Citation Nr: 1328382 Decision Date: 09/05/13 Archive Date: 09/16/13 DOCKET NO. 09-23 071A ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania THE ISSUES 1. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim for entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. 2. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim for entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss. 3. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim for entitlement to service connection for a headache disorder. 4. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim for entitlement to service connection for a gastrointestinal disorder, to include peptic ulcer disease (PUD). 5. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim for entitlement to service connection for a disability due to Agent Orange exposure. 6. Entitlement to service connection for a thoracolumbar spine disorder. 7. Entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea, to include as secondary to service-connected posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 8. Entitlement to service connection for an enlarged prostate, to include as due to Agent Orange exposure. REPRESENTATION Veteran represented by: New Jersey Department of Military and Veterans' Affairs WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD G. Jackson, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active military service from January 1966 to December 1967. This matter initially came before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from September 2008 and April 2009 rating decisions issued by the RO. In April 2011, the Veteran testified before the undersigned Acting Veterans Law Judge in a hearing at the RO. A transcript of his hearing testimony is of record. The Board remanded the claims on appeal for further development in March 2012. That development was completed, and the case has since been returned to the Board for appellate review. The Board notes that, in addition to the paper claims file, there is a Virtual VA electronic claims file associated with the Veteran's claim. A review of the documents in the electronic file reveals that they are either duplicative of the evidence in the paper claims file or are irrelevant to the issue on appeal herein decided. The issues of entitlement to service connection for rheumatoid arthritis, to include as due to exposure to environmental hazards at Camp Lejeune or to Agent Orange and entitlement to service connection for insomnia, to include as secondary to service-connected PTSD have been raised by the record, but have not been adjudicated by the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ). Therefore, the Board does not have jurisdiction over them, and they are referred to the AOJ for appropriate action. The issues of entitlement to service connection for a thoracolumbar spine disorder and sleep apnea, to include as secondary to service-connected PTSD are addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and are REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran's claims for service connection for tinnitus, bilateral hearing loss, a headache disorder, a gastrointestinal disorder, to include PUD, and a disability due to Agent Orange exposure were previously denied by the RO in a May 2006 rating decision. The Veteran did not perfect a timely appeal of that decision, and there was no new and material evidence received within one year of its issuance. 2. The evidence received since the May 2006 rating decision, by itself, or in conjunction with previously considered evidence, is either cumulative or redundant of evidence previously of record or does not relate to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claims for service connection for tinnitus, bilateral hearing loss, a headache disorder, a gastrointestinal disorder, to include PUD, and a disability due to Agent Orange exposure. 3. The Veteran served in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era and is presumed to have been exposed during such service to certain herbicide agents, including Agent Orange. 4. The Veteran's enlarged prostate did not manifest in service or for many years thereafter and is not related to his military service, including herbicide exposure. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The May 2006 rating decision, which denied service connection for tinnitus, bilateral hearing loss, a headache disorder, a gastrointestinal disorder, to include PUD, and a disability due to Agent Orange exposure, is final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 20.1103 (2012). 2. The evidence received subsequent to the May 2006 rating decision is not new and material, and the claims for service connection for tinnitus, bilateral hearing loss, a headache disorder, a gastrointestinal disorder, to include PUD and a disability due to Agent Orange exposure are not reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2012). 3. An enlarged prostate was not incurred in service and is not due to herbicide exposure in service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1112, 1116, 1154 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), codified at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, and 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011) redefined VA's duty to assist a claimant in the development of a claim. VA regulations for the implementation of the VCAA were codified as amended at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, and 3.326(a) (2011). The notice requirements of the VCAA require VA to notify the claimant of any evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim, as well as the evidence VA will attempt to obtain and which evidence he is responsible for providing. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2012). The requirements apply to all five elements of a service connection claim: veteran status, existence of a disability, a connection between a veteran's service and the disability, degree of disability, and effective date of the disability. Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). VCAA notice must be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable decision on a claim for VA benefits by the agency of original jurisdiction (in this case, the RO). Id.; see also Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). However, the VCAA notice requirements may be satisfied if any errors in the timing or content of such notice are not prejudicial to the claimant. See Pelegrini, 18 Vet. App. at 121. In Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006), the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that the law requires VA to look at the bases for the denial in the prior decision and to respond with notice that describes what evidence would be necessary to substantiate the element or elements required to establish service connection that were found insufficient in the previous denial. In this case, in a May 2008 letter issued prior to the decision on appeal, the Veteran was provided notice regarding what information and evidence is needed to substantiate his claims for service connection for tinnitus, bilateral hearing loss, a headache disorder, a gastrointestinal disorder, to include PUD, and a disability due to Agent Orange exposure, as well as what information and evidence must be submitted by the Veteran and what information and evidence will be obtained by VA. The letter advised the Veteran of how disability evaluations and effective dates are assigned and of the type of evidence which impacts those determinations. As to the request to reopen the claims for entitlement to service connection for tinnitus, bilateral hearing loss, a headache disorder, a gastrointestinal disorder, to include PUD, and a disability due to Agent Orange exposure, the letter described what evidence would be necessary to substantiate that element or elements required to establish service connection that were found insufficient in the previous denial. In a February 2009 letter issued prior to the decision on appeal, the Veteran was provided notice regarding what information and evidence is needed to substantiate his claim for service connection for an enlarged prostate, as well as what information and evidence must be submitted by the Veteran and what information and evidence will be obtained by VA. The letter advised the Veteran of how disability evaluations and effective dates are assigned and of the type of evidence which impacts those determinations. The record also reflects that VA has made reasonable efforts to obtain relevant records adequately identified by the Veteran. Specifically, the information and evidence that have been associated with the claims file include the Veteran's service treatment records (STRs), private treatment records, and VA treatment records. The Veteran has not identified any outstanding records that are pertinent to the claims being decided herein. In this regard, pursuant to the March 2012 remand instructions, all outstanding records of VA treatment were requested and were included in the Veteran's Virtual VA electronic claims file. Thus, the Board finds that there was substantial compliance with the March 2012 remand directives. Accordingly, no further remand is necessary. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998); D'Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 97, 104 -05 (2008). In addition, the Veteran was afforded an April 2012 VA examination and January 2012 opinion in connection with his claim for service connection for an enlarged prostate. When VA undertakes to provide a VA examination or obtain a VA opinion, it must ensure that the examination or opinion is adequate. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 312 (2007). The Board finds that the examination and medical opinion obtained in this case are adequate, as they are predicated on a full reading of the Veteran's claims file. The examiner considered all of the pertinent evidence of record, to include the statements of the Veteran, and provided a rationale for the opinions stated. Additionally, regarding the claims to reopen, examinations were not required, because there is no duty to provide such an examination unless new and material evidence is submitted. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c). Accordingly, the Board finds that VA's duty to assist has been met. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). Finally, the Veteran was also afforded an opportunity to present testimony at a hearing before the Board. During the hearing, the undersigned Acting Veterans Law Judge clarified the issues on appeal, identified an evidentiary deficit, and suggested the submission of additional evidence to support the Veteran's claims. The actions of the Acting Veterans Law Judge supplement the VCAA and comply with any related duties owed during a hearing. Based on the foregoing, the Board concludes that there has been compliance with the duty to notify and assist provisions. The Veteran was notified and aware of the evidence needed to substantiate his claims, the avenues through which he might obtain such evidence, and the allocation of responsibilities between himself and VA in obtaining such evidence. The Veteran was an active participant in the claims process by providing evidence and argument and presenting for a VA examination. Thus, he was provided with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the claims process and has done so. Any error in the sequence of events or content of the notices is not shown to have any effect on the case or to cause injury to the Veteran. Therefore, any such error is harmless and does not prohibit consideration of this matter on the merits. See Dingess, supra; see also ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1998). New and Material - Law and Analysis The Board observes that the Veteran's claims for service connection for tinnitus, bilateral hearing loss, a headache disorder, a gastrointestinal disorder, to include PUD, and a disability due to Agent Orange exposure were previously considered and denied by the RO in a rating decision dated in May 2006. The evidence of record at the time of the May 2006 denial included the Veteran's STRs, VA treatment records and the report of an April 2006 VA audio examination. In the May 2006 decision, the RO found that the Veteran's tinnitus and bilateral hearing loss were not incurred in or aggravated during active duty service; the treatment records did not show treatment for chronic headaches that were incurred in service; there was no evidence of treatment for a current gastrointestinal disorder, to include PUD; and, there was no identified disability associated with Agent Orange exposure. With regard to the claims for service connection for tinnitus and bilateral hearing loss, the report of April 2006 VA audio examination reflected the Veteran's report that his hearing was okay and he did not experience any difficulty communicating. He complained of constant bilateral tinnitus; however, he was uncertain of the onset of the tinnitus. He reported that he was exposed to excessive noise when he was a combat engineer and was around explosives and jackhammers for a period of two years without the use of hearing protection. He also reported a 40 year history of excessive noise exposure subsequent to his military service when he worked construction without the use of hearing protection. Pure tone thresholds, in decibels, were as follows: HERTZ 500 1000 2000 3000 4000 RIGHT 5 5 0 30 LEFT 15 0 15 45 Speech discrimination was 100 percent in the right ear and 96 percent in the left ear. The examiner concluded that the Veteran's current hearing loss was not the result of noise exposure while in the military since his hearing was normal upon discharge. The examiner also concluded that the tinnitus was not the result of military noise exposure because the Veteran was unsure of date of onset and he had a 40 year history of occupational noise exposure without the use of hearing protection. With respect to the Veteran's claim for service connection for headaches, the treatment records document report of a history of and complaints of headache. Regarding the Veteran's claim for service connection for a gastrointestinal disorder, the STRs reflect that the Veteran received treatment for complaints of stomach pain in August 1967. STRs otherwise contain no complaints of, treatment for or diagnosis of a gastrointestinal disorder to include PUD. The post service treatment records documented a report of a history of bleeding ulcers. There was no complaint of or indication of current disability related thereto. As to the claim for service connection for a disability due to Agent Orange exposure, the Veteran did not identify or claim a disability related thereto. The Veteran was notified of the May 2006 rating decision and of his appellate rights, but he did not perfect a timely appeal with that decision. In general, rating decisions that are not timely appealed are final. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1103. Moreover, the Board notes that the Veteran did not submit new and material evidence or other information within one year of the issuance of that decision. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b). Therefore, the Board finds that the May 2006 rating decision became final. The Veteran's current application to reopen his claims for service connection for tinnitus, bilateral hearing loss, a headache disorder, a gastrointestinal disorder, to include PUD and a disability due to Agent Orange exposure was received in December 2007. The September 2007 rating decision now on appeal denied the Veteran's claims on the basis that new and material evidence had not been submitted. The Board, in the first instance, must rule on the matter of reopening a claim. The Board has a responsibility to consider whether it is proper for a claim to be reopened, because reopening is jurisdictional. Jackson v. Principi, 265 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In order to reopen a claim which has been denied by a final decision, the claimant must present new and material evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108. New and material evidence means evidence not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers; which relates, either by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim; which is neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and which raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). To reopen a previously disallowed claim, new and material evidence must be presented or secured since the last final disallowance of the claim on any basis, including on the basis that there was no new and material evidence to reopen the claim since a prior final disallowance. Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 273, 285 (1996). For purposes of reopening a claim, the credibility of newly submitted evidence is generally presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). The threshold for determining whether new and material evidence raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating a claim is low. Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110, 117 (2010). Furthermore, in determining whether this low threshold is met, VA should not limit its consideration to whether the newly submitted evidence relates specifically to the reason why the claim was last denied, but instead should ask whether the evidence could reasonably substantiate the claim were the claim to be reopened, to include by triggering the Secretary's duty to assist. Shade, 24 Vet. App. at 118. The evidence associated with the Veteran's claims file since the May 2006 rating decision was issued includes VA medical records, an April 2010 Audiology consult record, as well as the Veteran's hearing testimony before the undersigned in April 2011 and his various other statements. With respect to the additional VA medical records, the Board finds that they are new because they were not of record at the time of the May 2006 rating decision. However, the majority of those records do not document any complaints, treatment, or diagnosis of tinnitus, bilateral hearing loss, a headache disorder, a gastrointestinal disorder to include PUD and a disability due to Agent Orange exposure, and thus, they are not material. An April 2008 treatment record reflects, in pertinent part, that a review of the Veteran's systems showed complaints of chronic headaches which had not changed. There was no nausea or vomiting; previous MRI was normal. Review of gastrointestinal symptoms showed no abdominal pain, rectal bleeding or change in bowel habits. A January 2009 VA treatment record shows, in pertinent part, that review of gastrointestinal system was normal. A March 2009 VA treatment record reflects, in pertinent part, the Veteran's complaint of occasional headaches (not consistently) in the morning and occasional abdominal discomfort beneath the umbilicus (infrequent but occurred weekly and last up to half an hour and was unrelated to any specific food). There was no change in bowel habits except for some constipation since he started the Methotrexate. The Veteran was not interested in evaluating the symptoms further. An April 2010 VA audiology consult record reflects that the Veteran was not very forthcoming with history information. The examiner documented that the previous examination report indicated military noise exposure from the combat engineers including explosions and jackhammers and that the Veteran also worked construction for 40 years without hearing protection. Notably absent in this additional evidence is discussion as to whether Veteran's tinnitus and bilateral hearing loss were incurred in or aggravated during active duty service; discussion as to whether chronic headaches were incurred in service; evidence of treatment for a current gastrointestinal disorder, to include PUD; and, evidence of an identified disability associated with Agent Orange exposure. As such, the records do not relate to an unestablished necessary to substantiate the claims. Rather, they reiterate the Veteran's contentions which were already established at the time of the prior rating decision. Therefore, the Board finds that the additional VA medical records are not new and material. With respect to the Veteran's April 2011 hearing testimony and other lay assertions, the Board also finds that they are not sufficient to reopen the previously denied claims. Essentially, the Veteran reiterated previous contentions. The Board finds his hearing testimony and lay statements to be cumulative and redundant of the evidence considered at the time of the May 2006 rating decision. Although the April 2011 hearing testimony may be new, his contentions remained the same as those previously considered by the RO. Therefore, the hearing testimony and lay statements are not new and material evidence and the claims are not reopened. Service Connection - Law and Analysis Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted during active military service, or for aggravation of a pre- existing injury suffered, or disease contracted, during such service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Establishing service connection generally requires (1) evidence of a current disability; (2) evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Service connection also may be granted for any disease initially diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Veterans who, during active service, served in the Republic of Vietnam during the period beginning on January 9, 1962, and ending on May 7, 1975, shall be presumed to have been exposed to an herbicide agent, unless there is affirmative evidence of non-exposure. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1116; 38 C.F.R. § 3.307. If a veteran was exposed to a herbicide agent (to include Agent Orange) during active military, naval or air service and has contracted an enumerated disease to a degree of 10 percent or more at any time after service (except for chloracne and acute and subacute peripheral neuropathy which must be manifested within a year of the last exposure to an herbicide agent during service), the veteran is entitled to a presumption of service connection even though there is no record of such disease during service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112; 38 C.F.R. § 3.307, 3.309(e). The enumerated diseases include prostate cancer. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a)(6)(iii), 3.309(e), 3.313, 3.318. VA has determined there is no positive association between exposure to herbicides and any other condition for which the Secretary has not specifically determined that a presumption of service connection is warranted. See Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. 27630 -27641 (2003). A presumption of service connection based on exposure to herbicides used in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam Era is not warranted for various conditions and any other condition for which the Secretary has not specifically determined a presumption of service connection is warranted. See Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 32,395-32,407 (Jun. 12, 2007); see also Notice, 74 Fed. Reg. 21,258 -21260 (May 7, 2009). Notwithstanding the foregoing, regulations also provide that service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disability was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d); Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994). A presumption of service connection provided by law is not the sole method for showing causation in establishing a claim for service connection for disability due to herbicide exposure. Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120 (2007) (holding that the availability of presumptive service connection for some conditions based on exposure to Agent Orange does not preclude direct service connection for other conditions based on exposure to Agent Orange). The Board is required to render a finding with respect to the competency and credibility of the lay evidence of record. Coburn v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 427, 433 (2006). Competent, credible lay evidence could be, in and of itself, sufficient to establish an elemental fact necessary to support a finding of service connection. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372, 1376 (2007). As a fact finder, the Board is obligated to determine whether lay evidence is credible in and of itself. The Board cannot determine that lay evidence lacks credibility solely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence, but it may consider a lack of contemporaneous medical evidence as one factor in determining the credibility of lay evidence. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F. 3d 1331, 1336- 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Credibility is a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence, to be made after the evidence has been admitted or deemed competent. Cartwright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24 (1991). Board determinations with respect to the weight and credibility of evidence are factual determinations going to the probative value of the evidence. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994). A veteran is competent to describe symptoms that he experienced in service or at any time after service when the symptoms he perceived, that are, experienced, were directly through the senses. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (competent lay evidence means any evidence not requiring that the proponent have specialized education, training, or experience; lay evidence is competent if it is provided by a person who has knowledge of facts or circumstances and conveys matters that can be observed and described by a lay person.); Layno, 6 Vet. App. at 469-71 (lay testimony is competent as to symptoms of an injury or illness, which are within the realm of one's personal knowledge; personal knowledge is that which comes to the witness through the use of the senses; lay testimony is competent only so long as it is within the knowledge and personal observations of the witness, but lay testimony is not competent to prove a particular injury or illness); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007) (lay testimony is competent to establish the presence of observable symptomatology, where the determination is not medical in nature and is capable of lay observation). Lay evidence may establish a diagnosis of a simple medical condition, a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or symptoms that later support a diagnosis by a medical professional. Jandreau, 492 F. 3d at 1377. A veteran is also competent to offer an opinion on a simple medical condition. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F. 3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Jandreau). VA must consider the competency of the lay evidence and cannot outright reject such evidence on the basis that such evidence can never establish a medical diagnosis or nexus; however, this does not mean that lay evidence is necessarily always sufficient to identify a medical diagnosis, but rather only that it is sufficient in those cases where the layman is competent and does not otherwise require specialized medical training and expertise to do so, i.e., the Board must determine whether the claimed disability is a type of disability for which a layperson is competent to provide etiology or nexus evidence. Davidson, 581 F. 3d at 1316 (recognizing that, under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a), lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when a layman is competent to identify the medical condition; he is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis; or lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional). The Board has reviewed all of the evidence in the Veteran's claims file, with an emphasis on the evidence relevant to this appeal. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting its decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, every piece of evidence of record. Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Hence, the Board will summarize the relevant evidence where appropriate, and the analysis below will focus specifically on what the evidence shows, or fails to show, as to the claim. When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2011). When all of the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a fair preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case the claim is denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55 (1990). In this case, the Veteran contends that his claimed enlarged prostate is related to his military service. Specifically, he has asserted that his claimed enlarged prostate is related to his herbicide exposure while he was serving in the Republic of Vietnam. The Veteran served in the Republic of Vietnam during his period of service. As such, he served in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era and is therefore presumed to have been exposed during such service to certain herbicide agents, including Agent Orange. Nevertheless, the Board finds that no injury, disease, or chronic symptoms of an enlarged prostate was manifested during the Veteran's military service. In fact, his STRs do not document any treatment for or diagnosis of an enlarged prostate. Additionally, the Veteran's claimed enlarged prostate is not related to his herbicide exposure during service. An enlarged prostate is not on the list of diseases that VA has associated with Agent Orange exposure. The scientific studies reviewed as part of that regulatory process has associated prostate cancer with herbicide exposure, but not an enlarged prostate. Moreover, an April 2008 VA treatment record reflects that the Veteran's prostate was not enlarged. Regardless, a VA physician in the January 2013 VA opinion stated that an enlarged prostate was not prostate cancer and therefore unrelated to Agent Orange exposure. In this case, the evidence does not link the onset of the enlarged prostate to the period of active service. Despite the Veteran's contentions that his enlarged prostate is due to such exposure, he is not competent to provide such a complicated opinion assessing the causation of a particular kind of prostate condition based on chemical exposures. No other competent and probative opinion suggests that there a relationship, or nexus, between the claimed enlarged prostate (or even a diagnosis thereof) and the Veteran's active service. In the January 2013 VA opinion, the examiner explicitly stated that an enlarged prostate was unrelated to Agent Orange exposure, explaining that an enlarged prostate was not prostate cancer. Neither the Veteran nor his representative has identified, presented, or alluded to the existence of any medical evidence or opinion to contradict that provided by the VA examiner (which was based on a review of the medical records). The only evidence of record supporting the Veteran's claim is his general lay assertions. In this case, the Board finds that the Veteran is competent to state that he has an enlarged prostate. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007). But he is not competent, as noted above, to provide such a complex medical opinion that goes beyond the knowledge of a lay person. Moreover the Board finds the opinion of the VA examiner in the January 2013 VA opinion statement to be more probative. The VA examiner is a medical professional who has reviewed the claims file and considered the Veteran's assertions. The examiner used his expertise in reviewing the facts of this case and determined that an enlarged prostate was unrelated to the Veteran's service, to include Agent Orange exposure. It is clear that the examiner fully understood the basis for the Veteran's claim yet still determined, after reviewing the facts of the case, that the claimed enlarged prostate was unrelated to Agent Orange exposure. For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds that the claims of entitlement to service connection for an enlarged prostate, to include as due to Agent Orange exposure must be denied. In reaching this conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, that doctrine is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53-56 (1990). ORDER New and material evidence not having been submitted, the applications to reopen claims of entitlement to service connection for tinnitus, bilateral hearing loss, a headache disorder, a gastrointestinal disorder, to include PUD, and a disability due to Agent Orange exposure are denied. Service connection for an enlarged prostate, to include as due to Agent Orange exposure is denied. REMAND Remand is required regarding the Veteran's claims for service connection to obtain adequate examinations. Where VA provides the veteran with an examination in a service connection claim, the examination must be adequate. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 311 (2007). Initially, the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy. The Veteran's DD Form 215 reflects that he received the Combat Action Ribbon which denotes combat. Thus, the combat provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154 are applicable in this case. As he is a combat veteran, his testimony and lay statements of sustaining a back injury during service as a result of heavy lifting and building bunkers is accepted as consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of his service, notwithstanding the lack of official record of such incurrence or aggravation. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (west 2002); Libertine v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 521, 524 (1996); Collette v. Brown, 82 F.3d 389, 392-94 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Report of April 2012 VA examination documents the Veteran's report that he developed a low back and lumbar spine condition due to heavy lifting and building bunkers during his period of military service which resulted in his current low back and lumbar spine disorder. Following objective examination, the diagnosis was lumbosacral strain with range of motion abnormality of the lumbar spine. The examiner opined that the Veteran's current low back or lumbar spine condition was not caused by or a result of his military service. The examiner explained that the opinion was based on a history and physical examination of the Veteran, review of the C-file and the Veteran's discharge physical examination dated December 11, 1967, which revealed no evidence of lumbar spine condition at time of military discharge. Under these circumstances, the Board finds additional VA examination is necessary to address the etiology of the claimed thoracolumbar spine disorder. For purposes of the examination, as he is a combat veteran, the examiner should accept the Veteran's statements of sustaining a back injury during service as a result of heavy lifting and building bunkers as consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of his service. Given that acceptance, the examiner should offer opinion as to whether the Veteran's current thoracolumbar spine disorder (lumbosacral strain) is due to disease or injury incurred in service. Here, in a January 2013 VA opinion, the examiner concluded that it was unlikely that PTSD was implicated in causality of obstructive sleep apnea. The examiner did not, however, expressly state whether obstructive sleep apnea was aggravated by the PTSD. In a secondary service connection claim, a medical opinion that a disorder is not the result of an already service-connected disability does not address the issue of aggravation. El-Amin v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 136, 140-41 (2013). Where an examiner finds that a service- connected disability did not cause a claimed disorder and that the claimed disorder was more likely related to other factors, it isn't clear that aggravation has been addressed. El-Amin, 2013 WL 151154, *4-5. Accordingly, remand is required for a VA addendum opinion. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. Obtain an addendum opinion from a VA examiner regarding the thoracolumbar spine disorder. The entire claims file (i.e., both the paper claims file and any electronic medical records) should be made available to and be reviewed by the examiner, and it should be confirmed that such records were available for review. If the examiner does not have access to electronic medical records, any such relevant treatment records must be printed and associated with the paper claims file so they can be available to the examiner for review. If the examiner determines an examination is required, such an examination shall be provided. The rationale for all opinions expressed must be provided. If an opinion cannot be provided without resort to speculation, it must be noted in the opinion report, and a rationale provided for that conclusion. The examiner must provide an opinion, in light of prior examination findings and the service and post-service evidence of record whether it is at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater probability) that the Veteran's current thoracolumbar spine disorder began during the Veteran's period of service or is otherwise etiologically related to the Veteran's period of service. For purposes of the examination, the examiner should accept the Veteran's statements of sustaining a back injury during service as a result of heavy lifting and building bunkers as consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of his service. 2. Obtain an addendum opinion regarding from a VA examiner regarding the sleep apnea. The entire claims file (i.e., both the paper claims file and any electronic medical records) should be made available to and be reviewed by the examiner, and it should be confirmed that such records were available for review. If the examiner does not have access to electronic medical records, any such relevant treatment records must be printed and associated with the paper claims file so they can be available to the examiner for review. If the examiner determines an examination is required, such an examination shall be provided. The rationale for all opinions expressed must be provided. If an opinion cannot be provided without resort to speculation, it must be noted in the opinion report, and a rationale provided for that conclusion. The examiner must provide an opinion, in light of prior examination findings and the service and post-service evidence of record whether it is at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater probability) that the Veteran's claimed sleep apnea was aggravated by his service-connected PTSD. If the examiner finds that the sleep apnea was aggravated by the PTSD, the examiner must provided an opinion regarding the baseline level of severity of the sleep apnea prior to onset of aggravation. 3. Review the VA examiner's reports to ensure that they are in complete compliance with the directives of this remand. If the reports are deficient in any manner, the AMC must implement corrective procedures. Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998). 4. After completing the above action and any other development as may be indicated by any response received as a consequence of the actions taken in the paragraphs above, the claims must be readjudicated. If the claims remain denied, a supplemental statement of the case must be provided to the Veteran and his representative. After the Veteran and his representative have had an adequate opportunity to respond, the appeal must be returned to the Board for appellate review. The Veteran has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2012). ______________________________________________ K. MILLIKAN Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs