Citation Nr: 1334452 Decision Date: 10/29/13 Archive Date: 11/06/13 DOCKET NO. 10-32 219 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Petersburg, Florida THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for a right hip disability. 2. Entitlement to service connection for right knee arthritis. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a right ankle disability. 4. Entitlement to service connection for a disability manifested by right thigh and foot numbness. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J. Connolly, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active service from January 1945 to November 1946. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a September 2009 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Petersburg, Florida The Veteran testified at a hearing in November 2011 before the undersigned. A copy of the transcript has been associated with the claims file. In February 2012 and January 2013, the Board remanded this case to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC) for further development and it has now been returned to the Board. Please note this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2013). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a)(2) (West 2002). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. A right hip disability is not attributable to service. 2. Right knee arthritis is not attributable to service, and did not manifest within one year of service discharge. 3. A right ankle disability is not attributable to service. 4. A disability manifested by right thigh and foot numbness is not attributable to service. CONCLUSION OF LAW 1. A right hip disability was not incurred or aggravated in active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304. 3.306 (2013). 2. Right knee arthritis was not incurred in or aggravated by service and may not be presumed to have been incurred therein. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.306, 3.307, 3.309 (2013). 3. A right ankle disability was not incurred or aggravated in active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.306 (2013). 4. A disability manifested by right thigh and foot numbness was not incurred or aggravated in active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.306 (2013). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326. Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the Veteran and his or her representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, that is necessary to substantiate the claim, including apprising him or her of the information and evidence he or she is responsible for providing versus the information and evidence VA will obtain for him or her. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). These notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service-connection claim: (1) Veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the Veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), aff'd sub nom. Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (2007). So this notice must include information that a "downstream" disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is granted. Id. at 486. Ideally, this notice should be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the RO. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004) (Pelegrini II). If, however, for whatever reason it was not, or the notice provided was inadequate, this timing error can be effectively "cured" by providing any necessary notice and then readjudicating the claim - including in a statement of the case (SOC) or supplemental SOC (SSOC), such that the intended purpose of the notice is not frustrated and the Veteran is given an opportunity to participate effectively in the adjudication of the claim. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Mayfield IV); Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006). The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that VCAA notice errors are not presumptively prejudicial, rather, must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and that, as the pleading party attacking the agency's decision, the Veteran, not VA, bears this burden of proof of establishing there is a VCAA notice error and, moreover, above and beyond this, that the error is unduly prejudicial, meaning outcome determinative of the claim. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009). The Veteran has received all essential notice, has had a meaningful opportunity to participate in the development of the claim, and is not prejudiced by any technical notice deficiency along the way. See Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir., 2004). VCAA letters were sent in June 2009, November 2009, April 2012, February 2013, and July 2013. The letters, especially in combination, indicated the type of evidence and information needed to substantiate the claim and apprised the Veteran of the Veteran's and VA's respective responsibilities in obtaining this supporting evidence. The letters also notified the Veteran that a "downstream" disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits would be assigned if service connection was granted, in compliance with Dingess. The Veteran has been afforded a hearing before a Veterans Law Judge (VLJ) in which he presented oral argument in support of his claim. In Bryant v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 488 (2010), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ("the Court") held that 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2) requires that the VLJ/DRO who chairs a hearing fulfill two duties to comply with the above the regulation. These duties consist of (1) the duty to fully explain the issue and (2) the duty to suggest the submission of evidence that may have been overlooked. Here, during the hearing, the VLJ asked specific questions directed at identifying whether the Veteran met the criteria necessary to establish service connection. The VLJ also sought to identify any pertinent evidence not currently associated with the claims. The Veteran also volunteered his treatment history. Accordingly, the Veteran is not shown to be prejudiced on this basis. Finally, neither the Veteran nor his representative has asserted that VA failed to comply with 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2), nor has he identified any prejudice in the conduct of the Board hearing. By contrast, the hearing focused on the elements necessary to substantiate the claims, and the Veteran, through his testimony, demonstrated that he had actual knowledge of the elements necessary to substantiate his claims. As such, the Board finds that, consistent with Bryant, the VLJ complied with the duties set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2). Regarding the duty to assist, VA also satisfied this obligation in terms of obtaining all potentially relevant evidence concerning these claims. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. The Veteran's service available treatment records (STRs) and post-service medical treatment records have been obtained, to the extent available. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. VA has undertaken repeated efforts to obtain all of the Veteran's STRs, but those not contained in the claims file were lost in a fire. In addition, efforts were taken to obtain records from the Social Security Administration (SSA), but those records were destroyed per contact from the SSA in November 2009. There is no indication that any additional evidence, relevant to these claims, is available and not part of the claims file. The Veteran also was provided multiple VA compensation examinations which addressed the etiology of the claimed disorders. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d)(2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). See also McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). Indeed, the Board remanded this case for an addendum opinion. Combined, the VA examination and two addendum opinions are adequate. 38 C.F.R. § 4.2. See also Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 311 (2007) (holding that once VA undertakes the effort to provide an examination for a service-connection claim, even if not statutorily obligated to do so, it must provide an adequate one or, at a minimum, notify the claimant why one will not or cannot be provided). See Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 123 (2007) (VA's duty to assist includes providing an adequate examination when such an examination is indicated). Furthermore, in obtaining the additional medical evidence, the Board is now satisfied there was compliance with the Board's remand directives. Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141, 146-47 (1999); Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998). In summary, the Board finds that "it is difficult to discern what additional guidance VA could have provided to the Veteran regarding what further evidence he should submit to substantiate his claim." See Livesay v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 165, 178 (2001) (en banc) (observing that "the VCAA is a reason to remand many, many claims, but it is not an excuse to remand all claims."); Reyes v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 113, 116 (1994); Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 540, 546 (1991) (both observing circumstances as to when a remand would not result in any significant benefit to the Veteran). Service Connection Service connection will be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1153; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.306. Establishing service connection generally requires medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) an in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table); Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. In addition, arthritis will be presumed to have been incurred in or aggravated by service if it had become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year of a veteran's separation from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. The Board notes that 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) provides that with chronic diseases shows as such in service or within the presumptive period so as to permit a finding of service connection, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. This rule does not mean that any manifestation of joint pain, any abnormality of heart action or heart sounds, any urinary findings of cases, or any cough, in service will permit service connection of arthritis, disease of the heart, nephritis, or pulmonary disease, first shown as a clearcut clinical entity, at some later date. For the showing of chronic disease in service there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "Chronic." When the disease identity is established, there is no requirement of evidentiary showing of continuity. Continuity of symptomatology is required only where the condition noted during service or the presumptive period is not, in fact, shown to be chronic or where the diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. When the fact of chronicity in service is not adequately supported, then a showing of continuity after service is required to support the claim. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. Presumptive periods are not intended to limit service connection to diseases so diagnosed when the evidence warrants direct service connection. The presumptive provisions of the statute and the Department of Veterans Affairs regulations implementing them are intended as liberalizations applicable when the evidence would not warrant service connection without their aid. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) recently held that the regulation creating a presumption of service connection for "chronic diseases" manifesting during service and then again at any later date (38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b)), is only available to establish service connection for the "chronic diseases" enumerated in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) (listing named chronic diseases). Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In the same case, the Federal Circuit clarified that the continuity of symptomatology language in § 3.303(b) also "restricts itself to chronic diseases" found in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). Id. at 1335. Walker held that "[t]he clear purpose of the regulation is to relax the requirements of § 3.303(a) for establishing service connection for certain chronic diseases."). The Federal Circuit noted that the requirement of showing a continuity of symptomatology after service is a "second route by which a veteran can establish service connection for a chronic disease" under subsection 3.303(b). Walker, supra. Showing a continuity of symptoms after service itself "establishes the link, or nexus" to service and also "confirm[s] the existence of the chronic disease while in service or [during the] presumptive period." Id. (holding that section 3.303(b) provides an "alternative path to satisfaction of the standard three-element test for entitlement to disability compensation"). Significantly, the Federal Circuit indicated that showing a continuity of symptomatology after service is a lesser evidentiary burden than the nexus requirement of the three-part test discussed above. The primary difference between a chronic disease that qualifies for § 3.303(b) analysis, and one that must be tested under § 3.303(a), is that the latter must satisfy the 'nexus' requirement of the three-element test, whereas the former benefits from presumptive service connection or service connection via continuity of symptomatology. A layperson is generally incapable of opining on matters requiring medical knowledge. Routen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 183, 186 (1997), aff'd sub nom. Routen v. West, 142 F.3d 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 404 (1998). However, lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when: (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (e.g., a broken leg, separated shoulder, pes planus (flat feet), varicose veins, tinnitus (ringing in the ears), etc.), (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In essence, lay testimony is competent when it regards the readily observable features or symptoms of injury or illness and "may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection." Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2). When, for example, a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. In such cases, the Board is within its province to weigh that testimony and make a credibility determination as to whether that evidence supports a finding of service incurrence and continuity of symptomatology sufficient to establish service connection. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 310 (2007). Thus, medical evidence is not always or categorically required when the determinative issue involves either medical diagnosis or etiology, but rather such issue may, depending on the facts of the particular case, be established by competent and credible lay evidence under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a). See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). As held in Davidson, section 1154(a) requires that VA give "due consideration" to "all pertinent medical and lay evidence" in evaluating a claim for disability or death benefits. See also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[T]he Board cannot determine that lay evidence lacks credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence" such as actual treatment records). The Veteran is competent to report the Veteran can observe and feel through the senses. See Layno. When considering whether lay evidence is competent the Board must determine, on a case by case basis, whether the Veteran's particular disability is the type of disability for which lay evidence may be competent. Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428 (2011). Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether the evidence also is credible, as only then does it ultimately have probative value. See Layno (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted")); Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997) (Competency is a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered by the trier of fact, whereas credibility is a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted). In rendering a decision on appeal, the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence that it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons or bases for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant. See Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36, 39-40 (1994); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 57 (1990). To this end, the Board is charged with the duty to assess the credibility and weight given to evidence. Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1046 (1998); Wensch v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 362, 367 (2001). Indeed, in Jefferson v. Principi, 271 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the (Federal Circuit), citing its decision in Madden, recognized that the Board had inherent fact-finding ability. Id. at 1076; see also 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a) (West 2002). Moreover, the Court similarly has declared that, in adjudicating a claim, the Board has the responsibility to weigh and assess the evidence. Bryan v. West, 13 Vet. App. 482, 488-89 (2000); Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614, 618 (1992). As a finder of fact, when considering whether lay evidence is satisfactory, the Board may also properly consider internal inconsistency of the statements, facial plausibility, consistency with other evidence submitted on behalf of the Veteran, and the Veteran's demeanor when testifying at a hearing when he/she has testified. See Dalton v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23, 38 (2007); Caluza, aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604(Fed. Cir. 1996). See, too, Macarubbo v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 388 (1997) (similarly holding that the credibility of lay evidence can be affected and even impeached by inconsistent statements, internal inconsistency of statements, inconsistency with other evidence of record, facial implausibility, bad character, interest, bias, self-interest, malingering, desire for monetary gain, and witness demeanor). The determination as to whether these requirements for service connection are met is based on an analysis of all the relevant evidence of record, medical and lay, and the evaluation of its competency and credibility to determine its ultimate probative value in relation to other evidence. See Baldwin v. West, 13 Vet. App. 1, 8 (1999). Reasonable doubt concerning any matter material to the determination is resolved in the Veteran's favor. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. As already explained, competent lay evidence may establish the presence of observable symptomatology and, in certain circumstances, it may provide a basis for establishing service connection. See Barr. Although claimants may be competent to provide the diagnoses of simple conditions, such as a broken leg, they are not competent to provide evidence on more complex medical questions beyond simple observations. Jandreau; see Colantonio v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (recognizing that in some cases lay testimony "falls short" in proving an issue that requires expert medical knowledge); Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that a Veteran's lay belief that his schizophrenia aggravated his diabetes and hypertension was not of sufficient weight to trigger the Secretary's duty to seek a medical opinion on the issue). Indeed, even if lay testimony is competent, should VA find it to be mistaken or lacking credibility, the Board may reject it as unpersuasive and, thus, not ultimately probative. Buchanan; see also Rucker and Layno. The Board may find a lack of credibility in, for example, conflicting medical statements or witness biases. Buchanan at 1337. The lack of contemporaneous medical evidence is also relevant; however, the mere lack of such evidence may not constitute the sole basis for discrediting the lay evidence. Id. Although the Veteran is competent in certain situations to provide a diagnosis of a simple condition such as a broken leg or varicose veins, the Veteran is not competent to provide evidence as to more complex medical questions. See Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456 (2007). The Veteran is competent in this case to report his symptoms, but nothing in the record demonstrated that he has received any special training or acquired any medical expertise in evaluating and determining causal connections for the claimed conditions. Therefore, a medical expert opinion would be more probative regarding the causation question in this case and has been obtained as set forth below. See Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456 (2007). The Veteran is competent in this case to report his symptoms, but nothing in the record demonstrated that he has received any special training or acquired any medical expertise in evaluating and determining causal connections for the claimed condition. Therefore, a medical expert opinion would be more probative regarding the causation question in this case. King v. Shinseki, No. 2011-7159 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2012). The Veteran is certainly competent to report pain, numbness, swelling and edema, weakness, other symptoms, and that his activities are restricted. See Barr; Jandreau; Layno. Most of the Veteran's service treatment records are missing and appear to have been destroyed in a fire at the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri in July 1973. Under such circumstances, the Court has held that there is a heightened obligation on the part of VA to explain findings and conclusions and to consider carefully the benefit of the doubt rule. See Cuevas v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 542, 548 (1992); O'Hare v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 365, 367 (1991). It is further noted, however, that the case law does not lower the legal standard for proving a claim for service connection, but rather increases the Board's obligation to evaluate and discuss in its decision all of the evidence that may be favorable to the claimant. See Russo v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 46 (1996). Moreover, there is no presumption, either in favor of the claimant or against VA, arising from missing records. See Cromer v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 215, 217-18 (2005) (the Court declined to apply an "adverse presumption" where records have been lost or destroyed while in Government control which would have required VA to disprove a claimant's allegation of injury or disease in service in these particular cases). As noted above, efforts were made to secure the Veteran's complete STRs via the National Personnel Records Center, but all efforts were futile. In June 2013, the Veteran was provided an NA Form 13055 to complete to reconstruct his records, but he did not return the form. The Veteran's separation examination; however, is already contained in the records. The Veteran has indicated that the causal connection between current disabilities of the right hip, knee, ankle and entire lower extremity, and his military service, is based upon having sustained an inservice injury while stationed in Japan in 1945 or 1946. According to the Veteran, in the capacity as part of the motor pool picking up and transporting troops, he had parked his truck and was exiting the vehicle when another trucked backed into his vehicle, ultimately causing the Veteran to fall and land upon his right side. The Veteran maintains that he was hospitalized for a week due to this incident, then returned to his unit though on crutches for a significant time period thereafter. However, a review of his service separation examination does not substantiate his statements. The Veteran's October 1946 medical examination for purposes of military separation does not reference any instance of hospitalization for an automobile accident. The examination report does indicate a one-week hospitalization in 1945 in Japan for the condition of "boils, face, hands arms and right leg, unknown hospital." Further noted on the report is "pains, abdominal region (all four quadrants) no hospital past year," and "pains, left chest, no hospital past year." Still further noted on separation was "pain in right upper and right lower quadrant, while being jarred in truck driving; no gastrointestinal or genitourinary disturbances associated" with questionable "visceroptosis." Physical examination of the musculoskeletal system and feet yielded normal findings. As already explained, competent lay evidence may establish the presence of observable symptomatology and, in certain circumstances, it may provide a basis for establishing service connection. See Barr. Although claimants may be competent to provide the diagnoses of simple conditions, such as a broken leg, they are not competent to provide evidence on more complex medical questions beyond simple observations. Jandreau; see Colantonio v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (recognizing that in some cases lay testimony "falls short" in proving an issue that requires expert medical knowledge); Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that a Veteran's lay belief that his schizophrenia aggravated his diabetes and hypertension was not of sufficient weight to trigger the Secretary's duty to seek a medical opinion on the issue). Indeed, even if lay testimony is competent, should VA find it to be mistaken or lacking credibility, the Board may reject it as unpersuasive and, thus, not ultimately probative. Buchanan; see also Rucker and Layno. The Board may find a lack of credibility in, for example, conflicting medical statements or witness biases. Buchanan at 1337. The lack of contemporaneous medical evidence is also relevant; however, the mere lack of such evidence may not constitute the sole basis for discrediting the lay evidence. Id. The Veteran is competent in this case to report his symptoms, but nothing in the record demonstrated that he has received any special training or acquired any medical expertise in evaluating and determining causal connections for the claimed conditions. Therefore, a medical expert opinion would be more probative regarding the causation question in this case and has been obtained as set forth below. See Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456 (2007). The post-service medical evidence contains three medical opinions regarding claimed right hip, right knee, right ankle, and right thigh/foot numbness disorders. In July 2009, the Veteran was afforded a VA examination. At that time, the Veteran reported the claimed inservice truck incident. Physical examination and x-rays were performed. The examiner commented that the Veteran's claimed disabilities were not shown in the military records therefore it was less likely than not that the claimed disabilities were caused by or aggravated during service. Another VA medical opinion was provided in August 2012. That examiner indicated that the claimed disabilities were less likely than not incurred in or caused by the claimed inservice event. The examiner opined that there was no medical record documentation in the Veteran's file to demonstrate that he sustained traumatic injuries to any of the claimed bodily areas (right lower extremities) during active service. In addition, the examiner referred to the October 1946 separation examination which showed that his musculoskeletal system and feet were normal when he left service. In July 2013, another medical addendum from another VA examiner concluded the same. The Veteran is competent to report that he had had an inservice injury and hurt his right hip, right knee, right ankle, right thigh and right foot. A fall producing injuries can be felt and observed. However, whether lay evidence is competent and sufficient in a particular case is a fact issue. Further, the Board retains the discretion to make credibility determinations and otherwise weigh the evidence submitted, including lay evidence. See Buchanan. This includes weighing the absence of contemporary medical evidence against lay statements. Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible. See Layno, supra (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted")). See Barr. The Veteran is not credible in light of the conflicting contemporaneous medical evidence. The separation examination contained a physical evaluation of his right lower extremities which yielded normal findings. Further, the Veteran did not make any complaints that he had ever suffered any injury or been hospitalized. Further, the Board may consider whether the silence of the Veteran in reporting complaints regarding his right lower extremities when he reported other medical complaints constitutes negative evidence. See Forshey v. West, 12 Vet. App. 71, 74 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the definition of evidence encompasses "negative evidence" which tends to disprove the existence of an alleged fact). In this case, it does constitute negative evidence. There is not just a lack of evidence; rather, there is evidence showing normal findings. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Dulin v. Mansfield, 250 Fed. Appx. 338, 2007 WL 2914797 (C.A. Fed. Oct. 5, 2007). In this case, other medical complaints and findings, as well as a history of a hospitalization for a skin disorder, were all noted on the separation examination. The Board finds that it is not reasonable that the Veteran would not have reported, nor the examiner noted, a two week-long hospitalization for residuals of a truck accident, when the examiner did in fact report another hospitalization as well as several medical complaints, none of which related to the right lower extremities. Although the Veteran submitted a photograph which he states was taken after he was no longer on crutches, it does not substantiate the claimed truck incident. In this case, the absence of symptoms on separation for the claimed arthritis condition is significant and inconsistent with the Veteran's report of ongoing medical problems with his right lower extremities from his claimed time of inception during service in 1945-1946. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b); Maxson (It was proper to consider the Veteran's entire medical history, including a lengthy period of absence of complaints.). The absence of symptoms constitutes negative evidence and opposes the claim. Forshey (Negative evidence is to be considered.); see also Dulin (The majority in Forshey interpreted negative evidence to mean that "which tends to disprove the existence of an alleged fact. The absence of evidence in support of an alleged fact clearly is an evidentiary circumstance that weighs against the existence of the alleged fact). In this case, the clinical records do not show the claimed ongoing nature of residuals of the purported accident. In sum, the lay evidence in this case is not credible as it is in direct conflict with the clinical findings which constitute medical assessments made for the right lower extremity disabilities which were undertaken and yielded only normal results. Further, there is no other competent and probative evidence otherwise linking the Veteran's post-service right hip, right knee, right ankle, right thigh, and right foot disabilities to service. In determining the probative value to be assigned to a medical opinion, the Board must consider three factors. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008). The initial inquiry in determining probative value is to assess whether a medical expert was fully informed of the pertinent factual premises (i.e., medical history) of the case. A review of the claims file is not required, since a medical professional can also become aware of the relevant medical history by having treated a Veteran for a long period of time or through a factually accurate medical history reported by a Veteran. See id. at 303-04. The second inquiry involves consideration of whether the medical expert provided a fully articulated opinion. See id. A medical opinion that is equivocal in nature or expressed in speculative language does not provide the degree of certainty required for medical nexus evidence. See McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). The third and final factor in determining the probative value of an opinion involves consideration of whether the opinion is supported by a reasoned analysis. The most probative value of a medical opinion comes from its reasoning. Therefore, a medical opinion containing only data and conclusions is not entitled to any weight. In fact, a review of the claims file does not substitute for a lack of a reasoned analysis. See Nieves-Rodriguez; see also Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 124 (2007) ( "[A] medical opinion ... must support its conclusion with an analysis that the Board can consider and weigh against contrary opinions."). In this case, the examiners were aware of the Veteran's medical history, provided fully articulated opinions, and also furnished a reasoned analysis. The normal separation examination was fully explored. The Board therefore attaches significant probative value to this opinion, and the most probative value in this case, as it is well reasoned, detailed, consistent with other evidence of record, and included an access to the accurate background of the Veteran. See Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444, 448-9 (2000) (Factors for assessing the probative value of a medical opinion include the thoroughness and detail of the opinion). If a veteran has provided lay testimony of an inservice injury, then, unless the Board finds that the testimony is not credible, an examiner may not ignore that lay evidence and base an opinion that there is no relationship to service merely on the absence of inservice corroborating medical records. Dalton V. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23, 39-40 (2007). Such medical opinion that does not take into account the Veteran's reports of symptoms and history (even if recorded in the course of the examination), is inadequate. Id. However, in this case, the Board has found that the Veteran is not credible. Therefore, the only evidence of a nexus between the Veteran's currently claimed disabilities of the right lower extremity and service is the Veteran's own generalized lay statements. The Federal Circuit has recognized that in some cases, lay testimony falls short in proving an issue that requires medical knowledge. See Colantonio v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, in this case, the Veteran is simply not credible and his assertions are outweighed by the medical evidence in this case which is not in his favor. In sum, the competent and credible evidence does not establish that claimed disabilities of the right lower extremity began in service or that arthritis was manifest within one year of separation or that the claimed disabilities are otherwise etiologically connected to service. Accordingly, service connection is not warranted. The evidence in this case is not so evenly balanced so as to allow application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule as required by law and VA regulations. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. The preponderance is against the Veteran's claim, and it must be denied. ORDER Service connection for a right hip disability is denied. Service connection for right knee arthritis is denied. Service connection for a right ankle disability is denied. Service connection for a disability manifested by right thigh and foot numbness is denied. ____________________________________________ K. PARAKKAL Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs