Citation Nr: 1320124 Decision Date: 06/21/13 Archive Date: 07/02/13 DOCKET NO. 09-49 694 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Petersburg, Florida THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for degenerative joint disease (DJD) of the lumbar spine. 2. Entitlement to service connection for sciatica of the right leg, to include as secondary to DJD of the lumbar spine. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD T. Hal Smith, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from August 1969 to March 1971. These matters are before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a September 2008 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Petersburg, Florida. The Veteran testified before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge (VLJ) at a Travel Board hearing in August 2011. A transcript of the hearing is associated with the claims folder. The issues were remanded by the Board in December 2011 for further development. The following determinations are based on review of the Veteran's claims file in addition to his Virtual VA "eFolder." FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran sustained a back injury during service. 2. Lumbar spine disorder symptoms were not chronic in service and have not been continuous since service. 3. Currently diagnosed lumbar spine DJD is unrelated to inservice lumbar spine injury and symptoms, and lumbar spine arthritis did not manifest within the one year presumptive period. 4. The Veteran did not sustain an injury or disease of the right sciatic nerve in service, and current right leg sciatica is not related to active service. 5. Current right leg sciatica is associated with his lumbar spine disorder which is not a disorder of service origin. 6. The Veteran's right leg sciatica is not causally related to or aggravated by any service-connected disability (e.g., varicose veins). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Lumbar spine DJD was not incurred in or aggravated by active service, and may not be presumed to have been incurred therein. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1112, 1137, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2012). 2. Right leg sciatica was not incurred in or aggravated by active service, may not be presumed to be and is not proximately due to or aggravated by a service-connected disability. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1112, 1113, 1137, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Duties to Notify and Assist The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), codified in part at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A, and implemented at 38 C.F.R. § 3.159, amended VA's duties to notify and assist a claimant in developing the information and evidence necessary to substantiate a claim. First, VA has a duty under the VCAA to notify a claimant and any designated representative of the information and evidence needed to substantiate a claim. In this regard, letters to the Veteran from the RO (to include letters in April 2008 January 2012) specifically notified him of the substance of the VCAA, including the type of evidence necessary to establish entitlement to service connection on a direct, presumptive and secondary basis, and of the division of responsibility between the Veteran and the VA for obtaining that evidence. Consistent with 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b), VA essentially satisfied the notification requirements of the VCAA by way of these letters by: (1) informing the Veteran about the information and evidence not of record that was necessary to substantiate his claims; (2) informing the Veteran about the information and evidence VA would seek to provide; and (3) informing the Veteran about the information and evidence he was expected to provide. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that the notice requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of a service connection claim, to specifically include that a disability rating and an effective date will be assigned if service connection is awarded. Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). In the present appeal, the Veteran was provided with notice of this information in the April 2008 letter mentioned above. Second, VA has made reasonable efforts to assist the Veteran in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate his claims. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A (West 2002 & Supp. 2012). The information and evidence associated with the claims file consist of his service treatment records (STRs), VA medical treatment records, private post-service medical treatment records, VA examination reports, and statements and testimony from the Veteran and his representative. There is no indication that there is any additional relevant evidence to be obtained by either VA or the Veteran. It is noted that the appellant was afforded the opportunity to testify before a VLJ in August 2011. In Bryant v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 488 (2010), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that 38 C.F.R. 3.103(c)(2) (2012) requires that the Veteran's law judge who chairs a hearing fulfill two duties to comply with the above the regulation. These duties consist of (1) the duty to fully explain the issues and (2) the duty to suggest the submission of evidence that may have been overlooked. Here, during the hearing, the VLJ essentially elicited testimony necessary to determine the nature of the appellant's claim regarding service connection. In addition, the undersigned sought to identify any pertinent evidence not currently associated with the claims folder that might have been overlooked or was outstanding that might substantiate the claim. Moreover, neither the Veteran nor his representative has asserted that VA failed to comply with 38 C.F.R. 3.103(c)(2) nor have they identified any prejudice in the conduct of the Board hearing. By contrast, the appellant, through his testimony, demonstrated that he had actual knowledge of the elements necessary to substantiate his claims for benefits. As such, the Board finds that, consistent with Bryant, the undersigned complied with the duties set forth in 38 C.F.R. 3.103(c)(2) and that the Board can adjudicate the claims based on the current record. In September 2008, the Veteran was examined by a VA physician and opinions were provided regarding the etiology of current lumbar spine and right leg conditions. Addendums to that exam dated in September 2009 and January 2012 were ultimately added to the record. As explained below, the Board finds the medical opinions, in toto, to be adequate to address the current claims. Thus, the Board finds that VA has satisfied the duty to assist provisions of law. No further notice or assistance to the appellant is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist him in development. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Service Connection Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in the line of duty or for aggravation of preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in the line of duty. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2012). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2012). Where there is a chronic disease, as identified in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a), shown as such in service or within the presumptive period under § 3.307 so as to permit a finding of service connection, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however, remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2012). This rule does not mean that any manifestations in service will permit service connection. To show chronic disease in service there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "chronic". When the disease entity is established, there is no requirement of evidentiary showing of continuity. When the fact of chronicity in service is not adequately supported, then a showing of continuity after discharge is required to support the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2012). Continuous service for 90 days or more during a period of war, or peace time service after December 31, 1946, and post-service development of a presumptive disease such as DJD (arthritis) to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from the date of termination of such service, establishes a rebuttable presumption that the disease was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2012). Establishing service connection generally requires medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) an in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Circ. 2009); Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table). Disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury shall be service connected. Additionally, when aggravation of a veteran's nonservice-connected condition is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected condition, the veteran shall be compensated for the degree of disability over and above the degree of disability existing prior to the aggravation. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (2012). Competency of evidence differs from weight and credibility. Competency is a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered by the trier of fact, while credibility is a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67 (1997); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994); Cartwright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24 (1991) (although interest may affect the credibility of testimony, it does not affect competency to testify). A veteran is competent to report symptoms because this requires only personal knowledge, not medical expertise, as it comes to him through his senses. See Layno, 6 Vet. App. 465. The Board is charged with the duty to assess the credibility and weight given to evidence. Wensch v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 362, 367 (2001); Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). In weighing credibility, VA may consider interest, bias, inconsistent statements, bad character, internal inconsistency, facial plausibility, self interest, consistency with other evidence of record, malingering, desire for monetary gain, and demeanor of the witness. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995). The Board may weigh the absence of contemporaneous medical evidence against the lay evidence in determining credibility, but the Board cannot determine that lay evidence lacks credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Generally, the degree of probative value which may be attributed to a medical opinion issued by a VA or private treatment provider takes into account such factors as its thoroughness and degree of detail, and whether there was review of the veteran's claims file. See Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444, 448-49 (2000). Also significant is whether the examining medical provider had a sufficiently clear and well-reasoned rationale, as well as a basis in objective supporting clinical data. See Bloom v. West, 12 Vet. App. 185, 187 (1999); Hernandez-Toyens v. West, 11 Vet. App. 379, 382 (1998); see also Claiborne v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 181, 186 (2005) (rejecting medical opinions that did not indicate whether the physicians actually examined the veteran, did not provide the extent of any examination, and did not provide any supporting clinical data). The Court has held that a bare conclusion, even one reached by a health care professional, is not probative without a factual predicate in the record. Miller v. West, 11 Vet. App. 345, 348 (1998). Medical evidence that is speculative, general or inconclusive in nature cannot support a claim. See Obert v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 30, 33 (1993); see also Beausoleil v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 459, 463 (1996); Libertine v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 521, 523 (1996). A physician's statement framed in terms such as "may" or "could" is not probative. See Warren v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 4, 6 (1993). A significant factor to be considered for any opinion is the accuracy of the factual predicate, regardless of whether the information supporting the opinion is obtained by review of medical records or lay reports of injury, symptoms and/or treatment. See Harris v. West, 203 F.3d 1347, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (examiner opinion based on accurate lay history deemed competent medical evidence in support of the claim); Kowalski v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 171, 177 (2005) (holding that a medical opinion cannot be disregarded solely on the rationale that the medical opinion was based on history given by the veteran); Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458, 461 1993) (holding that the Board may reject a medical opinion based on an inaccurate factual basis). When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with a veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against a claim, in which case, the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2012). The Board has reviewed all the evidence in the Veteran's claims file. Although the Board has an obligation to provide adequate reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no requirement that the evidence submitted by a veteran or obtained on his behalf be discussed in detail. Rather, the Board's analysis below will focus specifically on what evidence is needed to substantiate the claim and what the evidence in the claims file shows, or fails to show, with respect to the claim. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122, 128-30 (2000). Background and Analysis The Veteran contends that his current low back disability originated in service and has continued since that time. Specifically, he fell in 1970 and suffered injury to his back. (See, e.g., hearing (hrg.) transcript (tr.) at pgs. 3-5.) His current right leg sciatica is secondary to that condition. (Tr. at pg. 17.) He admitted that he did not receive treatment at a medical facility for about 20 years after service, but he said that he was taking over-the-counter medications for his low back/sciatica problems. (Tr. at pgs. 6-7.) After a review of all the evidence of record, lay and medical, the Board finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that the Veteran sustained a lumbar spine injury in service, but that lumbar spine disorder symptoms were not chronic in service. He was seen in July 1970 after a fall of 8 feet to the deck aboard the USS Leary. He landed on his left side and hip without loss of consciousness. He complained of pain over the left costal margin and in the left hip. He ultimately underwent a splenectomy for his complaints and service connection was established for that disorder in a June 1971 rating decision. As the Veteran was also treated during service for left leg varicose veins, service connection was also established for that condition in the 1971 determination. Post service VA records dated from 2008 forward show diagnoses of DJD of the lumbar spine at L4-5, as well as for right leg sciatica. VA examination was conducted in September 2008. At that time, the examiner opined that the Veteran's DJD of the lumbar spine was less likely that not related to his inservice fall. For rationale, the examiner noted that the Veteran did not have symptoms of a low back condition and had not been treated for one for "the last 30 years." It was also opined that the Veteran's right leg sciatica was due to neuropathy associated with the nonservice-related back disorder. It was not the result of service-connected varicose veins of the left leg. A VA record dated in April 2009 and signed by a VA nurse practitioner and by a VA neurologist noted that the Veteran was a candidate for a lumbar laminectomy at L4/5. It was also noted that the Veteran had requested documentation that his back problems stemmed from the inservice injury. It was reported that it was conceivable that the degenerative process in the lumbar spine was a result of or an exacerbation of the injury the claimant sustained while on active duty. Added to the record in May 2009 were three lay statements in support of the Veteran's claim. One statement attested to the fact that the Veteran had back problems in the mid 1970s. She was married to the Veteran at the time and recalled that he was unable to sleep on his back without pain, so he always slept on his side. His mother recalled that the Veteran injured his back during service. After service, he favored sitting in a chair rather than on the couch as it made his back feel better. Another attestee asserted that she had known the Veteran since 1999 and that he had always had back problems. Subsequently, the claims folder was referred to the VA physician who conducted the September 2008 VA examination for an addendum report. In a September 2009 report, the examiner opined that the Veteran's DJD of the lumbar spine was less likely than not the result of the inservice back injury. The rationale was that the Veteran did not have any symptoms for almost 30 years after service until 2001 when he started to have low back problems. There was no chronicity of the disability following service, and it was reported that it was rare to develop severe low back arthritis after 30 years without symptoms. Private records dated in July 2010 reflect that the Veteran was seen for his low back complaints. The Board requested additional VA addendum or examination upon remand decision in December 2011 in part, because the 2009 VA examiner did not consider the statements of record attesting to low back complaints shortly after service. The examiner noted that the entire claims file was reviewed. In a January 2012 report, it was reiterated that the Veteran's lumbar spine DJD was not related to the inservice fall. For rationale, it was pointed out that there was no evidence of low back disability and/or chronicity in the STRs or after service. While it was noted that the Veteran experienced back pain in 1974-75, it was recognized that this was several years after service discharge. The Veteran's STRs reflect injury to the back in 1970 but no chronic lumbar spine residuals thereafter. There is no report that he was placed on permanent profile or permanent restriction in service because of a lumbar spine injury. If there is no showing of a resulting chronic condition during service, then a showing of continuity of symptomatology after service is required to support a finding of chronicity. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2012). The Board next finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that symptoms of a lumbar spine disorder have not been continuous since service separation in March 1971. Following service separation, the evidence of record shows no complaints, diagnosis, or treatment for any lumbar spine disorder or right leg sciatica until 2008. The evidence shows a lumbar spine disorder first manifested many years after service in 2008, notably over 35 years after service discharge, when the Veteran was diagnosed with DJD of the lumbar spine as well as associated right leg sciatica. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the passage of many years between discharge from active service and the medical documentation of a claimed disability is one factor that tends to weigh against a claim for service connection). The absence of post-service complaints, findings, diagnosis, or treatment after service for many years until 2008 is one factor, considered in addition to the other factors stated in this decision, that tends to weigh against a finding of either chronic lumbar spine disorder symptoms in service or continuous symptoms of a lumbar spine disorder after service separation. See Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1337 (holding that the Board may weigh the absence of contemporaneous medical evidence as one factor in determining credibility of lay evidence, but the Board cannot determine that lay evidence lacks credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence). While the Veteran is competent to state that he had lumbar spine/right leg symptoms at any time, including in service, the Board finds that the Veteran's more recent assertions of chronic lumbar spine disorder symptoms in service and continuous lumbar spine disorder symptoms since service, made in the context of the April 2008 claim for service connection (disability compensation) for a lumbar spine disorder and for right leg sciatica, are outweighed by the other, more contemporaneous, lay and medical evidence of record, and are not credible. See Charles, 16 Vet. App. 370. The recent statements of chronic lumbar spine disorder symptoms in service and continuous post-service lumbar spine disorder symptoms are inconsistent with the actual records in the claim file. While the Board has considered the Veteran's assertions that his back problems have been ongoing since the inservice injury, and also the lay statements attesting to back problems shortly after service, there simply are no medical records actually showing treatment for back problems to corroborate such accounts. It seems likely that if the Veteran were having back problems in the years after service, he would have been treated by a physician at some point. At the hearing, he conceded that he did not see a doctor for his complaints for approximately 20 years after service. Moreover, even if he was allegedly seen by a chiropractor for low back problems in approximately 1991 (see the hrg. tr. at pg 16), this is still years after service. The Board finds that the contemporaneous inservice reports by the Veteran and clinical findings, the Veteran's statements indicating a lack of continuity of a lumbar spine disorder symptomatology made to health care professionals for treatment purposes, and the absence of evidence of post-service complaints, findings, diagnosis, or treatment for many years after service are more probative than the more ambivalent and inconsistent statements regarding a lumbar spine disorder made pursuant to the recent claim for compensation benefits. See Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) ("although interest may affect the credibility of testimony, it does not affect competency to testify. Also see Pond v. West, 12 Vet. App. 341 (1991). The Board also notes that the Veteran's service connection claim to VA for other disabilities in March 1971 did not include or mention the lumbar spine disorder; the first time the Veteran had asserted a lumbar spine injury during service and continuous lumbar spine disorder symptoms since service was in 2008. See Cromer v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 215 (2005) (upheld Board's denial of service connection and finding that a veteran's recent post-service account of in-service events was not credible because the veteran had previously given other histories and theories that did not mention the alleged in-service event, and first "came up with the story" years after service and in connection with the compensation claim). The Board acknowledges that symptoms, not treatment, are the essence of any evidence of continuity of symptomatology (Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 496 (1997)); however, here, the Veteran filed a claim for service connection, but did not mention low back or sciatica symptoms at that time. This suggests to the Board that there was no pertinent low back or sciatica symptomatology at that time. While inaction regarding filing a claim is not necessarily indicative of the absence of symptomatology, where, as here, a veteran takes action regarding other claims, it becomes reasonable to expect that the veteran is presenting all issues for which he is experiencing symptoms that he believes are related to service. The Board further finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that the Veteran's currently diagnosed lumbar spine disability with associated right leg sciatica is not related to his active service. While disabilities of the lumbar spine and right leg have been noted since 2008, the VA examiner's 2008 opinions with addendums in September 2009 and January 2012, are not supportive of the claims. The VA examiner opined that, based on the evidence of record, the Veteran's lumbar spine disability was less likely than not (less than a 50/50 probability) caused by or the result of active military service. The VA examiner reasoned that chronicity of symptomatology was not shown after the initial back injury. Even though there is anecdotal evidence that he had ongoing back problems since the inservice injury, there are no medical records to corroborate such assertions. Moreover, the examiner opined that that the Veteran's right leg sciatica was related to his low back problems (and not his service-connected varicose veins) and, therefore, was also not the result of the inservice injury. In making these determinations, the Board has considered the April 2009 statement that it is conceivable that the lumbar spine degenerative process resulted from the inservice injury or that it is an exacerbation of the inservice injury, but such is found to have little probative value. It is noted that factors for assessing the probative value of a medical opinion are the physician's access to the claims file and the thoroughness and detail of the opinion. See Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444, 448-89 (2000). The weight of a medical opinion is diminished where that opinion is ambivalent, based on an inaccurate factual premise, based on an examination of limited scope, or where the basis for the opinion is not stated. See Sklar v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 140 (1993); Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458 (1993); Guerrieri v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 467, 470-71 (1993); Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229, 232 (1993). The Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant. See Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36, 39-40 (1994); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 57 (1990). In reviewing the April 2009 record, the opinion presumed that the Veteran suffered an injury to his lumbar spine as a result of his 1970 inservice injury, not stating what that injury was or why it was not manifested until many years after service. Again, the Veteran's STRs clearly show one injury to the back, but no residuals thereafter. Moreover, these records are entirely silent as to any further pain that the Veteran experienced in his lumbar spine. The Veteran is service-connected for the splenectomy residuals that have been deemed related to this in-service injury. Thus, VA has recognized the traumatic nature of the Veteran's inservice injury. That being said, the most probative evidence of record (the contemporaneous treatment records) do not show that the Veteran chronically injured his lower back in that fall, and the 2009 VA report does not provide a description as to what lumbar spine injury the Veteran suffered in that event and why it was not medically documented until many years had passed. The opinion is conclusory, simply stating that the Veteran suffered an injury which could have resulted in post service back residuals but offering no explanation as to why this might be so. To be considered probative evidence, a conclusion from a doctor or other medical professional must be enhanced by sufficient commentary so as to allow for weighing of that conclusion. Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 125 (2007) (holding that "a mere conclusion by a medical doctor is insufficient to allow the Board to make an informed decision as to what weight to assign to the doctor's opinion."); see also Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 304 (2008) ("The Board must be able to conclude that a medical expert has applied valid medical analysis to the significant facts of the particular case in order to reach the conclusion submitted in the medical opinion."); Miller v. West, 11 Vet. App. 345, 348 (1998) ("A bare conclusion, even one reached by a health care professional, is not probative without a factual predicate in the record."). "Neither a VA medical examination report nor a private medical opinion is entitled to any weight in a service-connection or rating context if it contains only data and conclusions." Nieves-Rodriguez, 22 Vet. App. at 304. In summary, the Board finds that the most probative evidence of record does not indicate a nexus between the Veteran's inservice fall in 1970 and his current lumbar spine disability with associated right leg sciatica. The Board also finds that there is no competent or credible evidence of a post-service continuity of symptomatology of the Veteran's lumbar spine arthritis. Accordingly, the Board concludes that service connection for a lumbar spine disability is not warranted. Moreover, as his right leg sciatica is related to this nonservice-connected back disorder and not to his service-connected varicose veins, secondary service connection is also not warranted for that condition. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1131, 1154, 5103, 5103A, 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.310 (2012). (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) ORDER Service connection for DJD of the lumbar spine is denied. Service connection for sciatica of the right leg, to include as secondary to DJD of the lumbar spine, is denied. ____________________________________________ BARBARA B. COPELAND Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs