Citation Nr: 1330957 Decision Date: 09/26/13 Archive Date: 09/30/13 DOCKET NO. 10-25 804 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD N. Sonia, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from October 1984 to August 2007. This case comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a June 2008 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The issues of an increased rating for asthma and service connection for Primary Snoring have been raised by the record, but have not been adjudicated by the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ). Therefore, the Board does not have jurisdiction over them, and they are referred to the AOJ for appropriate action. The Board has not only viewed the Veteran's physical claims file, but also the file on the Virtual VA and VBMS system to insure a total review of the evidence. FINDING OF FACT Sleep apnea is not shown. CONCLUSION OF LAW Sleep apnea was not incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1131, 5103(a), 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2013). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Under the relevant laws and regulations, service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2013). Service connection may be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), if a chronic disease or injury is shown in service, and subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease or injury at any later date, however remote, are shown, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. For a showing of a chronic disorder in service, the mere use of the word chronic will not suffice; rather, there is a required combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. Service connection may also be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), where a condition in service is noted but is not, in fact, chronic, or where a diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. The continuity of symptomatology provision of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) has been interpreted as an alternative to service connection only for the specific chronic diseases listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). See Walker v. Shinseki, 718 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In this case, sleep apnea is not listed as a "chronic disease" under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a); therefore, 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) does not apply. Service connection may also be established with certain chronic diseases based upon a legal presumption by showing that the disorder manifested itself to a degree of 10 percent disabling or more within one year from the date of separation from service. Such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a). While the disease need not be diagnosed within the presumption period, it must be shown, by acceptable lay or medical evidence, that there were characteristic manifestations of the disease to the required degree during that time. As above, sleep apnea is not listed in 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a); therefore, the one-year presumption does not apply. Service connection may also be established for any disease diagnosed after discharge when the evidence establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). This has been interpreted as a three-element test based on nexus: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. See Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Significantly, service connection may only be granted for a current disability; when a claimed condition is not shown, there may be no grant of service connection. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141 (1992) (Congress specifically limits entitlement for service-connected disease or injury to cases where such incidents have resulted in a disability). "In the absence of proof of a present disability there can be no valid claim." See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). In this decision, the Board has considered the lay evidence as it pertains to the issue. In rendering a decision on appeal, the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant. See Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36, 39-40 (1994); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 57 (1990). Competency of evidence differs from weight and credibility. Competency is a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered by the trier of fact, while credibility is a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) ("although interest may affect the credibility of testimony, it does not affect competency to testify"). "Competent medical evidence" means that which is provided by a person who is qualified through education, training, or experience to offer medical diagnoses, statements, or opinions. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1). "Competent lay evidence" is any evidence not requiring that the proponent have specialized education, training or experience, but is provided by a person who has the knowledge of facts or circumstances and conveys matters that can be observed and described by a lay person. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469-70 (1994). A veteran is competent to report symptoms that he experiences at any time because this requires only personal knowledge as it comes to him through his senses. Layno, 6 Vet. App. at 470; Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 309 (2007) (when a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation). The absence of contemporaneous medical evidence is a factor in determining credibility of lay evidence, but lay evidence does not lack credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence. See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (lack of contemporaneous medical records does not serve as an "absolute bar" to the service connection claim); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007) ("Board may not reject as not credible any uncorroborated statements merely because the contemporaneous medical evidence is silent as to complaints or treatment for the relevant condition or symptoms"). In determining whether statements submitted by a veteran are credible, the Board may consider internal consistency, facial plausibility, consistency with other evidence, and statements made during treatment. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995). With respect to evaluating the medical evidence, generally, the degree of probative value which may be attributed to a medical opinion issued by a VA or private treatment provider takes into account such factors as its thoroughness and degree of detail, and whether there was review of the veteran's claims file. Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444, 448-9 (2000). Also significant is whether the examining medical provider had a sufficiently clear and well-reasoned rationale, as well as a basis in objective supporting clinical data. Bloom v. West, 12 Vet. App. 185, 187 (1999); Hernandez-Toyens v. West, 11 Vet. App. 379, 382 (1998); see also Claiborne v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 181, 186 (2005) (rejecting medical opinions that did not indicate whether the physicians actually examined the veteran, did not provide the extent of any examination, and did not provide any supporting clinical data). The Court has held that a bare conclusion, even one reached by a health care professional, is not probative without a factual predicate in the record. Miller v. West, 11 Vet. App. 345, 348 (1998). Medical evidence that is speculative, general or inconclusive in nature cannot support a claim. Obert v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 30, 33 (1993); see also Beausoleil v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 459, 463 (1996); Libertine v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 521, 523 (1996). A physician's statement framed in terms such as "may" or "could" is not probative. See Warren v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 4, 6 (1993). A significant factor to be considered for any opinion is the accuracy of the factual predicate, regardless of whether the information supporting the opinion is obtained by review of medical records or lay reports of injury, symptoms and/or treatment. See Harris v. West, 203 F.3d 1347, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (examiner opinion based on accurate lay history deemed competent medical evidence in support of the claim); Kowalski v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 171, 177 (2005) (holding that a medical opinion cannot be disregarded solely on the rationale that the medical opinion was based on history given by the veteran); Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458, 461 (1993) (holding that the Board may reject a medical opinion based on an inaccurate factual basis). The Board must determine whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the appellant prevailing in either case, or whether the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case, service connection must be denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). The Board has reviewed all of the evidence in the Veteran's claims folder. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, the extensive evidence of record. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has held that the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence. Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Therefore, the Board will summarize the relevant evidence where appropriate, and the Board's analysis below will focus specifically on what the evidence shows, or fails to show, as to the issue. The Veteran filed a claim for, among other things, sleep apnea in June 2007. Service treatment records do not reflect complaints of or treatment for sleep apnea. In May 2007, he underwent a polysomnogram. The report noted "[n]o evidence of Obstructive sleep apnea (OSA)." The final diagnosis was Primary Snoring and Rule/out Upper Airway Resistance Syndrome. Similarly, in a March 2008 VA examination, the examiner reviewed the Veteran's subjective complaints as well as diagnostic tests to determine that there was no evidence of sleep apnea syndrome. In addition, the Veteran himself has acknowledged that he does not have sleep apnea. In an Informal Hearing Presentation, he noted that the claim had been processed as sleep apnea and "properly denied" by the RO. Rather, he asserted a claim for "Primary Snoring and any underlying etiology which may be causing other respiratory related dysfunction (Asthma) also experienced in service." The Board notes that he is already service-connected for asthma. The Board interprets his statement as a request for a new claim for service connection for a condition diagnosed as "Primary Snoring" or for an increased rating for asthma (as noted in the Introduction) rather than as part and parcel of the claim adjudicated by the RO. Specifically, at the time of the March 2008 examination, he reported symptoms of daytime hypersomnolence, snoring, apnea phases at night, and felt like he woke up coughing. Snoring was not identified as the claim but rather only reported as a symptom of sleep apnea. In sum, the only claim before the Board is one for sleep apnea. There is no objective evidence of sleep apnea and after additional medical testing, the Veteran himself has acknowledged that he does not have a diagnosis of sleep apnea. For the reasons and bases discussed above, the Board finds that a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for sleep apnea and the appeal is denied. Because the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not applicable. Finally, as provided for by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2013). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and medical or lay evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). This notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the RO. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). When VCAA notice is delinquent or erroneous, the "rule of prejudicial error" applies. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7261(b)(2) (West 2002). In addition, the notice requirements of the VCAA apply to all five elements of a service-connection claim, including: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Further, this notice must include information that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded. Id. at 486. In the present appeal, the VCAA duty to notify was satisfied by a September 2007 letter that informed the Veteran of what evidence was required to substantiate the claim, and of his and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence. In addition, the letter included the type of evidence necessary to establish a disability rating and effective date. Under these circumstances, the Board finds that the notification requirements of the VCAA have been satisfied as to both timing and content. Regarding the duty to assist, VA must make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claim for the benefit sought, unless no reasonable possibility exists that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. The duty to assist also includes providing an examination when necessary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. The Board finds that all necessary development has been accomplished, and therefore appellate review may proceed without prejudice to the Veteran. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). In connection with the current appeal, the evidence of record includes the service treatment records, statements in support of the claim, and two VA examinations, which included a Sleep Apnea Protocol Exam, in March 2008. The examinations are adequate because the examiners reviewed the Veteran's relevant medical history, recorded pertinent examination findings, and provided a sufficient analysis to support the conclusions offered. See Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 123-24 (2007). The Veteran has not identified, and the record does not otherwise indicate, any existing, pertinent evidence that has not been obtained. The record also presents no basis for further development to create any additional evidence to be considered in connection with the matters currently under consideration. Hence, no further notice or assistance is required for fair adjudication of the claim. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). ORDER Service connection for sleep apnea is denied. ____________________________________________ L. HOWELL Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs