Citation Nr: 1332654 Decision Date: 10/21/13 Archive Date: 10/24/13 DOCKET NO. 12-28 307 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Chicago, Illinois THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss. WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J. Connolly, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from June 1945 to December 1946. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a December 2005 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Chicago, Illinois. The Board notes that while subsequent ratings decisions characterized the issue on appeal as being a new and material issue, the Veteran perfected his appeal to the initial rating decision which denied his claim. In July 2013, the Veteran testified at a Travel Board hearing before the undersigned. Please note this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2012). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a)(2) (West 2002). FINDING OF FACT Bilateral hearing loss is attributable to service. CONCLUSION OF LAW Bilateral hearing loss was incurred in active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 5107(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304. 3.306 (2012). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) There has been a significant change in the law with the enactment of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA). See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326. The Veteran's claim is being granted. As such, any deficiencies with regard to the VCAA are harmless and nonprejudicial. Service Connection Service connection will be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1153; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.306. Establishing service connection generally requires medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) an in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table); Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. In addition, sensorineural hearing loss will be presumed to have been incurred in or aggravated by service if it had become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year of a veteran's separation from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. The Board notes that 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) provides that with chronic diseases shown as such in service or within the presumptive period so as to permit a finding of service connection, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. This rule does not mean that any manifestation of joint pain, any abnormality of heart action or heart sounds, any urinary findings of casts, or any cough, in service will permit service connection of arthritis, disease of the heart, nephritis, or pulmonary disease, first shown as a clearcut clinical entity, at some later date. For the showing of chronic disease in service there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "Chronic." When the disease identity is established, there is no requirement of evidentiary showing of continuity. Continuity of symptomatology is required only where the condition noted during service or the presumptive period is not, in fact, shown to be chronic or where the diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. When the fact of chronicity in service is not adequately supported, then a showing of continuity after service is required to support the claim. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. Presumptive periods are not intended to limit service connection to diseases so diagnosed when the evidence warrants direct service connection. The presumptive provisions of the statute and the Department of Veterans Affairs regulations implementing them are intended as liberalizations applicable when the evidence would not warrant service connection without their aid. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) recently held that the regulation creating a presumption of service connection for "chronic diseases" manifesting during service and then again at any later date (38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b)), is only available to establish service connection for the "chronic diseases" enumerated in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) (listing named chronic diseases). Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In the same case, the Federal Circuit clarified that the continuity of symptomatology language in § 3.303(b) also "restricts itself to chronic diseases" found in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). Id. at 1335. Walker held that "[t]he clear purpose of the regulation is to relax the requirements of § 3.303(a) for establishing service connection for certain chronic diseases."). The Federal Circuit noted that the requirement of showing a continuity of symptomatology after service is a "second route by which a veteran can establish service connection for a chronic disease" under subsection 3.303(b). Walker, supra. Showing a continuity of symptoms after service itself "establishes the link, or nexus" to service and also "confirm[s] the existence of the chronic disease while in service or [during the] presumptive period." Id. (holding that section 3.303(b) provides an "alternative path to satisfaction of the standard three-element test for entitlement to disability compensation"). Significantly, the Federal Circuit indicated that showing a continuity of symptomatology after service is a lesser evidentiary burden than the nexus requirement of the three-part test discussed above. The primary difference between a chronic disease that qualifies for § 3.303(b) analysis, and one that must be tested under § 3.303(a), is that the latter must satisfy the 'nexus' requirement of the three-element test, whereas the former benefits from presumptive service connection or service connection via continuity of symptomatology. Hearing loss disability is defined by regulation. For the purposes of applying the laws administered by VA, impaired hearing will be considered to be a disability when the auditory threshold in any of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 Hertz is 40 decibels or greater; or when the auditory thresholds for at least three of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, or 4000 Hertz are 26 decibels or greater; or when speech recognition scores using the Maryland CNC Test are less than 94 percent. 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held that "the threshold for normal hearing is from 0 to 20 dB [decibels], and higher threshold levels indicate some degree of hearing loss." See Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155, 157 (1993). The Court, in Hensley, 5 Vet. App. 155 (1993), indicated that 38 C.F.R. § 3.385 does not preclude service connection for a current hearing disability where hearing was within normal limits on audiometric testing at separation from service if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate a relationship between the Veteran's service and his current disability. A layperson is generally incapable of opining on matters requiring medical knowledge. Routen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 183, 186 (1997), aff'd sub nom. Routen v. West, 142 F.3d 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 404 (1998). However, lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when: (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (e.g., a broken leg, separated shoulder, pes planus (flat feet), varicose veins, tinnitus (ringing in the ears), etc.), (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In essence, lay testimony is competent when it regards the readily observable features or symptoms of injury or illness and "may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection." Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2). When, for example, a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. In such cases, the Board is within its province to weigh that testimony and make a credibility determination as to whether that evidence supports a finding of service incurrence and continuity of symptomatology sufficient to establish service connection. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 310 (2007). Thus, medical evidence is not always or categorically required when the determinative issue involves either medical diagnosis or etiology, but rather such issue may, depending on the facts of the particular case, be established by competent and credible lay evidence under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a). See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). As held in Davidson, section 1154(a) requires that VA give "due consideration" to "all pertinent medical and lay evidence" in evaluating a claim for disability or death benefits. See also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[T]he Board cannot determine that lay evidence lacks credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence" such as actual treatment records). The Veteran is competent to report the Veteran can observe and feel through the senses. See Layno. When considering whether lay evidence is competent the Board must determine, on a case by case basis, whether the Veteran's particular disability is the type of disability for which lay evidence may be competent. Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428 (2011). Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether the evidence also is credible, as only then does it ultimately have probative value. See Layno (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted")); Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997) (Competency is a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered by the trier of fact, whereas credibility is a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted). In rendering a decision on appeal, the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence that it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons or bases for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant. See Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36, 39-40 (1994); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 57 (1990). To this end, the Board is charged with the duty to assess the credibility and weight given to evidence. Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1046 (1998); Wensch v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 362, 367 (2001). Indeed, in Jefferson v. Principi, 271 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the Federal Circuit, citing its decision in Madden, recognized that the Board had inherent fact-finding ability. Id. at 1076; see also 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a) (West 2002). Moreover, the Court similarly has declared that, in adjudicating a claim, the Board has the responsibility to weigh and assess the evidence. Bryan v. West, 13 Vet. App. 482, 488-89 (2000); Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614, 618 (1992). As a finder of fact, when considering whether lay evidence is satisfactory, the Board may also properly consider internal inconsistency of the statements, facial plausibility, consistency with other evidence submitted on behalf of the Veteran, and the Veteran's demeanor when testifying at a hearing when he/she has testified. See Dalton v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23, 38 (2007); Caluza, aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604(Fed. Cir. 1996). See, too, Macarubbo v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 388 (1997) (similarly holding that the credibility of lay evidence can be affected and even impeached by inconsistent statements, internal inconsistency of statements, inconsistency with other evidence of record, facial implausibility, bad character, interest, bias, self-interest, malingering, desire for monetary gain, and witness demeanor). The determination as to whether these requirements for service connection are met is based on an analysis of all the relevant evidence of record, medical and lay, and the evaluation of its competency and credibility to determine its ultimate probative value in relation to other evidence. See Baldwin v. West, 13 Vet. App. 1, 8 (1999). Reasonable doubt concerning any matter material to the determination is resolved in the Veteran's favor. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. The Veteran served during World War II. On his separation examination, the whispered voice testing was 15/15. Nonetheless, the absence of audiometric examination data on separation examination does not preclude a finding that current hearing loss disability is related to service. Moreover, the absence of hearing loss disability in service is not in and of itself fatal to a claim for service connection for bilateral hearing loss disability. Ledford v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 87, 89 (1992). Rather, service connection is warranted if all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, reflects that current bilateral hearing loss is related to in-service noise exposure or any other event, illness or injury in service. Post-service, an April 1949 examination noted that there was no "apparent impairment in hearing;" however, no audiometric tests were performed to confirm that impression. In September 2005, the Veteran's current claim for service connection for hearing loss was received. In written correspondence and oral testimony, the Veteran expressed that he was stationed in the Philippines at large ammunition dump. There were several instances of loud explosions, including one where others were injured. He related that afterwards, he experienced hearing loss. Although his hearing ability returned, he indicated that he continued to have hearing difficulty from that time to the present day. VA records document treatment for hearing loss from 1998 onward, consisting mainly of hearing aid maintenance. In December 2005, the Veteran was afforded a VA examination which confirmed that he had bilateral hearing loss within the meaning of 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. It was noted that the Veteran reported inservice acoustic trauma, but no post-service acoustic trauma. The examiner noted that the inservice whispered voice test did not rule out a mild or high frequency hearing loss. The examiner opined that the current bilateral hearing loss was less likely than not related to service because no hearing loss was identified in 1949 and the Veteran maintained employment and ran a company for years after service. A September 2009 medical opinion stated that the Veteran's bilateral hearing loss was most likely caused by or was the result of exposure to noise. The Veteran was afforded another VA examination in March 2011 which indicated that the Veteran had bilateral hearing loss within the meaning of 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. The examiner basically reiterated the opinion of the December 2005 examiner, also noting that complaints were remote to service. There is also private medical evidence. The audiologist indicated that the Veteran had essentially flat moderate to severe to severe sensorineural hearing loss from 250 to 6000 Hertz and profound hearing loss at 8000 Hertz in the right ear and severe hearing loss at 8000 Hertz in the left ear. The audiologist opined that given the lack of significant noise exposure besides in the military, it was not unexpected that the Veteran developed his type of hearing loss. The audiologist basically related the current bilateral hearing loss etiologically to service. The Board notes that the Veteran stated he was exposed to loud noise in service when working at the ammunition dump, and this is consistent with his military occupation duties; thus, the Board will therefore presume in-service noise exposure. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (each disabling condition for which a veteran seeks service connection must be considered based on factors including the basis of places, types, and circumstances of service as shown by service record). In addition, a lay statement has been received from J.D.W. which confirms in its entirely the incidence of noise exposure described by the Veteran as J.D.W. was also stationed at the ammunition dump and described the explosions as well as the Veteran's complaints regarding his ears, thereafter. As already explained, competent lay evidence may establish the presence of observable symptomatology and, in certain circumstances, it may provide a basis for establishing service connection. See Barr. Although claimants may be competent to provide the diagnoses of simple conditions, such as a broken leg, they are not competent to provide evidence on more complex medical questions beyond simple observations. Jandreau; see Colantonio v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (recognizing that in some cases lay testimony "falls short" in proving an issue that requires expert medical knowledge); Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that a Veteran's lay belief that his schizophrenia aggravated his diabetes and hypertension was not of sufficient weight to trigger the Secretary's duty to seek a medical opinion on the issue). Indeed, even if lay testimony is competent, should VA find it to be mistaken or lacking credibility, the Board may reject it as unpersuasive and, thus, not ultimately probative. Buchanan; see also Rucker and Layno. The Board may find a lack of credibility in, for example, conflicting medical statements or witness biases. Buchanan at 1337. The lack of contemporaneous medical evidence is also relevant; however, the mere lack of such evidence may not constitute the sole basis for discrediting the lay evidence. Id. The Veteran is competent in this case to report his problems with hearing. As noted, the initial noise exposure has been confirmed. He has described having a continuity of symptoms after the inservice noise exposure and over the years to the current time. The Veteran is both competent and credible in his report of continuity of symptoms as his statements are also confirmed by both a VA medical opinion as well as the private medical evidence, which cited to inservice noise exposure precipitating the Veteran's type of hearing loss. In determining the probative value to be assigned to a medical opinion, the Board must consider three factors. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008). The initial inquiry in determining probative value is to assess whether a medical expert was fully informed of the pertinent factual premises (i.e., medical history) of the case. A review of the claims file is not required, since a medical professional can also become aware of the relevant medical history by having treated a Veteran for a long period of time or through a factually accurate medical history reported by a Veteran. See id. at 303-04. The second inquiry involves consideration of whether the medical expert provided a fully articulated opinion. See id. A medical opinion that is equivocal in nature or expressed in speculative language does not provide the degree of certainty required for medical nexus evidence. See McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). The third and final factor in determining the probative value of an opinion involves consideration of whether the opinion is supported by a reasoned analysis. The most probative value of a medical opinion comes from its reasoning. Therefore, a medical opinion containing only data and conclusions is not entitled to any weight. In fact, a review of the claims file does not substitute for a lack of a reasoned analysis. See Nieves-Rodriguez; see also Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 124 (2007) ( "[A] medical opinion ... must support its conclusion with an analysis that the Board can consider and weigh against contrary opinions."). The Board notes that the December 2005 opinion is flawed due to usage of the Veteran's employment as a basis, in part, for finding that he has not had hearing loss. Clearly many individuals with hearing loss maintain employment. Also, while the 1949 examination noted no apparent hearing loss, there were no audiogram findings and no specific audiological examination to support the impression. The later 2011 examination largely reiterated the prior opinion. Conversely, another VA examiner indicated that there was a connection between current bilateral hearing loss and service. While no rationale was provided, this opinion is supported by the opinion of the private audiologist who described the current type of hearing loss in the opinion, warranting greater probative value. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008). Because there is both competent and credible supporting evidence of the occurrence of acoustic trauma resulting in bilateral hearing loss during service and on a continual basis since, as evidenced by the lay evidence as well as the medical evidence, and there is also competent and credible supporting evidence of continuity of symptomatology, the Board concludes that the evidence supports the grant of service connection for bilateral hearing loss, particularly when all reasonable doubt is resolved in the Veteran's favor. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (b);38 C.F.R. § 3.102. ORDER Service connection for bilateral hearing loss is granted. ____________________________________________ S. L. Kennedy Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs