Citation Nr: 1338855 Decision Date: 11/26/13 Archive Date: 12/06/13 DOCKET NO. 08-31 063 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Indianapolis, Indiana THE ISSUE Whether new and material evidence has been presented to reopen a claim of service connection for multiple sclerosis (MS) with weakness of the lower extremities, and if so, whether service connection is warranted. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Paralyzed Veterans of America, Inc. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J. Connolly, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from June 1962 to June 1966. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a May 2007 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Indianapolis, Indiana. The RO reopened the claim, but continued the denial issued in a previous final decision. The Board has an obligation to make an independent determination of its jurisdiction regardless of findings or actions by the RO. Barnett v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 1 (1995), aff'd, 83 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1996). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In August 1988, the Board denied service connection for MS. 2. Evidence submitted since the Board's August 1988 decision, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim, and therefore raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 3. MS with weakness of the lower extremities was initially manifest during service or within the 7 year presumptive period. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The August 1988 Board decision, which denied service connection for MS, is final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2012). 2. New and material evidence has been received since the Board's August 1988 decision; thus, the claim is reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7104 (West 2002 & Supp. 2021); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2013). 3. MS with weakness of the lower extremities was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131, 1137 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.306, 3.307, 3.309 (2013). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) There has been a significant change in the law with the enactment of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA). See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326. The Veteran's claim is being granted. As such, any deficiencies with regard to VCAA are harmless and nonprejudicial. New and Material In an August 1988 decision, the Board denied entitlement to service connection for MS on the basis that it was not first manifest during service or within the seven year presumptive period. A claim will be reopened and the former disposition reviewed if new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to the claim which has been disallowed. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held that, when "new and material evidence" is presented or secured with respect to a previously and finally disallowed claim, VA must reopen the claim. Manio v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 140, 145 (1991). New evidence means existing evidence not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). According to the Court, the pertinent VA law requires that in order to reopen a previously and finally disallowed claim, there must be new and material evidence presented or secured since the time that the claim was finally disallowed on any basis. Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 273 (1996). Since the prior final decisions, evidence has been added to the claims file. The additional evidence of record includes medical opinion evidence, discussed further below, which dates the onset of the Veteran's MS to the period during service or within the initial seven years of service. For the purpose of establishing whether new and material evidence has been submitted, the truthfulness of evidence is presumed, unless the evidence is inherently incredible or consists of statements which are beyond the competence of the person(s) making them. See Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992); Meyer v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 425, 429 (1996); King v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 19, 21 (1993); but see Duran v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 216 (1994) ("Justus does not require the Secretary [of VA] to consider the patently incredible to be credible"). Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has indicated that evidence may be considered new and material if it contributes to a more complete picture of the circumstances surrounding the origin of a veteran's injury or disability, even where it will not eventually convince the Board to grant the claim. Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2010). In Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2010), the Court stated that when determining whether the submitted evidence meets the definition of new and material evidence, VA must consider whether the new evidence could, if the claim were reopened, reasonably result in substantiation of the claim. Id. at 118. New and material evidence has been received since the Board's August 1988 decision, thus, the claim of service connection for MS with weakness of the lower extremities is reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. Service Connection Service connection will be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 1153; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 30306. In addition, MS will be presumed to have been incurred in or aggravated by service if it had become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more seven years of a veteran's separation from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. The Board notes that 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) provides that with chronic diseases shown as such in service or within the presumptive period so as to permit a finding of service connection, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. This rule does not mean that any manifestation of joint pain, any abnormality of heart action or heart sounds, any urinary findings of casts, or any cough, in service will permit service connection of arthritis, disease of the heart, nephritis, or pulmonary disease, first shown as a clearcut clinical entity, at some later date. For the showing of chronic disease in service there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "Chronic." When the disease identity is established, there is no requirement of evidentiary showing of continuity. Continuity of symptomatology is required only where the condition noted during service or the presumptive period is not, in fact, shown to be chronic or where the diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. When the fact of chronicity in service is not adequately supported, then a showing of continuity after service is required to support the claim. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. Presumptive periods are not intended to limit service connection to diseases so diagnosed when the evidence warrants direct service connection. The presumptive provisions of the statute and the Department of Veterans Affairs regulations implementing them are intended as liberalizations applicable when the evidence would not warrant service connection without their aid. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). The Federal Circuit recently held that the regulation creating a presumption of service connection for "chronic diseases" manifesting during service and then again at any later date (38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b)), is only available to establish service connection for the "chronic diseases" enumerated in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) (listing named chronic diseases). Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In the same case, the Federal Circuit clarified that the continuity of symptomatology language in § 3.303(b) also "restricts itself to chronic diseases" found in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). Id. at 1335. Walker held that "[t]he clear purpose of the regulation is to relax the requirements of § 3.303(a) for establishing service connection for certain chronic diseases."). The Federal Circuit noted that the requirement of showing a continuity of symptomatology after service is a "second route by which a veteran can establish service connection for a chronic disease" under subsection 3.303(b). Walker, supra. Showing a continuity of symptoms after service itself "establishes the link, or nexus" to service and also "confirm[s] the existence of the chronic disease while in service or [during the] presumptive period." Id. (holding that section 3.303(b) provides an "alternative path to satisfaction of the standard three-element test for entitlement to disability compensation"). Significantly, the Federal Circuit indicated that showing a continuity of symptomatology after service is a lesser evidentiary burden than the nexus requirement of the three-part test discussed above. The primary difference between a chronic disease that qualifies for § 3.303(b) analysis, and one that must be tested under § 3.303(a), is that the latter must satisfy the 'nexus' requirement of the three-element test, whereas the former benefits from presumptive service connection or service connection via continuity of symptomatology. A chronic disease need not be diagnosed during the presumptive period but characteristic manifestations thereof to the required degree must be shown by acceptable medical and lay evidence followed without unreasonable time lapse by definite diagnosis. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(c); Caldwell v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 466, 469 (1991). An important factor in the factual question of reasonableness in lapse of time from manifestation to diagnosis under 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(c) is the difficulty in diagnosing the disability and the strength of the evidence establishing an identity between the disease manifestations and the subsequent diagnosis. A strong evidentiary link tends to ensure the disease is not due to 'intercurrent cause' as set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b); Cook v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 231, 238 (1993). The lapse in time from manifestation to diagnosis under 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(c) "is ultimately a question of fact for the Board to address." Bielby v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 260, 266 (1994). Establishing service connection generally requires medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) an in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table); Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Medical evidence is not always or categorically required when the determinative issue involves either medical diagnosis or etiology, but rather such issue may, depending on the facts of the particular case, be established by competent and credible lay evidence under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a). See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Reasonable doubt concerning any matter material to the determination is resolved in the Veteran's favor. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. The Veteran contends that during service and in the years immediately following service, he began having problems with his extremities with clumsiness and weakness. He had been in an automobile accident during service and he initially thought that his physical problems were related to that accident. In a January 2008 statement, his brother also described the Veteran's clumsiness and shaking of the extremities which he observed beginning in the 1971-1973 timeframe. A layperson is generally incapable of opining on matters requiring medical knowledge. Routen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 183, 186 (1997), aff'd sub nom. Routen v. West, 142 F.3d 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 404 (1998). However, lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when: (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (e.g., a broken leg, separated shoulder, pes planus (flat feet), varicose veins, tinnitus (ringing in the ears), etc.), (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In essence, lay testimony is competent when it regards the readily observable features or symptoms of injury or illness and "may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection." Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2). When, for example, a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. In such cases, the Board is within its province to weigh that testimony and make a credibility determination as to whether that evidence supports a finding of service incurrence and continuity of symptomatology sufficient to establish service connection. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 310 (2007). The Veteran is competent in this case to report his symptoms and his brother is competent to describe his observations. Both have also credibly provided statements in that regard. However, since the case involves complex questions, a medical expert opinion would be more probative regarding the causation question in this case and has been obtained. See Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456 (2007). The post-service medical evidence dated after service reflected that the Veteran was first formally diagnosed with MS in 1976. However, medical opinions have been offered which place the onset of the manifestations earlier. In March 2007, J.T.M., M.D., a neurologist, indicated that the Veteran had a formal diagnosis of MS in June 1976, but his symptoms including diffuse tingling were dated from 1972. In February 2008, this neurologist indicated that he had a more complete history of the Veteran's illness. In sum, he indicated that the Veteran's initial symptoms of MS began by at least the summer of 1966. He described the abnormal sensations that the Veteran experienced in the lower extremity areas. By 1969, the Veteran also had significant incoordination of the upper extremities. By 1970, he experienced shaking and weakness of his legs and then paresthesias. In sum, he opined that it was much more likely than not and with a very high degree of certainty that the Veteran was afflicted with MS by the mid 1960's and certainly had the disease by 1972. Another private physician, Dr. R.R., also indicated that the Veteran's inservice orthopedic injuries also could have contributed to the Veteran's development of MS. In determining the probative value to be assigned to a medical opinion, the Board must consider three factors: whether a medical expert was fully informed of the pertinent factual premises (i.e., medical history) of the case; whether the medical expert provided a fully articulated opinion; and whether the opinion is supported by a reasoned analysis. The most probative value of a medical opinion comes from its reasoning. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008). . Therefore, a medical opinion containing only data and conclusions is not entitled to any weight. In fact, a review of the claims file does not substitute for a lack of a reasoned analysis. See Nieves-Rodriguez; see also Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 124 (2007) ( "[A] medical opinion ... must support its conclusion with an analysis that the Board can consider and weigh against contrary opinions."). In this case, in particular, the Veteran's neurologist was aware of the Veteran's medical history, provided a fully articulated opinion, and also furnished a reasoned analysis. The Board therefore attaches the most significant probative value to this opinion, and the most probative value in this case, as it is well reasoned, detailed, consistent with other evidence of record, and included an access to the accurate background of the Veteran. See Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444, 448-9 (2000) (Factors for assessing the probative value of a medical opinion include the thoroughness and detail of the opinion). Thus, as the most probative evidence dates the onset of the MS symptoms to service time or within the seven year presumptive period, the Board finds that service connection for MS with weakness of the lower extremities is warranted. ORDER Service connection for MS with weakness of the lower extremities is granted. ____________________________________________ S. L. Kennedy Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs