Citation Nr: 1326627 Decision Date: 08/21/13 Archive Date: 08/29/13 DOCKET NO. 11-14 028 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Milwaukee, Wisconsin THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus, type II. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Wisconsin Department of Veterans Affairs ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J. Schulman, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran, who is the appellant in this case, had active service from December 1966 to September 1970. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an October 2009 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, which denied service connection. The Veteran appealed the denial of service connection in this decision, and the matter is now before the Board. A review of the Virtual VA paperless claims processing system does not reveal any additional documents pertinent to the present appeal that are not already of record. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran was not exposed to herbicide during service. 2. Diabetes mellitus did not manifest within one year of separation from service. 3. Diabetes mellitus is not etiologically related to service CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for diabetes mellitus have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1116, 1137, 1153 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Duties to Notify and Assist The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) describes VA's duties to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2012). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, that is necessary to substantiate the claim and of the relative duties of VA and the claimant for procuring that evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2012). VCAA notice should be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ). Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). In this case, the RO provided a VCAA notice letter to the Veteran in July 2009, prior to the initial adjudication of the service connection claim. The letter notified the Veteran of what information and evidence must be submitted to substantiate the claim, including a description of what information and evidence must be provided by the Veteran and what information and evidence would be obtained by VA. The Veteran was also advised to inform VA of any additional information or evidence that VA should have, and to submit evidence in support of the claim to the RO. The content of the letters complied with the requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b The notice requirements of the VCAA apply to all elements of a service connection claim, including: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Further, this notice must include information that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded. Id. at 486. In this case in the July 2009 letter, the Veteran was provided with such notice, including the type of evidence necessary to establish a disability rating and effective dates. Based on the foregoing, timely and adequate notice was provided to the Veteran prior to the transfer and certification of this case to the Board and complied with the VCAA notice requirements of 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). Next, VA has a duty to assist a veteran in the development of the claim. To that end, VA must make reasonable efforts to assist the claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claim for the benefit sought, unless no reasonable possibility exists that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2012); see Golz v. Shinseki, 590 F.3d 1317, 1320-21 (2010) (stating that the "duty to assist is not boundless in its scope" and "not all medical records . . . must be sought - only those that are relevant to the veteran's claim"). In this case, service records have been obtained, as have records of VA treatment. These pertinent records have been associated with the Veteran's claims file and reviewed in consideration of the issue before the Board. In disability compensation claims, VA must provide a medical examination and medical opinion when there is (1) competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability, and (2) evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service or establishing certain diseases manifesting during an applicable presumptive period for which the claimant qualifies, and (3) an indication that the disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability may be associated with the veteran's service or with another service-connected disability, but (4) insufficient competent medical evidence on file for the VA to make a decision on the claim. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). With respect to the factor of relationship of current disability to service (or, by analogy, to a service-connected disability), the Court has indicated that this element establishes a low threshold and requires only that the evidence "indicates" that there "may" be a nexus between the current disability or symptoms and a veteran's service. The types of evidence that "indicate" that a current disability "may be associated" with military service include, but are not limited to, medical evidence that suggests a nexus but is too equivocal or lacking in specificity to support a decision on the merits, or credible evidence of continuity of symptomatology such as pain or other symptoms capable of lay observation. McLendon, 20 Vet. App. at 83; see also Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (while there must be "medically competent" evidence of a current disability, "medically competent" evidence is not required to indicate that the current disability may be associated with service). Service treatment records are silent as to any complaints or treatment referable to diabetes during service and post-service treatment for diabetes mellitus did not begin until 37 years after separation from service. Furthermore, development of the claim has shown that the Veteran was not exposed to herbicide during service. Consequently, a VA examination as to the etiology of the claimed disorder is not warranted, even under the low threshold of McLendon. See also Bardwell v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 36, 40 (2010) (holding that where the evidence has failed to establish an in-service injury, disease, or event, VA is not obligated to provide a medical examination). The Board finds that all necessary development has been accomplished; therefore, appellate review may proceed without prejudice to the Veteran. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). In addition to the evidence discussed above, the Veteran's statements in support of the claims are also of record. The Board has carefully considered such statements and concludes that no available outstanding evidence has been identified. Additionally, the Board has reviewed the medical records for references to additional treatment reports not of record, but has found nothing to suggest that there is any outstanding evidence with respect to the Veteran's claim. For these reasons, the Board finds that the duties to notify and assist the Veteran in the development of this claim have been met, so that no further notice or assistance to the Veteran is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001). Service Connection for Diabetes Mellitus Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2012). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). As a general matter, service connection for a disability requires evidence of: (1) the existence of a current disability; (2) the existence of the disease or injury in service, and; (3) a relationship or nexus between the current disability and any injury or disease during service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999), citing Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In this case, diabetes mellitus is a "chronic disease" which is listed under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a); therefore the presumptive provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) apply. Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Where the evidence shows a "chronic disease" in service or "continuity of symptoms" after service, the disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service. In order to show a "chronic" disease in service, the record must reflect a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. Where a chronic disease has been incurred in service, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service-connected unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. If a condition noted during service is not shown to be chronic, then generally, a showing of "continuity of symptoms" after service is required in order to establish entitlement to service connection. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Additionally, where a veteran served ninety days or more of active service, and certain chronic diseases, including diabetes mellitus, become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year after the date of separation from such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a). While the disease need not be diagnosed within the presumption period, it must be shown, by acceptable lay or medical evidence, that there were characteristic manifestations of the disease to the required degree during that time. Id. A veteran who, during active military, naval, or air service, served in the Republic of Vietnam during the period beginning on January 9, 1962 and ending on May 7, 1975, shall be presumed to have been exposed during such service to an herbicide agent, unless there is affirmative evidence to establish that the veteran was not exposed to any such agent during that service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a) (2012). The last date on which such a veteran shall be presumed to have been exposed to an herbicide agent shall be the last date on which he or she served in the Republic of Vietnam during the period beginning on January 9, 1962 and ending on May 7, 1975. "Service in the Republic of Vietnam" includes service in the waters offshore and service in other locations if the conditions of service involved duty or visitation in the Republic of Vietnam. If a veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service, the following diseases shall be service-connected if the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (2012) are met, even though there is no record of such disease during service, provided further that the rebuttable presumption provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(d) (2012) are also satisfied: Chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne; Type 2 diabetes (also known as Type II diabetes mellitus or adult-onset diabetes); Hodgkin's disease; hairy cell leukemia and other chronic B-cell leukemias; multiple myeloma; non-Hodgkin's lymphoma; acute and subacute peripheral neuropathy; porphyria cutanea tarda; respiratory cancers (cancer of the lung, bronchus, larynx or trachea); soft-tissue sarcoma (other than osteosarcoma, chondrosarcoma, Kaposi's sarcoma, or mesothelioma); Parkinson's disease; and ischemic heart disease. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) (2012). Note 3 at the end of § 3.309 defines ischemic heart disease as not including hypertension or peripheral manifestations of arteriosclerosis such as peripheral vascular disease or stroke. The above reflects changes to the Code of Federal Regulations which became effective August 31, 2010. These changes are applicable to claims received by VA on or after August 31, 2010 and to claims pending before VA on that date. As the Veteran's claim was pending on August 31, 2010, the changes are applicable to the immediate case. The diseases listed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) shall have become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more at any time after service, except that chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne, porphyria cutanea tarda, and acute and subacute peripheral neuropathy shall have become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within a year after the last date on which the veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(ii) (2012). Where the evidence does not warrant presumptive service connection, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has determined that an appellant is not precluded from establishing service connection with proof of direct causation. Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Generally, lay evidence is competent with regard to a disease with "unique and readily identifiable features" that is "capable of lay observation." See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 308-09 (2007). Lay evidence can be competent and sufficient evidence of a diagnosis if (1) the layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Additionally, a lay person may speak to etiology in some limited circumstances in which nexus is obvious merely through observation, such as sustaining a fall leading to a broken leg. Id. A layperson is not competent to provide evidence as to more complex medical questions and, specifically, is not competent to provide an opinion as to etiology in such cases. See Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456, 462 (2007) (concerning rheumatic fever). See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2). When there is an approximate balance in the evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. The Court has held that an appellant need only demonstrate that there is an "approximate balance of positive and negative evidence" in order to prevail. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). The Court has also stated, "[i]t is clear that to deny a claim on its merits, the evidence must preponderate against the claim." Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996), citing Gilbert. The Veteran contends that while serving aboard the aircraft carrier USS Constellation during the Vietnam conflict, he filled the tanks of aircraft with a substance he believed to be herbicides, including Agent Orange. He has stated that the aircraft flew sorties over Vietnam, spraying the substance which he had filled into their tanks. A sign reading "poison" was placed in the area of the ship where barrels of the substance were stored. The Veteran contends that this exposure caused his diabetes mellitus. Based on the foregoing, the Veteran does not allege that diabetes mellitus was incurred as a result of combat against enemy forces nor does he allege that he ever had such combat. Accordingly the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 2002) are not for application. With regard to the Veteran's alleged exposure to herbicide agents, including Agent Orange, while aboard the USS Constellation, the Board finds that the Veteran was not exposed to herbicides. In May 2009, the Joint Army Services Records Reserch Center (JSRRC) issued a memo stating that research had been conducted using official military documents, ships histories, deck logs, and other sources of information from Navy and Coast Guard ships regarding the use of tactical herbicide agents during the Vietnam Era. The JSRRC concluded that there was no evidence that any Navy or Coast Guard ship transported, used, stored, or tested tactical herbicides. The Board finds that the JSRRC's memo indicating that herbicide agents were not transported, used, stored, or tested aboard Navy and Coast Guard during the Vietnam Era to be more probative than the Veteran's assertions regarding the contents of barrels aboard the USS Constellation. Specifically, the only evidence offered by the Veteran has been his own lay statements regarding what he believed the substance may have been. In contrast, the conclusions of the JSRRC are based on review of official military documents including ships histories, deck logs, and other government sources - sources the Board finds to be highly competent and credible, and thus the JSRRC's conclusions are found to be highly probative. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that the Veteran was not exposed to herbicide agents during service. Having found that the Veteran was not exposed to herbicide agents during service, the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6) are not for application. Nonetheless, that the evidence does not warrant service connection on a presumptive basis does not precluded establishing service connection on a direct basis. Combee, 34 F.3d 1039. Service treatment records do not indicate show complaints of, treatment for or a diagnosis of diabetes mellitus, including on separation examination in August 1970. Following separation from active service in September 1970, the Veteran diagnosed with diabetes mellitus at a VA medical center with diabetes mellitus in January 2007 - 37 years after separation from service. The evidence shows that diabetes mellitus was not incurred during service and did not become manifest within one year of separation. Furthermore, while the Veteran is competent to state that he handled barrels and loaded their contents onto aircraft, Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994), to the extent that the Veteran argues that diabetes mellitus was caused by exposure such contents, he is not competent to make such a medically complex determination, Jandreau, 492 F.3d 1372, and accordingly his statements are of no probative value. The Board finds that the weight of the evidence shows no relationship or nexus between diabetes mellitus and service. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application, and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. ORDER Service connection for diabetes mellitus, type II is denied. ____________________________________________ K. J. ALIBRANDO Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs