claim. A review of the documents in the electronic file reveals that they are either duplicative of the evidence in the paper claims files or are irrelevant to the issue on appeal. Lastly, the Board observes that the Veteran's service separation examination is incorrectly date stamped "20 Oct 1955" when the actual date is October 1965. It is clear from the record that the exam date is not October 1955 as the Veteran was not in service at this time, he was not separated in that year, and the hand written dates on the exam report and medical history are shown to be October 1965. Therefore, the Board shall refer to this exam report as dated in October 1965. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. An acquired shown psychiatric disorder, to include a depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, psychotic disorder, and schizophrenia, was not incurred in service and is not otherwise related to service; a psychotic disorder to include schizophrenia is not shown within the initial post separation year. 2. The Veteran does not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder to include PTSD, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and psychotic disorder (to include schizophrenia) are not met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§1110, 1112, 1113, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.304(f), 4.125(a) (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 The Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA), codified in pertinent part at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A (West 2002 & Supp. 2012), and the pertinent implementing regulation, codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2012), provide that VA will assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate a claim but is not required to provide assistance to a claimant if there is no reasonable possibility that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim. They also require VA to notify the claimant and the claimant's representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, not previously provided to the Secretary that is necessary to substantiate the claim. As part of the notice, VA is to specifically inform the claimant and the claimant's representative, if any, of which portion, if any, of the evidence is to be provided by the claimant and which part, if any, VA will attempt to obtain on behalf of the claimant. Although the regulation previously required VA to request that the claimant provide any evidence in the claimant's possession that pertains to the claim, the regulation has been amended to eliminate that requirement for claims pending before VA on or after May 30, 2008. The Board also notes the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held the plain language of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) requires notice to a claimant pursuant to the VCAA be provided "at the time" or "immediately after" VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for VA-administered benefits. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 119 (2004). The timing requirement articulated in Pelegrini applies equally to the initial-disability-rating and effective-date elements of a service-connection claim. Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). The Board finds that VA satisfied its duty to notify. The record reflects that VA sent to the Veteran all required notice in a June 2006 letter, prior to the rating decision on appeal. This letter further outlined the unique legal requirements for establishing a claim for PTSD. Furthermore, VA provided an updated VCAA letter to the Veteran in August 2010, which notified him of the relevant regulatory changes to establishing a PTSD stressor. VA subsequently readjudicated the matter on appeal. The Veteran has been afforded due process of law. It is noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that an error in VCAA notice should not be presumed prejudicial, and that the burden of showing harmful error rests with the party raising the issue, to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009). In this case, the Veteran has not demonstrated any prejudicial or harmful error in the VCAA notice. The Board also finds that VA satisfied its duty to assist the Veteran in the development of his claim. VA obtained all relevant medical treatment records identified by the Veteran, to include Social Security Administration (SSA) records pertaining to his disability claim. These records have been associated these records with the claims files. VA further afforded the Veteran an appropriate VA examination and obtained a medical opinion on his behalf. Neither the Veteran nor his representative has identified any outstanding evidence that could be obtained to substantiate the Veteran's claim; the Board is also unaware of any such evidence. Pursuant to Court Order, the Board remanded this case for additional development to include requesting outstanding medical records, copies of records pertaining to his SSA claim, and copies of VA mental health treatment records located at the Mountain Home facility; also, consistent with the Court Order, the Board remanded this case for a VA examination and medical opinion. Thereafter, VA conducted the requested actions. The Board has reviewed the development to include the examination report and finds substantial compliance with the requirements articulated in the Board's prior remand. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998); Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141, 146-47 (1999). Lastly, VA afforded the Veteran hearings on appeal. Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2), a VLJ who conducts a hearing must fulfill two duties: First, the VLJ must fully explain the issues and, second, the VLJ must suggest the submission of evidence that may have been overlooked. Here, during the Board personal hearing, the Veteran made an opening statement wherein he recited the relevant law and argued the facts of his case. Specifically, he noted that the law provided for compensation for those who incurred injury or disease in service; and he then argued that his psychiatric condition had its onset in service. It was evident that the Veteran had actual knowledge of the elements of his claim that were lacking when he requested that the Board accept his lay testimony as to onset of injury or disease in service to substantiate the claim of service connection. The VLJ asked questions to ascertain whether there existed any outstanding medical evidence to support the claim. The hearing focused on the elements necessary to substantiate the claim, and the Veteran, through his testimony, demonstrated that he had actual knowledge of the elements necessary to substantiate his claim for service connection. It is noted that the remand of this case was predicated, in part, on this testimony. Therefore, the Board finds that the VLJ complied with the duties set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2). See also, Bryant v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 488 (2010). Accordingly, the Board will address the merits of the claim. II. Entitlement to Service Connection The Veteran seeks service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability. He contends that he began to have psychiatric problems in service to include auditory hallucinations. In his May 2006 claim for service connection, the Veteran asserted that his IQ was only 75 when he entered military service, and he did not have the mental or emotional capabilities to perform required duties or "cope with [his] situation," including learning Morse code. The Veteran further asserted that his current mental health status is due to being informed during basic training in November 1963 that President John F. Kennedy (JFK) and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson had been shot and killed. The Veteran stated that he was traumatized by this and began hearing voices telling him to kill himself shortly afterwards. Alternatively, the Veteran asserted that his current mental health status is the result of learning Morse code during service for his military occupational specialty of radio operator, in that it runs through his mind and he still frequently taps out Morse code without realizing it. He stated that he began hearing the voices before learning Morse code, but this has also tormented him. See, e.g., PTSD Questionnaire response received in June 2006; December 2007 statement; November 2008 Board hearing transcript. In 2008, the Veteran testified that he had mental health symptoms during service, including auditory hallucinations and suicidal thoughts, and that such symptoms continued after discharge. He stated that he did not seek treatment during service because his father and fellow servicemen told him that it was a disgrace to be "mentally sick." He further stated that the "voices" would bother him less when he jogged or ran after discharge, so he speculated that the frequent running and physical training during service suppressed them during service. See, e.g., Board hearing transcript. The Veteran testified that he received treatment shortly after discharge but this did not help, and he lived with his illness until about 2000, when he sought treatment from private psychiatrist, M.R. because he was dangerously suicidal. In support of his claim, the Veteran has submitted a November 2007 statement from a fellow service member, D.S., stating that the Veteran seemed depressed after the announcement during basic training, and that he "fell into depression" a few months after discharge from service and had to seek professional help. D.S. further stated that the Veteran said he felt like Morse code put him in this state of mind. The Veteran reported that he sought treatment for such symptoms from Dr. L.S. in 1966 or 1967. In support of his claim, he submitted a letter dated in August 2007 from Dr. L.S., which reflects that the doctor was retired but recalled treating the Veteran "sometime in 1967" for chronic anxiety, agitated depression, and suspected hallucinations, with an "obvious diagnosis" of schizophrenia. Dr. L.S. stated that he referred the Veteran to a mental health clinic for a formal diagnosis and treatment, as he was not a psychiatrist, but those providers did not forward to him any reports concerning the Veteran's care. Dr. L.S. further indicated that his treatment records concerning the Veteran had been destroyed, and any psychiatric records from that period were also no longer available, as the clinic was defunct and those psychiatrists were deceased. In January 2009 statement, the Veteran reported that "While in basic training, I got sick with 'schizophrenia,' but due to the shame of mental illness, I didn't seek help." Legal Criteria Initially, the Board notes the Veteran does not assert that his claimed psychiatric problems are a result of combat. Therefore, the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) are not for application in this matter. Compensation may be awarded for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110. Service connection basically means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred coincident with service in the Armed Forces, or if preexisting such service, was aggravated therein. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Establishing service connection generally requires (1) evidence of a current disability; (2) evidence of in- service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), an alternative method of establishing the second and third Shedden/Caluza element is through a demonstration of continuity of symptomatology. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 307 (2007); Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-97 (1997); see also Clyburn v. West, 12 Vet. App. 296, 302 (1999). Continuity of symptomatology may be established if a claimant can demonstrate (1) that a condition was "noted" during service; (2) evidence of post-service continuity of the same symptomatology; and (3) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the post-service symptomatology. Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-96 (1997); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has recently held that the theory of continuity of symptomatology can be used only in cases involving those conditions explicitly recognized as chronic under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Psychosis shall be considered to have been incurred in or aggravated by service although not otherwise established during the period of service if manifested to a compensable degree within one year following service in a period of war or following peacetime service on or after January 1, 1947. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a) (3), 3.309(a). Generally, entitlement to service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); (2) a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and (3) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). A personality disorder or mental deficiency is not eligible for service connection because it is not considered a disease or injury for VA compensation purposes. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(c), 4.9. However, such condition may be service connected if it is subject to, or aggravated by, a superimposed disease or injury during service which results in additional disability. See VAOPGCPREC 82-90 (July 18, 1990), published at 56 Fed. Reg. 45,711 (1990); see also Winn v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 510, 516 (1996); Natali v. Principi, 375 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Board is required to analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for any evidence that it finds persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant. See Daye v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 512, 516 (2006). It is noted that competency of evidence differs from weight and credibility. The former is a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered by the trier of fact, while the latter is a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) ("although interest may affect the credibility of testimony, it does not affect competency to testify"). In determining whether statements are credible, the Board may consider internal consistency, facial plausibility, and consistency with other evidence submitted on behalf of the claimant. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995). Except as otherwise provided by law, a claimant has the responsibility to present and support a claim for benefits under laws administered by the Secretary. The Secretary shall consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case before the Secretary with respect to benefits under laws administered by the Secretary. When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2012); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). To deny a claim on its merits, the evidence must preponderate against the claim. Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996), citing Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 54. Analysis Having carefully reviewed the evidence of record, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. An acquired psychiatric disorder is not shown in service and psychosis is not shown within the initial post separation year; an acquired psychiatric disorder shown during the appeal period has not been attributed to service, to include the Veteran's learning Morse code or his being told of JFK's and others' assassinations; and a diagnosis for PTSD in accordance with the DSM-IV is not shown. Service treatment records reflect no psychiatric complaints or abnormal findings. A report of separation examination dated in October 1965 reflects normal psychiatric evaluation, and the Veteran did not report any history of psychiatric problems or symptoms. On the history part of that exam dated in October 1965, he denied frequent trouble sleeping; frequent or terrifying nightmares; depression or excessive worry; loss of memory; nervous trouble of any sort; and attempted suicide. A psychiatric disorder is first noted during a routine physical in September 2001. The examiner reported that, during a physical, he "uncovered what is probably a depression" and indicated that the Veteran's main stresses were "church related and loss of a job from what he feels is an unjust accusation." Auditory hallucinations are first documented in September 2002. At this time, the Veteran presented for a psychiatric evaluation at the direction of his primary physician. By history, the Veteran had problems with anxiety and depression for "some time" and he reported that he had been hearing voices since he was taught Morse code in the service. The assessment was psychosis not otherwise specified (NOS) and major depression with history of psychotic features. Also, when the Veteran presented for a follow-up neurological appointment related to headache disorder in September 2002, he reported that he had been having auditory hallucinations for the past 35 years. A follow-up private neurological record shows history of "a form of schizophrenia." In connection with his SSA claim, a psychological evaluation dated in November 2002 showed a history of schizophrenia (the Veteran reported that his psychiatrist told him this) and that he "battled it all my life." The Veteran reported that he had never been terminated from a job. The diagnoses were anxiety disorder NOS with mixed anxiety; depression; rule out obsessive/compulsive disorder; and personality disorder NOS with histrionic features. The record shows that the Veteran was awarded SSA disability due to a psychiatric disorder characterized as an affective disorder and it reflects that the disability began in February 2002. Report of VA examination dated in December 2011 reflects diagnoses for depressive disorder NOS and psychotic disorder NOS. The examiner found that the Veteran did not meet the DSM-IV criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD as the alleged stressor (hearing that the president, vice-president, and governor were assassinated) was not adequate to support such a diagnosis; there was no exposure to a traumatic event; and no traumatic event is persistently re-experienced. The examiner reported that the Veteran's current symptoms (depressed mood and mild memory loss) were not related to military service, to include the Veteran's report of distress at hearing that JFK had been assassinated, explaining that hearing this information in service would not cause onset many years later of depression or psychotic disorder. The examiner noted that examination revealed no indication that the Veteran had symptoms consistent with schizophrenia, paranoid schizophrenia, or bipolar disorder-noting that the Veteran's report of maintaining work for 30 years in chemical operations, a complicated job in which he excelled and got along with coworkers/supervisors, was inconsistent with the presence of these disorders. No mental deficiency of personality disorder was found. This above discussed evidence is highly probative and weighs against the claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. This evidence shows no acquired psychiatric disorder in service or related to service; no psychotic disorder within the initial post separation year; and that the Veteran does not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. The Board has considered the Veteran's sworn testimony and statements, to include report of treatment soon after service discharge, in 1966 or 1967. The Board finds that the Veteran is competent to report his symptoms and treatment. Layno at 469 (1994); see also Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 398, 405 (1995). Furthermore, lay assertions may serve to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d. 1372 (2007); see Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F. 3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, to the extent that the Veteran suggests in-service onset of an acquired psychiatric disorder, or onset of psychosis in service or within the initial post separation year, the Board finds that he is not credible. First, as to the Veteran's report of in-service onset, the Board finds that this is incongruous with the normal separation examination in 1965, his denial of various psychiatric symptoms on the history part of that exam, his self-report in September 2002 that his auditory hallucinations had been present for 35 years (since 1967-two years after service separation) and the absence of any complaints in service or at service separation. This coupled with the more than 30 years intervening service separation and his first documented complaints or treatment along with an absence of complaints when otherwise obtaining medical treatment between 1991 and 2000 weigh against the credibility of his assertions here. It is noted that a private treatment record dated in January 1992 reflects a review of the systems and, on neuropsychiatric evaluation, the Veteran was described as "oriented times three, pleasant and cooperative." There was no indication of psychiatric disorder. As such, the Board finds that the Veteran's statements in this regard have diminished probative value. The Board has considered the Veteran's report of treatment soon after service discharge, in 1966 or 1967, in conjunction with Dr. L.S.'s report in 2007 that he treated the Veteran "sometime in 1967" for chronic anxiety, agitated depression, and suspected hallucinations, with an "obvious diagnosis" of schizophrenia. The Board accepts that both the Veteran and L.S. are competent to report these facts. However, the Board finds that Dr. L.S.'s report in 2007 of recalling such specific symptoms and a diagnosis for schizophrenia from 40 years earlier without the benefit of clinical records for review defies belief. Furthermore, when first reporting his auditory hallucination, the Veteran never included any history for diagnosis of schizophrenia in 1967, which seems a very unlikely oversight by him when seeking treatment many years later for the same symptom, hearing voices. Therefore, the Board finds that these statements have diminished probative value. The Board further acknowledges the lay statement of D.S. dated in November 2007. D.S. is competent to report his observations of the Veteran, for instance that he appeared depressed. However, to the extent that he suggests that the Veteran's learning Morse code caused his psychiatric problems or that he had depressive disorder, he is not competent because he lacks any particular expertise to render an etiological medical opinion or medical diagnosis, and because such conclusions are not susceptible to lay observation, unlike a broken leg. See Jandreau, supra. at 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (the Federal Circuit provided an example, stating that a layperson would be competent to identify a simple condition such as a broken leg, but not competent to provide evidence as to a more complex medical question such as a form of cancer). See also, Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Although it is error to categorically reject a non-expert opinion as to etiology, or nexus, not all questions of nexus are subject to non-expert opinion). As such, the Board finds that the statement of D.S. has diminished probative value. The Board has considered the Veteran's 2009 statement indicating that he had schizophrenia in service but was too ashamed to get help. Notably, the Veteran did not report his "symptoms" in this statement but rather indicated that he had schizophrenia. The Veteran is competent, as stated above, to report his symptoms. Layno, supra. However, he is not competent to diagnose a psychiatric disorder, such as, schizophrenia since he lacks any medical expertise and this disorder is not susceptible to lay observation. See Jandreau, supra. at 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Davidson, supra. Therefore, the Veteran's report of having schizophrenia in service has no probative value. The Board assigns greater probative value to the service separation examination dated in October 1965, the medical records dated since 2001, and report of VA examination dated in December 2011 because this evidence was prepared by skilled, neutral medical professionals with consideration of the Veteran's medical history and examination of the Veteran. The Board finds that the service treatment records along with the report of separation examination are highly probative as to the non-existence of a psychiatric disorder in service. These records show no complaints that could be attributed to psychiatric disorder or abnormal psychiatric findings. Moreover, the Veteran did not report psychiatric problems at service separation and clinical evaluation at that time was normal. The Veteran reports that he was too ashamed to seek help for his symptoms, hearing voices, in service, but the Board believes that this explanation is incongruous with his denial of problems at service separation and then his later report of seeking treatment soon after service. The Board also finds that the first documented findings for psychiatric disorder dated in 2001 are highly probative of the absence of any prior history of psychiatric disorder. At that time, depression was found by the examiner which was attributed to church related stresses and job loss. There was no mention of hearing voices at this time or auditory hallucinations. Auditory hallucinations are first documented a year later, in September 2002. At this time, the Veteran reported having auditory hallucinations since learning Morse code in service, but he later reported having had a 35 year history of hearing voices, which would place onset two years after service separation in 1967. The Veteran is an inconsistent historian in regards to his history of onset of hearing voices and the Board has found he is not credible in this regard as discussed at length above. Further, the Board assigns greater probative value to the negative VA medical opinion dated in December 2011, which shows that the Veteran does not meet the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD and that his current psychiatric disorder was not related to service. The VA medical opinion is probative as it was prepared after review of the claims files and evaluation of the Veteran. Furthermore, the medical opinion is supported by a rationale. It is noted that the credibility and weight to be attached to such opinions are within the province of the Board as adjudicators. Guerrieri v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 467, 470-71 (1993). The Board observes that there is no favorable medical opinion in this case for consideration and, while Dr. L.S. reports that the Veteran had schizophrenia in 1967, this diagnosis is based on his recollection some 30 years later and, even if accurate, place this diagnosis beyond the initial post separation year. The record shows that the Veteran does not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Also, there is no indication that the Veteran has a personality disorder that was subject to, or aggravated by, a superimposed disease or injury during service which results in additional disability. See VAOPGCPREC 82-90 (July 18, 1990). Accordingly, because the weight of the evidence is against the claim, the claim is denied. There is no doubt to resolve as the evidence is not roughly in equipoise. Gilbert, supra. ORDER Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder to include PTSD, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and psychotic disorder (to include schizophrenia) is denied. ____________________________________________ C. TRUEBA Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs