Citation Nr: 1333667	
Decision Date: 10/24/13    Archive Date: 10/24/13

DOCKET NO.  07-15 892	)	DATE
	)
	)

On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Los Angeles, California


THE ISSUE

Entitlement to service connection for a left lung disorder, claimed as a left lung lesion.


REPRESENTATION

Appellant represented by:	Disabled American Veterans


ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD

M. Sopko, Associate Counsel



INTRODUCTION

The Veteran served on active duty from July 1966 to July 1974.

This matter comes to the Board of Veteran's Appeals (Board) from a January 2006 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Los Angeles, California.

In his VA Form 9, Appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeals, received in May 2007, the Veteran indicated he wanted to have a hearing before the Board at the RO.  The Veteran was scheduled for a Travel Board Hearing in September 2009.  However, he failed to report for the scheduled hearing.  The Board finds there is no Board hearing request pending at this time.  38 C.F.R. § 20.702(d) (2012).

The Board remanded this case in June 2010, August 2012, and July 2013.  The case has been returned to the Board, and it is ready for adjudication.

A review of the Virtual VA paperless claims processing system does not reveal any additional documents pertinent to the present appeal.


FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The findings of the December 2012 VA examiner are competent medical evidence. 

2. The preponderance of the evidence reflects that the Veteran does not have a lung condition due to any incident of his active duty service.



CONCLUSION OF LAW

The veteran's lung condition was not incurred or aggravated in service.  38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303 (2012).


REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Introductory Matters

In this decision, the Board will discuss the relevant law which it is required to apply. This includes statutes enacted by Congress and published in Title 38, United States Code ("38 U.S.C.A."); regulations promulgated by VA under the law and published in Title 38 of the Code of Federal Regulations ("38 C.F.R.") and the precedential rulings of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (as noted by citations to "Fed. Cir.") and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) (as noted by citations to "Vet. App."). 

The Board is bound by statute to set forth specifically the issue under appellate consideration and its decision must also include separately stated findings of fact and conclusions of law on all material issues of fact and law presented on the record, and the reasons or bases for those findings and conclusions. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(d); see also 38 C.F.R. § 19.7 (implementing the cited statute); see also Vargas-Gonzalez v. West, 12 Vet. App. 321, 328 (1999); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 56-57 (1990) (the Board's statement of reasons and bases for its findings and conclusions on all material facts and law presented on the record must be sufficient to enable the claimant to understand the precise basis for the Board's decision, as well as to facilitate review of the decision by courts of competent appellate jurisdiction. The Board must also consider and discuss all applicable statutory and regulatory law, as well as the controlling decisions of the appellate courts). 


Duties to Notify and Assist

The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 ("VCAA") describes VA's duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. 
§§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2012).

Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the Veteran and his representative, if any, of any information and medical or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim, and to indicate which information and evidence VA will obtain and which information and evidence the claimant is expected to provide. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). VCAA notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service connection claim: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the Veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 486 (2006). The notice must be provided to the Veteran prior to the initial adjudication of his claim. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). 

VA has satisfied its duty to notify by issuing a pre-adjudication notice letter in July 2005. The letter advised the Veteran of what evidence was required to substantiate his claim and of his and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence. The letter provided notice regarding the disability evaluation and effective date elements of a service connection claim. Dingess, 19 Vet. App. at 473. 

The duty to assist provisions of the VCAA have been met. The claims file contains service treatment records (STRs), reports of post-service medical treatment, the report of a VA examination in December 2012, and a March 2013 addendum to that report. The examination was adequate because it was based on a thorough examination, a description of the Veteran's pertinent medical history, and appropriate diagnostic tests. The examiner also provided rationales for his opinion. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 312 (2007); Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 124-25 (2007) (holding an examination is considered adequate when it is based on consideration of the appellant's prior medical history and examinations and also describes the disability in sufficient detail so that the Board's evaluation of the disability will be a fully informed one). 

This case was remanded in July 2013 to obtain VA medical and Social Security Administration (SSA) records.  The Appeals Management Center determined the Veteran is not receiving Social Security disability benefits and issued a formal finding in August 2013.  The Veteran confirmed he has never applied for Social Security disability benefits in August 2013.

His additional VA records were obtained.  Therefore, there was substantial compliance with the Board's remand directives.  See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998); Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141, 146-47 (1999).

The Veteran has not made the RO or the Board aware of any additional evidence that must be obtained in order to fairly decide the appeal. He has been given ample opportunity to present evidence and argument in support of his claims. Pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.655, all relevant evidence necessary for an equitable disposition of the Veteran's appeal of these issues has been obtained and the case is ready for appellate review. General due process considerations have been complied with by VA. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (2012). 

Analysis of the Claim

Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all of the evidence establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d).

In interpreting sections 1110 and 1131 of the statute and section 3.303(a) of the regulations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) held that a three-element test must be satisfied in order to establish entitlement to service connection. Specifically, the evidence must show (1) the existence of a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the current disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service (the "nexus" requirement). Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d. 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ((quoting Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 

Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), claims for certain chronic diseases-namely those listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a)-benefit from a somewhat more relaxed evidentiary standard. See Walker, 708 F3d. at 1339 (holding that "[t]he clear purpose of the regulation is to relax the requirements of § 3.303(a) for establishing service connection for certain chronic diseases."). When a chronic disease is established during active service, then subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, will be entitled to service connection, unless clearly attributable to causes unrelated to service ("intercurrent causes"). 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). In order to establish the existence of a chronic disease in service, the evidence must show a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "chronic." Id. Thus, the mere manifestation during service of potentially relevant symptoms (such as joint pain or abnormal heart action in claims for arthritis or heart disease, for example) does not establish a chronic disease at that time unless the identity of the disease is established and its chronicity may not be legitimately questioned. Id. If chronicity in service is not established, then a showing of continuity of symptoms after discharge is required to support the claim. Id. 

The Federal Circuit noted that the requirement of showing a continuity of symptomatology after service is a "second route by which a veteran can establish service connection for a chronic disease" under subsection 3.303(b). Walker, 708 F3d. at 1336. Showing a continuity of symptoms after service itself "establishes the link, or nexus" to service and also "confirm[s] the existence of the chronic disease while in service or [during the] presumptive period." Id. (holding that section 3.303(b) provides an "alternative path to satisfaction of the standard three-element test for entitlement to disability compensation"). Significantly, the Federal Circuit indicated that showing a continuity of symptomatology after service is a lesser evidentiary burden than the nexus requirement of the three-part test discussed above: "The primary difference between a chronic disease that qualifies for § 3.303(b) analysis, and one that must be tested under § 3.303(a), is that the latter must satisfy the 'nexus' requirement of the three-element test, whereas the former benefits from presumptive service connection . . . or service connection via continuity of symptomatology" (emphasis added). Id. at 1339. 

Not all diseases that may be considered "chronic" from a medical standpoint qualify for the relaxed evidentiary standard under section 3.303(b). Rather, the Federal Circuit held that this subsection only applies to the specific chronic diseases listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). Id. at 1338-40. Thus, if the claimant does not have one of the chronic diseases enumerated in section 3.309(a), then the more relaxed continuity-of-symptomatology standard does not apply, and "medical nexus of a relationship [sic] between the condition in service and the present condition is required." Id. at *1338; see also id. at 1336, 1340 (holding that the claimant's allegation of a continuity of hearing loss ever since active service was not sufficient to support the claim under subsection 3.303(b), as hearing loss was not among the chronic diseases listed in section 3.309(a)). 

Although the Veteran has been diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), the disorder is not included under section 3.309(a).  Therefore, the provisions of subsection 3.303(b) for chronic disabilities do not apply, and the claim may not be supported by evidence of a continuity of symptomatology after service.  The Veteran's COPD is also not eligible for presumptive service connection. 

The Board must assess the value of all evidence submitted, including lay and medical evidence. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). This evaluation generally involves a three-step inquiry. First, the Board must determine whether the evidence is competent. See, e.g. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Second, the Board must determine if the evidence is credible, or worthy of belief. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 308 (2007) (observing that once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible). Third, the Board must assess the probative value and weight of the evidence in light of the entire record. Gonzales, 218 F.3d at 1380-81.

As observed by the Federal Circuit, lay evidence must "demonstrate some competence." See King v. Shinseki (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Board may therefore discount the probative value of lay evidence if it finds such evidence not to be competent. See id.; see also Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994) (holding that in order for testimony to be probative of any fact, the witness must be competent to testify as to the facts under consideration). However, the Board may not "categorically" require medical evidence or disregard lay evidence without first assessing its competence. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that it was error in a cause-of-death claim to find "categorically" that a medical opinion was required to prove a nexus between the Veteran's service-connected mental disorder and his drowning death, and likewise to reject categorically the claimant's testimony on this issue as not competent simply because she was a lay person); see also Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 434 (2011) (holding that the Board erred in categorically rejecting lay evidence without analyzing and weighing it). Importantly, lay statements submitted by or on behalf of a claimant can be competent with respect to both the diagnosis and the etiology or cause of a disability. See Davidson, 581 F.3d at 1316.

Competent lay evidence means any evidence not requiring that the proponent have specialized education, training, or experience. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2); Layno, 6 Vet. App. at 469 (holding that lay testimony is not competent to prove that which would require specialized knowledge, training, or medical expertise). Lay evidence is competent if it is provided by a person who has first-hand knowledge of facts or circumstances, or conveys matters that can be observed and described by a lay person. See Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 368 (2005) (holding that appellant was competent to testify as to factual matters of which he had first-hand knowledge, such as experiencing pain in his right hip and thigh in service, reporting to sick call, being placed on limited duty, and undergoing physical therapy). For example, the Court has held that a lay person is competent to diagnose a disease with "unique and readily identifiable features" such as varicose veins. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 309 (2007). Similarly, the Court has found a lay person competent to identify tinnitus and flat feet, which are disorders that can be identified based on lay observation alone. See Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370 (2002) (tinnitus); Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 398 (1995) (flatfeet). 

However, lay testimony is not competent with respect to determinations that are "medical in nature" or require medical knowledge due to their complexity. See Barr, 21 Vet. App. at 309. See Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456, 462 (2007). The Federal Circuit has held that lay evidence may be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition in the following circumstances: (1) when the condition is simple, such as a broken leg, as opposed to when the condition is more complex, such as a form of cancer; (2) when the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or; (3) when lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372, 1377 & n4 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Competent medical evidence, as distinguished from lay evidence, is evidence provided by a person who is qualified through education, training, or experience to offer medical diagnoses, statements, or opinions. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1). Competent medical evidence may include statements conveying sound medical principles found in medical treatises. Id. It would also include statements contained in authoritative writings such as medical and scientific articles and research reports or analyses. Id.

The competency of evidence differs from the weight assigned to the evidence, which varies according to its credibility and probative value. See Layno, 6 Vet. App. at 469; accord Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 1997); see also Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) (stating that "although interest may affect the credibility of testimony, it does not affect competency to testify."). The Board discounts the weight of evidence it finds not to be credible. See Washington, 19 Vet. App. at 368 (noting that the witness's credibility affects the weight to be given to his testimony). 

In determining whether statements submitted by a veteran are credible, the Board may consider their internal consistency, facial plausibility, and consistency with other evidence submitted on behalf of the claimant. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. at 711, aff'd, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (table); see also Madden v. Brown, 125 F.3d 1447 (Fed Cir. 1997) (holding that the Board has the "authority to discount the weight and probative value of evidence in light of its inherent characteristics in its relationship to other items of evidence"). Further, the Federal Circuit has held that while the absence of contemporaneous medical records does not, in and of itself, render lay testimony not credible, the Board may weigh the absence of contemporaneous records when assessing the credibility of lay evidence. See Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1336 ("Nor do we hold that the Board cannot weigh the absence of contemporaneous medical evidence against the lay evidence of record."). Moreover, although the Board cannot reject a claimant's statements merely because he is an interested party, the claimant's interest may affect the credibility of his testimony when considered in light of the other factors. See Cartright, 2 Vet. App. at 25; accord Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1337 (holding that "the Board, as fact finder, is obligated to, and fully justified in, determining whether lay evidence is credible in and of itself, i.e., because of possible bias . . . .").

The Veteran filed his claim for service connection for a lung disorder in May 2005 - over 30 years after he was discharged from active duty.  He was afforded a VA examination in December 2012.  The VA examiner diagnosed the Veteran with COPD, thereby satisfying the first prong of a service-connection claim - the existence of a current disability.  

The Veteran's service treatment records (STR's) show he did not have any known medical conditions upon entering the military in July 1966.  A granuloma was found on his left mid-lung in October 1969, although the etiology of it was unknown and was described as "probably inactive."  Subsequent X-rays of his chest in February and April 1970 showed no change.  Additionally, in March 1970, he began complaining of right arm pain.  It was noted that he had injured this arm during a cervical biopsy, and he was found to have atrophy of his upper right arm. He received physical therapy to increase the strength and bulk of this arm.  A solitary cavitating lesion on his left lung of unknown etiology was again noted.

Another chest X-ray in January 1972 continued to show no change.  In his July 1974 pre-separation physical examination, the Veteran reported having, either presently or in the past, a "tumor, growth, or cyst."  However, he also stated he was "in good health and not on medication."  His July 1974 separation examination noted a diagnosis of asthmatic bronchitis. 

At the December 2012 VA examination, the Veteran was diagnosed with COPD, but not asthma or chronic bronchitis. The examiner noted the Veteran was diagnosed with COPD in 2005, over 30 years after discharge.  The examiner also noted that the Veteran's pulmonary function test (PFT) results in 2005 "were within normal limits."  PFT results from the VA examination revealed "how lung function has deteriorated in just 8 years after initial diagnosis."  Because "COPD is a disease that has been medically proven to be directly linked to smoking," and the Veteran had smoked "for greater than 52 years," the examiner concluded that "it is less likely that current COPD was incurred in or caused by military service."

A March 2013 addendum to the examination report reiterates the 1969 lesion diagnosis.  The examiner noted that the lesion had been biopsied and identified as a granuloma, which according to the examiner was "benign tissue, in this case, [of] unknown etiology."  The examiner reported that a granuloma "does not interfere with respiratory function and has no role in [the] current chronic obstructive lung disease."  

The VA compensation examiner's unfavorable opinion is the only medical evidence in the claims file addressing this determinative issue of causation.  Under Walker, the Veteran cannot refute this opinion merely by alleging a continuous lung disorder since service, so the third prong of entitlement to service connection has not been satisfied.

Given the foregoing, the preponderance of the evidence is against this claim.  The doctrine of reasonable doubt therefore does not apply, and the claim is denied.  See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55-57 (1990).


ORDER

Entitlement to service connection for a left lung disorder, claimed as a left lung lesion, is denied.



____________________________________________
Vito A. Clementi
Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals



Department of Veterans Affairs