Citation Nr: 1328366 Decision Date: 09/05/13 Archive Date: 09/16/13 DOCKET NO. 07-14 190 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Waco, Texas THE ISSUES 1. Whether new and material evidence has been received to reopen a claim seeking service connection for schizophrenia. 2. Entitlement to service connection for any other acquired psychiatric disorder other than schizophrenia (claimed as bipolar disorder). REPRESENTATION Veteran represented by: Vietnam Veterans of America ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Matthew Blackwelder, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active service from September 1980 to September 1984. He also served with the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR) from September 1984 until May 1988 at which time he was discharged under other than honorable conditions. This appeal initially came to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a May 2006 rating decision. In December 2011, the Board denied the issue of service connection for a psychiatric condition other than schizophrenia, and remanded the issue of whether new and material evidence has been presented to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for schizophrenia. The Veteran appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). In November 2012, the Court vacated the Board decision and remanded the Veteran's claim for action consistent with the directives of a joint motion for remand (JMR). In this case, the Veteran originally filed his claim for entitlement to service connection for bipolar disorder; however, the Court subsequently held that the scope of a mental health disability claim includes any mental disability that may reasonably be encompassed by a claimant's description of the claim, reported symptoms, and other information of record. Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009). Given this precedential decision, the Board recharacterized the issues on appeal. The service connection claim was broadened to include any acquired psychiatric disability, other than schizophrenia, and the Board also recognized that the Veteran's claim, although not explicitly doing so, could be interpreted as an attempt to reopen the previously denied claim for service connection for schizophrenia and therefore added this issue. The Board remanded this matter in April 2009, and then again in December 2011, for additional development, which has been completed. Thus, because the Board's order was fully complied with, there is no prejudice for the Board to proceed. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The evidence of record makes it less likely than not that the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disability, other than schizophrenia, either began during or was otherwise caused by his military service or had its onset during a period of active duty for training. 2. In an April 1997 rating decision, the RO denied the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for schizophrenia, and he did not initiate an appeal or submit new and material evidence within the one year appeal period. 3. Evidence obtained since the April 1997 rating decision does not raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim for service connection for schizophrenia at this time. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, other than schizophrenia, have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303 (2012). 2. The August 2001 rating decision which denied entitlement to service connection for schizophrenia is final; new and material evidence has not been submitted, and the Veteran's claim is not reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104(a), 3.156, 20.302 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. Service Connection Service connection for VA compensation purposes will be granted for a disability resulting from disease or personal injury incurred in the line of duty or for aggravation of a pre-existing injury in the active military, naval or air service. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). "Service connection" basically means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred coincident with service in the Armed Forces, or if preexisting such service, was aggravated therein. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. The term "active military, naval or air service" is further defined as (1) active duty or a period of ACTDUTRA during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from a disease or injury incurred or aggravated in line of duty, and (2) any period of INACTDUTRA during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from an injury incurred or aggravated in line of duty. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 101(24). Service connection for disability arising from inactive duty training is permitted only for injuries, not diseases, incurred or aggravated in the line of duty, (with the exceptions for acute myocardial infarction, a cardiac arrest, or a cerebrovascular accident, not pertinent here). See Brooks v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 484, 485 (1993). As such, for purposes of VA benefits, the key periods are those specific, discrete periods of active duty; any particular dates of active duty training during which the Veteran incurred or aggravated a disease or injury in line of duty; or a particular date of inactive duty training during which the Veteran incurred or aggravated a disease in line of duty. Thus, simply being affiliated with a National Guard unit would not itself establish a basis for entitlement to VA benefits for any disability arising over the course of that same period. Rather, as indicated, to establish VA service connection benefits, the claimed disability must have begun or been aggravated in line of duty during a specific period of active duty; during a specific period of active duty for training; or have resulted from an injury in line of duty during a period of inactive duty for training. In this case, because an acquired psychiatric disability is a disease, service connection would not be available if it was found to have been incurred during a period of inactive duty for training. To warrant service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, it would need to be shown that it was incurred or aggravated during a period of either active duty for training or active duty. As discussed briefly in the introduction, the Board previously denied the Veteran's claim for an acquired psychiatric disability, other than schizophrenia in December 2011. Essentially, the Board concluded that the Veteran's reserve service from which he was discharged under other than honorable conditions should serve as a bar to the receipt of VA benefits per 38 C.F.R. § 3.12. The Board also briefly explained that it did not even have to reach such a conclusion as to the status of discharge, because even if the Veteran's discharge status did not bar benefits, service connection would still not be warranted based on any period of reserve service, as the law specifically prohibits awarding service connection for any disease that manifests during reserve service, unless the disease manifests during a period of active duty for training. In this regard, it is important for the Veteran to understand that reserve service, under the law, is treated manifestly differently than active duty service for VA disability benefit purposes. As discussed below, service connection remains denied, and there is no prejudice to the Veteran in adjudicating his appeal, even if the RO has not specifically adjudicated the issue of whether this discharge from reserve service is a bar to benefits during that service. The reason for this, which is explained below, is that even if the Veteran had received an honorable discharge from the Marine Corps Reserve, he would not be entitled to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability for that period of service as the evidence does not show that his acquired psychiatric disability actually began either during active duty or during a period of active duty for training. In this case, the Veteran seeks service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, claimed as bipolar disorder. The Veteran had active service from September 1980 to September 1984, and then served with the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve from September 1984 until May 1988. Service treatment records (STRs) do not show complaint or treatment of bipolar disorder or any other mental health disorder during the Veteran's active service and he was found to be psychiatrically normal at his separation physical in August 1984. As noted, the Veteran then enlisted in the Marine reserves, but the service treatment records from his period in the reserves also fails to describe any psychiatric symptomatology. Additionally, at a January 1987 annual examination he was again found to be psychiatrically normal. The Veteran completed a medical history survey in conjunction with this physical on which he specifically denied any frequent trouble sleeping, depression/excessive worry, or any nervous trouble, providing factual evidence against his own claim at this time. The Veteran was discharged from the USMCR in May 1988 'under other than honorable conditions' for misconduct identified as drug abuse. Specifically, the official administrative decision from the Navy Discharge and Review Board discharged the Veteran as unfit for service due to drug abuse. A mental health disorder was not indicated at that time. The first indication of a mental health disorder is dated December 1989, more than five years after separation from active duty service, at which time the Veteran was hospitalized and diagnosed with schizophrenia. The first indication of a mental health disorder other than schizophrenia is dated December 1990, more than six years after separation from active duty service, at which time he was diagnosed with psychotic depression. Thus, the medical evidence does not show that the Veteran's psychiatric symptomatology was unremitting from the time of service until it was first diagnosed approximately five years after active duty service was completed. It does not appear that the Veteran is currently diagnosed with any psychosis, although several records have discussed psychotic features. However, even if it were determined that the Veteran had a psychoses, a "chronic disease" listed under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a), service connection would still not be warranted under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) for the following reasons. See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013): As noted, no psychosis was diagnosed either while on active duty or within a year of the Veteran's separation from active service in 1984. In fact no mental illness of any kind was noted for more than five years after the Veteran separated from active service. Even the lay statements from the Veteran and his brother which are contained in the early psychiatric treatment records do not place the onset of psychiatric symptoms during active service. Rather, they place the onset several years after service. Thus, there is no indication in either the lay statements or treatment records (service or post-service) to show that the symptoms of a psychosis existed continuously from the time of active service to the present. Such a conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Veteran specifically denied any psychiatric impairment at a medical history survey completed in 1987. With regard to the Veteran's time in reserve service, the Court has determined that a claimant whose claim involves a period of ACDUTRA can never be entitled to the presumption of service connection. See Smith v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 40 (2010). Therefore, 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) does not apply to the Veteran's period of reserve service. See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Psychiatric diagnoses rendered during the pendency of the Veteran's claim include depressive disorder, substance induced major depressive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and schizophrenia. In April 2009, the Veteran reported a history of bipolar disorder, however, medical records do not confirm such a diagnosis and bipolar disorder is not a disorder with "unique and readily identifiable features" that is "capable of lay observation." See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Thus, the Veteran is not competent to self-diagnose himself with bipolar disorder. As noted above, depressive disorder was diagnosed in 1990, more than six years after separation from service, weighing against the claim. Neither the treatment records nor the Veteran's statements to medical providers or VA allege that the condition had onset during active service or is otherwise related to service. Regarding substance inducted major depressive disorder, treatment records show that the Veteran has a long history, including diagnosis, of drug and alcohol abuse. The Board observes that VA's governing regulations define "alcohol abuse" as the use of alcoholic beverages over time, or such excessive use at any one time, sufficient to cause disability to or death of the user. "Drug abuse" is defined as the use of illegal drugs (including prescription drugs that are illegally or illicitly obtained), the intentional use of prescription or non-prescription drugs for a purpose other than the medically intended use, or the use of substances other than alcohol to enjoy their intoxicating effects. 38 C.F.R. § 3.301. Alcohol abuse and drug abuse, unless they are a secondary result of an organic disease or disability, are considered willful misconduct. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.301(c)(2), 3.301(c)(3). The isolated and infrequent use of drugs by itself will not be considered willful misconduct. However, the progressive and frequent use of drugs to the point of addiction will be considered willful misconduct. 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(c)(3). VA's provisions prohibit a grant of direct service connection for drug or alcohol abuse based on incurrence or aggravation in the line of duty during service. Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 8052, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388- 351 (1990); VAOPGCPREC 2-98 (Feb. 10, 1998), 63 Fed. Reg. 31263 (1998). However, a Veteran may be service connected for an alcohol or drug abuse disability acquired as secondary to, or as a symptom of, a service-connected disability. In order to qualify for service connection, the Veteran must establish, by clear medical evidence, that his alcohol or drug abuse disability is secondary to or is caused by a primary service-connected disorder, and that it is not due to willful wrongdoing. Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In this case, assuming a causal relationship between the Veteran's in-service drug use and his currently diagnosed substance inducted major depressive disorder, there is no evidence that his substance abuse has ever been secondary to or a result of a service-connected condition. In this case, the substance abuse caused the mental health condition. Therefore, service connection is barred as a matter of law, as such substance use amounts to willful misconduct. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.301(c)(2), 3.301(c)(3). Regarding PTSD, in February 2006 a VA provider discussed PTSD in relation to his experiences during Hurricane Katrina. In May 2006, he mentioned that while he was not in combat during service, he was scared by a bomb threat in 1983; however, STRs and personnel records do not corroborate the incident. Noteworthy is that the Veteran did not mention the bomb scare prior to, or subsequent to, the May 2006 appointment. More importantly, the May 2006 record indicated that additional assessment was needed before rendering a diagnosis of PTSD. Treatment records dated subsequent to May 2006 fail to show diagnosis of PTSD, weighing against the claim as there cannot be a grant of service connection without a current disability. PTSD is simply not indicated by the best medical evidence in this case at this time. In addition to the medical evidence, the Board has considered the Veteran's statements to VA and to his medical providers. Private and VA treatment records as well as records obtained from the Social Security Administration show that the Veteran has been treated since 1989 and hospitalized on multiple occasions for acquired psychiatric disabilities. None of the treatment records show that he ever attributed his acquired psychiatric disabilities to his active duty service, providing more evidence against this claim. At most, his statements indicate a belief that his acquired psychiatric disorders onset during his reserve service (1984-1988), but he has never actually alleged that his psychiatric symptoms first began during a period of active duty for training. The JMR specifically found that the Board had not addressed the credibility or probative value of lay testimony from the Veteran's family which stated that his psychiatric symptoms were noted during his service in the reserves. In May 2011, the Veteran's representative summarized these lay statements. The representative stated that the records indicate psychiatric treatment from at least late 1989 when the Veteran sought care for headaches and behavioral changes after being struck in the head on the job. In a November 1989 report, the Veteran's family stated that the symptoms had existed for at least 6 months prior to the accident. Finally, the representative noted that the Veteran had stated in February 1990 that he had experienced psychiatric symptoms for 2.5 years. As an initial point, these statements at best place the onset of the Veteran's psychiatric symptomatology during his time in the Marine Corps reserves. However, these records do not even suggest that the symptoms began during a period of active duty for training. The Board could begin a credibility analysis, but even taking these statements as accurate at this point, the fact remains that service connection is not warranted unless the evidence establishes that it is at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater) that a psychiatric disability began during active duty for training. Simply developing a psychiatric disability and being in the military reserves at the time is not enough. Had there been a precipitating event during a period of active duty for training that triggered the onset of psychiatric symptomatology one would have expected the Veteran or his family members to mention it when the Veteran was first seeking psychiatric treatment in the late 1980s, as it is clear from the statements above that the Veteran's family was involved in his care and concerned with his well- being from the very beginning of his treatment. Nothing is indicated. Likewise had the Veteran begun experiencing psychiatric problems during a period of active duty for training, one would expect some evidence of psychiatric treatment in the service treatment records, as it is clear from the numerous records of treatment that the Veteran was not unwilling to seek medical care (the records are highly detailed). As such, the absence of any mention of any psychiatric problems or symptoms in either the lay statements or service treatment records is a factor which weighs against the conclusion that his psychiatric symptoms first manifested during a period of active duty for training. As noted above, STRs do not show any complaints of or treatment for an acquired psychiatric disability during reserve service, and the Veteran even specifically denied any psychiatric symptomatology on a medical history survey completed in 1987. Based on the evidence, the Board cannot find that service connection for depression is warranted. The evidence does not show onset of symptomatology during active service or within one year of active service. The evidence shows that the onset of depression was 1990, more than six years after separation from service, which weighs against the conclusion that depression either began during or was otherwise caused by the Veteran's active military service. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (lengthy period of absence of medical complaints for condition can be considered as a factor in resolving claim). The Veteran's statements do not allege continuity of symptomatology of depression since service. Specifically, 1989 VA treatment records show he alleged that his schizophrenia symptoms had onset after a head injury. He did not have depression, PTSD or any other acquired psychiatric disability at that time. In 2006, he told treating providers that he started hearing voices in his late twenties, which would equate to the late 1980s, not during his period of active service. While he alleged during one May 2006 mental health appointment that he was scared by a bomb threat in 1983, he never mentioned that incident prior to or subsequent to that appointment, which weighs against a finding of trauma or a stressor in service. Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Board is entitled to discount the credibility of evidence in light of its own inherent characteristics and its relationship to other items of evidence). Further, his personnel records do not substantiate the occurrence of a bomb threat. With the exception of the allegation of the in-service bomb threat, an allegation made subsequent to filing his service connection claim, not once prior to or subsequent to May 2006 has the Veteran told his treating providers that any of his acquired psychiatric disorders were related to service, weighing against his claim. The JMR did not disagree with this conclusion. Simply stated, a review of the evidence fails to show that depression had onset during service, within one year of separation from service, or is in any other way related to active service, and provides evidence against such a finding, with significant evidence, including the Veteran's own prior statements, indicating that this problem began after service. Further, neither the medical nor the lay evidence supports a finding of continuity of symptomatology of depression since service and actually provides evidence against such a finding. Therefore, service connection for depression is not warranted. As noted above, the Veteran does not have diagnosis of PTSD or bipolar disorder; therefore, service-connection cannot be granted for these acquired psychiatric disabilities. Finally, service connection is barred for substance abuse induced major depressive disorder. In light of the above discussion, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder other than schizophrenia and there is no doubt to be otherwise resolved. As such, the appeal is denied. II. New and Material Evidence The Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for schizophrenia was denied in an April 1997 rating decision. He neither filed a notice of disagreement with this rating decision nor submitted any additional evidence within a year, and the rating decision therefore became final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104(a), 3.156(b), 3.160(d), 20.302. However, a previously denied claim may be reopened by the submission of new and material evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. New evidence is defined as evidence not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). In order to be "new and material" evidence, the evidence must not be cumulative or redundant, and "must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim," which has been found to be enabling, not preclusive. See Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2010). When determining whether the claim should be reopened, the credibility of the newly submitted evidence is to be presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1991). At the time of the April 1997 rating decision, the evidence of record included service treatment records, which did not show any psychiatric impairment; VA treatment records showing that the Veteran was hospitalized for treatment of schizophrenia in January 1996; and a decision by the Social Security Administration (SSA) awarding the Veteran disability for schizophrenia. The Veteran's VA claim was denied as there was no showing that his schizophrenia either began during or was otherwise caused by his military service. Since April 1997, hundreds of pages of medical records from VA and from the SSA have been associated with the Veteran's claims file; service personnel records have also been obtained. However, while these records are "new" in that they were not previously considered, the records are not material in that they only describe a diagnosis of schizophrenia, without giving any indication that schizophrenia either began during or was otherwise caused by the Veteran's military service. Because the records provide no new information associating the condition with service, they are not considered to be material. Of note, there were several comments from family members of the Veteran in the treatment records which were obtained since 1997, addressing the onset of the Veteran's psychiatric symptomatology. The representative also specifically identified these comments in the May 2011 informal hearing presentation. For example, in a December 6, 1989 treatment record, the Veteran's brother stated that he had noticed psychiatric symptoms over the previous six months. The Veteran had also reported in February 1990 that he had been experiencing psychiatric symptoms for 2.5 years. However, while these statements might be considered relevant and material if the Veteran had been in active service through 1988, they are not material in this case because the Veteran was on reserve duty during this time. They do not provide a basis to grant the claim, even if presumed true. Essentially, there has been no assertion that the Veteran's psychiatric symptoms began during a period of active duty for training, only that they began while he was in the reserves. As noted, service connection is not warranted for psychiatric diseases which first manifest while someone is in the reserves solely by virtue of them being in the reserves. In fact, service connection is not even warranted for psychiatric diseases which first manifest during inactive duty for training. Rather, to warrant service connection for psychiatric symptomatology first manifesting during reserve service, the symptoms must first manifest while a Veteran is on active duty for training. As such, the statements by the Veteran and his family, even assuming them to be credible for the purpose of reopening, are not considered to raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the Veteran's claim as they do not suggest in any way that the Veteran's psychiatric symptoms first manifested during a period of active duty for training or active duty. They indicate nothing that would connect the Veteran's service in the reserves to the cause of the problem; they simply indicate that the Veteran was in the reserves when the problem began (not a basis for a grant of this claim). Thus, as described, new and material evidence has not been presented, and the Veteran's request to reopen his previously denied claim is denied. The Board is aware that when determining whether the submitted evidence meets the definition of new and material evidence, VA must consider whether the new evidence could, if the claim were reopened, reasonably result in substantiation of the claim. Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110, 118 (2010). Pursuant to Shade, evidence is considered new if it has not been previously submitted to agency decisionmakers, and it is material if, when considered with the evidence of record, it would at least trigger VA's duty to assist by providing a medical opinion, which might raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. Id. The Court interprets the language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) as creating a low threshold, and views the phrase "raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim" as "enabling rather than precluding reopening." The Board acknowledges that this is a low threshold, but it is a threshold nonetheless, and as described the evidence that has been added since 1997 does not reach that threshold. To address Shade more precisely, this evidence would not trigger any additional duty to assist on the part of VA, as none of it even suggests that the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disability onset during a period of active duty for training. The low threshold has not been met, particularly in light of the facts presented in this case and the unique contentions raised. It is important for the Veteran to understand that even if the Board were to reopen the claim for service connection for schizophrenia, there is significant evidence against this claim, including, but not limited to, the Veteran's service treatment records, which do not show any psychiatric complaints or treatment, and the post-service treatment records which also do not show any psychiatric complaints or treatment for several years after active duty service and show no psychiatric complaints during a period of active duty for training, and the Veteran own prior statements (as cited above). Thus, even if the claim were to be reopened, the claim, for reasons cited above, would be denied. As such, the Veteran's request to reopen his previously denied claim for service connection for schizophrenia is denied. III. Duties to Notify and Assist Under applicable criteria, VA has certain notice and assistance obligations to claimants. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a). Notice must be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on a claim for VA benefits and must: (1) inform the claimant about the information and evidence not of record that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) inform the claimant about the information and evidence that VA will seek to provide; and (3) inform the claimant about the information and evidence the claimant is expected to provide. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004) (Pelegrini II). With respect to service connection claims, a section 5103(a) notice should also advise a claimant of the criteria for establishing a disability rating and effective date of award. Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 486 (2006). In the present case, required notice was provided by a letter dated in January 2012, which informed the Veteran of all the elements required by the Pelegrini II Court as stated above. The letter also informed the Veteran how disability ratings and effective dates were established; and informed him both what "new" and "material" meant in the context of his back disability claim, and why his claim had previously been denied. See Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006). Under these circumstances, the Board finds that the notification requirements of the VCAA have been satisfied as to content. The Board finds that any defect concerning the timing of the notice requirement was harmless error. Although the notice provided to the Veteran was not given prior to the first adjudication of the claim, the Veteran has been provided with every opportunity to submit evidence and argument in support of his claim and ample time to respond to VA notices. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Additionally, the Veteran's claim was readjudicated following completion of the notice requirements. As to VA's duty to assist, the Board finds that all necessary development has been accomplished, and therefore appellate review may proceed without prejudice to the Veteran. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). Service treatment records and personnel records have been obtained, as have numerous VA treatment records and SSA records. It is noted that attempts were made to contact Pendleton Memorial Methodist Hospital, but a response was noted that any records pertaining to the Veteran would have been destroyed in 2007. The Veteran and his representative were informed of this development in March 2010. As such, a remand is not necessary to seek any treatment records. See Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994) (remands which would only result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran are to be avoided). The Veteran was also offered the opportunity to testify at a hearing before the Board, but he declined. While a medical opinion of record was not provided with regard to the Veteran's previously denied claim, VA is not required to obtain an examination or obtain a medical opinion because VA has determined that new and material evidence has not been received and the claim has not been reopened. See Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 345 F.3d 1334, 1341-44 (Fed. Cir. 2003). As such, an opinion is not necessary with regard to the claim for schizophrenia. A VA medical opinion was also not provided with regard to the issue of service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, other than schizophrenia. However, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (Federal Circuit) has recognized that there is not a duty to provide an examination in every case. See Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Rather, the Secretary's obligation under 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d) to provide the Veteran with a medical examination or to obtain a medical opinion is not triggered unless there is an indication that the disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability may be associated with the Veteran's service or with another service-connected disability. See McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App.79, 81 (2006). The record in this case is negative for any indication, other than the Veteran's own assertion, and the assertions of his family and representative, that his acquired psychiatric disability, other than schizophrenia, either began during or was otherwise caused by the Veteran's military service. However, these statements do not actually suggest that the symptoms began while he was on either active duty or on active duty for training. Rather they suggest only that the symptoms began while he was in the Marine Corps reserves, which as was explained in the body of this decision does not warrant service connection. As such, these lay statements are insufficient to trigger VA's duty to provide an examination with an opinion, as they do not provide any indication that the Veteran's current acquired psychiatric disability even may be related to the in-service event. See Waters, 601 F.3d 1274. As such, VA has satisfied its duties to notify and assist, and additional development efforts would serve no useful purpose. See Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 540, 546 (1991); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994). Because VA's duties to notify and assist have been met, there is no prejudice to the Veteran in adjudicating this appeal. ORDER Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, other than schizophrenia, is denied. New and material evidence has not been presented to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for schizophrenia, and the Veteran's claim is not reopened. ____________________________________________ JOHN J. CROWLEY Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs