Citation Nr: 1322393 Decision Date: 07/12/13 Archive Date: 07/18/13 DOCKET NO. 08-33 661 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Atlanta, Georgia THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include dysthymic disorder, depressive disorder, and anxiety with psychotic features. REPRESENTATION Veteran represented by: Georgia Department of Veterans Services ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J. Fussell, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active duty from February 5, 1974, to February 19, 1974. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a December 2006 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Atlanta, Georgia. The Veteran seeks service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder and medical records show various diagnoses for his symptomatology. In this regard, the scope of a claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder includes any mental disability that may reasonably be encompassed by the claimant's description of the claim, reported symptoms, and the other information of record. See Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009). Thus, the claim has been captioned as shown on the title page hereof to reflect the inclusion of all currently diagnosed acquired psychiatric disorders, to include his currently diagnosed dysthymic disorder, depressive disorder, and anxiety with psychotic features. In an October 2008 substantive appeal (VA Form 9), the Veteran indicated that he wished to appear at a hearing before a Veterans Law Judge sitting at the RO, but in September 2011, he stated he was withdrawing his hearing request and wanted his appeal to be decided upon the evidence of record. 38 C.F.R. § 20.704(e) (2012). The Board remanded this case in February 2012 for additional records, including medical records, and for an examination addressing the nature and etiology of the Veteran's current psychiatric disorder. Thereafter, additional evidence was added to the record, and the VA psychiatric examination was conducted in July 2012. The Board again remanded this case in November 2012 for an addendum opinion from the examiner that conducted the July 2012 examination. The case has now been returned to the Board for further appellate consideration. The Board notes that, in addition to the paper claims file, there is a paperless, electronic (Virtual VA) claims file associated with the Veteran's claims. A review of the Virtual VA claims file reveals VA treatment records dated through February 2012, which were considered in the August 2012 supplemental statement of the case. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran had less than 90 days of active service. 2. There was no disease or injury superimposed on the Veteran's personality disorder during service that resulted in additional disability. 3. An acquired psychiatric disorder is not causally or etiologically related to any disease, injury, or incident in service. CONCLUSION OF LAW An acquired psychiatric disorder was not incurred in or aggravated by the Veteran's active duty military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION VA's Duties to Notify and Assist The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) and implementing regulations impose obligations on VA to provide claimants with notice and assistance. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2012). Proper VCAA notice must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). In Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that the VCAA notice requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of a service connection claim. Those five elements include: 1) Veteran status; 2) existence of a disability; 3) a connection between the Veteran's service and the disability; 4) degree of disability; and 5) effective date of the disability. In Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004), the Court held that a VCAA notice, as required by 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a), must be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on the claim for VA benefits. In the instant case, the Board finds that VA has satisfied its duty to notify under the VCAA. Specifically, a July 2006 letter, sent prior to the initial unfavorable decision issued in December 2006, advised the Veteran of the evidence and information necessary to substantiate his service connection claim as well as his and VA's respective responsibilities in obtaining such evidence and information. Additionally, the letter advised him of the information and evidence necessary to establish a disability rating and an effective date in accordance with Dingess/Hartman, supra. Relevant to the duty to assist, the Veteran's service treatment records (STRs) as well as post-service VA and private treatment records have been obtained and considered, including those obtained pursuant to and in compliance with the February 2011 Board remand. The Veteran has not identified any additional, outstanding records that have not been requested or obtained. Additionally, he declined the opportunity to testify at a hearing in support of his claim. In this regard, the Board notes that, in his May 2006 claim for service connection, the Veteran indicated that was in receipt of disability benefits from the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWCP), formerly the U.S. Bureau of Employees Compensation, related to a claim filed in January 1989. However, he did not note the disability for which the disability benefits were granted. After the July 2012 VA examination was conducted pursuant to the February 2012 remand, but prior to the November 2012 remand, additional evidence was received and is of record. When requested to provide information pertaining to and release for records of a workmen's compensation claim, the Veteran indicated that it was for a back injury in the 1980s. He was informed by letter from the AOJ in May 2012 that such records would not be released to VA by the State Board of Workers Compensation even with a release executed by the Veteran and, so, he would have to obtain those records. The records subsequently obtained concerned a work-related injury of a finger of his left hand in 2000. Additionally, the Veteran has not reported, and neither does the evidence of record show, that he is in receipt of Social Security Administration (SSA) disability benefits for his claimed disability. Absent any evidence showing that the Veteran is in receipt of said benefits for his claimed disorders, VA need not attempt to obtain his SSA records. Golz v. Shinseki, 590 F.3d 1317, 1323 (2010). Additionally, in compliance with the February 2011 Board remand, the Veteran was afforded a VA examination with an opinion in July 2012. See generally 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d) ; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4); McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 81 (2006). In the November 2012 Board remand it was stated that the July 2012 VA examiner did not address the Board's specific questions regarding whether the Veteran had a pre-existing psychiatric disorder, nor whether his personality disorder diagnosed during service was subject to, or aggravated by, a superimposed injury during service that resulted in additional disability; and that the opinion that the current psychiatric disorder was not due to or caused by military service did not appear to take into account the in-service symptomatology and treatment which resulted in the diagnosis of a personality disorder. Accordingly, in November 2012 the Board remanded the case for compliance with the February 2012 remand. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 286, 271 (1998). It was requested that the July 2012 VA examiner render an addendum opinion addressing the questions posed in the February 2012 remand. In a December 2012 opinion, a different VA examiner reiterated the July 2012 VA examiner's opinion and further noted that documents from 2004 indicated that his depression was reportedly not of sufficient severity to receive treatment until 2006. Thereafter, the July 2012 VA examiner, a psychologist, rendered an addendum in March 2013, in which the full record, to include the Veteran's lay statements, was considered. The 2013 addendum clarifies that the Veteran's personality disorder was not related to any Axis I diagnosis, was not causally related to any specific incident, but was acquired during the early developmental years, and did not increase during his service, essentially indicating that there was no superimposed disease or injury during service that resulted in additional disability. The VA examiner also addressed the question of whether the Veteran had a pre-existing psychiatric disorder, stating that the Veteran had no mental health problem diagnosed and treated prior to the military according to the records. This is substantial compliance with Board's inquiry regarding whether the Veteran's currently diagnosed acquired psychiatric disorder clearly and unmistakably pre-existed his entry to active duty. Moreover, since the examiner found no pre-existing disorder, the remainder of the questions pertaining to such are rendered moot. See D'Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 97, 105 (2008); Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141, 146-47 (1999) (remand not required under Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998), where the Board's remand instructions were substantially complied with), aff'd, Dyment v. Principi, 287 F.3d 1377 (2002). Some of the additional evidence received since the February 2012 Board remand pertains to a completely different Veteran and has erroneously been place in the wrong claim file. Specifically, the record on appeal, i.e., the Veteran's claim files, now consists of five (5) volumes plus the records contained in Virtual VA. The erroneously filed evidence was contained in volume three (3) and consisted of inservice treatment records of a completely different Veteran that performed military service in the 1950s (whereas, the Veteran in this case had military service only in the month of February 1974). Also, extensive VA treatment records of this unrelated Veteran were also contained in volume three, as were three lay statements in support of a claim (apparently for service connection for a psychiatric disability) from that unrelated Veteran's brother and two acquaintances. These erroneously filed records have now been removed. In this regard, neither the VA psychologist that performed the July 2012 VA examination and rendered the March 2013 addendum, nor another VA psychologist that rendered an opinion in December 2012, referenced the records which pertain to a different and unrelated Veteran and, thus, the opinions expressed by those VA psychologists were not adversely impacted by these records. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that there has been substantial compliance with the February 2012 and November 2012 remand directives such that no further action is necessary in this regard. See D'Aries, supra. Accordingly, the Board finds that all reasonable efforts have been undertaken by VA with respect to the instant appeal, and no further development is required under these circumstances. For the above reasons, no further notice or assistance to the appellant is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist the appellant in the development of the claim. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd, 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Background The Veteran's January 1974 enlistment examination is silent for any psychiatric abnormalities. On a concurrent Report of Medical History, he indicated that he did not have any prior depression or excessive worry, or nervous trouble of any sort. Subsequent service treatment records (STRs) indicate that he was hospitalized during service and admitted for medical board processing. A February 13, 1974, Narrative Summary indicates that the Veteran encountered immediate stress on entering the Army and reacted adversely to large numbers of people and to small enclosed areas. He was diagnosed with inadequate personality, chronic, severe; manifested by limited social skills, chronic anxiety related to interpersonal relationships in his unit, low level of adaptability and general lack of emotional stamina. A February 12, 1974, Disposition Form indicates that the Veteran requested discharge from service for physical reasons which existed prior to his enlistment, and that he had a nervous condition known to him for approximately four years prior to enlistment. A February 12, 1974, Medical Board Proceedings indicates that the Veteran's inadequate personality existed prior to service and was not caused incident to service or aggravated by active duty. An August 2005 VA outpatient treatment (VAOPT) record shows that the Veteran denied having been prescribed or having taken medication for any mental health issue. He had begun drinking alcohol at age 16. He had begun abusing Vicodin at about the age of 32 after receiving a gunshot wound of his left hip. In an April 2006 statement, the Veteran stated that he had bipolar disorder, suicide disorder, old timer's disorder, psychoneurotic disorder, and schizophrenia. A June 2006 VA vocational intake assessment form indicates that the Veteran reported a history of bipolar disorder and psychoneurotic depression. It was noted that he had been homeless for over a year and unemployed for about a year. He had previously been in a VA domiciliary for about a year but had left one year earlier. When intoxicated he heard voices. He had used alcohol since age 18 and had used cocaine since 1998. Additional VA treatment records dated through February 2012 reflect diagnoses of various psychiatric disorders, to most recently include depression with psychotic features. Alcohol abuse and a history of substance abuse were also noted. A July 2012 VA examiner, a psychologist, diagnosed depressive disorder not otherwise specified (NOS) and alcohol abuse in remission by patient report. The examiner noted that the Veteran was discharged from service in 1974, but by his own report did not seek psychiatric treatment until 2006, which corresponded to the VA medical records. Thus, the examiner concluded that the Veteran's depression was not due to or caused by his military experience/service. Following the November 2012 Board remand, the claim file was reviewed by a different VA psychologist, in the absence of the VA psychologist that conducted the July 2012 VA examination. The VA psychologist (conducting the December 2012 review) reiterated the July 2012 opinion and stated that the Veteran had been discharged from service in 1974 and by his own report had not sought treatment for a psychiatric condition until 2006. The Veteran's depression was not a function of, or caused by his military experiences. He further noted that documents from 2004 indicated that his depression was reportedly not of sufficient severity to receive treatment until 2006. The diagnoses were a depressive disorder, not otherwise specified; and alcohol abuse, in remission by the Veteran's report. In a March 2013 addendum, the July 2012 VA examiner stated that the Veteran was examined for a mental health in July 2012 and diagnosed with depression and alcohol abuse. He further noted that the Veteran was discharged from the military in 1974 and did not seek treatment for a mental health condition until 2006. Therefore, his depression is not due to or caused by his military experience. The examiner further indicated that there was not a mental health problem diagnosed and treated prior to the military according to the records. Additionally, while in the service, he was diagnosed with an Axis II disorder of "Inadequate personality, chronic, severe". The examiner indicated that such diagnosis is not related to any Axis I diagnosis, including depression but, rather, is acquired during the developmental years. There is no evidence that the Veteran's diagnosis of personality disorder increased during service and the fact that no treatment was sought following his discharge for several decades indicates that there was no exacerbation of symptoms. The examiner again opined that the Veteran's current condition of depression is not related to, due to, or caused by his military experience. Principles of Service Connection Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). The law provides that a Veteran is considered to have been in sound condition when examined, accepted and enrolled for service, except as to defects, infirmities, or disorders noted at entrance into service, or where clear and unmistakable (obvious or manifest) evidence demonstrates that an injury or disease existed prior thereto and was not aggravated by such service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1111; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b). VA must show by clear and unmistakable evidence both that the disease or injury existed prior to service and that the disease or injury was not aggravated by service. A pre-existing injury or disease will be considered to have been aggravated by active service where there is an increase in disability during such service, unless there is a specific finding that the increase in disability is due to the natural progress of the disease. Aggravation may not be conceded where the disability underwent no increase in severity during service on the basis of all the evidence of record pertaining to the manifestations of the disability prior to, during, and subsequent to service. 38 U.S.C.A. 1153; 38 C.F.R. 3.306. Personality disorders and mental deficiency are not eligible for service connection, as they are not considered a disease or injury for VA compensation purposes. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(c), 4.9. However, such conditions may be service-connected if they are subject to, or aggravated by, a superimposed disease or injury during service which results in additional disability. See VAOPGCPREC 82-90 (July 18, 1990), published at 56 Fed. Reg. 45,711 (1990); see also Winn v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 510, 516 (1996); Natali v. Principi, 375 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Direct service connection may not be granted without evidence of a current disability; in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disease or injury. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304. See also Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995) aff'd, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) [(table)]. Additionally, for Veterans who have served 90 days or more of active service during a war period or after December 31, 1946, certain chronic disabilities, such as a psychosis, are presumed to have been incurred in service if manifest to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. According to 38 C.F.R. § 3.384 , the term "psychosis" includes a brief psychotic disorder; delusional disorder; psychotic disorder due to general medical condition; psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified (NOS); schizoaffective disorder; schizophrenia; schizophreniform disorder; shared psychotic disorder; and substance-induced psychotic disorder. Alternatively, when a disease at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) is not shown to be chronic during service or the one year presumptive period, service connection may also be established by showing continuity of symptomatology after service. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). However, the use of continuity of symptoms to establish service connection is limited only to those diseases listed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) and does not apply to other disabilities which might be considered chronic from a medical standpoint. See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In the instant case, while a psychosis is a chronic disease for the purpose of entitlement to the provisions of presumptive service connection, the application of those provisions is dependent upon the Veteran's having had 90 continuous days of active duty. Since the Veteran had less that 90 days of active service, he is not entitled to the application of the regulations governing presumptive service connection for a psychosis. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(1) (the Veteran must have served 90 days or more during a war period or after December 31, 1946). Lay evidence is competent to establish the presence of observable symptomatology and "may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection." Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994). When a condition is capable of lay observation and may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature." Lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis when a layperson (1) is competent to identify the medical condition; or, (2) is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis; or, (3) describes symptoms at the time which supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Although a lay person is competent in certain situations to provide a diagnosis of a simple condition, a lay person is not competent to provide evidence as to more complex medical questions. See Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456 (2007). Likewise, mere conclusory or generalized lay statements that a service event or illness caused a current disability are insufficient. Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278 (2010). The Board must weigh any competent lay evidence and to make a credibility determination as to whether it supports a finding of service incurrence; or, if applicable, continuity of symptomatology; or both, sufficient to establish service connection. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); see also Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994). The credibility of lay evidence may not be refuted solely by the absence of corroborating contemporaneous medical evidence, but it is a factor. Davidson, 581 F.3d at 1316 (Fed.Cir. 2009). Other credibility factors are the lapse of time in recollecting events attested to, prior conflicting statements as opposed to consistency with other statements and evidence, internal consistency, facial plausibility, bias, interest, the length of time between alleged incurrence of disability and the earliest or first corroborating medical or lay evidence thereof, and statements given during treatment (which are usually given greater probative weight, particularly if close in time to the onset thereof). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). Analysis Initially, the Board observes that, to the extent that the Veteran may possibly have a psychosis, presumptive service connection, including by virtue of continuity of symptomatology, is not warranted because he had less than 90 days of active service. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(1); Walker, supra. Therefore, the remaining inquiry is whether the Veteran has an acquired psychiatric disorder related to his military service. In this regard, the only medical opinion addressing this matter has been proffered by the July 2012 and December 2012 VA examiners. In this regard, the opinions obtained from such examiners in July 2012 and March 2013, and December 2012, respectively, are based on a full review of the record, to include the Veteran's lay statements and his STRs, and offered clear conclusions with supporting data. See Nieves- Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008); Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 120, 124 (2007) ("[A]medical opinion ... must support its conclusion with an analysis that the Board can consider and weigh against contrary opinions"). Moreover, there is nothing in the record that otherwise contradicts the findings of the VA examiners with respect to the etiology of the Veteran's psychiatric symptoms. In this respect, the Board observes that those core findings, with respect to a lack of nexus between the Veteran's underlying psychiatric symptoms, regardless of diagnosis, and his active service, are uncontroverted by the objective record. Such consistency with the other evidence of record adds to the probative weight of those opinions. 38 C.F.R. § 4.1; Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 4444 (2000); Wray v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 488, 492-93 (1995). Therefore, the Board accords great probative weight to his opinions. The Board notes that, as opined by the March 2013 VA examiner, there was not a mental health problem diagnosed and treated prior to the military according to the records. Therefore, the Veteran is presumed to be sound upon entry to service with respect to an acquired psychiatric disorder. However, he was treated during and released from his brief period of active duty for what was diagnosed as a personality disorder. A personality disorder is a developmental defect and not a disease within the meaning of applicable legislation providing for compensation benefits. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c). Neither the STRs nor any post-service clinical records indicate that the Veteran had an acquired psychiatric disorder during active service. Moreover, while service connection may be warranted if an acquired psychiatric disorder was incurred or aggravated in service or superimposed upon a preexisting personality disorder, there is nothing in the record which supports such a finding in the instant case. 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.9, 4.125(a), 4.127 (2012); Carpenter v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 240 (1995); Beno v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 439 (1992). In the instant case, the Veteran's STRs only reflect a diagnosis of a personality disorder. Moreover, the probative March 2013 VA examiner's opinion indicates that such diagnosis is not related to any Axis I diagnosis, including depression but, rather, is acquired during the developmental years. Moreover, he found that there is no evidence that the Veteran's diagnosis of personality disorder increased during service and the fact that no treatment was sought following his discharge for several decades indicates that there was no exacerbation of symptoms. Therefore, as there was no superimposed disability of an acquired psychiatric disorder as a result of a disease or injury during service, and no aggravation of the Veteran's personality disorder during service that resulted in additional disability, the Board finds that service connection for an additional disability as a result of a disease or injury superimposed on the Veteran's personality disorder during service is not warranted. Moreover, as discussed previously, the probative evidence of record, to specifically include the VA opinions, indicate that an acquired psychiatric disorder is not related to the Veteran's military service. Accordingly, the Board finds that the probative evidence of record does not support a grant of service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. In this regard, the Board acknowledges that the Veteran himself has opined that he suffers from an acquired psychiatric disorder which is attributable to his military service. The Board has considered those lay assertions. While a lay person, the Veteran is certainly competent to offer evidence about his current and past psychiatric symptoms, which fall within the realm of his personal experience. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 471 (1994). Significantly, however, the Veteran has not demonstrated that he has the requisite clinical expertise to opine as to medical etiology. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); Grover v. West, 12 Vet. App. 109 (1999); Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456 (2007) (although the claimant is competent in certain situations to provide a diagnosis of a simple condition such as a broken leg or varicose veins, the claimant is not competent to provide evidence as to more complex medical questions). In this regard, the Board notes that sometimes laypersons are competent to identify a condition, i. e., when simple, such as a broken leg, and sometimes not, e.g., a form of cancer. See Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1377 n.4. A psychiatric disorder is not necessarily accompanied by observable symptoms, and for that reasons alone is more akin to cancer than a broken leg. See Tyrues v. Shinseki, No. 04-584, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Vet. App. Aug. 23, 2012) (nonprecedential memorandum decision). The record in this case reflects a variety of psychiatric diagnoses. The records are thus illustrative of the complex nature and etiology of the Veteran's current psychiatric status. Thus, the Veteran's statements, standing alone, are insufficient to address a medically complex question, such as the link, if any, which exists between any of his current acquired psychiatric disorder and his military service. Accordingly, even after careful consideration of those lay statements, the Board finds service connection is not warranted. In rendering this determination, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit of the doubt doctrine. However, the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. As such, that doctrine is not applicable in the instant appeal, and his claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). ORDER Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is denied. ____________________________________________ A. JAEGER Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs