Citation Nr: 1321037 Decision Date: 07/01/13 Archive Date: 07/12/13 DOCKET NO. 09-22 270 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in New Orleans, Louisiana THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to a compensable evaluation for left thumb laceration. 2. Entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer, to include as due to herbicide exposure. 3. Entitlement to service connection for left knee disability. 4. Entitlement to service connection for osteoarthritis of the left hip (claimed as osteoarthrosis). 5. Entitlement to service connection for olecranon bursitis of the right elbow (claimed as bursitis). 6. Entitlement to service connection for anemia. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD K. Kordich, Senior Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from March 1968 to March 1970. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a June 2005 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in New Orleans, Louisiana. The Board notes that a review of the Virtual VA paperless claims processing system does not reveal any additional documents pertinent to the issues decided in this appeal. The issues of entitlement to a compensable evaluation for left thumb laceration and entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer are addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and are REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran's left knee disability did not originate in service, arthritis of the left knee was not manifested in the first post-service year; and the left knee disability is not otherwise etiologically related to service. 2. The osteoarthritis of the Veteran's left hip did not originate in service, arthritis of the left hip was not manifested within one year of active service; and the Veteran's left hip disability is not otherwise etiologically related to service. 3. The Veteran's currently diagnosed olecranon bursitis of the right elbow did not originate in service, and is not otherwise etiologically related to service. 4. The Veteran's currently diagnosed anemia did not originate in service, and is not otherwise etiologically related to service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Left knee disability, to include arthritis, was not incurred in service and is not presumed to have been incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 7104 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2012). 2. Osteoarthritis of the left hip was not incurred in service and is not presumed to have been incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 7104; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309. 3. Olecranon bursitis of the right elbow was not incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 7104; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. 4. Anemia was not incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 7104; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA) Duty to Notify The VCAA and its implementing regulations provide that VA is to notify a claimant and his representative, if any, of the information and medical or lay evidence not previously provided to the Secretary that is necessary to substantiate a claim. As part of the notice, VA is to specifically inform the claimant and his representative, if any, of which portion of the evidence the claimant is to provide and which portion of the evidence VA will attempt to obtain on the claimant's behalf. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2012). These notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service connection claim, including: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of disability; (3) a connection between service and disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of disability. Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 484 (2006). Notice provided in support of a service connection claim must inform a claimant that if a claim is granted, VA will assign the service-connected disability a rating and an effective date. Id. at 486. In this case, the RO provided the Veteran VCAA notice on the claims decided herein by letters dated in June and September 2004. With regard to content, the letters reflect compliance with the pertinent regulatory provisions and case law noted above. Therein, the RO acknowledged the Veteran's claims, notified him of the evidence needed to substantiate these claims, identified the type of evidence that would best do so, notified him of VA's duty to assist and indicated that it was developing his claims pursuant to that duty. As well, it identified the evidence it had received in support of the Veteran's claims and the evidence it was responsible for securing. The RO noted that it would make reasonable efforts to assist the Veteran in obtaining all other outstanding evidence provided he identified the source(s) thereof. The RO also noted that, ultimately, it was the Veteran's responsibility to ensure VA's receipt of all pertinent evidence. Additionally, although the notifications to the Veteran did not include the criteria for assigning disability ratings or effective dates, see Dingess, supra, because the Board will deny the Veteran's claims of service connection for left knee disability; osteoarthritis of the left hip; olecranon bursitis of the right elbow; and anemia, this deficiency is harmless. Consequently, a remand is not necessary. See Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994) (remands that would only result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the appellant are to be avoided). Notice under the VCAA must be provided a claimant prior to an initial unfavorable decision by the agency of original jurisdiction. Pelegrini v. Principi (Pelegrini II), 18 Vet. App. 112, 119-20 (2004). In this case, the RO sent the notice letters timely, before the RO initially decided the Veteran's claims. Duty to Assist VA is also to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate a claim, but such assistance is not required if there is no reasonable possibility that it would aid in substantiating the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (2012). The RO made reasonable efforts to identify and obtain relevant records in support of the Veteran's claims. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(a), (b), (c) (West 2002). Specifically, the RO secured and associated with the claims file all evidence the Veteran identified as being pertinent to his appeal, including service treatment records and post-service treatment records. The record shows that the Veteran was not afforded VA examinations regarding the claims decided herein. The Board finds, however, that VA examinations are not necessary regarding these claims. Generally, a VA examination is required where the record includes (1) competent evidence of a current disability or continuous symptoms since service; (2) evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service or establishing certain diseases manifesting during an applicable presumptive period for which the claimant qualifies; and (3) an indication that the disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability may be associated with a veteran's service or with another service-connected disability; and (4) lack of sufficient competent evidence upon which the Board can decide the claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(i). A veteran is not entitled to a VA examination based solely on his own conclusory statements indicating that there is a relationship between an in-service illness or injury and a present disability. See Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The record must contain some other factual basis supporting his statements. See Waters, 601 F.3d at 1278; see also Colantonio v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In this regard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has addressed the appropriate standard to be applied in determining whether an examination is warranted under this statute. In Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) and Colantonio v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the Federal Circuit held that while there must be "medically competent" evidence of a current disability, "medically competent" evidence is not required to indicate that the current disability may be associated with service. Colantonio, 606 F.3d at 1382; Waters, 601 F.3d at 1277. On the other hand, a conclusory generalized lay statement suggesting a nexus between a current disability and service would not suffice to meet this standard as this would, contrary to the intent of Congress, result in medical examinations being "routinely and virtually automatically" provided to all veterans claiming service connection. Waters, 601 F.3d at 1278-1279. The Federal Circuit also held that there must be evidence "establishing" that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service. See Waters, supra. Given the above standard, the Board finds that a remand for VA examinations is not required because service treatment records are negative for the claimed left knee, left hip, right elbow, and anemia disorders, and the post-service record is negative for the claimed disorders for approximately 33 years after his separation from active duty. Here, the Board finds the record as to each of the claims at issue does not establish the occurrence of a disease, injury or event in service. The only evidence that the Veteran's claimed disabilities are related to his military service is his own conclusory generalized lay statements, which are not supported by any medical evidence. Accordingly, the Board finds that a VA medical examination or opinion is not necessary for any of the issues decided. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A (d); see also Bardwell v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 36 (2010) (holding that VA was not required to provide a medical examination when there is no credible evidence of an event, injury, or disease in service when the Board does not find his statements credible); McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). In summary, the facts relevant to this appeal have been properly developed and there is no further action to be undertaken to comply with the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103(a), 5103A or 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. Therefore, the Veteran will not be prejudiced as a result of the Board proceeding to the merits of the appeal. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 392-94 (1993). In adjudicating the claims below, the Board has reviewed all of the evidence in the Veteran's claims file including those found in virtual VA. Although the Board has an obligation to provide adequate reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no requirement that all the evidence submitted by the Veteran or obtained on his behalf be discussed in detail. Rather, the Board's analysis below will focus specifically on what evidence is needed to substantiate the claim and what the evidence in the Veteran's claims folder shows, or fails to show, with respect to the claims. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122, 128-30 (2000). Service Connection Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. As a general matter, service connection for a disability on the basis of the merits of such claim is focused upon (1) the existence of a current disability; (2) the existence of the disease or injury in service, and; (3) a relationship or nexus between the current disability and any injury or disease during service. See Cuevas v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 5342 (1992); Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141 (1992). Certain chronic disabilities, such as arthritis, are presumed to have been incurred in or aggravated by service if manifest to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from active duty. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2012). In claims for VA benefits, VA shall consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case before the Secretary with respect to benefits under laws administered by the Secretary. When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53-54 (1990). In this decision, the Board has considered the lay evidence as it pertains to the issues. In rendering a decision on appeal, the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant. See Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36, 39-40 (1994); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 57 (1990). Competency of evidence differs from weight and credibility. Competency is a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered by the trier of fact, while credibility is a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) ("although interest may affect the credibility of testimony, it does not affect competency to testify"). A veteran is competent to report symptoms that he experiences at any time because this requires only personal knowledge as it comes to him through his senses. Layno, 6 Vet. App. at 470; Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 309 (2007) (when a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation). The absence of contemporaneous medical evidence is a factor in determining credibility of lay evidence, but lay evidence does not lack credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence. See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (lack of contemporaneous medical records does not serve as an "absolute bar" to the service connection claim); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007) ("Board may not reject as not credible any uncorroborated statements merely because the contemporaneous medical evidence is silent as to complaints or treatment for the relevant condition or symptoms"). In determining whether statements submitted by a veteran are credible, the Board may consider internal consistency, facial plausibility, and consistency with other evidence, and statements made during treatment. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995). The Federal Circuit has recognized the Board's "authority to discount the weight and probity of evidence in light of its own inherent characteristics and its relationship to other items of evidence." Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997). VA is free to favor one medical opinion over another provided it offers an adequate basis for doing so. See Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429 (1995). It is the policy of VA to administer the law under a broad interpretation, consistent with the facts in each case with all reasonable doubt to be resolved in favor of the claimant; however, the reasonable doubt rule is not a means for reconciling actual conflict or a contradiction in the evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2012). Left Knee Disability and Osteoarthritis of the left hip Service treatment records are silent for any treatment, findings or diagnosis of a left knee or left hip disorder. The records show treatment for right knee injuries in February and April of 1969, with x-rays of the right knee. There are no complaints or findings regarding the left knee or left hip recorded in the Veteran's February 1970 Report of Medical History upon separation from service. Treatment reports from the VA Medical Center (VAMC) in Alexandria show the Veteran has been seen for pain in the left knee since October 2003. The Veteran reported that the pain began in July 2003, and it was noted by the examiner that the pain from the hip joint was often felt distal in the knee area. He was diagnosed with bursitis of the left hip and with pain in the left knee. Treatment reports from the VAMC also show a diagnosis of osteoarthrosis involving the pelvic region and thigh in June 2003. On his May 2004 Veteran's Application for Compensation and Pension (VA Form 21-526), the Veteran claimed service connection for a left knee injury which he indicated was noted incorrectly as to the right knee in his service treatment records. In his May 2005 Statement in Support of Claim (VA Form 21-4138) the Veteran indicated that the service documents refer to his right knee when in fact it was his left knee that was treated. In addition, the Veteran claimed that his left knee had now caused his hip to go bad and should be service connected as well. Private treatment records from Daniel Oas, D.O. dated in February 2013 show that the Veteran was seen for right knee pain with effusion with near end-stage arthritis of the patellofemoral joint and mild to moderate medial and lateral compartment arthritis. The Veteran's right knee was aspirated and he was given an injection of Depo-Medrol and Marcaine. The Board notes that arthritis is a chronic disease listed under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a); therefore the presumption of service connection under 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 and the provisions regarding chronicity and continuity under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) must be addressed. See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). After a review of all of the evidence, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the Veteran did not have left knee or left hip arthritis or any other left knee or hip disability in service, that the Veteran did not have symptoms of left knee or left hip arthritis continuously since service, and that the current left knee and left hip conditions are not otherwise related to service. The service treatment records are silent for any mention of injury, accident, or disease affecting the left knee or left hip. The 1970 Report of Medical History at the time of the Veteran's separation did not note problems or complaints with the left knee or left hip. Thus, the service records do not establish the presence of a chronic left knee or left hip disorder in service. After service, the first reference to left knee problems is in VA outpatient treatment records or 2003; for the left hip, the first reference is in June 2003. There is no clinical evidence or assertion on the part of the Veteran that a left knee or hip disability became manifest to a compensable degree within a year of service separation, or that symptoms of a left knee or hip disability were continuous after service. In addition, there is no competent evidence of record that relates any currently diagnosed left knee or hip disorders to military service. There is no medical opinion of record which opines on the etiology of any currently diagnosed left knee or hip disorders. Under certain circumstance, lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish the etiology or diagnosis of a condition. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (2009). However, such etiological evidence is only competent to the extent that it relies on observable symptomatology. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 307 (2007). In this case, the Veteran claims that he injured his left knee during service, and that he has a current diagnosis of a left knee disorder which is related to that injury and a left hip disorder secondary to his left knee disorder. The Veteran is competent to report that he experienced left knee symptoms during military service. However, the Board finds that the Veteran's statements regarding left knee symptomatology during service are not credible as they are contradicted by the evidence of record. The only explanation given by the Veteran as to why he believes his left knee was injured in service is that the two references in the service treatment records to right knee complaints, in February 1969 and again in April 1969 actually refer to his left knee. The Board finds his account implausible. The service treatment records show that the Veteran's right knee was x-rayed in service with negative results. While the Board finds it plausible that a single medical report may have mistakenly listed the wrong knee, the Board finds that it is unlikely that the exact same mistake would have been made a few months later resulting in an additional x-ray to the purported wrong knee. Absent some other indication suggesting that these entries were all erroneous, the Board will not presume that they incorrectly attributed the Veteran's left knee symptoms to his right. In addition, the 1970 Report of Medical History upon the Veteran's separation from service does not indicate problems with his knees or hips. As such, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence of record demonstrates that the Veteran's February and April 1969 treatment was for right knee symptoms, not left knee symptoms. The Board finds that these medical entries warrant greater probative value than the Veteran's current lay statements. See Curry v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 59, 68 (1994) (noting that contemporaneous evidence has greater probative value than history as reported by the Veteran). Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence of record contradicts the Veteran's reports of in-service left knee symptomatology. As a result, the Board finds that the Veteran's reports of in-service left knee symptomatology are not credible. In his May 2005 correspondence, the Veteran claims that due to his left knee condition his left hip has been affected. The Veteran did not indicate that his left hip condition is a result of active service. The Board notes that the service treatment records are otherwise silent for left hip complaints or findings, or post-service evidence of left hip problems until years after service. Service connection on a direct basis thus is not warranted. Moreover, because the Veteran's left knee condition is not a service-connected disability, service connection for osteoarthritis of the left hip as a derivative or secondary to this disorder cannot be established as a matter of law. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.310; Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995). Thus, service connection on a secondary basis for osteoarthritis of the left hip, is unwarranted. In sum, there is no credible evidence of a left knee or left hip disorder in service or until years after service, and no competent evidence linking any left knee or hip disorder to service. The Board thus finds that service connection for left knee disability and osteoarthritis of the left hip are not warranted. In reaching this conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the claims, that doctrine is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 53-56. Olecranon Bursitis of the Right Elbow, and Anemia The service treatment records are negative for any complaints, treatment, or diagnoses of right elbow disability or anemia. There are no complaints relating to anemia or the right elbow in the Veteran's February 1970 Report of Medical History upon separation from service. A problem list from the VAMC in Alexandria noted a diagnosis of anemia in April 2003, and olecranon bursitis of the right elbow in May 2003. These are the first references to either condition. In this case, although there is evidence of current disabilities of olecranon bursitis of the right elbow and anemia, there is no competent evidence of a nexus between those disabilities and the Veteran's military service. None of the VA medical records address the etiology of either disorder, and there is no medical opinion on file supportive of the claims. To the extent that the Veteran himself has related his current olecranon bursitis of the right elbow and anemia to his service, the Board observes that lay witnesses may, in some circumstances, opine on questions of diagnosis and etiology. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Board's categorical statement that "a valid medical opinion" was required to establish nexus, and that a layperson was "not competent" to provide testimony as to nexus because she was a layperson, conflicts with Jandreau). However, in this case, a contention that the Veteran's olecranon bursitis of the right elbow and anemia are related to service is an etiological question as to an internal disease process, unlike testimony as to a separated shoulder, varicose veins, or flat feet, which are capable of direct observation. See Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1376 (lay witness capable of diagnosing dislocated shoulder); Barr, 21 Vet. App. at 308-309 (lay testimony is competent to establish the presence of varicose veins); Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456, 462 (2007) (unlike varicose veins or a dislocated shoulder, rheumatic fever is not a condition capable of lay diagnosis); Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. at 405 (lay person competent to testify to pain and visible flatness of his feet). In other words, the Board finds that the Veteran is not competent to address the etiology of the right elbow or anemia disorders because both involve non-observable processes and are dealing within the realm of medical science. It is also significant to note that the Veteran does not contend, and the evidence does not reflect, that there was continuity of symptomatology. The Veteran's statements did not indicate that he experienced continuity of symptomatology. After service, the first reference to the right elbow and anemia comes in VA outpatient treatment records in 2003, approximately 33 years after separation from service. The Board finds the preponderance of the evidence to be against the Veteran's claims of service connection for olecranon bursitis of the right elbow and anemia. The evidence of record does not indicate that these disabilities were incurred in service. There is no competent evidence of record that relates any currently diagnosed olecranon bursitis of the right elbow or anemia to military service, nor are there medical opinions of record which opines on the etiology of these disorders. Consequently, in the absence of evidence linking the Veteran's olecranon bursitis of the right elbow and anemia, to service, the Board does not find that the competent medical evidence of record supports the Veteran's claims, and these claims must be denied. In reaching these determinations, the Board has considered the doctrine of reasonable doubt. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claims, the doctrine is not applicable. See Gilbert, supra. ORDER Entitlement to service connection for left knee disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for osteoarthritis of the left hip is denied. Entitlement to service connection for olecranon bursitis of the right elbow is denied. Entitlement to service connection for anemia is denied. REMAND After review of the record, the Board finds that a remand for further development is warranted with respect to the issues of entitlement to a compensable evaluation for left thumb laceration and entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer. The Board notes that the Veteran underwent a VA examination with regard to his thumb laceration in September 2004 shortly after filing his claim for service connection in May 2004. The Veteran was granted service connection in a June 2005 rating decision and assigned a noncompensable evaluation effective May 3, 2004. The criteria for rating scars were revised, effective October 23, 2008. See 73 Fed. Reg. 54,708 (Sept. 23, 2008) (codified at 38 C.F.R. § 4.118, Diagnostic Codes 7800 to 7805). The amendment applies to all applications for benefits received by VA on or after October 23, 2008. See 73 Fed. Reg. 54,708 -54,710 (Sept. 23, 2008); see also 38 C.F.R. §4.118 (2012). However, the introductory paragraph to 38 C.F.R. §4.118 notes that a Veteran who VA rated under Diagnostic Codes 7800, 7801, 7802, 7803, 7804, or 7805 before October 23, 2008 can request review under diagnostic codes 7800, 7801, 7802, 7804, and 7805, irrespective of whether the Veteran's disability has increased since the last review. VA will review that Veteran's disability rating to determine whether the Veteran may be entitled to a higher disability rating under diagnostic codes 7800, 7801, 7802, 7804, and 7805. A request for review pursuant to this rulemaking will be treated as a claim for an increased rating for purposes of determining the effective date of an increased rating awarded as a result of such review; however, in no case will the award be effective before October 23, 2008. The Veteran was issued a statement of the case (SOC) in regard to his disagreement with the disability rating for his service connected scar disability in April 2009. The SOC listed the rating criteria used to evaluate his disability. The Veteran's scar disability was evaluated under both the pre-October 23, 2008 rating criteria and the revised criteria effective October 23, 2008. However, there has not been a VA examination conducted since September 2004 addressing the Veteran's current level of disability. Under the circumstances, the Board finds that another VA examination is required in order to ensure that the left thumb disability is properly rated under the current criteria. The Veteran has alleged that he developed prostate cancer based on exposure to an herbicide agent. In this case, the Veteran does not allege that he served in the Republic of Vietnam. Rather, he asserts that he was exposed to Agent Orange or other defoliants while stationed in Korea, where he worked in company supply as a duty driver transporting cargo and personnel near the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Personnel records show that the Veteran served in Korea from June 1969 through May 1970, where he was attached to the 258th Signal Company, 304th Signal Battalion with an occupational specialty of a pole lineman. There are certain units that served in Korea during particular time frames that are recognized as having likely been exposed to herbicides. The Veteran's unit is not among those units. If a veteran was neither a member of an identified unit or entity, nor served during the qualifying time period, the VA Adjudication Procedure Manual (M21-1MR) directs that a request should be sent to the Joint Service Records Research Center (JSRRC) if the veteran has provided sufficient information to permit a search for information verifying exposure to herbicides. See M21-1MR, Part IV, Subpart ii, Chapter 2, Section C, para. 10(p). The evidence of record includes the dates the Veteran was in Korea, his unit information and his military occupational specialty. As already mentioned, the Veteran did serve in Korea during the applicable period, but not in an identified unit. The Board observes that the RO did contact JSSRC in an attempt to verify whether the Veteran's units were in an area where he was exposed to herbicides while he was serving in Korea. The JSSRC noted that a search was made and an annual historical supplement of the 304th Signal Battalion for 1969 was located. The JSSRC was unable to locate separate records of the 258th Signal Company (Construction). The JSSRC noted that additional records of these units, if they still exist, may be in the custody of the Department of the Army and contact information was given in the correspondence. It does not appear that the RO contacted the Department of the Army, to ascertain if any additional unit records were available. Thus, a remand is necessary for further development of the Veteran's claim. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. Schedule the Veteran for a VA compensation examination to reassess the severity of the Veteran's scar disability of the left thumb. The claims file must be made available to and reviewed by the examiner for the pertinent medical history. The examiner's report should set forth in detail all current complaints and clinical findings concerning this disability, including the measurement and description of all residual scars and any damage to surrounding or underlying tissues. 2. Attempt to verify the Veteran's claimed exposure to herbicides (to include Agent Orange) through the Department of the Army. Specifically, the RO/AMC should send a request to the Department of the Army for verification as to whether the Veteran, as a Pole Lineman, with the 258th Signal Company (Construction); 304th Signal Battalion was located near the DMZ in Korea during the period from June 1969 to March 1970. Any response from the Department of the Army (positive or negative) should be associated with the claims file. 3. Thereafter, readjudicate the Veteran's claims for an initial compensable rating for left thumb laceration and entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer, based on a review of the entire evidentiary record. If the benefits sought on appeal remain denied, provide the appellant and his representative with a supplemental statement of the case and the opportunity to respond thereto. Thereafter, subject to current appellate procedure, the case should be returned to the Board for further consideration, if in order. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2012). ______________________________________________ JOHN Z. JONES Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs