Citation Nr: 1323157 Decision Date: 07/19/13 Archive Date: 07/24/13 DOCKET NO. 07 12 418 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Muskogee, Oklahoma THE ISSUE Entitlement to an effective date prior to April 8, 2004 for service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD David S. Ames, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from December 1968 to December 1972. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a May 2006 rating decision by the Muskogee, Oklahoma, Regional Office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), which granted the Veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD, effective April 8, 2004. The Veteran appealed the issue of entitlement to an earlier effective date for the award of service connection. In August 2009, the Board denied the claim. The Veteran appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). Pursuant to a Joint Motion to Vacate and Remand (Joint Motion), the Court, in an August 2010 Order, vacated the August 2009 Board decision and remanded the appeal to the Board. Subsequently, in January 2011, the Board once again denied the claim, and additionally addressed the question as to whether there was clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in February 1973 and November 1976 rating decisions. The Veteran also appealed that decision to the Court. Pursuant to a Joint Motion, the Court, in an August 2011 Order, vacated the portion of the January 2011 Board decision which denied entitlement to an effective date prior to April 8, 2004, and remanded the appeal to the Board. The portion of the January 2011 Board decision which found that there was no CUE in February 1973 and November 1976 rating decisions was not disturbed. In November 2011, the Board denied the claim for a third time. The Veteran appealed that decision once again to the Court. Pursuant to a Joint Motion, the Court, in an October 2012 Order, vacated the November 2011 Board decision and remanded the appeal to the Board. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. A November 1976 rating decision denied the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for chronic nightmares. 2. In May 2006, the RO granted service connection for PTSD; the RO assigned an effective date for service connection of April 8, 2004. 3. Evidence associated with the claims file since the November 1976 rating decision includes an amendment to the Veteran's DD Form 214 which constitutes a relevant service department record which was received after the decision had become final. 4. The Veteran is not shown to have met all eligibility criteria for service connection for PTSD from April 11, 1980 to March 10, 2004. 5. The Veteran's service-connected psychiatric disorder was first diagnosed on March 10, 2004. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for an effective date of March 10, 2004 for a grant of service connection for PTSD have been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5107, 5110 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (2006); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.155, 3.157, 3.400 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Upon receipt of a substantially complete application, VA must notify the claimant and any representative of any information, medical evidence, or lay evidence not previously provided to VA that is necessary to substantiate the claim. The notice must: (1) inform the claimant about the information and evidence not of record that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) inform the claimant about the information and evidence that VA will seek to provide; and (3) inform the claimant about the information and evidence the claimant is expected to provide. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2012); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). If VA does not provide adequate notice of any element necessary to substantiate the claim, or there is any deficiency in the timing of the notice, the burden is on the claimant to show that prejudice resulted from a notice error, rather than on VA to rebut presumed prejudice. Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009). The Board finds that any defect with regard to the timing or content of the notice to the Veteran is harmless because of the thorough and informative notices provided throughout the adjudication and because the Veteran had a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of the claim with an adjudication of the claim by the RO subsequent to receipt of the required notice. The record does not show prejudice to the Veteran, and the Board finds that any defect in the timing or content of the notices has not affected the fairness of the adjudication. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005); Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Specifically, the Veteran was notified in letters dated in April 2004 and May 2008. The Veteran has neither alleged nor demonstrated any prejudice with regard to the content or timing of the notice provided. Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009) (reversing prior case law imposing a presumption of prejudice on any notice deficiency, and clarifying that the burden of showing that an error is harmful, or prejudicial, falls upon the party attacking the agency's determination); Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Board considers it significant that the subsequent statements made by the Veteran and his representative, particularly those which partially resulted in the July 2010, July 2011, and October 2012 Joint Motions, suggest actual knowledge of the elements necessary to substantiate the claim. Dalton v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23 (2007) (actual knowledge is established by statements or actions by the claimant or the claimant's representative that demonstrate an awareness of what is necessary to substantiate a claim). In any event, in cases where service connection has been granted and an initial disability rating and effective date have been assigned, the typical service connection claim has been more than substantiated, it has been proven, thereby rendering section 5103(a) notice no longer required because the purpose that the notice was intended to serve has been fulfilled. Dingess, 19 Vet. App. at 491. Thus, VA has satisfied its duty to notify the Veteran and had satisfied that duty prior to the adjudication in the supplemental statement of the case. Overton v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 427 (2006) (Veteran afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in adjudication of claim, and therefore notice error was harmless). The Board also finds that the duty to assist requirements have been fulfilled. All relevant, identified, and available evidence has been obtained, and VA has notified the Veteran of any evidence that could not be obtained. The Veteran has not referred to any additional, unobtained, relevant, available evidence. Thus, the Board finds that VA has satisfied the duty to assist provisions of law. No further notice or assistance to the Veteran is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist him in development. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). The Veteran asserts that he is entitled to an effective date prior to April 8, 2004 for service connection for PTSD. As noted above, the Veteran's claim has been the subject of three separate Board decisions and a corresponding number of Joint Motions. The most recent Joint Motion found that the Board had erred by failing to discuss 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (2006), but did not otherwise state any fault with how the Board had addressed the subjects of the previous Joint Motions. However, as a result of the October 2012 Court Order, the portion of the November 2011 Board decision which addressed the concerns of the previous Joint Motions was also vacated. As such, the Board shall restate that reasoning in full, to ensure compliance with the previous Joint Motions, before turning to a discussion of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (2006). 38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a)(3) The Veteran argues, in essence, that his claim should be granted under 38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a)(3) because he has met all eligibility criteria for the liberalized benefit (i.e., for service connection for PTSD) since April 11, 1980. The Board notes that it first denied this claim in August 2009. The July 2010 Joint Motion filed subsequent to that decision stated that a remand was required because the Board failed to address 38 C.F.R. § 3.114. In January 2011, the Board again denied the claim. At that time, the scope of the earlier effective date claim included allegations of CUE in RO decisions, dated in 1973 and 1976. The subsequently filed July 2011 Joint Motion stated that the CUE claims have been abandoned. The July 2011 Joint Motion essentially stated that a remand was required because the Board had failed to address 38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a)(3). In this regard, the January 2011 Board decision discussed 38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a), but it did not discuss 38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a)(3). In February 1973, the RO denied a claim for passive aggressive personality disorder. In November 1976, the RO denied a claim for a nervous condition, also characterized as a claim for "chronic nightmares." In each case, there was no appeal, and the RO's decisions became final. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(c) ( West 2002 & Supp. 2012). On April 8, 2004, the Veteran filed a claim for service connection for PTSD. In May 2006, the RO granted the claim, and assigned an effective date of April 8, 2004. Generally, the effective date of an award of a claim is the date of receipt of the claim or the date entitlement arose, whichever is later. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5110(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400. If a claim for disability compensation is received within one year after separation from service, the effective date of entitlement is the day following separation or the date entitlement arose. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(b)(2). However, where pension, compensation, or dependency and indemnity compensation is awarded or increased pursuant to a liberalizing law, or a liberalizing VA issue approved by the Secretary or by the Secretary's direction, the effective date of such award or increase shall be fixed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the effective date of the act or administrative issue. Where pension, compensation, or dependency and indemnity compensation is awarded or increased pursuant to a liberalizing law or VA issue which became effective on or after the date of its enactment or issuance, in order for a claimant to be eligible for a retroactive payment under the provisions of this paragraph the evidence must show that the claimant met all eligibility criteria for the liberalized benefit on the effective date of the liberalizing law or VA issue and that such eligibility existed continuously from that date to the date of claim or administrative determination of entitlement. 38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a). The July 2011 Joint Motion specifically stated that the Board's January 2011 decision required a remand because the Board failed to discuss 38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a)(3). Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a)(3): If a claim is reviewed at the claimant's request more than one year after the effective date of the law, the effective date of the award may be one year prior to the date of receipt of such request, if the Veteran met all the criteria of the liberalizing law or issue at that time. PTSD was first recognized as a distinct disability by VA on April 11, 1980, see 45 Fed. Reg. 26,326 (1980), and this change constituted a "liberalizing VA issue." See VAOPGCPREC 26-97, 62 Fed. Reg. 63,604 (1997). In order to be entitled to retroactive benefits based on liberalizing legislation effective prior to the date of his claim, the evidence must show that the Veteran met all eligibility criteria for the liberalized benefit of entitlement to service connection for PTSD on the effective date of the liberalizing law or VA issue, which in this case is April 11, 1980. The Veteran must also show that such eligibility existed continuously from that date to the date of claim or administrative determination of entitlement. 38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a); VAOPGCPREC 26-97. In no event shall such award or increase be retroactive for more than one year from the date of application therefor or the date of administrative determination of entitlement, whichever is earlier. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5110(g); 38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a)(3). Applicable regulations provide that service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a), a link, established by medical evidence between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). A claim is a formal or informal communication in writing requesting a determination of entitlement or evidencing a belief in entitlement to a benefit. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(p). Any communication or action indicating an intent to apply for VA benefits from a claimant or representative may be considered an informal claim. Such informal claim must identify the benefit sought. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a). Except as discussed below, the Veteran does not assert, and there is no evidence to show, that he filed a claim for service connection for PTSD prior to April 8, 2004. The Veteran argues, in essence, that his claim should be granted under 38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a)(3) because he has met all eligibility criteria for the liberalized benefit (i.e., for service connection for PTSD) since April 11, 1980. The relevant evidence is summarized as follows: The Veteran's discharge (DD Form 214), and personnel file, show that he served in the Republic of Vietnam. The Veteran's service treatment reports show that beginning in October 1970, he was treated for complaints of nightmares related to Vietnam. He further reported that his nightmares had begun prior to being sent to Vietnam. On examination, there was no evidence of neurosis, psychosis, thought disorder or suicidal ideation. The diagnosis was inadequate personality and passive-dependent personality. Thereafter, he received several diagnoses of personality disorders, to include an inadequate personality and passive-dependent personality, and a passive-aggressive personality disorder. The Veteran's separation examination report shows that his psychiatric condition was clinically evaluated as normal. As for the post-service medical evidence, the earliest post-service records are dated in 1976. Specifically, VA progress notes show that between October and November of 1976, the Veteran was treated for complaints of nightmares. The most detailed findings are in an October 1976 report, which shows that he reported one or two nightmares per week, and that the day after he was nervous, with a decreased appetite and puffy eyes, which interfered with his work attendance. The report notes that he was not taking medication, that he was oriented times four (i.e., to time, place, person, and objects), that affect was appropriate, that his form of verbalizations was not unusual, and that content reflected "war nightmares." The diagnosis was nightmares about war. The report indicates that he refused medication. In November 1976, the Veteran requested medication for his nightmares. He was provided with Mellavil, and was recommended for biofeedback. In December 1976, he reported a small reduction in the frequency and intensity of his nightmares. The assessment was anxiety reaction to war material. He was recommended for ten sessions of relaxation and EMG (electromyogram) training, however, he failed to report for this treatment the following month. There is no relevant medical evidence for the next 28 years. VA and private medical reports, dated in 2004, show treatment for psychiatric symptoms, with diagnoses of PTSD, dysthymic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and insomnia secondary to PTSD. As an initial matter, the Veteran has asserted that he was awarded a Bronze Star Medal with a "V" device (for valor). See e.g., Veteran's statements dated in July and October 2004, and August 2005; Dr. L.M.L.'s report, dated in June 2009. However, the Veteran's DD Form 214, DD Form 215, and his personnel file, do not show that he received a Bronze Star Medal with a "V" device. They indicate that his Bronze Star Medal was for meritorious service; they do not show that it was accompanied by a "V" device. See Bronze Star Citation (noting that the award was for "meritorious achievement"); April 1994 Special Order (same). Furthermore, the evidence shows that the Veteran was fully aware that his records did not show that his Bronze Star Medal included a "V" device. Specifically, an "Application for Correction" (DD Form 149), dated in November 2004, and an associated cover letter dated that same month, show that the Veteran petitioned the service department to have his records "corrected" to show that his Bronze Star Medal included the "V" device. There is no record of a response from the service department. In addition, he has asserted that he participated in flight duty while in Vietnam. See e.g., VA progress notes, dated in March 2004 ("He served on a gunship"); April 2004 ("[h]is primary job during the war was to spot fire in a bombing plane. He reports this always gave him a sense of loss of control, as he could not even see the direction the plane was flying."); Dr. L.M.L.'s reports, dated in February 2005 ("he had to continue flying in the same kind of aircraft that his friend died in"), and June 2009 (noting service "as a crew chief on a gunship"). However, there is nothing in the Veteran's personnel file to show that he had flight duty, to include receipt of awards indicating flight duty, such as an air medal. His service treatment reports do not include any physical examination reports or other evidence indicating flight duty. His "Airman Performance Reports" dated during service in Vietnam indicate he was a "crew chief," but do not note flight duty; they indicate that his duties were as a mechanic on the flight line, during which time he performed maintenance and inspections, and assisted in launch and recovery of planes. In summary, the Veteran's assertions are shown to be so inconsistent, uncorroborated and contradicted by the record that the Board finds that he is not a credible historian. See Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 16, 19-20 (1991); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 511 (1995) (in determining whether documents submitted by a Veteran are credible, the Board may consider internal consistency, facial plausibility, and consistency with other evidence submitted on behalf of the claimant). The Board finds that the evidence is insufficient to show that the Veteran met all eligibility criteria for service connection for PTSD as of April 11, 1980. In 1976, several years' prior to the addition of PTSD as a diagnostic entity, he was treated for complaints of nightmares, with assessments of nightmares, and an anxiety reaction to war material. There is no relevant medical evidence dated between December 1976 and 2004, a period of about 28 years. In this regard, the Board is fully aware that applicable regulation requires continuity of symptomatology, not continuity of treatment. Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 16 (1991). However, in a merits context, the lack of evidence of treatment may bear on the credibility of the evidence of continuity. Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488 (1997). In this case, the evidence shows that during this 28-year time span without treatment, the Veteran attended school for about two years, worked for 30 years as an aircraft mechanic at an air force base, and that he married in 1985. See e.g., March 2004 VA progress note; certificate of marriage, dated in 1985. In summary, there are no medical records to show treatment for psychiatric symptoms between separation from service in 1972 and 2004, other than treatment for nightmares for two months in 1976. The earliest diagnosis of PTSD is dated in 2004. Accordingly, the Board finds that the evidence is insufficient to show that the Veteran met all eligibility criteria for service connection for PTSD on the effective date of the liberalizing law and that such eligibility existed continuously since that time. While the appellant contends that he experienced symptomatology consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD well before he was officially diagnosed with PTSD, there is no probative evidence demonstrating that he, in fact, met the diagnostic criteria for PTSD as of April 11, 1980, and that he continued to meet such diagnostic criteria since that time. Therefore, the Board finds that 38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a)(3) is not applicable to the appellant's case. In reaching this decision, the Board has considered several reports from L.M.L., Ph.D., dated between 2005 and 2009, and in particular a March 2008 report, which contain a number of statements to the effect that the Veteran met the criteria for PTSD during service, and that his symptoms have been ongoing since his service. However, her conclusion is vague and speculative, and is not shown to have a sufficient basis. See Neives-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008). In this case, other than treatment for two months in 1976, there are no clinical findings of record, and almost no other relevant and objective evidence, that is dated between April 1980 and April 2004. This is a period of 24 years. Given the lack of medical and other relevant evidence during that time, her conclusion lacks a sufficient basis. In addition, to the extent that she may have relied upon the Veteran's reported history, her opinion is not probative, as the Board has determined that he is not a credible historian. See e.g., Kowalski v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 171, 179 (2005); Coburn v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 427, 432 (2006). Based on the forgoing, the Board finds that the evidence shows that the Veteran has not continuously met the criteria for entitlement to service connection for PTSD since April 11, 1980. Accordingly, entitlement to an effective date prior to April 8, 2004 for PTSD is not warranted under 38 C.F.R. § 3.114(a)(3). 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (2006) As discussed above, in October 2012 the Court once again remanded the claim for compliance with an October 2012 Joint Motion. That Joint Motion stated that the Board had erred by failing to discuss the applicability of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (2006). This regulation states that, in cases where the issue is whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim, a claim will be reconsidered if the new evidence "consists of a supplemental report from the service department . . . This comprehends . . . corrections by the service department of former errors of commission or omission in the preparation of the prior report or reports and identified as such." 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (2006). While this regulation was specifically amended in October 2006 to remove its applicability to service records that did not exist at the time of the original claim, the Joint Motion noted that this amendment to the regulation was not retroactive. See Cline v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 18 (2012). Accordingly, the Board shall address the applicability of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (2006) below. The Board notes that the Veteran's claim was consistently adjudicated as an original claim for service connection for PTSD, not a claim to reopen a previously denied issue. However, by indicating that 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (2006) was applicable to the Veteran's claim, the October 2012 Joint Motion in effect also concluded that the Veteran's April 2004 claim for service connection for PTSD was actually a claim to reopen the previously denied issue of entitlement to service connection for chronic nightmares. As such, the Board shall accept this conclusion and treat the April 2004 claim as a claim to reopen a previously denied claim for a general psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD. See Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 5-6 (2009) (the scope of a mental health disability claim includes any mental disability that may reasonably be encompassed by the claimant's description of the claim, reported symptoms, and the other information of record). In this case, the Veteran's DD Form 214 was amended in 1994 to insert the award of the Bronze Star Medal. The October 2012 Joint Motion indicated that this amendment qualified as a correction of an error of omission for the purposes of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (2006). While this amendment did not exist until over 20 years after the Veteran's claim was originally denied, under the regulations in effect at the time the Veteran filed his claim such a fact was not relevant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c). Accordingly, the Veteran's 1994 amendment to his DD Form 214 constitutes a relevant service department record which was received after the decision had become final. As such, the Veteran's original claim of entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder must be reconsidered, to the extent that it impacts the Veteran's claim of entitlement to an effective date prior to April 8, 2004 for service connection for PTSD. See Clemons, 23 Vet. App. at 5-6. Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5110(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(b)(2)(i) (2012), the effective date of an award of direct service connection shall be the day following separation from active service or date entitlement arose if a claim is received within one year after separation from service; otherwise, the effective date of an award of direct service connection shall be either the date of receipt of the claim, or date entitlement arose, whichever is later. A claim is defined in the VA regulations as a formal or informal communication in writing requesting a determination of entitlement, or evidencing a belief in entitlement, to a benefit. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(p) (2012). An informal claim is any communication or action indicating an intent to apply for one or more benefits. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) (2012). As discussed above, the Veteran's claim is being reconsidered. As such, the Board shall use the initial claim which resulted in the initial rating decision which denied service connection for a psychiatric disorder as the Veteran's claim for the purposes of the issue on appeal. The February 1973 rating decision was the result of a December 11, 1972 claim. While that claim did not include any references to a psychiatric disorder, the fact remains that it was considered the claim which resulted in the subsequent rating decision which denied service connection for a psychiatric disorder. As such, it constitutes the Veteran's claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, including PTSD, for the purposes of this appeal. As December 11, 1972 is less than one year after the Veteran's separation from service, the proper effective date for the grant of service connection for PTSD is the day following separation from active service, in this case December 6, 1972, or date entitlement arose, whichever is later. The medical evidence of record shows that PTSD was first diagnosed in a March 29, 2004 VA sleep management report. While there is no medical evidence of record dated prior to March 29, 2004, which gave a diagnosis of PTSD, the Board notes that the evidence of record includes a March 10, 2004 VA social work assessment report which gave Axis I diagnoses of major depression and rule out PTSD. While a 'rule out' diagnosis is not a final diagnosis for VA purposes, the fact remains that major depression was diagnosed at that time, and PTSD was subsequently found to be an appropriate diagnosis as well. Accordingly, applying the doctrine of reasonable doubt, the Board finds that March 10, 2004, is the date that the Veteran's service-connected PTSD was first diagnosed. The Board notes that the Veteran did receive a diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder prior to March 10, 2004; namely the passive-aggressive personality disorder for which service connection was denied in February 1973. However, personality disorders are specifically not diseases or injuries for VA purposes. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c) (2012). Accordingly, the Veteran's diagnosis of a personality disorder does not provide evidence that the Veteran had a diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder for VA purposes prior to March 10, 2004. The Board notes that the evidence of record includes assessments of nightmares and an anxiety reaction to war material in 1976. However, these were found to be symptoms of the Veteran's personality disorder, for which service connection cannot be granted. In addition, the Board emphasizes that, as discussed above, PTSD was first recognized as a distinct disability by VA on April 11, 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 26,326 (1980). Accordingly, entitlement to service connection for PTSD could not have arisen until over seven years after the Veteran's separation from service, despite his diagnosis of a personality disorder. By that time, there had been no medical evidence to substantiate the existence of a psychiatric disorder of any kind for several years. Indeed, as discussed above, the evidence of record weighs against a finding that the Veteran was having any psychiatric difficulties during this time period. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (ruling that a prolonged period without medical complaint can be considered, along with other factors, as evidence of whether an injury or a disease was incurred in service which resulted in any chronic or persistent disability); Mense v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 354, 356 (1991) (holding that VA did not err in denying service connection when the Veteran failed to provide evidence which demonstrated continuity of symptomatology, and failed to account for the lengthy time period for which there is no clinical documentation of his low back condition). As such, by the time the eligibility for service connection for PTSD become possible in April 1980, the evidence no longer demonstrated that the Veteran had a psychiatric disorder of any kind, let alone one for which service connection could be granted. The evidence of record includes multiple private medical reports from L.M.L., Ph.D., dated between 2005 and 2009. Some of these reports opined that the Veteran's PTSD had existed continuously since his separation from service, and related his current diagnosis to the symptoms that were originally diagnosed as a personality disorder. However, as discussed above, the Board has found that these opinions lack a sufficient basis and are not probative as they relied on the Veteran's reported history, which the Board has determined is not credible evidence. See e.g., Kowalski v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 171, 179 (2005); Coburn v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 427, 432 (2006). Accordingly, the private medical reports from L.M.L., Ph.D. do not demonstrate that the Veteran's service-connected PTSD was diagnosed prior to March 10, 2004. As such, March 10, 2004, is the date entitlement to service connection for PTSD arose for the purposes of determining an effective date. Again, the proper effective date for the claim on appeal is the day following separation from active service, December 6, 1972, or date entitlement arose, whichever is later. In this case, the later date is March 10, 2004, the date that the Veteran's service-connected psychiatric disorder was first diagnosed. Accordingly, March 10, 2004, is the appropriate effective date for service connection for PTSD. The Board has considered whether an effective date prior to March 10, 2004, is warranted. However, as discussed above, the evidence of record does not demonstrate that the Veteran's service-connected psychiatric disorder was diagnosed prior to March 10, 2004. As such, there is no basis on which an effective date earlier than March 10, 2004, can be assigned for service connection for PTSD. In reaching this decision, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. The evidence of record does not show that the Veteran ever received a diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder for VA purposes prior to March 10, 2004. Therefore, the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). ORDER An effective date of March 10, 2004, but no earlier, for the grant of service connection for PTSD is granted. ____________________________________________ F. JUDGE FLOWERS Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs