Citation Nr: 1322761 Decision Date: 07/17/13 Archive Date: 07/24/13 DOCKET NO. 12-33 816 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in New Orleans, Louisiana THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and major depressive disorder. 2. Entitlement to service connection for bilateral tinea pedis, claimed as athlete's foot. 3. Entitlement to service connection for tinea cruris, claimed as jock itch. 4. Entitlement to service connection for asbestosis. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. D. Simpson INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active duty service from May 1970 to December 1971. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from February and March 2010 rating decisions by the Regional Office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in New Orleans, Louisiana. The Veteran was afforded an April 2013 videoconference hearing before the undersigned. A hearing transcript is associated with the electronic folder (efolder) in Virtual VA. The issues of service connection for PTSD and a mental disorder have been combined to reflect consideration of all psychiatric disorders raised by the record. See Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009). A review of the Veteran's Virtual VA efolder does not any additional pertinent evidence that is not already associated with the claims folder. Please note this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2012). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a)(2) (West 2002). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran did not have service in Vietnam, and his unit of assignment in Korea is not recognized by VA as having been exposed to herbicides; search efforts to verify herbicide exposure have been unsuccessful. 2. The Veteran is not demonstrated to serve in combat or have a stressor related to fear of hostile enemy activity and there is no credible supporting evidence for his stressor; additional psychiatric diagnoses of depression and anxiety were neither aggravated nor incurred during active service. 3. The probative evidence does not show that tinea pedis or tinea cruris was aggravated or incurred during active service, to include reported asbestos exposure. 4. The probative evidence does not show that asbestosis was aggravated or incurred during active service; rather the Veteran had significant occupational asbestos exposure after service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, depression and anxiety, have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2012); 75 Fed. Reg. 39843 (Jul. 13, 2010). 2. The criteria for service connection for tinea pedis have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303 (2012). 3. The criteria for service connection for tinea cruris have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303 (2012). 4. The criteria for service connection for asbestosis have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Duty to Notify and Assist The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) and implementing regulations imposes obligations on VA to provide claimants with notice and assistance. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2012). Proper VCAA notice must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1) (2012); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). In Pelegrini, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that VCAA notice, as required by 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a), must be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable adjudication by the RO. The Court has also held that the VCAA notice requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of a service connection claim. Those five elements include: 1) veteran status; 2) existence of a disability; 3) a connection between the veteran's service and the disability; 4) degree of disability; and 5) effective date of the disability. Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). The record indicates that the Veteran was provided with adequate VCAA notice in August and September 2009 prior to initial adjudication. Specifically, the RO notified the Veteran of information and evidence necessary to substantiate his service connection claims, including degree of disability and assignment of an effective date. He was notified of the information and evidence that VA would seek to provide and the information and evidence that he was expected to provide. The duty to notify has been met. The Board further concludes that the duty to assist has also been met. The Veteran's service treatment records, September 2009 Vet Center letter, and private medical records have been obtained, in addition to various written statements by the Veteran himself. The RO also obtained a Joint Service Records Research Center (JSRRC) to verify possible herbicide exposure in Korea. See MR21- 1MR, Part VI, Chapter 2, Section B, Subsection 6, (d). At the hearing, the Veteran referred to VA Baton Rouge treatment records. The RO contacted the Vet Center, Baton Rouge and received a September 2009 letter detailing his treatment. At the April 2013 hearing, the transcript suggests that the Veteran continues to have psychological and/or dermatology treatment at either at the VA Community Based Outpatient Clinic (CBOC) and/or Vet Center in Baton Rouge. To the extent there may potentially be outstanding Baton Rouge CBOC records, the Board finds that a verified stressor has not been shown. As detailed below, the Board does not find the Veteran credible in his assertion of a continuity of symptomatology of tinea pedis or tinea cruris beginning in service. The Veteran's reported stressor has not been verified. These potentially outstanding records concern current treatment and would not raise any reasonable possibility of substantiating the alleged stressor or the claimed in-service dermatological disorders. In other words, they are not relevant, and a remand to obtain these potential records would not raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(d). The Veteran was not afforded a VA examination for any of his claims. In service connection claims, VA is obliged to provide an examination or obtain a medical opinion when the record contains competent evidence that the claimant has a current disability or signs and symptoms of a current disability, the record indicates that the disability or signs and symptoms of disability may be associated with active service, and the record does not contain sufficient information to make a decision on the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d); McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 83 (2006). The threshold for finding a link between current disability and service is low. Locklear v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 410 (2006); McLendon, 20 Vet. App. at 83. The Veteran's reports of a continuity of symptomatology can satisfy the requirement for evidence that the claimed disability may be related to service. McLendon, 20 Vet. App. at 83. Here, service treatment records are entirely negative for any of the claimed disabilities. The absence of treatment combined with his affirmative denial of skin disease at separation render the Veteran's assertions that he had rashes in service incredible, as detailed below. Agent Orange exposure is not conceded and the Veteran is not shown to have a military occupational specialty that is recognized as working on asbestos materials. However, he is demonstrated to have had significant asbestos exposure in his post service occupation. His reports of an in-service stressor are not verified. Overall, the lay and medical evidence does not include any credible evidence of an in-service event, injury, or disease to which the claimed disabilities could be related. For these reasons, the Board finds that a VA examination is not necessary to adjudicate these claims, even under the low threshold for finding a link between current disability and service. Id.; see also Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that a Veteran's conclusory statements regarding causation were not sufficient to necessitate a VA examination in the absence of medical evidence, and that medical examinations are not to be routinely and automatically provided to all Veterans in disability cases involving nexus issues). The Court has held that the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2) (2012) impose two distinct duties on VA employees, including Board personnel, in conducting hearings: The duty to explain fully the issues and the duty to suggest the submission of evidence that may have been overlooked. Bryant v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 488 (2010) (per curiam); See also 77 Fed. Reg. 23128-01 (April 18, 2012). At the April 2013 hearing, the undersigned identified the issues on appeal. The Veteran provided testimony as to all treatment received for his claimed disabilities and, thereby, demonstrated actual knowledge of the ability to submit additional relevant evidence. The duties imposed by Bryant were thereby met. There is no indication that there is any relevant evidence outstanding for these claims, and the Board will proceed with consideration of the Veteran's appeal. Laws and regulations Service connection will be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Establishing service connection generally requires (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. For chronic disabilities listed under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a), an alternative method of establishing the second and third Shedden/Caluza element is through a demonstration of continuity of symptomatology. Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); see also Clyburn v. West, 12 Vet. App. 296, 302 (1999). However, the claimed tinea pedis, tinea cruris, and asbestosis are not considered chronic disabilities within the purview of 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). Psychosis is considered a chronic disability, but there is no evidence that the Veteran had any psychotic episode as part of his claimed psychiatric disability. Accordingly, the alternative method for establishing service connection through continuity of symptomatology is not applicable for any of the claims. Service connection may also be granted for a disease first diagnosed after discharge when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Special regulations apply to claims based upon herbicide exposure. The United States Department of Defense ("DOD") has confirmed that Agent Orange was used along the demilitarized zone ("DMZ") in Korea. Agent Orange was used to defoliate the fields of fire between the front line defensive positions and the south barrier fence. If it is determined that a Veteran who served in Korea during the applicable time period belonged to one of the units identified by DOD, then it is presumed that he or she was exposed to herbicides containing Agent Orange, and the presumptions outlined in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) will apply. See MR21- 1MR, Part VI, Chapter 2, Section B, Subsection 6. Here, personnel records show that the Veteran served in Korea from September 18, 1970 to December 23, 1971 with the 44th Artillery, 6th Battalion, Battery C. This unit is not recognized as serving near the DMZ. Id. The JSRRC response in October 2009 showed that herbicide exposure could not be verified for the Veteran. For the reasons stated above, the Veteran is not demonstrated to have been exposed to herbicides. The Federal Circuit has held that "[l]ay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional." Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[T]he Board cannot determine that lay evidence lacks credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence"). Although a claimant is competent in certain situations to identify a simple condition such as a fall leading to a broken leg, a lay person is generally not competent to provide evidence as to more complex medical questions. See Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456 (2007); see also Waters, 601 F.3d 1274. Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted")). In relevant part, 38 U.S.C.A. 1154(a) (West 2002) requires that VA give "due consideration" to "all pertinent medical and lay evidence" in evaluating a claim for disability or death benefits. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the VA shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). (i) Acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD and depression In addition to the regulations mentioned above, service connection for PTSD requires: (1) a medical diagnosis of PTSD utilizing the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) criteria, in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a causal nexus between current symptomatology and the specific claimed in-service stressor. See Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 138 (1997); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2012). Unless it is determined that a veteran was engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to such combat, the Veteran's alleged stressor(s) generally must be established by official service records or other credible supporting evidence. Cohen, supra; Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283 (1994); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). However, if the claimed non-combat stressor is related to the veteran's "fear of hostile military or terrorist activity" and a VA or VA-contracted psychiatrist or psychologist confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of PTSD, the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor so long as there is not clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the veteran's service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3) (2012). In September 2009, a Vet Center psychologist diagnosed PTSD primarily based upon the Veteran's stressor narrative about a motor vehicle accident (MVA) involving civilians. The Veteran has repeated this narrative throughout the appeal. As the MVA stressor is not related to fear of hostile military or terrorist activity, it requires credible supporting evidence. See id; Cohen, supra. The Board has also considered that the Vet Center psychologist briefly notes generalized reports of "some sniper fire" at the DMZ. However, he characterizes the MVA stressor as the "main stressful event" and proceeds to detail the event as related by the Veteran. Given the Vet Center psychologist's statements and the vague, isolated reports by the Veteran of DMZ enemy fire, the weight of the evidence is against finding a stressor involving fear of hostile enemy activity under 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). Service treatment records are entirely negative for any psychiatric complaints or findings. On his Report of History for Separation taken in December 1971, the Veteran denied frequent trouble sleeping and nervous trouble of any sort. He described his health as "very good." The first record of psychiatric treatment was not until May 2008. A private psychologist performed an evaluation in the context of the Veteran's suitability for bariatric surgery. He noted that the Veteran denied a past personal history of psychiatric treatment. After extensive clinical evaluation and quantitative testing, he listed the pertinent DSM-IV Axis I disorders: pain disorder associated with psychological factors and generalized medical condition, major depression, and anxiety disorder. He determined the Veteran had a high risk for substance abuse and declined to recommend him for bariatric surgery. In March 2010, the Veteran submitted a buddy statement that attested to the MVA where a Korean child was killed. A report from the Defense Personnel Records Information Retrieval System (DPRIS) reflects that there was not sufficient information for a search. It stated that civilian deaths were very difficult to verify. At the April 2013 hearing, the Veteran detailed the stressor. He stated that there were no official reports made on the MVA. However, the event bothered him for many years and he had started psychiatric treatment about six years ago for it. The Veteran contends service connection is warranted for a psychiatric disorder. As discussed below, an in-service event has not been demonstrated, and the claim must be denied. Here, the Veteran had service in Korea during the Vietnam era. Service records do not in any way suggest that he engaged in combat. See DD 214; Personnel records. As noted above, he has not been shown to have a stressor related to fear of hostile activity to meet the relaxed evidentiary requirement for a PTSD stressor under 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). Hence, credible supporting evidence of the MVA stressor is necessary. Cohen, supra.; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The DPRIS responded that they could not perform a search based upon the information provided. Moreover, at the April 2013 hearing the Veteran explicitly stated that the MVA went unreported. The service treatment records and personnel records are otherwise wholly absent for any evidence to corroborate the MVA stressor. As there is no credible evidence of a stressor, the service connection claim for PTSD must be denied. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Additional psychiatric diagnoses of depression and anxiety have been raised by the record. See Clemons, 23 Vet. App. 1. The May 2008 private psychologist does not in any way refer to a possible service nexus for any currently diagnosed psychiatric disorder. Notably, the September 2009 Vet Center psychologist referred to depression and anxiety as related to the MVA stressor. Unlike PTSD claims, these additional psychiatric diagnoses are not subject to the stringent 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) stressor evidentiary standards. However, even assuming the unverified MVA stressor occurred, the clear denials of psychiatric type problems at separation heavily weigh against the basic plausibility of the Veteran's assertions that he had psychiatric symptoms relating to the MVA. Given this inconsistency, the Board does not consider the September 2009 Vet Center report probative to show depression and/or anxiety is related to service. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 510-511 (1995), aff'd, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (table); see Madden v. Brown, 125 F. 3d 1447, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997); (Holding that the Board has the "authority to discount the weight and probative value of evidence in light of its inherent characteristics in its relationship to other items of evidence"). In summary, the weight of the probative evidence is against a finding that the Veteran currently has any current psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, depression, and anxiety, related to service. Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is denied. See id.; 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304(f), 3.307, 3.309. (ii) Bilateral tinea pedis and tinea cruris Service treatment records show that the Veteran was seen for pseudofolliculitis barbae on several occasions. On his Report of Medical History for Separation taken in December 1971, the Veteran denied having or ever having skin disease. No skin abnormalities were noted on contemporaneous clinical examination. Private medical records from 1984, May 1989, and July 1990 reflect that the Veteran sought medical attention for both episodic tinea pedis and tinea cruris. He again had private treatment for tinea pedis in January 1995 and January 1997. In October 2009, the Veteran asserted that his rashes were related to Agent Orange exposure while serving in the DMZ. In his November 2012 substantive appeal, he asserted that tinea pedis and tinea cruris were related to Agent Orange exposure in Korea. At the April 2013 hearing, the Veteran reported that both rashes initially appeared during basic training at Fort Polk. He used topical treatments to alleviate the rashes. He had a continuity of symptomatology beginning in service for both rashes. He recently started taking prescription strength pills in addition to over the counter medication. He also asserted that the rashes could be related to asbestos found in the barracks at Fort Polk. He recalled being exposed to a lot of white dust in the barracks and reported that they were subsequently condemn due to their poor physical condition. He also acknowledged working as pipe fitter after service, but believed he had asbestos exposure in service. The Veteran contends service connection is warranted. Although service treatment records do not show treatment for either rash during service, the Veteran is competent to relate his recollections and the Board will not discount his reports simply on an absence of contemporaneous treatment. Layno, 6 Vet. App. at 469; Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1337. However, the Veteran affirmatively denied having skin disease at separation. (December 1971 Report of Medical History). His denial in conjunction with an absence of medical treatment heavily weigh against the credibility of his reports that the rashes were initially manifested or significant enough to be an acknowledged problem in service. Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1336-1337 (Board may properly considers as possible bias, conflicting statements; internal inconsistency, facial plausibility and consistency with other evidence in determining probative value); see also Buczynski v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 221, 224 (2011) (silence in medical records may be relevant evidence that symptoms were not present if the record would normally have recorded such symptoms). Furthermore, the Veteran has a self interest reporting a symptomatology beginning in service. See Cartwright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) (VA cannot ignore a veteran's testimony simply because the veteran is an interested party; personal interest may, however, affect the credibility of the evidence). For the above stated reasons, the Board does not find the Veteran's reports persuasive to show an in-service symptomatology. Alternatively, the Veteran has asserted that his claimed rashes are related to Agent Orange or asbestos exposure. As noted above, he is not presumed to have been exposed to herbicides and his herbicide exposure reports were not verified by the JSRRC. Even if one were to presume Agent Orange or asbestos exposure, there is absolutely no medical evidence in any way suggesting that the rashes were related to in-service toxin exposure. He has not identified any healthcare provider informing him of such a relationship. Establishing a nexus for rashes reported many years after service is a complex medical question and requires competent medical evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a). The Veteran is not shown to be a medical professional and is not competent to express an opinion on such an issue. See Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1376-1377; see also Waters, 601 F.3d 1274; King v. Shinseki, 700 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, his assertions are not competent evidence to show a nexus to service and in this regard, have no probative value. Id; see Davidson, 581 F.3d at 1316. For the foregoing reasons, the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claims. The benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is therefore not applicable and the claim for service connection for tinea pedis and tinea cruris must be denied. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 55-57. (iii) Asbestosis Service treatment records do not show any respiratory illness. On his Report of Medical History for Separation taken in December 1971, the Veteran denied having or ever having asthma, shortness of breath, chest pain, or chronic cough. No lung abnormalities were noted on contemporaneous clinical examination. In July 2001, Dr. G.G. authored a letter. He stated that he was requested to provide an evaluation for possible occupational related lung disease. He noted that the Veteran worked for an oil company from 1972 to 1987 as a pipe fitter. During this time, he was exposed to asbestos dust. Recent X-rays showed bilateral pleural plaques, pleural thickening, and mild increase in interstitial fibrotic lung markings. Additional testing showed corresponding results. Dr. G.G. concluded that the Veteran had pulmonary asbestosis and a history of significant asbestosis exposure. In September and October 2009, the Veteran reported that he worked on unit vehicle brakes while in Korea. He recalled inhaling asbestos dust while working on the brakes. In his April 2010 notice of disagreement, the Veteran asserted that he had asbestos exposure from being stationed at the Fort Polk barracks. He stated that he inhaled asbestos while the barracks were being demolished. At the April 2013 hearing, the Veteran recalled that he was exposed to a lot of white dust in the barracks and reported that they were subsequently condemned due to their poor physical condition. He also acknowledged working as pipe fitter after service, but believed he also had asbestos exposure in service. The Veteran contends that service connection is warranted. The record reflects that the Veteran had significant post service asbestos exposure as a pipe fitter. See Dr. G.G. July 2001 letter. Even assuming his reports of incidental asbestos exposure at Fort Polk and while performing brake work are credible, the significant post service asbestos exposure greatly undermines the inherent plausibility that any incidental in-service asbestos exposure led to the current lung disease. Madden, 125 F. 3d at 1481. Moreover, personnel records show that his military occupational specialty (MOS) was as a military policeman. His MOS is not an occupation likely to be in vicinity of asbestos. See M21-1, VBA Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1 Manual Rewrite (M21-1 MR), Part IV, Subpart ii, Ch. 2, Section C, Topic 9, Subsections (a) and (f) (Dec. 13, 2005). Given the service records and clear evidence of significant post service occupational asbestos exposure, a nexus is not demonstrated. For the foregoing reasons, the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim. The benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is therefore not applicable and the claim for service connection for asbestosis must be denied. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 55-57. (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) ORDER Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, depression, and anxiety is denied. Service connection for tinea pedis, claimed as athlete's foot, is denied. Service connection for tinea cruris, claimed as jock itch, is denied. Service connection for asbestosis is denied. ____________________________________________ J. A. MARKEY Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs